Sartre basically hovered around the starting line just like the rest. "Consciousness of" is a brilliant reformulation of the predicament.

Nietzsche, more honest and brave, abandoned the whole pursuit, and trashed those who didn't get it.

he (Nietzsche) could take joy in immersing himself in self-transformative becoming rather than — Joshs

If we want to avoid looking like one of Nietzsche's "truth-seekers" take wisdom out of my post and call it "fact" or "reality" or whatever else might motivate progress beyond the depths of the cave. But Nietzsche, like all of us, could only move in self-contradiction. Self-transformation, self-creation, lays out an ontology and metaphysic of self-material, action upon that material, and new self material - these all fall prey to the disconnect between appearance and reality. If you want to use words like desperate and joy, Nietzsche was just as desperate and possibly joyless as the rest of us. I still only get talking the talk from Nietzsche and no walking anywhere.

"Counting" may start at 1. Numbers, however, do not "start" — 180 Proof

This clarifies the question for me.

I was talking about the fact that the first unit ever made in a mind, so the first number ever counted, was a "1", and all units since then (yes units), were multiples and divisions of when we first started counting units of one. So quantification started long ago with a 1. 'Numbers start at one' would be a weird way to say it, but it reflects this sense of "start" and "numbers" and "1" I meant.

Only started counting rocks when I picked up the first one. So, numbers start at one. — Zolenskify

But if the statement 'numbers start at one' means "of all numbers on the number line, numbers start at 1", then maybe it makes sense to say numbers don't start.

The act of counting itself moves in increments of 1. When physically counting, you have to say "1" in some fashion, first. If you count by fours, you first counted 4 ones, to make the first four, so you still started at "1".

However, we might also say we start counting from zero, and for the instant between zero and one, that is our start of counting. The first count, is a "1", but we start counting closer to zero, or at zero.

How about the genealogical-psychological first historical act of counting (way back when caves were still fashionable), the very first count was likely a physical word for "one". Just like our minds first made a unit, and one, to count at all, we made word "one" itself to follow, and then we had to make words for "two" and "three" probably quickly "none" or "zero". The word "one" may have been how numbers started. Maybe.

But now that numbers are here, however they started, we can start counting from any number. The number line gets laid out clearly the same every time; no matter what numbers you start at, it lines up the same. The only place we might find to "start" the number line, would be zero. There is a logic to it, a symmetry.

So it looks like four senses.
1. At the first moment quantification occurred to a mind, the number "1", the unit, had to be there first. Unitizing is the birth of all math. Numbers start at one.
2. When starting a count, you can be said to start "at 1" or "from zero" and so there is something unresolved there. Numbers may not start at one.
3. The first cave person who ever tried to count out loud, probably said and meant the word "one". Numbers start with one. (Who knows, throws in some actual skin in the game).
4. The most logical place to position the number line is from zero, but it can start from anywhere. So numbers don't start and if you had to choose, you would choose zero.

And what about lists? Has anyone ever started a list with anything, ever, besides 1? Put "Lists start with one" up there on my list, somewhere between 2 and 3.

Great, now I really don't know what I think anymore.

they might have been Zoroastrian — Lionino

In the end, after all the true history would be sorted out, to me, they would still represent the whole rest of the world, that he was there in a horse trough for all of us and all of us were there represented with our finest for him. Besides the history of it all, the story get's a lot of mileage with the kids too. Cute baby sheep, silver and gold.

Why interpret such an incredible ("I can't believe what I'm seeing") encounter as "God" or in some religious way? — 180 Proof

Yeah. There is a leap of faith involved. I do doubt it all at times. Not lately. But when I do, I think God still wants me (and all of us) so he keeps pulling me back in. It's not just up to me. That is what I found has been revealed.

But you won't find me using wishful thinking or not confronting my biases here though. The words in this forum have to stand alone. A quote from Plato, or Kant or Nietzsche should not be taken as any kind of gospel, so neither would a quote from the Bible or revelation. And anyway, even two Catholics talking about Christ's death on the cross are often having two totally different conversations.

I'll throw out one personal take on it all to show you how tough it would be for me to tell you why I believe in God, or why I believe something revealed is a revelation from God: it is precisely because the story of God told in the bible makes no sense that I believe it has to be true. Kind of like, seeing the unbelievable is believing. I know that does my argument no good (but it's not an argument), but hopefully still means something.

revelation was of a nature consistent with the Catholic faith, as opposed to, say, an Eastern faith which is quite different. — praxis

Yes, I try to be a Catholic. When Moses asked for God's name, God just said "I am". Sounds very Eastern. When Jesus was born, the story goes, he was visited by three wise men from the East. I find God has been revealing himself everywhere. I just think, personally, it's most explicit in the Catholic faith.

It's unclear to me what you are attempting to say other that there are different ways of knowing and that you believe in god because of personal experience. I was talking to a Muslim on Wednesday who put his argument the same way you do, except for him Jesus was a mortal who died and only Allah provides the way to Paradise. How do you measure one person's personal feelings (revelation) against another's, when the revelation grounds utterly different worldviews? — Tom Storm

I responded to the question of what religion by just talking about my belief in God, so I wasn't really being sensitive to the differences between different religions. Since here, it seemed like there was a threshold question about whether God or any religion even makes sense, I basically tackled that.

But I find the same God shows up in all kinds of religions and peoples. If everyone in the world was a Catholic, each person would still have something unique and particular in their view of God. It's like knowing a person. My view of my wife is unlike anyone else's view of my wife. In a sense, anyone who has a belief in God has their own religion.

So ... 'believing is seeing', is that it? or "Seek and ye shall find?" Seems to me an instance of the placebo-effect of confirmation bias. — 180 Proof

More like the other way around. Like, "I can't believe what I am seeing" or "I wasn't seeking anything and it found me and knocked me on my ass."

