he had a tendency to use past philosophers simply as leverage for his own thought. Maybe all of these pieces of the puzzle fit together in an obvious way. Maybe he was self-absorbed. — Leontiskos
Maybe because no one underdtands (or accepts) — 180 Proof
For Kant, I believe, this could be many objects, a plurality of various objects. However, it cannot be known, what, if any, "being" stands behind empirical understanding. It is "X" for lack of better term for Kant. For Kant as well, it is only a concept that is gotten to by negation. It is the "not-empirical thing". — schopenhauer1
For Schopenhauer, he thinks he can go "beyond Kant" by not just proposing that there are "things-in-themselves" behind the empirical, that we can never know (X), but rather, we CAN KNOW and very INTIMATELY what X actually IS.. and that is a monism, Will.. The very fact that we have an "inner being" (subjective experience) is for Schopenhauer proof that Will exists as this double-aspected thing that strives. — schopenhauer1
I don't think he is actually identifying the subject as Will. — schopenhauer1
it is not the case noumena represents direct reality. Noumena are nothing more than a conception understanding thinks on its own accord, for no other reason than there is no reason it can’t. — Mww
Kant was an admitted dualist — Mww
Freud, who was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, alluded to the ID as the wellspring of desire and arousal. — Shawn
Buddhanature is not any kind of entity or thing, but the latent capacity for enlightenment — Wayfarer
then how can anything be "projected" as if it proceeds from something — schopenhauer1
it would make more sense that the Noumenal is simply the Representation in its other aspect, one that we cannot know. — schopenhauer1
not something S. ever would have encountered even despite what knowledge of Buddhism he had, as it is part of a set of Buddhist doctrines that weren't translated until much later. — Wayfarer
Will' as a philosophical absolute, as a kind of 'blind God' (which sounds more like H P Lovecraft :yikes: ) but more as an inevitable condition of existence, something that drives living beings to continually crave to exist and to continue, without their really understanding why. — Wayfarer
the ordinary mode is to be caught up in the world of phenomenon, the enlightened person is the least "caught up", though still in the world, as the phenomenal doesn't just disappear altogether. — schopenhauer1
I think we should continue that discussion. I am not sure how, but if you have ideas, I will hear it out. — schopenhauer1
it is that it is "double-aspected" — schopenhauer1
Will literally IS the illusions. — schopenhauer1
still don't know where Denial of Will comes into play. — schopenhauer1
also makes no sense to say that Will CAUSED Representation — schopenhauer1
Whence the illusion? — schopenhauer1
Representation as "Illusion", as if it is NOT double-aspected but rather epiphenomenal, that is to say somehow "emergent from". However, this second interpretation would seem to be false under his own pretenses regarding the co-occurrence of both. There can be no prior or "originary", only BOTH being one and the same. — schopenhauer1
Not exactly, look at our conversation right above: — schopenhauer1
But then when one is "denying the Will", is one employing "higher Will" to deny the "lower Will"? And then this starts to unravel... And then you get to bring in those fun Sanskrit and Pali terms to placate it. — schopenhauer1
For Schopenhauer, this is through the negation of the will, while in Buddhism, it is through the elimination of craving and the attainment of nirvāṇa. — Wayfarer
One analogy I've found for Schopenhauer's 'will' is the Buddhist 'tannha' (craving or thirst). — Wayfarer
As to why his line of philosophical history separates them, I would have to understand what you mean exactly. — schopenhauer1
The Noumenal ding an sich is also the idea of a Phenomenal object, as represented in a mind — Gnomon
As soon as the thing-in-itself is presented to sensibility, it is no longer -in-itself, it becomes a yet undetermined thing -in-us, and we can intuit, thus represent it as phenomenon, subsequently experience it and know it as a certain thing. S, on the other hand, wants all things as representations of will, which removes the very construct of representation from the cognitive system itself. Under these conditions, and in anticipation of Kant’s concept that no knowledge is at all possible for that without representation, we find the thing that was unknowable because it wasn’t representable, now is the very representation that was formerly unavailable to us. — Mww
