I don’t have a unique opinion.

We need to be practical. Realistic.

There are guns.

Why would anyone want only one group to have them?

The only gun control that makes sense is to destroy every gun on the earth and never make them again.

I’d talk about that. I’d say that would be great. Also, that is impractical and will never happen.

So we’re back to, there are guns.

‘Cease from evil, learn to do good, and purify the mind.’ — Wayfarer

Cease from - means something was already going on that needs to cease.

Learn. To do. Good. - a life’s work.

Purify the mind.

Love it.

It does present Christians with an allusion to an inconsistent canon, but that inconsistency is not the thrust of the OP. — Leontiskos

So are you saying @Bob Ross basically has no skin in the OT/Biblical revelation game?

Bob has a conception of God.
This conception of God happens to be consistent with maybe the best parts of the NT. (Probably not all of the NT since the NT often upholds and seeks to support the OT.)

But separate and apart from that, in this OP, Bob is asking Christians and theologians, how they can reconcile a NT type conception of God with an OT type conception of God? How is a good God capable of doing what God is said to do in the OT?

The answer need make no reference to any actual scripture - it is a philosophical/theological question about goodness, Gods, and child killing.

(See, all along I thought Bob was a Christian - no wonder my posts meant so little and were off target.)

But @Bob Ross is that the gist?

The Catholic Church teaches that God Almighty came down from heaven to save us...
How does a person make sense of this? — frank

The Christian narrative is a response to a particular human narrative.

Christ is supposed to be God becoming a human being, and supposedly for the sake of human beings, who are all dying by our own hands.

So if we are to interpret the reasonableness of Christ’s response to the human condition (crosses and sacrifices for redemption, and death for eternal life, etc), don’t we need to form some understanding on the narrative describing the human condition, and whether that narrative is reasonable first?

In plain language, do you assume people, much like other animals, are just making their way the best they can in the universe, naturally doing whatever people have evolved to do? Or do you assume people, unlike the other animals, have some ability to work against their own survival interests, capable of “sinning” against each other selfishly to the detriment of themselves individually and to the detriment of the species, doing what is unnatural?

What is your starting point as a person, assumed or at least hypothesized, before you ask what is the deal with Christ and the “bizarre” Christian narrative?

Seems to me Christ will never make sense if you think human beings already make evolutionary sense, on some gradient scale with the other animals, all of them also already making sense.

OR, if you think human beings do not make sense, that we do absurd things to ourselves and our brothers, you might say the Christian narrative, although nonsense metaphysically, serves as a sort of psychological distraction; so although it may be internally incoherent, it is just the opiate the doctor ordered for the absurd patient that is mankind. So this doesn’t answer your question about the absurdity of the narrative, but explains why it has worked for 2000 years - man is nuts and only a nutty God story will suffice to build room in his mind for “hope” we could be better.

But this avoids your central question - how does a rational Christian make sense of the Christian narrative? Some of us are no longer affected by opiates.

My response there is, the best way to start to do so, might be to first make sense of a human narrative - understand who God is dealing with - and only then can we reason our way through a narrative of how Christ is said to have engaged with such a being as a person.

So, in the words of Pete Townsend, who are you?

If you are another innocent creature, Christ will never make sense.

looking at an artwork "properly" means looking at an artwork as it was intended by the artist — RussellA

I think that is right in the sense that, in order to see what the artist is showing, it often helps to know what the artist intended to show.

But I would add that there are works of art that declare much in themselves, demanding the viewer react - music can do this. Dance can do this. A poem can do this. But any type of art can require more instruction to orient the viewer and deepen the experience with the artwork.

even setting aside "wrath," to say the primary goal is: "to save us from himself," makes it seem like the problem of sin is entirely extrinsic. That is, it suggests that the entire problem with sin is that it has made God mad, not that it is inherently bad and bad for man. This would imply that if God simply chose not to "have a cow" over sin, there would be no issue at all. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agree. If someone understand sin only from the outside, as an infraction about which some external judge imposes a sentence, they will not understand our blameworthiness for the crucifixion, and they will not recognize God’s mercy despite this blameworthiness, nor forgiveness despite blameworthiness, and ultimately love, redemption and eternal life. Viewing the Bible’s God from the outside, they see wrath in the one who accuses and judges the sinful - sin only leads to hateful judgement, wrath, and punishment and death. They don’t see death as a natural consequence, self-inflicted though warned against, but at best they would see death as a punishment extrinsically imposed. Undeserved if not overly dramatic. And they cannot see the sacrifice of a truly innocent one as a triumph over all weakness and vanity. The crucifixion seems vain itself.