Short answer, yes.

I agree we shouldn't hold anyone up as such a great person, because we are all full of weaknesses and limitations.

But I also agree that we shouldn't let the failures of the people who do great things unravel the greatness of the great things they do. Just because Thomas Jefferson had slaves doesn't mean the words of the Declaration should be shredded. He was wrong at each moment he thought he could own another person and treated another person like property, which was every moment of his life. Terrible. But during that time, he was right (or at least his thoughts are worth knowing) about political freedom and equality among citizens the need for self-government to manage that.

By the same token, we shouldn't judge anyone as a bad person. Just because MLK cheated on his wife and I don't, doesn't mean I am better than him. None of us are good enough to be held above the others and therefore none of us are in a position to put others down.

If we recognize all of this, then maybe it can be inspiring to recognize the good things some people do and build a statue or have a holiday in their name. Forgive the sins, and be inspired that any of us might be able to do something good once in a while, like MLK or Jefferson did once in while.

I think you read way more into my saying that I can't change your mind. It was not meant as a comment on the openness of you and your question, and it was not a comment my own abilities; it was a comment on the nature of numbers and the number 1. By saying "it's too, late" I meant that we've already started using numbers, and when we started, we were at "1".

I just meant it makes sense to me that 1 has to be the first number. I gave my arguments for that to demonstrate my first impression of the question you've raised. So far, I can't change my own mind, so I can't argue something that might change your mind. And I don't yet see there is any reason to think differently. Not yet, but I'm open to it.

The best summary of my thinking here is the notion of starting. If we are asking a question about a start, about starting something, like numbers, we are already in a position only to say "1", first. We can't start with anything else but the first, which numerically, is "1".

Because "1" is built into starting something, I don't see how to argue anything else but "1".

At the risk of losing all respect and credibility in a world dominated by physicalistic, scientific discourse, I am a Catholic and believe in God.

To (maybe) salvage some credibility among so many non-believers, the God of all the philosophers has been such a hollow shell of a creature, mostly invented to fill an empty space on the chessboard of other doubtful pieces. The monad, the evil-genius who is the perfection of perfection, the "good" personified, the zeit-geist of history, or the prime mover - each one of us is more consequential than these concepts and would contain these phantoms in our minds, making them smaller than ourselves. Augustine admitted that all that he said was like a grain of sand on the beach of what there is to say, and Aquinas called all of his work like straw. They were right!

There is no God found in philosophy or science that has impressed me or influenced why I believe in God. Similarly, I am not impressed with any arguments that show God can't exist either.

The whole point of science and philosophy is to figure this experience out for ourselves. We start from scratch. No God, no nothing. And then, once we know something, we don't need anyone or anything else to explain it for us, we have it ourselves. God hasn't yet entered this picture and to stay scientific and philosophical, God need not enter the picture.

Since I do believe in God, God has a place in the ontology somewhere. Maybe we will one day reason our way to the presence of God, sort of sneak up on God from behind and say "Hey, we are made in your image because we just created you." But I also believe (more accurately think it is reasonable to assume) that there are individuals in the ontology, separate from God. We have our hands full enough trying to exit the confines of our own solitary minds and to find any meaning anywhere at all, so leaps that would include the concept of "God" to help us explain "identity" or "motion" or "math" seem to lack rigor and honest scientific inquiry.

But then, we don't just talk philosophy and science do we. We have to live. We don't skip breakfast because our senses could be deceiving us. We don't wonder about the metaphysics of identity or set theory when going to the bathroom to draw clear and distinct lines between the crap and our asses. And we enjoy deep conversations with the people we love, about all sorts of experiences, and about beauty or tragedy, without constantly reminding everyone how we can't know the thing-in-itself or that meaning is actually use.

God is experienced in those conversations, not scientific ones.

It's like this to me, when I'm doing math, the existence of God is irrelevant. All of science and philosophy is still in that place for me. God may be irrelevant to them. God and science are totally irrelevant when I go to bathroom and see there is no toilet paper. You can put that scenario in the context of science (needing an absorbent tissue to address the viscosity of the crap) or God (who says I am created in his image, here frantically looking for something to wipe my ass), but really who cares at that moment.

And I'm being gross on purpose. You don't cringe from one philosophical concept, ever. You might cringe if the crap accidentally touches your hands. God is way more wholistic an experience than just the concepts of philosophy.

So when I talk about God, I would be talking about revelation and my response to that revelation, which is really something hard to express to someone who has not already themselves had that response, that experience. I can't give anyone the experience of God all by myself. You have to respond in some way that would deliver that experience, that would lead you to say "Is that God?"

Something like revelation is here on this forum though. You can't know me at all without me revealing myself to you. You cannot come close to saying I exist or know who I am until I reveal myself. I reveal myself to you here, and you reveal yourselves to me, here on this forum. Otherwise, no one is there to consider. The existence of God starts like that. That's why people feel blessed that they believe in God, and why they say faith is a gift. It doesn't come from me, it comes from an experience of me with God.

And religion, and church and all the institutionalization and edifice, that's all hogwash unless you are interested in finding God in it. If you don't believe in God at all, I wouldn't recommend trying to analyze a church or a religion from the outside in. If you happen to find you God, and you were interested in keeping that new line of communication open, you might then be able to find uses in the religions and churches. Otherwise, they look like every other human institution - a place filled only with people and all of our limitations.

reasonable people can discuss their reasons — flannel jesus

can prove that a concept entails a contradiction — Lionino

These both agree with my point. My point is that reason and proof sit in between things that exist. We have to simply experience something to consider it's existence, and if we want to be reasonable about it, the first step is defining that experience as a concept. Once we enter the world of concepts we can start to be reasonable. It wasn't reason that delivered the experience of the thing we are now trying to be reasonable about.