How does a sensation follow from a representation, in the same manner as a sensation follows from a real physical object’s affect on the sensory apparatuses? — Mww
Kant took Plato’s forms from the external instances of universals and made them internal a priori content of the mind; S took Kant’s internal representations as content of faculties of mind and made them external objects of will. — Mww
if we know our will indubitably, and if it is possible to make the will, as it is known, to represent what K stipulated as unrepresentable, then the thing K said we couldn’t possibly know, just disappears, and with it the entire Kantian epistemological dualism. — Mww
Will is identified as the noumena of Kant- the Thing-in-Itself. — schopenhauer1
so Will's expression via Representation is to have a subject that perceives, experiences, and knows objects — schopenhauer1
as Kant proposed, is mediated by a priori categories such as time/space/causality, such that when it looks upon the object, it manifests the idea of the object in space/time/causality and the PSR (the world of phenomenon). — schopenhauer1
The objects for Schopenhauer, are akin to some kind of Platonic Forms. These Forms are the direct manifestation of Will unmediated by a subject — schopenhauer1
WHY is it that Will has the double aspect? — schopenhauer1
That is to say, Will cares not for its individuated expressions that are its manifestations. We end up suffering as being taken along for its ride as beings who strive constantly, being expressions of Will. — schopenhauer1
It is purely experiencing the Will without willing, if you will. — schopenhauer1
If we deny-the-will to the point of getting beyond our own subject-object nature, we can perhaps escape. — schopenhauer1
I think you need to slow down a bit. — Wayfarer
Zapffe's model lays it out well (distract, ignore, anchor in some value or reason, and sublimate). — schopenhauer1
You cannot extricate that which is inbuilt into our evolutionary cognitive framework. — schopenhauer1
Suffice to say that internal mental chatter is the default state of humanity, excacerbated by our media-saturated culture — Wayfarer
I am having trouble what you envision this "being nature, pure and simple" is. And I am also perplexed how it is you think humans can ever get to it, overriding our innate linguistic-based/signifier capacities: — schopenhauer1
my contention is that in no possible world is there a state of satisfaction — schopenhauer1
I don't see how it could ever be different for the human animal — schopenhauer1
come from having a linguistic-based mind, and the dynamics of our brain. — schopenhauer1
There is no secret knowledge that then "drops" the pretense of a linguistic mind that evaluates, reasons, explains, etc. It is how humans function and is part of the socialization process, which cannot be bypassed. — schopenhauer1
What Schopenhauer was saying about Boredom, is beyond merely having nothing to do and tedium. Rather, it is a sense of non-fulfillment in our being. — schopenhauer1
is driven by this angst. — schopenhauer1
we were to think about it in neoplatonic or medieval, or gnostic terms, we can say that a "perfected" state, one of purely "being" (not becoming) would be one where we would wont for nothing. There would be no need for need — schopenhauer1
but how could it be different, for the human? We evolved thus. — schopenhauer1
Will is ultimately the idea of this radical instrumental nature to existing as a self-reflective animal in this world. — schopenhauer1
If we are but illusory Will, trapped in subject-object, then the saintly person is able to be moved beyond this to see all as universally the same Will and thus helping with another's suffering and easing their burden is to them a delight as it is helping themselves. It is as if there was no separation.. — schopenhauer1
he didn't think everyone had this kind of agapic/philial love capacity — schopenhauer1
Everything is instrumental.. all the way down. O — schopenhauer1
Will is ultimately the idea of this radical instrumental nature to existing as a self-reflective animal in this world. — schopenhauer1
I think the Stoics to a point, have it right in the mindset that one has to put forward the "worst" version of events.. But not for the sake of virtue, as the Stoics would have it, but because it is therapeutic to the soul to confront one's Willing and suffering nature. — schopenhauer1
Less adequately pondered is the fact that much of what it is that the two have in common was taken by Schopenhauer from Kant. — Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy
:up:Nice that he mentions Tao of Physics, too. — Wayfarer