Because they instead see innocence as our true baseline condition and one that need never change or is in any need of redemption, (as if we are all just children - boys will be boys and if God created boys then what did he expect), then why would God blame us for anything we boys do? Now some sort of extrinsic theatre like the crucifixion has no impact on such a basically blameless creature, leaving only the impression of its absurdity and bizarreness without logic. They do not see that we are all the crucifiers, and responsible for sin and therefore all of its effects, and do not see that, without God’s help, the consequences are fixed and permanent. It simply cannot make sense to make sinners out of innocent children as if “sinners” is just a label and not a condition.

I don’t blame people for not getting it - but I do blame them for making fools of their brothers who try to answer their insulting “questions”.

True.

I was imagining being in the whole room with the blue wall. The blue wall is not just a blue wall (or maybe not even a wall) - it is in a corner, highlighted, because the other wall is not blue. It could have been displayed otherwise, but was not.

I am sure a case could be made that I am not looking at things properly. And a case could be made that there is no such thing as looking at these things properly. And a case could be made that I was looking at things properly, (no matter what I said I saw, or because of what I said I saw, namely, a sculpture with a blue wall).

Is that maybe a sculpture about a painting? Since it incorporates the room space to complete its portrayal?

I haven’t responded in a while because I’m trying to shorten this. It seems impossible to make this simple and make it satisfactory.

1. I think it is contradictory to think of God as all good, Jesus as God the Son, and that the God of the Israelites in the OT was not one and the same all good God whom Jesus loved as his Father, and taught us to love as our Father. Jesus spoke of his Father, and Jesus spoke of fulfilling the promises made to Abraham fortold by all of the prophets and worshiped by David and the judges.

God is certainly all good, so the task is to answer how are the things God told Saul to do something an all good God would tell us to do? The task is not to weed out all of the lies and misrepresentations in the Bible. That would contradict what Jesus did, what Jesus died for.

We can reject all of Bible, but we can’t logically accept only the NT and say we are literally doing what God, in the New or the Old testaments. tells us to do.

So I think your whole approach, thinking the depictions in the OT are not God, is doomed to fail and will blind you to any real answer.

You need to trust there is an answer.

2. Who is innocent, of what are they innocent? My interpretation of the law against killing is that it is a sin to commit unlawful, unjustified killing of another person. It is NOT that we can never kill innocent people, but we can kill evil people.

So you need to stop looking for innocent people and guilty people to find who it is justified to kill and who isn’t justifiable to kill.

The law against killing is a law I am to follow regardless of the guilt or innocence of the other person. The question when I am faced with the choice of whether to kill another person is not “do they deserve it?” The question is “am I justified before God in killing that person.” Am I justified before my fellow man and the dead person when I kill them?

So if a person just killed your son on your front lawn and was now breaking down your front door while screaming “I’m going to kill you all!” And you take your shotgun and kill them, can you justify the killing of this person? Sounds like self defense. But what if you and your son just murdered 20 people. Was it still unjust for someone to kill your son and break down your door to kill you? Or let’s say you and your son did nothing wrong, so you killed the maniac in self-defense. Should the maniac take any responsibility for his own death?

And if you are a bomber during war and your bombs kill the enemy’s bomb factory, and bridges and military installations, and some families and children, and hospitals, and some gun factories and tank factories, and some elderly and sick people - will you be justified before God and the enemy?

The answer to your question is not about the innocence of the children - it is always and only about whether God will find your actions justifiable. Or is always about who looks to God to justify their actions and who does not.

According to you, Bob, you know the guilt or innocence of others without God, by your own reason. You know children are innocent, you know killing the innocent is always only wrong, and you know the OT story describes God as killing innocent souls. And from all of these you conclude that either God does evil, or the OT is lying when it talks about God, so therefore the NT is lying when it talks about the OT.

That makes a mess of logic and of faith.

But I would say we should never judge the guilt or innocence of other souls (just our own - we can judge other’s actions, make laws, put people in jail, etc, but not condemn them to hell for sin), killing other people can be justified regardless of innocence or guilt, God never once ordered the death of an innocent soul, God does not do evil and Jesus taught us to love the God of the OT.

Basically, killing kids is terrible nasty business, but not per se evil. If you know God’s will but do not follow it (by omission) or resist it (by commission), that is per se evil. I feel it is easier to find all people deserve to be slaughtered for their sins then it is to see some people are innocent. It’s not that babies are innocent, it’s that they are lovable and can be saved. But do you know what God did with the souls of the Amalekite children? If you believe Jesus was God, what do you think Jesus did for the Amalekite children?