Some people think they experienced God. Who could penetrate that without being that person? Some people experienced tree-elves. Who could penetrate that? If they want me to "believe in" a tree elf, they need to work with the things I have already experienced and would agree already exist, and use these experiences to show me the distinct place where tree-elves should be in view, but they would be better off to just throw a tree-elf in my face. Give me the experience.

We can say that "All swans are white." and therefore if someone says "there is a black swan" they are either not pointing to a swan, or my definition of a swan was wrong - reason and logic show this. But whether any swans at all actually exist - nothing has been said about that, and no reason or logic or even science can prove logically one way or the other.

It's not that we give up on trying to show what exists. It's that we can't show it by reason. We show it. Period. Then we can look for how it fits reasonably in world where other things exist.

I don't think you can rule out the existence of some thing with reason alone, because I don't think you can rule in the existence of any thing by reason alone. Except your self, to your self. Which does no body else and nothing else in the world any good.

"All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal."
Tons of reason here and room for reasonable analysis.
None of will ever show you that a man is, mortality is, Socrates is. We reason about existing things, not to existing things.

All constrained to the same white posting box, with the same alphabet, same bold feature, etc., same words, yet after even only a few posts, each of our personalities come through as starkly distinct from one another. We are all amazing!

For that, I truly think you each deserve my respect, fellow thinkers about what the hell thinking means, or is, or what meaning means, putting their souls on display inside a small white box of words in the process.

And I hope you see me giving that respect in my posts. None of this matters to me without that respect. Even those of you who might argue no one need deserve any special respect - I still respect you despite yourself, and would be willing to try to discuss respect with you. I believe we have to give respect for no reason. It is only earned because the other to whom respect is given might accept that respect - whether they accept it or not isn't why you give it. Who and what they are, namely, a whole human being, is why respect is already owed.

That said, summing up some other poster's whole person as an "idiot" is never helpful. I think we truly are incapable of judging another whole person as anything, other than person deserving respect. And here, in particular, there can be no idiots in this forum - not physically possible. We passed idiocy when we decided to just join and read, in my opinion. We passed idiocy when we said "in my opinion" in a way that others could judge for themselves.

So when anyone actually thinks some other poster is an idiot and says it, we reveal more about ourself than the other poster. We reveal a limit we won't go to, won't stand that line of argument, don't see the point in it, don't understand, or simply belittle that person's station and moment in the quest, and lash out at the other person for wasting our time. So ad hominem negativity only destroys the baseline respect, and reveals your own limitations.

Unless there is some point to it that is actually focused on the content. Saying some idea is idiotic, that shoves meaning and truth in our faces. I say have at it, and let that personality shine! Further, once we truly get to know the respect is there, once we have a history showing respect, then we can let the harsh ad hominem attacks fly to emphasize our points, like calling your brother an idiot because he is doing something you think is stupid. He knows you love him and respect him, and that baseline deep knowledge is both why the betrayal that comes with being called a total idiot by your own brother who knows you, is funny, and why your brother can decide to either blow it off and say "how would you know, you moron" or rethink how stupid he's being. It doesn't mean you actually think your brother is just an idiot.

Lastly, notice I didn't say what I think of any one in particular. That's because I'm too new and would have to do some research to recall who said what, and what I think it tells me about that person. So I'm forgetful and lazy, and still manage to blather on way too long. Probably annoys a bunch of you.

An issue here is with the arbitrariness of what a rock consists of. — Vaskane

That is a true issue for physics or metaphysis (identity of a rock), but no matter what the results of those inquiries, even if no results, it could have no impact on the definition of "1". That's the beauty of this math we've invented. Which seems to me, got it's start with some "one".

I can't change your mind. I think it's too late. We'll never know if we could have started numbers some other way. We started counting, numbering, and in order to start, we already said "one" first. Starting is "one-ing".

First, there are no numbers. We don't just find numerical representations with our senses. We form them. Now that we've formed them, there are numbers. You pick up a rock, and you call it 1 (whether it is one or is not , maybe it's a rock with some moss on it and dirt, whatever, you pick it up and construct the basis of math by calling it "1"). You've made the first number.

You can't make two half rocks without the first rock. You don't name something a half, first. You have to have a whole before something can later be called half of that whole. By saying "half" you already referred to a whole. Halves come after wholes, not before they are made whole.

And you don't start with zero. We can't recognize zero until we recognize one. You learn and name zero by mentally removing the one rock or all of the rocks and things. Zero comes after 1 in experience, but is placed before one on the number line because of logic (mental functioning, just like naming something "one" or conceiving of "half-ones".)

There is no such thing as a negative rock. Negatives are mental constructs. Now that we have a new mental object we call "1" we can build off of it in all directions and build functions that yield zeros, twos, negative thirty-fives, the infinite.

The concept of "one" is the only that might have a referent in a world where you could make any start, such as the start of numbering things. Two rocks don't exist without a mind making a set called "two" having "rocks" as its members.

I agree. We can't do philosophy without grappling with Hume. But at the same time, if we listen to Hume, we just can't do philosophy.

I can see why people who believe in God, and who like philosophy, would want to prove the existence of God, so they can philosophically treat God as another real object in their philosophy. But frankly, I don't think you can prove the existence of anything, except yourself, to yourself. I can't prove the existence of anything to you, because you can't prove the existence of anything to yourself, except yourself (good ole Descartes). So if I can't prove the existence of my computer, to even me, how would I prove the existence of God?

Inversely, disproving the existence of something is just as difficult, if not impossible. At least I can prove that I exist, to myself. But proving for sure that something doesn't exist? May as well try to demonstrate a hole in the fabric of the universe (whatever that means). No one can prove God does not exist, just like no one can prove tree-elves do not exist. Nor should anyone bother to prove or disprove existence.

