I’m a bit confused because you first want to defend that citizens aren’t responsible for the crimes of their leaders, but using an argument that actually seems to prove the opposite:

Easy example is Trump and the insurrectionists. He's guilty even if he didn't want all of those crimes because he was in a position to stop them and chose not to.

Indeed, just like the military could stop a tyrant, but doesn’t. The only difference here is that, within the military, the responsibility is shared, whereas in your example it is rather concentrated in one person. The new problem, then, is to determine how big this difference is. Is a shared responsibility a smaller responsibility for each individual of the group? Can responsibility be “diluted”?

About your pilot example, I do agree that it is necessary to know that you are committing a crime in order to be considered responsible for that crime. I would just add, of course, that the individual must do everything possible to access information about the act he is about to commit. Otherwise, he is responsible for burying his head in the sand.

to live under a mafia is to live under coercion to support criminality

. That is a good way to put it.

if one handed over the cash of the bank at gunpoint one would not be committing robbery

. But there's an important difference here. The one handing over the cash is almost sure of dying if he disobeys. The military revolting against a tyrant (or a very large number of citizens revolting against a tyrant) are almost sure of putting an end to injustice. But they don't.

I'd like to learn what exactly was disappointing in the papers you read?

Sure, here it is:
"Suppose a charged particle is accelerating at a rate of 15 ms−2 under the joint influence of gravity and an electric field. How much did each force contribute to the particle's acceleration? A natural way of answering this question would be to consider what the acceleration would have been had that force not been present." (Kaiserman's paper)
My reaction: That's all well and good, but not everything in life (especially politics) can be summed up by just two factors. You can't say: Hitler caused 2.5 times more of the Shoah than Himmler.
Finally, scenarios such as "What if such and such a historical figure had not existed?" are absolutely unverifiable fictions, unlike the withdrawal of a variable in a closed physical system.

"Suppose they’re trying to push the boulder down the hill to save a climber’s life who got stuck under that boulder. They are of varying strengths—say, one is a little bit stronger than all the others who are equally strong. But all of them do everything they can to save the climber. And again, none of them are strong enough to push the boulder on their own, and hence each of them is needed for the outcome. They push the boulder down the hill and save the climber.
If causation comes in degrees, it seems plausible to think that the strongest teen¬ager is more of a cause of saving the climber’s life than all the others. This might in turn imply that she is more morally responsible—i.e., more praiseworthy—than all the others." (Demirtas' paper)
My reaction: Another example that is too abstract/simplified and cannot be generalised. In this situation, we assume that they all had the idea of saving the climber at the same time and in the same way. But, in truth, there were group effects, and individual wills were to some extent "blended" into the collective... The strongest climber lifted the rock more, but perhaps he wouldn't have done so if the skinnier climber hadn't suggested lifting it. And so on.
Only quantifiable factors: very problematic because there are 'spiritual' effects that are very important and unquantifiable, such as education or propaganda that would make someone a murderer, for example, and where the perpetrators of this influence would logically be held partly responsible for the crime.

Generally speaking, the authors of these articles always work in closed systems. A finite set of variables (and what's more, there are never many of them) but in reality the variables are far more numerous or even infinite. Example: one person in particular, and only that person, can kill the Bad Guy to save humanity. And he does. His action was necessary and sufficient and, what's more, of a high degree of necessity, because it was irreplaceable. It is therefore legitimate to consider this person responsible for this act (and to congratulate him). However, it was also necessary for his parents to bring him into the world... and to transmit to him an idea of civic-mindedness and courage... Otherwise none of this would have been possible... and the grandparents etc.

Or we would have to prove that reality is made up of closed systems, that these are not simplifications of reality. The question of the weighting of causality/responsibility then becomes first and foremost that of the existence of variables really isolated from others to explain an action.

I need to think about it more. (Hence the fact I asked the question).
What is your own answer, by the way? Are citizens responsible for the crimes of their leaders? And, for example, is the sergeant's "less responsible" for a war crime than his general? And the peasant who happened to be passing by at the time of the crime, who could have hidden the persecuted people so that they were not murdered, but did not do so, is even "less responsible" than the general and the sergeants? And how could all this be rigorously proven?

Yes, exactly. The famous Dostoevsky’s quote: "Each of us is guilty of everything against all." The fact that it is unpleasant to hear doesn't make it false.

A purely physical nothing would be a nothing that stays so without us even needing to think about it. It would be independent of thought. But that is totally unverifiable. Because, if you check that this nothing exists, well, too late, you're using thought again. That is the powerful argument by Berkeley. And it doesn't lead to a pure and insane subjectivism though, as Berkeley himself noted and as I tried to express in a recent message in the forum, in another discussion. I'm not fully Berkeleyan but this argument is very correct and important.

"we can not have any knowledge about the external world." That is true. But, if we can not have any knowledge about the external world, then we can't even say that this "external world" exists. So there would only be an "internal" world. But how could there be an "internal world" without an external one? So it means that our so-called "internal world" is not "just internal", "sadly internal"... It is the world itself.
(source: Brief Solutions to Philosophical Problems Using a Hegelian Method, Solution 2)

This question cannot be solved without first defining what an existence would be

That is correct but a more direct way to prove this would be to show that "nothing" (nothingness) is already not possible logically anyway. If I think that nothingness exists, I still think it, so there's at least a thought, not nothing. And if I think that "nothingness exists when I stop thinking about it", then this statement is purely unverifiable.
(source:Brief Solutions to Philosophical Problems Using a Hegelian Method, Solution 1)