SophistiCat, I have to admit some confusion about your position. It is as if you are saying determinism is true and untrue. Is that your view? If it is, maybe we should be discussing the meaning of a proposition being-true instead.

I am an advocate of human freedom — Leontiskos

I agree with Leontiskos. All humans have a free will and belief in that truth is what is at stake in the determinism debate.

Can't we all agree that we can all predict how the Roomba will act? But the Roomba cannot predict how we will act. Why is that? If we are both just physical systems acting in accordance with the principle of causal closure, why is there an asymmetry in predictability? If determinism is true, it seems to me that predictability should be possible with sufficient computational resources.

It may be that there are some limitations on predictability. For example, perhaps the prediction must be kept secret, lest a counterpredictor falsify the prediction. But then why couldn't we just make secret predictions about how another will act? Surely such predictions must come true if determinism is true?

But such predictions cannot reliably come true because determinism is false.

Perhaps your concern with Chat GPT is that AI really lacks the ability to evaluate good information from bad information. Infsofar as AI is a collective knowledge platform, it may treat even inaccurate information as veridical. Is that a fair assessment of your objection?

I believe AI will deeply undermine our ability to verify. — Leontiskos

If it's scientific knowledge, can't it ultimately be tested and therefore verified without AI? I don't need to figure out all the algorithms that went into how ChatGPT said that water is chemically made of H20, all I need to do is conduct an experiment to determine if it is true.

I think this is well-articulated even though I'm still not sure that I understand Bell's Inequality. So the sin^2 rule does not adhere under 45 degrees. Why is this a problem?

Counterargument: a lot of scientific knowledge is trusted anyways, the verification objection: (that verification is a prerequisite for scientific knowledge), would deprive us of a lot of information we take to be scientific knowledge based on our trust of others' research (and without using AI). Verification is not pragmatically important for scientific knowledge whether we are using AI or not. That is, AI-generated "knowledge" can be verified by means other than technical knowledge of how the AI application works.

Note: I think the proper domain for AI-based knowledge is scientific knowledge, not historical or moral knowledge.

Interesting point about the way the AI tech can sidestep personal experience, and the entire experiential aspect of art (both in its creation and its reception). Here are two additional concerns: 1) the expertise, the craft that goes into the artwork is lost in the AI generation. This is the problem with AI solutions in general, they subvert human thinking. Try driving without navigation software and you may see what I mean. 2) relatedly, the production of the art is devalued; the AI creates the illusion of creativity, when really it's just outputting pre-programmed inputs, but it's not really producing anything, it's dead; the producers of the art are taken for granted in the AI "generation" of the art; if there is no Van Gogh, there simply is no art.

This doesn't mean AI is per se bad. Like anything else, it can be used for good or ill.

I do not know enough about socialism to opine about it. My opinion of Marxism is that it is right to admonish against commodification of labor, but it is very wrong in that it calls for violence. While I think Marxism can be understood as critiquing capitalism and that such critique is helpful, I do not and cannot support Marxism's call for violence.

But that’s happening already. Trump was hardly an expert in anything, and pretty extreme.

Take a look at the republican candidates. Good lord. Politics is almost like survival of the dumbest. — Mikie

Lack of accountability is still an issue; randomized officials would be insulated from what the majority of citizens deem right. Voting is a virtue of our democracy and randomizing officials rather than electing them would undermine the democratic process, preventing citizens from voting according to what they think is best. If you take away voting, you severely curtail the ability of people to participate in the political process and you disconnect politics from the will of the people.

And that's not to mention that a lottery-selected candidate is accountable to no one.

My primary concern is that a non-expert might not make good decisions concerning a policy. My related concern is that an extremist would make decisions inconsistent with the majority.