We assume something exists, and then we prove things about it's motion, it's nature. It either is, or isn't that's a separate question. Not subject to proof. Only subject to experience.

Perceived sometimes, other times unperceived. The cup in the cupboard and all that. Hume discusses continued existence and concludes we can’t justifiably infer it from having perceived it previously. — Jamal

Hume somehow managed to rip everything apart, tearing everything to shreds, while leaving everything untouched. We can't know the cup is there, so there can never be a sound truth derived a priori from the cup, yet I'm sure he would call anyone looking under the couch for the cup an idiot too.

what is the relationship of the reality we map maths too (or visa versa)? — Tom Storm

I guess I don't see math as separate from the mapping process in the equation 'math properly mapped=reality.' My equation would be 'a mind mapping=the reality of math.' So the math is more closely tied to the mind's activity, than it is to a reality separate from the mind.

The objectivity of math comes in the picture where two people can't seem make 2 plus 2 equal anything but 4. Everyone (objectivity) sits in the place of Reality (objectivity). And everyone sees the same thing when 2 is added to 2. So I call my subjective experience when 2 is added to 2, objective, because no other subject is really even trying (let alone able) to show me something other than 4. This tells us something about the minds. The mind is a part of reality, so it tells us something about reality. But minds map to other minds, and the mapping is actual communication when they map through something objective. My mind can map to your mind, when we use math, for instance. But my math won't necessarily map to anything other than another mind.

Same goes for logic. Same goes for language. But the objects of language are much more complex than mere numbers. With numbers and math, we can quickly and easily connect minds. With language it is harder, because the objects of language keep the minds apart further; but every now and then someone says "I see what you are saying" and repeats it in their own words so the first person says "yep, you got it." At that point the minds are mapped to each other through the words. Like they do with math. And now we might call something objective, as in, something that the mind will have to see if the mind is looking the same way as another mind.

What I am interested in is the notion that mathematical knowledge is not inherently objective but is shaped by cultural, historical, and social factors. — Tom Storm

That's the issue right there isn't it. If there are variations in how maths is done, this does not appear to undermine its capacity to produce consistent results every time. — Tom Storm

Cuts right to the core of something that we all assume has to be a core, namely math.

On the one hand:

1 + 1 = 2 is universal and hence not culture relative or in any way socially constructed. — javra

the universality of arithmetic-geometry (Kant) is inescapable — 180 Proof

But on the other hand, maybe:

So rather than a perception of things in the world, counting requires turning away from the meaningful content of things in the world. — Joshs

Some argue that the concept of 2 is more fundamental than 1. — Joshs

First of all, it is too important of a question to answer quickly and easily. And then boom:

Challenging mathematics lack of grounding is already a major issue in mathematics. It's all about what else is true if the axioms are true, how could a tautology be unreliable? — Count Timothy von Icarus

This recognizes the issues at the foundations of math but also fixes "math as math" in itself, as a long-form tautology. From within the tautology of math, there is no room for cultural or historical influence. Or maybe the culture is that of universe, and its history is all time, and the society is the society of minds. Only such influences will produce a math, and because these influences are so simple (universe, mind, all time) that math is so simple and need never change - we've fixed it that way in its own axioms.

And I've just built a POMO language around the same math.

We can drop right back into the question and ask, even with new axioms, would we really have a new math?

I don't think we ever can or will. Math is sort of how we think, not what we think. Math turns whatever we think, objective. It makes objectivity by being math. It is therefore, non-cultural. It is just human.

If you are not understanding '1+1=2' then you are not doing math. If you were to prove '1+1=7' you would be using new words, but needing the same logic and math to demonstrate how this still works. Working itself is the math of it.

It is possible to live a whole human life without any math (the animals do it, probably early man did it). Or you could be raised to think all of math is simply addition and subtraction, and never understand cultures and society's that use multiplication or division. But those worlds where a new conception of math, a postmodern sense, might be said to grow don't address the question head-on. Once there is any math, it will always need a logic, and once there is a logic, it will have a math, and once there is math, it will have words and representations for the same things (representations relative to representations), and once there are words, there will be syntax and logic, and math.

And it's not that we are simply a "rational animal" - minds do other things besides math. But we are an an animal that can do math, and when we do math, we are generating the simple, logical, axiom following, universal. So math ends up objective, as objectivity is its default method.

The way the Platonic realm is said to work. Wouldn't that be something? Do you believe in this category? — Tom Storm

I don't think there are forms, floating in an eternal world of the forms, objectified for us to know (by recollection or experience of participating things....).

I can see why Plato said that. That schematic of universal forms and particulars fits over-top of experience easily. But it seems too easy. Not to belittle Plato at all, but it lacks a curiosity into the physics, so to speak, of the 'perfect'.

Then instead of forms, if we skip straight to the example of the perfect - the perfect thing - and see if we can understand perfection from a perfect thing, we get nowhere. Once you hold up an example, you get bogged down in all of difficulties of being clear about making any claim about any physical thing. I say that chair is the perfect chair, and as a chair, exemplifies perfection itself, but you could just say, "perfect how? Perfect for sitting? So is that stool. The chair doesn't help at all and you've said nothing about perfection." And again, we are no closer to understanding what a 'perfection' is, arguing back and forth about mere uses that beat around the bush.

Still, I think we all have to admit that there is something distinct about 'perfection'. I mean no one would say another word for 'perfection' is 'shoddy'. (You might describe a shoddy thing as a perfect example of shoddiness, but you aren't defining perfection here, but only defining shoddiness.) Perfection has a distinct use, or a distinct meaning, that shoddy can never replace. There is something distinct there when one is trying to speak of 'perfection'.

