Again, you have failed — schopenhauer1
wearing out my patience…stop misconstruing and strawmanning it — schopenhauer1
You told me to read it carefully and read it again and parse it out with questions. I don’t suppose you meant me to do that with the above.
Rather, it's about the dignity of the (future) child. […] That is say, no person exists to be violated prior to procreation. The violation only takes place once procreation occurs. — schopenhauer1
Ok, the violation occurs when procreation happens. But you didn’t say the rule that’s violated (and I’m not going to dare to assume anything). The violation of what rule specifically in your words for me to parse out?
But I got this rule is violated once procreation occurs.
prevent the harm if possible, especially if it is unnecessary to let the harm happen in the first place!) versus remediative harm (the harm is already taking place, now a set of actions is needed to remediate it!). — schopenhauer1
That sounds like a rule in there. The rule seems to be to “prevent harm when possible, especially when unnecessary.” Then, once procreation happens and the rule has been violated, you move to a different rule where, if there is harm already done “a set of actions is needed to remediate it.”
I think you said before AN has nothing to do with remediative actions. Which makes sense since AN is a pre-procreation moral guidance.
in a given context of a society means having to move about in public spaces- in the situatedness of a social sphere. This means, inevitably you will cause unintentional harm. — schopenhauer1
This seems to be about a wider moral position, and has stepped outside of a narrow focus on AN. The above all talks about how to treat other currently living people. In this context, and if I got the rule right, the rule being: “prevent harm when possible, especially when unnecessary”, in the wider context of other living people we still must try to prevent harm, especially when unnecessary, but there can be harmed caused that is “unintentional harm.” And any step we take is towards remediation, not prevention first.
[Could negligent behavior blur the line between preventative and remediative acts? Is there a duty to try to prevent negligence, and while some acts are purely unintentional, others are wanton and grossly negligent sorts that we all have a duty to prevent? This is a tangent - forget the question.]
Positive ethics DOES matter in the sphere of existing to some extent, as long as it doesn't unnecessarily violate others. Remember the bridge argument? The fishermen want to catch the biggest fish of their life. It's blocking YOUR right to go to your car. Whatever pleasure they get from fishing and the collateral damage of causing your harm, it was unnecessary to "recruit" you into their project. This is different than being one car of many in traffic "recruiting" you into traffic. With the road situation, it is tacitly accepted that this is part of how roads worked. However, if a car wanted to stop traffic so they can look out the side of the road at some attraction, that is now falling into unnecessary "recruiting" territory. — schopenhauer1
I sum this up as making the point that what is wrong about procreation is that we are recruiting a future person into a life of suffering, and failing to prevent obviously unnecessary suffering.
I can only present the argument faithfully and to the best of my ability — schopenhauer1
I think you are making me do all the work and judging by your abilities you could do it way better, and tighter. You just don’t want to waste your time on a bad faith opponent - well you’re judging me harshly. I’m doing my best too.
I think people can be great parents, and are good people, but that procreation is still wrong. — schopenhauer1
I get it’s a tough moral choice to make. That was in The Revealers too.
The ethic is to not unnecessarily create more people that suffer, and to force people into a world based on one's own estimation of how much suffering is good (especially since the amount and kind of suffering for another is unknown as just a fact of the matter). It's then the inclination that must be re-educated, not the ethic. — schopenhauer1
You said “especially since the amount of suffering is unknown.” That adds an interesting element. “Amount of suffering” as a concept, plus this amount being “unknown.”
I don’t think the amount of suffering matters, and I don’t think the fact of suffering is unknown. We know every time we procreate we are recruiting someone into suffering. Period. Right?
As far as the re-education, I agree it would be in the face of inclinations and old habits. But I’m still trying to parse out the content of the education. That is a 2.0 discussion about inclinations and where they come from and why someone might resist AN. I’m just sticking to what AN is.
You even said yourself after talking about people who aren’t inclined to have kids, about religion and family as urging kids, as existential need for purpose.. “…Though of course, there are also plenty of horrible parents as well,
but all of this is besides the point.”
So I don’t think I need to parse that part out yet to focus on what AN is.
I’m not intending to mischaracterize anything you are trying to explain, so if I do, that wasn’t my intent, so don’t accuse me of bad faith anymore, please. (If something is wrong, clarify it for me. Nothing wrong with wiping the blackboard clean and laying out a tight argument from the top again.)
Then you said this:
It is more than just suffering. If it was just suffering, I would consider myself a hedonic utilitarian or some such. It is rather about not using people by force recruiting them into projects that will harm them. Suffering matters here, but it is the particular nature of preventing suffering absolutely in the case of procreation that makes it exceptionally different than already-existing scenarios, — schopenhauer1
So it is more about not forcing someone to be born at all, regardless of any suffering; it is about how “recruiting them into projects” is wrong. The fact that it is a project “that will harm them” makes it all the worse, but “it is more than just suffering. […] It is rather about not using people by force.”
This is why you don’t like my arguments about the amount of suffering. Suffering in life is a part of what is wrong about procreation, but it is the involuntary recruitment that might be the real heart of the rule that is violated.
So I had the rule as (trying to quote you) “ prevent the harm if possible, especially if it is unnecessary to let the harm happen in the first place.” But there is a second rule or complication to the rule (again that I hope you will clarify) something like (as tight as I can make to build less room for misinterpretation): “do not impose harm, especially when it can be avoided.”
So this confuses “prevent” with “not impose”. But I am seeing AN as more saying “do not impose” in order to get the involuntary recruitment aspect into it.
But that undermines all of the time spent parsing out “prevent” from “remediate”. That wasn’t really the issue. And that issue was related to the suffering, where first you must prevent suffering, but then once procreation happens and you are with the currently living you are following a rule relating to remediating suffering. But we also said that the suffering isn’t the heart of the issue.
So I think all of the arguments over prevent versus remediate and suffering and amounts of suffering, were off the mark (or at least my objections and rebuttals to those aspects of the arguments were off the mark). Because that wasn’t the real heart of the problem. That’s why it can be ok to cause some suffering in living people, because they can consent to that suffering.
The mark for AN has to do with the lack of consent to live at all.
It is wrong to force a being into existence when no such being could give its consent, therefore one should not procreate.
Is this right?
Suffering matters here, but it is the particular nature of preventing suffering absolutely in the case of procreation that makes it exceptionally different than already-existing scenarios, where we are simply remediating suffering (doing the best with what we have, trading greater with lesser harms, negotiating our interests, etc.). — schopenhauer1
It is right. It sounds right to me. I still don’t think I’m mischaracterizing anything you are saying.
And I also still think it can all be summed up in a tighter argument where every word counts better than I’ve done here. I’m not sure if the best formulation of the rule involved ( “prevent harm” or “not imposing harm”).
There are holes that I can’t seem to fill, and that I’m afraid to fill for fear of “strawmanning”!!
There is an apparent vacillation on the place of the future non-existing baby that is both prevented from existing (as a future possible baby), and in which suffering is prevented from existing. I know that the baby never exists when the rule is followed and no violation occurs. But the rule itself seems to invoke the existence of a baby that cannot give its consent, to whom life is being imposed involuntarily; there’s a tension there that you (not me) introduce into the text. The existence of the baby seems to matter (actual) and not matter (potential) to the world this ethic describes.
And I still see a hole in the value of suffering to the AN argument. Something needs further clarity here. Does AN hold its ground regardless of any suffering or not?
But I’ve gone too far astray from the text.
Before you respond to all of the things I got wrong, can you at least admit how far I DO seem to understand it? Most of this whole post was me trying to restate you without causing any cringing.