Okay, but why does something need to be an "it" to have a position in space? Why do only things with mass get a position in space? Surely even something with no mass can occupy a "point in space."

he's talking about it like the elector thing is the only thing Donald Trump is in hot water for. Correct me if I'm mistaken, but I don't believe if is. I'm not even sure it's ONE of the things he's in hot water for. — flannel jesus

Recommended to read the indictment. My understanding is that Trump is Not being charged for inciting violence. Rather, he is being charged with both (A) obstructing the electoral process, and (B) conspiring to obstruct the electoral process.

Maybe there is no ethical difference in what the electors did, but there is definitely an ethical difference between conducting a recount and conspiring to overthrow legitimate election results.

Geez NOS, how far would you let someone go in "contesting an election" ? Would you let them overthrow legitimate elections?

T Clark, we may stipulate that you are too important to the shelter society to sacrifice yourself (you're president or something like that). If you try to sacrifice yourself, the secret service knocks you unconscious and drags you to the shelter.

I save mom. But, being a utilitarian, I also kill the stranger (they would've died anyways) harvest their organs (we might use those later), and head on over to the Winchester for a pint "until this whole thing blows over."

I think Hegel was influenced by Fichte. In Fichte's Foundations of Natural Rights, he posits humans as finite beings; finite in body, finite in our ability to exercise our own rights against others. That said, there is ,alongside righthood, the realization of free efficacy as such; however, this isn't any particular "thing." Rather "thinghood is thought, thought is thinghood."

For Hegel, I think the Absolute, the unbounded, the infinite, may be properly understood as Spirit. It is that that is never at the fore of conscious but always subterranean in its operations. Consciousness, self-consciousness, etc. actualizes insofar as it actualizes Spirit. Spirit is, maybe, a bit like a book before it has been written.

Empirical findings are helpful. Thanks for the research advice.

Antony, I like the dialogues you wrote, cool. Also, I appreciate you engaging with the issue I stated.

I have two questions to ponder:

(1) where do we get the criteria for what counts as an object?

(2) I think the issue is a "how does our brain do that" mystery. Light enters the brain through the retina, it is parsed as images (lines, shapes, colors, and so on). At what point does that assemblage of lines shapes, colors, etc. become an object? If it's the brain that does that, how does it do so?

The law of non-contradiction seems like a rational insight. And it seems to be both a reliable source of justification as well as something independent of experience. Where in experience is the law of non-contradiction to be found? Further, following the law of non-contradiction does not seem to involve a lack of imagination.

I am not looking for an argument, I am just saying, we can recognize objects as such, that's kind of strange is it not?

That sounds right to me wonderer1, it just seems strange to me that we should be able to perceive objects as objects at all.

In other words, it seems like it would be difficult to explain to someone who is not familiar with an object, what an object is. If I said to someone "That is a lion." And they said back "what is a lion?" And I said, "the big creature with a mane over there." They might be like "I understand that you are trying to point something out to me, but all I see is a mane-like appearance connected to a creature-like appearance surrounded by a context of Savannah, I am unable to pick out what you are referring to as a lion." And then what can I say to them, to indicate that there is something there, namely a lion, and that the lion is distinct from the surrounding Savannah.

And you might say to me: "NotAristotle, the lion is the thing that will try to eat you." This might cause me some alarm, but if I am unfamiliar, fundamentally, with what an object is, then there is no way for me to differentiate the lion from everything else in the environment perceived. In other words, I would have to pick out the lion first, before I have good reason to avoid it.

But I can pick out lions, and other things. How do I do this?

I get that we perceive objects in contexts. My question is, after we have applied the Gestalt principles: how do we become conscious of an object? Sure, I am happy to acknowledge that we use similarity and closure in picking out an object. My question is, after the mind has applied the principles of similarity and closure, at what point does "what-is-there" become an object to you? How does something, as it were, break out of the background of visual stimuli, the context, to announce itself as a distinct object? Because similarity itself does not guarantee that something enters into awareness as a distinct object. For example, two trees are green, but I recognize that, despite the similarity in their color tone, they are not the same tree.