So maybe I place perfection's thereness (so to speak) in the community of minds that would agree, sort of make an agreed upon use, and the few parts we all agree on, how we all use 'perfection' perfectly well, in that transcendental space we've constructed, we'll insert an objectified 'perfection'. "There are three knives, two of them are rusty. Which one is the most perfect? Since we all agree the one with no corrupting rust is the most perfect, we will together admit the perfect is like the uncorrupted knife, and we agree that every time we use the word perfect, we will use it consistently with this use."

This is the better place (the transcendent place we make) to start to define 'perfection', I think. However, if 'perfection' only exists in convention among minds, I still have to admit that I don't know what I have in my own mind alone when I think to myself that I know what 'perfection' is. I can't have a floating form. I am not looking at an example. I am still distinguishing 'perfect' from 'shoddy', but if I don't know what a mind thinking 'perfection' is in itself, why would adding other minds thinking 'perfection' to themselves AND adding the two minds creating some agreed upon, transcendental 'perfection' as if it was objective...this starts to sound like the same wishful thinking as Plato, making a floating form.

It's still better - two minds are more likely to make a more perfect 'perfection' than one.

The question is "Is 'perfection' subjective?" But don't we have to ask first, "Is anything objective?" You kind of just asked that, so I think you would agree this question is in the mix here. I mean, if nothing is objective, or we can't know it if it is, than what measuring stick can we hold up to anything to adjudge "No, this one is subjective." And then to ask about a thing like 'perfection' whether it is subjective or not - difficult question.

After all of that, I would still say that I do believe in objectivity itself. Along with objectivity, there is the subjective experience of these objects. And perfection is useful in describing things in subjective experience and things in the objective world. Sometimes we agree that some performance, some experiment, some physical act, was perfect, and we all can agree. Other times I see perfection and know no one else could ever possibly see it because I am looking through eyes and at phenomena that no one else could ever experience, but I still see perfection and could care less what anyone else thinks.
Perfection lives with the subjective, and can be inserted in the physical world for others to live with as well.

Still haven't defined perfection though. Then we are throwing in language, definition, use of a concept. I'd say perfection is a mix of 'complete' (but that's not it), with 'actualized' (but that's not enough), with superlative (that may be too much), with 'good' (but that's still not enough), and with 'perfecting' the verb, bringing it to life as an activity (but this seems opposite to 'complete' and "actualized')... tough word to define. I say it has it's objectivity (allowing us to avoid using 'shoddy' in it's place and carving it's distict contours), and it's subjectivity (allowing us to use it all). But no forms.

Indeed I'm first looking for the truth — LFranc

The principal seems to be "Inaction in the face of another one's immorality implicates one in the other one's immorality."

I’m a bit confused because you first want to defend that citizens aren’t responsible for the crimes of their leaders, but using an argument that actually seems to prove the opposite:

"Easy example is Trump and the insurrectionists. He's guilty even if he didn't want all of those crimes because he was in a position to stop them and chose not to. - Fire Ologist — LFranc

If the principal is "inaction in the face of another one's immorality implicates one in the other one's immorality" then we could apply this principal to Trump and say Trump's inaction during the insurrection makes him responsible for the actions of the insurrectionists.

I agree leaders should be implicated in the immorality and crimes of those they lead. The other way around is too complicated. I think we are implicated in the immorality of other's actions when we have the power to stop it but fail. I don't think every tyrant gives the world an example of a whole citizenry who had the power to stop the tyrant but failed. There are real victims here. People who topple a tyrant are a pipedream of an example of a perfectly good principal.

The word perfect is used in various ways, sometimes it just means ‘great’ or ‘cool’. The more interesting philosophical aspect of this is the transcendental implications of the idea of perfection. — Tom Storm

"The word perfect is used in various ways.." This sounds like subjectivity is at play.

"...it just means..." This sounds like objectivity is at play.

"The more interesting..." Wait, more interesting than my post?

"The transcendental implications of the idea of perfection."

What would really be interesting is what you mean by "transcendental implications" in general, and then apply it to "perfection".

Did you say "the idea of.." for a reason, or do you just mean "transcendental implications of 'perfection' which happens to be an idea"?

What's the perfect definition of "perfect"?

Wouldn't the perfect definition of perfect, simply be, the definition of perfect? Just the definition of perfect, no more, no less, just the perfect definition of perfect.

Perfection, then would mean the actual.

An imperfect chair is only potentially a chair until it can actually serve as a chair, at which time it can be called perfect.

"Need a seat?" Slides over a chair with a broken leg. Slides a phone book under the broken leg to stand it up straight and solid. "Perfect!"

So is perfection subjective?

I think it can be, in the sense that something can be perfect to me, and maybe no one else. I say this chair is perfect, and then someone else tries it and says it is terrible. Sounds like perfection is subjective.

But if I can explain all the reasons it is perfect to me - allows my legs to bend at just the right height, gently supporting my back, soft, but firm - they might say "yeah, I see why you say it is perfect to you - that would be perfect - except to me, that chair hurts my knees and my ass."

So if we can convey why we think something is perfect, we might be conveying why actual things objectively would generate the same judgment of perfection if perceived in the same way to any subject. In this sense the perfect is an objective thing. This, I think is the perfect use of the word "perfect" to convey objectivity and actuality, not just subjectivity.

What is the perfect solution for X in the problem 2+2=X? This makes it easy to convey perfection.
But if the problem is, what is the perfect artform, abstract sculpture or live symphonic music - the argument could go on forever and maybe neither one is actually perfect. So we just say "shut up - you don't know perfection if it bit you in artform" or agree to disagree and say "perfection must be subjective."

In the, saying something is perfect to me, tells you nothing. Unless the question is something simple, like "Is 2+2=4 correct?"

