Hey Wayfarer,
No interruption at all!
Schopenhauer’s philosophy is built on the premise that our understanding of the world is mediated through perception and cognition. — Wayfarer
The phenomenal veil, of our own construction, that cloaks and hides the thing-in-itself. Yes, love it. Straight out of Kant, and I like Schop too, the old curmudgeon.
However, Schopenhauer extends this idea, positing that the will is the fundamental reality behind all appearances. — Wayfarer
Yes, the objects are ideal, and they are brought about when we will, will to hold them as phenomenal objects. We not only make them by mediation of senses and cognition, but we will the sensing and the cogitating. And also, the will is preserved at the heart of the things-in-themselves that pour in the data, wiling-themselves towards our senses and cognition, as we transform this into our phenomenal experience.
He (Schop) argues that objects, as we know them, do not exist independently of our perception. — Wayfarer
I bolded “as we know them” because that is the key to me. We have objects as we do NOT know them (things in themselves), we apply our senses and cognition to those objects (and/or those objects apply themselves to our senses and cognition), and we get the objects
as we know them (phenomena).
According to Schopenhauer, what we perceive are representations (Vorstellungen), which are dependent on the subject (I would add, as well as the object, as I don’t deny that objects exist). — Wayfarer
I agree with your parenthetical. The things in themselves are existing objects. They are out there and I am with them. They shape my phenomenal experience too. I see no reason to conclude otherwise. We just only know those objects indirectly, mediated - we experience objects subjected to an influence outside or beyond those objects, namely me, the subject.
But this gets to noAxiom’s question. If we can’t know the objects in themselves and unmediated, then all “objects” should have quotes around them. They are ideal only.
But we just admitted there are objects separate from me, things in themselves out of which I fashion my phenomenal veil over them.
And the OP is about the “physical basis for what constitutes a thing or an object.”
I think we have to take the “physical basis” to be another term for “thing-in-itself”, in which case we may never be able to properly have this conversation or know a physical basis for what constitutes a thing.
In the end, I can only intuit that distinctions exist in physical form, in the various distinct many things in themselves, but I think they are there, apart from me and my cognitions. But I do so intuit.
And there are also clearly distinctions between the ideal forms we make, but that is not the question, and that is easy to find, since I can make the ideal distinctions clear myself.
The overlap, to me, is the phenomenal world
that we take as representing the physical form.
I am trying to equate where you said “as we know them” with “that we take as representing the physical form.”
You said “them”. Objects as we know “them.” The “them” here are the physical forms. There are now objects, and separately there are objects as we know them or as we take them to represent things in themselves (as phenomena).
So we have two different objects (things and ideals, or, in-themselves and phenomena), and call them both objects. We should only be calling one of them the object. But we aren’t having any luck at that.
Which is why I said in my first post this might be an impossible question to answer (or pose), and in my last post above I said that I am losing site of the question.
We are tasked by noAxiom with using words to demonstrate some thing, some physical object, in the act (willing) of speaking for itself.
So I posted a word of gibberish in attempt to create such a thing right here, now, for us to play with.
My only solution to poke a small hole in the phenomenal veil is to triangulate towards the thing-in-itself
by comparing the ideals from other minds who together investigate the same or at least similar phenomena. We both point to “that pumpkin” and we post it our ideal of where pumpkin begins and ends, where some thing in itself over there meets human sense and cognition, where we sense something apart from the single subject, and together sense where “that pumpkin” makes sense to both of us.
This sounds like Kantian transcendence, but I see it as more than that (because if the things will, it’s own essence for itself), enough to try and answer noAxiom’s question as “yes, there are physical objects that are not the same as our ideal objects, and we can know these objects exist.”
Just takes some willingness to see willingness apart from oneself.
PS.
Maybe essence is will, in each thing in itself be it physical or not, and phenomena are these wills as object, where we attempt to capture the essence, the will of something beyond the subject. Maybe?
I think Schopenhauer’s will, taken up by Nietzsche, is an underdeveloped metaphysical wisdom. (Because Nietzsche shattered metaphysics.). It’s also in Aristotle as desire and telos.