Question 1: yes, something unchanging must be eternal. But to come into existence, as does light, is a change. Therefore, neither light, nor the speed of light (a property of light), is eternal. Question 2: if something is unchanging in some respect, than it cannot change in that respect. Light changes with respect to position, not velocity. We may conclude that there is not a union between what changes to an extreme, and what does not change, at least not in the same respect. For if there were unity therein, then what changes would not change and that is a contradiction.

Is it not possible to perceive, except in an object-oriented way?

I'd grant that we can comprehend non-objective matters like the good or justice, but our perception seems to be conditioned always by objects.

I am not sure I am getting the argument. In particular, I am not sure I understand Premise 1. Why would the explanation of a belief in terms of non-rational causes prohibit the belief from being rationally inferred? Is the concern overdetermination of the belief?

Seems to me that even if we are mistaken, viz. interpretation, about what is there, when we are faced with some illusion, we are never mistaken that there is something there. We are only ever mistaken about what it is.

I do not understand the paradox. Why would people walking in different directions have radically different perspectives of events in the Andromeda galaxy? I get that it has to do with relativity of simultaneity. I don't get how walking in different directions has such radical consequences (it seems that the relative velocities are not that different).

I think I understand your objection now. You are saying that a prediction of a prediction is necessary for the computer to printout anything intelligible about what Ned will or will not do.

Maybe you can see where I am coming from too? It seems to me that with sufficient information about the state of the world at time t1, one should be able to make an accurate prediction about how the world would be at time t2. What seems to matter is mapping information about where each atom is, neural activity, electrical activity, etc., such that a prediction at time T2 is possible. If determinism is true, the subjective state of someone "I am a counterpredictor in such and such situation" should not matter. In other words, what someone reads on a printout should not affect their behavior if we have already a complete map of their behavior in terms of atoms etc. So I agree with you that a counterpredictor can always act otherwise, but that seems to pose a contradiction for determinism; namely, that the prediction and counterprediction must both obtain.

It feels intuitively to me that in some, many, most? cases unraveling cause is not possible even in theory. It's not just a case of being ignorant. Part of that feeling is a conviction that sufficiently complex systems, even those that are theoretically "caused," could not be unraveled with the fastest supercomputer operating for the life of the universe. There is a point, isn't there, where "completely outside the scope of human possibility" turns into "not possible even in theory." Seems to me there is. — T Clark

The problem of computability described by T Clark seems to me to be a salient one. If the prediction cannot be made because of instrumentation that is not precise enough, or because there is just too much information for a supercomputer to process, then the prediction just cannot be made.

it could be that predictability is not achievable under the specified conditions.

The first paper that you cited makes an important point about predictability right in the abstract, by drawing a distinction between external predictability and embedded predictability: — SophistiCat

At first glance, it appears that determinism should imply predictability, if not in an embedded way, at least in an external way. The paper cited says about as much, although I am unclear as to why an embedded predictor cannot make a true and accurate prediction in a deterministic universe. Or at least, it is unclear to me why an external predictor cannot be physical. Seems as though an external predictor could be physical, and yet still external to the situation (e.g. a computer that does not share its predictions with the system or person that it is predicting about).

thanks everyone for commenting

In this case, the computer would need to forecast what occurs as a consequence of Ned reading the printout. This would invariably involve predicting Ned's reaction to the prediction, triggering the problematic self-reference loop I had mentioned. — Pierre-Normand

I think the self-reference objection you are describing is a good one, I am just not sure that it applies in every case that Ned reads the printout. It would be problematic if Ned read the entire printout. In that case, we have our prediction, then we have Ned reading the prediction, so our final prediction will have to be a prediction of Ned reading the prediction, but then Ned will read that, so our final prediction will have to be a prediction about Ned reading the prediction of himself reading the prediction...to infinity.

On the other hand, if Ned only reads part of the printout in a non-self-referential way.. suppose it says "Ned will go for a walk in 5 minutes," that seems unproblematic. In that case, the reading of part of the prediction will itself have to be part of the prediction, however I cannot see why that is an issue. If you still think it is, would you explain to me in greater detail why you think it is an issue? It seems to me that reading only a specific part of the printout is significantly different than reading the entire printout.