One cannot convict a whole population of any moral failure, but must prove it of each individual, showing that there were things they could and should have done that they did not do, and/or things that they did that they could and should not have done. — unenlightened

Completely agree with that. Enforcing moral responsibility is an individual by individual thing. So practically speaking if we held whole citizenry responsible for the acts of their leaders, to be fair about it, they would each have to held accountable one at a time. So if I agreed with the original assertion that the citizens can be held responsible for the crimes of their leaders, then I'd be calling for an impossible administration of justice. But I don't agree with it. I agree with what you said here.

But I thought this post was about:

"I am not responsible for the war crimes committed by my country, only the tyrant is". But if the people revolted, the regime would collapse and the people could demand an end to the war. So they are responsible... — LFranc

You are saying the practical implications of holding all the people responsible would be unrealistic to enforce. I agree with that, and also say there is nothing to enforce. Tyrants are the criminals. Their own people are innocent victims. Unless they collaborate. Failing to topple a bad leader isn't a crime.

I recommend the following: http://godisallthatmatters.com/2021/05/22/the-solution-to-russells-paradox-and-the-absurdity-of-more-than-one-infinity/ — Philosopher19

I read the article. I certainly get how this discussion needs to be analytical to be precise, but I am not fluent enough in the symbolic language to keep up.

Is there any way you can provide an example of a set that IS a member of itself, other than the set of all sets, in plain language? I can't think of one.

I’m a bit confused because you first want to defend that citizens aren’t responsible for the crimes of their leaders, but using an argument that actually seems to prove the opposite:
"Easy example is Trump and the insurrectionists. He's guilty even if he didn't want all of those crimes because he was in a position to stop them and chose not to." Me. — LFranc

Holding Trump responsible for insurrection day and trying to topple him through the courts (for now) is holding a leader responsible for actions of that leader's citizens. You are arguing for the opposite.

If citizens are to be held responsible for the acts of their leaders, aren't all of the Palestinians responsible for the October 7 attack/murder/rape of non-combatants? If they should all be held responsible since they didn't stop the attackers, then how can we say Israel is committing war crimes or doing anything wrong when Israel just trying to hold the right people responsible by attacking all of Gaza?

What is your own answer, by the way? Are citizens responsible for the crimes of their leaders? And, for example, is the sergeant's "less responsible" for a war crime than his general? — LFranc

It's a good question.

Short answer, no. In fact, I would say it would be easier to say a leader is responsible for the crimes of his/her citizens even when that leader did not actually do anything. Easy example is Trump and the insurrectionists. He's guilty even if he didn't want all of those crimes because he was in a position to stop them and chose not to.

It is hard enough to clarify for our own minds (as much as for the rest of the world and then the government) that we are responsible for our own acts at our own hands directly. Even these acts some people wonder "am I responsible for what I just did?" Responsibility for one's own actions has to be the foundation of all judgments one would even call a "crime" or just "bad" or "wrong". They you want to add judgments of what other people are doing as wrong, and further, make me responsible for those others' actions. Citizens are too far-removed from their leaders to be responsible for what the leaders do.

Citizens can be responsible for following a criminal leader and doing the leader's bidding. That's a choice a citizen can take responsibility for. When a leader gets charged with a war crime, some hand had to actually do the crime, and those actual henchmen get charged too. Leader tells a pilot to bomb a city, and the pilot bombs the city. Pilot later finds out the leader was trying to commit genocide, targeting non-combatants for no other reason but genocide. The pilot didn't try to commit genocide. Pilot was doing his job. Sometimes cities need to be bombed in wars for all kinds of reasons. But now the leader tells the pilot to bomb another city and now the pilot knows the leader is targeting non-combatants - now the pilot knows the leader is using him to commit genocide. Pilot can then be responsible if he drops another bomb.

I do think the concept of "levels of responsibility" and being guilty of crimes in greater and lesser degrees makes real distinctions, but there is a trip wire where someone is either implicated in the crime to whatever degree, or not implicated in the crime. No degrees necessary for that distinction. I don't think citizens trip the wire because some leader of theirs applies resources in some horrific manner, nor do I think that those same citizens continue to perpetrate the crime until they topple the leader. They should resist the leader, not contribute to the leader, and these kinds of acts may lead to the leader toppling. But they aren't war criminals until they storm the castle and die hoping to topple the leader.

I can't answer that yes or no.

I don't believe in aliens, if by believe in, you mean that I think aliens exist even though there is only unexplained phenomenon that might be explained by aliens existing, but no clear evidence. I need more evidence before I would say I think aliens exist.

An alien would be a sensible object. I'd like to sense it first before I concluded it was alien and it existed. It is because certain phenomenon are unexplained that we insert "aliens" as an explanation. But as a scientist, I leave it currently unexplained.

If I had to answer yes or no, I would say no, not until I get enough evidence to make my judgment. Do purple swans exist? I don't know, but so far, I'd say no if you forced me, because, they have never made a clear appearance to me.
 
My answer is certainly maybe though. I even saw something in the night sky I can't explain. A light like a shooting star crossed the sky, and then it changed direction on a dime and shot off at much higher speed and disappeared. I was with someone and they said "whoa, what was that!?" so I know I saw something.

But I have no idea what I saw.

To make this philosophy, if there are sentient beings that are not human, I do believe they will be a lot like us - have math and logic, have language, have physics, have philosophy, and probably similar laws and proofs, at least at the highest levels. They would have to admit that we humans, like them, understand the notion of appearance distinct from reality, and so the notion of truth. They would have a notion of good.

I do believe we humans are not simply making all of this philosophy up. We are making it up, but any sentient being would be forced to play the same game we play. So we aren't just making it up. We are finding the real rules of the road for any traveler of space and time. They would understand subject/object distinctions, being and non-being. They would have a name for "time" and "space" and "nothing" and "infinite". My notion of "nothing" would include the exact the same content as the alien's notion.

But who knows. Hope we get to figure this one out, and they don't eat us.

I get where you're coming from. I believe the issue lies in correctly determining what it is for something to be a member of itself... — Philosopher19

I'm not sure I get what I'm saying.

Help me out. Besides the set of all sets, what is an example of a set that is a member of itself?

Dostoevsky isn't writing criminal statutes. He's talking about conscience, or the internal act of taking responsibility. If we put this in practice, then, where do we start? And it is already too late, we are all guilty. We should all just march ourselves to jail. There is no time for revolt to wash us clean of our guilt - we are already guilty of everything.

Why not start with "Each of us is credited of everything in favor of all" and say we are as good as all the good things in the world because we have not prevented them? Now the unpleasant is pleasant and we still haven't acted.

Crimes can be by commission or omission. So I agree with the theory. But applied to tyrants committing war crimes and people omitting revolutions. Let's say the right thing to address war crimes is to revolt - what if the revolution fails - are the people still guilty? What about if the revolution takes three months - who is guilty for what during those three months?

But if the people revolted, the regime would collapse and the people could demand an end to the war. So they are responsible for not ending the war. — LFranc

By this reasoning, everyone is responsible for everything. We are all now implicated in all criminal activity we ever heard of but are right now failing to stop.

Isn't the set of all sets equivalent to the set of all members?

There aren't actually any sets within the set of all sets. There are only members.

For example, if we take the set of all numerical values (0 through 9 - ten members) and the set of all alphabetical values (a to z - twenty-six members), we could make the set of these two sets and call it the Set of all Characters (for sake of argument). So does this set of all characters (including 1, 2, 3, etc., and a, b, c, etc.) now contain a total of 36 members? I say yes. Or does it contain 2 more members, total of 38, being the prior sets called "numerical" and "alphabetical" plus their members? If we call it the set of two sets, do we need to add in the set designated "numerical" and the set designated "alphabetical" and count the members separately from the sub-sets, when we join the sub-sets into a new super-set?

I say no. We are smart animals, so we can look at the single set of all Characters which has 36 members and simultaneously see that there are sub-sets of 10 numbers and 26 letters, but we are not counting those two distinctions as 2 additional members of the set of all Characters. The set of numbers has 10 members, and the set of letters has 26 members, and any set containing only these two sets would have 36 members.

When you bring sets together, under a new super-set, the sub-set distinctions that were named for example "numerical set" and "alphabetical set" no longer exist - these distinctions are irrelevant or non-existent to the set of all characters.

Apply this when joining all sets into the "set of all sets". We take the set of numbers, the set of letters, the set of atomic particles, the set of forces, etc., etc., until we take up all sets, list them on the blackboard, and fashion the idea of "the set of all sets". Aren't we just overcounting this new "set of all sets" if we count the sets within it, and not just the members of those sets (ignoring the prior set distinctions themselves)?

If so, then we have no need to call it "the set of all sets" - the set of all sets (incoherent paradoxical term) becomes the set of all members, or just a misapplication of the term "all".

This doesn't solve the paradox. It just shows that the paradox is where logical process, which occurs between multiple things (as in between sets and members), borders on the identity of single things (like what is a member, or what is a set). Logic lives between things, in their relations. Once we say the set of all sets, we have a logical problem if we lose site of the members of all those sub-sets and just look at those sub-sets themselves as if those sub-sets could be members without their own sub-members in the first place. As we gather up sets into bigger sets, the distinctions between this set and that set are no longer relevant and do not count in the membership, and only the new set exists.

The set of all sets is really the set of all members, which is also how we use the word "all" in the first place.

what is your best description of Metaphysics? — Rob J Kennedy

How about, it is an objectified version of subjective experience.

the notion that reality can be understood is a metaphysical presupposition — Tom Storm

I agree. Although I would change "presupposition" to simply "assertion." And would add that the notion that reality cannot be understood is also a metaphysical assertion.

Despite how impossible it seems (or is) to prove a metaphysical assertion is accurate, by being a subject, a metaphysic of that subjective being (whether it is ever discovered or accurately asserted) is also there. If I assert "I am" I am simultaneously asserting "The world is" and now the subjective is seen objectively or metaphysically.

I don't see how we can assert anything and not simultaneously assert a metaphysic of the world where the original assertion has been asserted. Doesn't mean the assertion had any true content or even identifiable content. Doesn't mean you know something accurate about the metaphysical, but it does mean there is some content, and with it, some metaphysics of a content-laden world.

Do we infer the unperceived existence of what we perceive from the nature of our experience? If so, how? If not, why not? — OwenB

Reminds me of "If a tree falls in the woods and no one is there, does it make a sound?" which is Berkeley. But without the context that could take you way off on a tangent.

Terrible question without some context and definitions of some heavy words like "existence", "perceive" and terms like "unperceived existence" and "the nature of our experience" or even "we infer". And after 3,000 plus years of writing thoughts down about (what I believe to be) this question, the answer of all the greatest thinkers is - I have no idea how. So "if so, how?" is just plain mean to do to a student.

I would restate what you have to assume the question is driving at, and then answer your new restated question. I'd reframe it as a recognition of how we are enslaved to our senses (Plato) or cut off from the thing-in-itself by the structure and condition of experience (Kant), and then re-ask it as "Do we infer that the things we experience exist in themselves in the same way we perceive them to be?" Or something.