Asking that question seems to suggest that a computer is conscious, does it not?

So then the question may become: "what about the structure of the brain allows information processing?" In other words, structurally speaking, what is doing the actual processing?

I am supposing that the details that went into making the prediction are known. Ned has every reason to believe the prediction, there is no reason to doubt it. It is simply the case that Ned chooses contrary to the prediction. It would be strange, would it not, if some magical events transpired to guarantee that Ned's choice was always consistent with the prediction? And that's the point, if we bar these magical occurrences, Ned can choose to act contrary to the deterministic prediction. But that should not be possible if determinism is true.

And if you are talking about me specifically, I do not lack a reason to believe the prediction, I concede that the prediction should be correct if determinism is true. However, given that the prediction cannot be correct if Ned acts contrary to it, I conclude that determinism is false. I do not see how that is an "argument from ignorance." Unless you are saying that I do not have all the information that is contained in such a prediction, and in that case you are correct, I do not, but I do not see what impact that has on the thought experiment. The fact remains that, in consideration of the prediction, Ned can always choose to act in opposition to it.

Right, the contradiction is the paradox that the thought experiment expresses. Ned's immediate actions can be predicted.. if determinism is true, they should correctly predict how he should act. However, there seems to be no reason Ned could choose not to follow the prediction, and were he to act otherwise, he would falsify the prediction. Because determinism leads to this paradoxical conclusion, it must be false. That is what I am arguing.

@Philosophim @wonderer1 @Bob Ross

So there is what Ned Block has characterized as the "Harder Problem of Consciousness." This speaks to Philosophim's point about experiencing other consciousnesses.. the problem as I understand it is: how can I know what it's like to be you, without actually being you. The physicalist rejoinder may be: well the brain stuff is the same, so the mental states must be the same.. but the brain stuff is only approximately the same, not exactly the same, and the difference in brain states means different mental states, and these mental states are simply not accessible to another, at least, not in an "experiential" way.

David Chalmers states the hard problem thusly: "there is no question that experience is closely associated with physical processes such as brains. It seems that physical processes give rise to experience, at least in the sense that producing a physical system with the right physical properties yields corresponding states of experience. But how and why do physical processes give rise to experience? Why do not these processes take place "in the dark"..." (Chalmers, Consciousness and its place in Nature).

In other words, what is it about this arrangement of physical matter and energy that allows consciousness, and how is it different from some other assortment of physical matter and energy that does not allow consciousness? That is, if we think consciousness arises from a physical substrata, what about that physical substrata gives rise to consciousness?

One of the papers I included in my original post does go into what is known as the "Halting Problem" - a problem in computer science proposed by Alan Turing. This is what I take to be your objection to the thought experiment. And, I agree that the situation can be formulated such that a self-referential issue arises. However, all I need for the thought experiment to be effective as an argument against determinism, is a situation where there is no self-referential issue, but a paradox remains anyways.

In the original scenario as I have described it, Ned reads the printout, but he only reads a part of it. And, importantly, he does not read a part of it where he is reading the printout -- that would be self-referentially problematic. Because there is no self-referentially in the parts of the printout that Ned does read, there is nothing necessarily theoretically vicious about Ned reading some parts of the printout.

1. With sufficient information about Ned’s internal states and sufficient information about the surrounding environment, Ned’s immediate actions could be predicted.
2. There is sufficient information about Ned’s internal states and sufficient information about the surrounding environment.
3. Therefore, Ned’s immediate actions can be predicted.

I suppose we could stipulate that Ned has enough information about his immediate environment to make an accurate prediction about how he will act. It doesn't really concern us whether this sort of information can, as a matter of practicality, be acquired; the concern is whether in principle, if this information were acquired, could Ned act in opposition to it. And the answer to that seems to be yes.