In other words - I see a red ball. I, at first, assume there is a red ball over there in the world, whether I am looking at it or not. So I am perceiving something as it is in the world, inferring my experience in my head on the ball and in the world. But then I realize it is red because the light that is hitting that object is a red light and I'm looking at some false appearance so I don't really know what color it is, and further, I see that my eyeball builds for me an impression I call "red", so I've self-generated or constructed this experience (Plato's cave, Kant), and I know even less about the object I was calling a red ball over there in the world apart from me. So if I want to refer to "objects in the world", I have to infer my constructed perception in my head back onto them. With this context, it will be easier to answer the question, and with this context, it will be easier to answer the question if you say that it is the nature of our experience that we are cut-off from the world, constructing appearances and fabricating forms of perception and so what we infer is not necessarily correct or even has anything at all to do with the world in-itself. That's my easier answer to think about.

But there is the odd part of the question, "unperceived existence of what we perceive" - really, what the hell is that supposed to mean? I think they are trying to capture Kant's idea of the thing-in-itself as discussed above. My interpretation of the question is that it is about whether what we think we know (or perceive) about the world is a true reflection (inference) of the world as it is in itself. Are our inferences good if we seek to know something about the world. If it is a true reflection, how, and if not, how not so? But "unperceived...[words]...we perceive" - thanks for that clarification.

Instead of a red ball, you could treat the question itself as the object of perception and ask whether the question in your mind has anything to do with the question the teacher had in mind. Use the question itself to demonstrate how our perceptions have nothing to do with the real world, because the "nature of our experience" is to be confused when presented with just about any perception, but certainly with this question, and only once our minds re-organize things does the object of perception really take shape in the first place. The object before you is this amorphous, opaque, masked unknown, hiding in the words "Do we infer the unperceived existence of what we perceive from the nature of our experience?" Not until you redefine the terms here can you have in mind an actual question, an actual object, that you are now perceiving. So you would be answering the teacher's question, by saying it is not possible for you to have any true inference of what the teacher's question really is, since all we can do is reconstruct our own experience that is cut-off from the world. Basically, say "see Kant".

So this conversation, between two brains, conveying the idea of Universal Form, is itself two instances of Brain; (insert appropriate mental/non-physical).

everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. — SEP

If you describe the human being as a non-physical spirit with a body, the physicalist must say that the thing being identified as a non-physical "spirit", is really a supervening moment necessitated by a conscious brain.

Certainly seems plausible. At the very least, there is the physical. There is no real reason to deny the presence of the physical. Physicalism appears an elegant solution to a sensing, bodily being.

Thanks to Plato and Kant, we have to admit there are serious difficulties with really saying what a physical, individuated thing is in itself. So, though I think we have to admit the omni-presence of the physical, we haven't yet really satisfied ourselves that we have any actual explanation of physical things.

After searching round and round the cave under all of its physical, fleeting manifestations, being unsatisfied, what real use is it to introduce non-physicalism for more explanatory power? We don't even know what matter is, and so to insert something non-physical seems like a naïve way of introducing another unexplainable substance, adding confusion, making things worse.

But do we just need more science of the physical then, to really explain what an individuated, moving thing is? Though the physical is always there, I don't agree that the physical alone can account for my experience. We can't do what we are doing right now, namely, passing ideas from one mind to another through words, or, in other words, communicating, without the non-physical. Meaning is not physical. I mean, I know you are familiar with meaning, and use it every time you speak. We are submerged in meaning, because we are human beings.

I can say "you know what I mean" or I can say "you catch my drift" - these are different physical things, but with the same meaning, so we have three "things" here: my first phrase, my second different phrase, and the meaning of each, which happens to be the same meaning...if you are following me and digging what I'm laying down here. To make use of words, we make meaning, apart from the words. Same meaning, different words, means words and meaning are different. Meaning is the non-physical part, and only there when fabricated in a mind.

We, human minds in communication with one another, meaning things, become the bookends on the physical. We are the limit of the physical. Only from here, in the attempt to communicate meaning across the abyss of the physical, standing somewhere/somehow outside the physical, can we ask about the physical and physicalism. There is no question in the necessity of the purely physical, yet here we are, communicating our wonder over this experience.

Another way to say what I mean: the physical is tied to necessity, but if something is said to "supervene on" the physical, it must not be physical, or it would not be supervening, and it would remain part of the chain of necessity. There is no supervening on the physical without something non-physical. Somehow, we alone are that supervening, saturated in a world of immateriality.

Now whether this meaning matters, that is another question. (Yes I said "matters" as applied to "meaning" and meant "matters" in the sense of 'means anything to you' - and yes, I meant to make a pun of the words 'matter' and 'meaning'; the pun, where meaning makes a mockery of the matter/words.)
But for physicalism to mean that meaning can be fully reduced to the physics, does not seem to account for this very conversation, if any of us have meant anything here, or if any of us 'see what the other is saying', or might say "I understand." You feel me? Physics just doesn't cut it, at least not deep enough.

For example it's structure helps resolve the monism/dualism question. It clearly has two components but in a physicalism sense all is derived from physical matter. — Mark Nyquist

You said: "All is derived from physical matter." Physical matter here being the brain, in this form (for example): Brain; (non-physicals).

Where "non-physicals" in this case are brain states that manipulate "all" or abstractions like "physical matter" (abstract here because you aren't talking about a particular physical thing, you are talking about "physical matter" itself, now abstracted as a non-physical in this example, and all of this activity is turned into a universal form as "Brain; (non-physicals)."

Do I appear to get it?

"Who are you to choose which mass extinction event is good and which is bad? How dare you fight climate change! How dare you!" Said the three billion year old fungus.

I think you could perfectly coherently claim spatiotemporal relations exist between the things in-themselves and that the actual extension and temporal sequences do not exist. Positing that space and time exist as a relation is not the same as a substance (as far as I can tell). Therefore, you have not posited actual motion, space, or time when positing matter. — Bob Ross

So would you say matter is a substance, and motion, space and time are relations between material substances? Or is motion more substantial than relational, but maybe both?