One of the lessons of Saul story is that, if we would just listen to God, we can let God work out what is just and good and evil because by always listening to God, we are always good and justified. We have the ability to judge good and evil for sake of judging our selves and so that we can face God honestly and knowingly like men - not for the sake of judging others, and certainly not for judging God.

Maybe all the silent theists and believers, patiently being silent should now come forward and make their presence felt. Otherwise the casual observer might conclude that philosophy has won the debate that the issue of God and divinity in the world we find ourselves in has been put to bed. When in reality, they’ve just been told to be quiet. — Punshhh

It’s hard to have a discussion with a rock.

Especially when the rock carries a slogan on it like:
“Argument is irrelevant”
“Belief is irrational”

Further, the non-theists don’t mind being the ones to characterize what theism is, and then waiting for the theists to answer their questions about their characterization.

Frank and others already seem to understand all there is to understand about Catholicism, and therefore, their conclusion of bizarre absurdity is not really the issue. The issue is how could someone who claims to be rational actually follow such bizarre absurdity.

That is a recipe for a non-conversation. A sparring match here in the coliseum.

is my question: is it more that a bizarre narrative — frank

the lack of logic in the core Christian doctrine — frank

attempts to express that truth result in a convoluted story. — frank

How does a story that makes no sense survive that long? — frank

at best, the story is horrifying, at worst, it just makes zero sense.

What myth is even close to that bizarre? — frank

original sin (which was basically a matter of eating fruit — frank

the core message of Jesus, — frank

The message of Jesus.

Let’s say you don’t speak or write Chinese but you have a question about something written in Chinese. Do you think you will get anywhere stepping into room of non-Chinese speakers and asking them their opinions? Or then going into a room with some Chinese and English speakers and saying “having no alphabet makes no sense and using characters can’t be a precise way of communicating - the Chinese language is bizarre and can’t be logical - but tell me, how do you speak Chinese anyway?”

That’s what you are doing here. Are you looking for any actual information or just a sense of confirmation for your bias?

The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. — Thomas Nagel

how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all. — Thomas Nagel

since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood — Thomas Nagel

So there is something intangible, or non-physical, about the contents of conscious experience, and it is within this intangible something, that purpose exists. Does that jibe?

The exclusion of purpose was never, and in fact could never be, empirically demonstrated; it was simply excluded as a factor in the kind of explanations physics was intended to provide. Meaning was left behind for the sake of predictive accuracy and control in specific conditions. — Wayfarer

I don’t quite follow how meaning was left behind for the sake of predictive accuracy. Are you saying, scientists saw no need to wonder what the bat (for instance) is subjectively experiencing when they could make predictive models about bat behaviors that need not include any such considerations?

the assertion that because physics finds no purpose, the universe therefore has none. This is not science speaking, but metaphysics ventriloquizing through the authority of science. It is a philosophical sleight of hand that confuses methodological silence for ontological negation. — Wayfarer

Although I like the metaphor bolded above, to be sure I follow, could it be restated as: the finding of no purpose in the universe is not something a physical scientist can say, but only something a metaphysician can say, despite the fact that many physicists play metaphysician and say it as if it is physics. Is that the dryer meaning of the bolded?

The question of whether life, the universe, and everything is in any sense meaningful or purposeful is one that entertains many minds in our day. — Wayfarer

It will as long as there are new minds that come to be. Give a mind long enough time (in the modern academy) and maybe purpose can be weeded out of the conversation (straining incredulity). But there is no therapy for questions of meaning, for the mind’s ability to consider itself. There are only answers, or opiates/lies/distractions - like a ventriloquist distracts.

How does a person who hasn't had a lobotomy make sense of this? — frank

How does a person who expects a respectful exchange of information ask a question like this?

How does a person who has survived life beyond childhood think the explanation for all of human history would simply make sense?

We can’t agree if the cat is really on the mat or not. Do you think it will be easy to explain what God is on the cross or not?

Don’t you already know the answer? Lobotomies are fairly easy to obtain. Good explanation. Why are you checking your math?

No one brought themselves into existence. Our lives are a gift. We each take this gift and demand more than we even care to give back, and steal more, and murder and lie about it. Instead of crushing us out root and stem, God marked us down as incurring a debt. Then God paid the debt for us.

Make of this second chance what you will. That’s the story. All makes perfect sense to me.

allowing Himself to be tortured to death. And apparently this strategy worked in spite of the fact that he didn't actually die — frank

You could do the autopsy 20 feet away from the body. The cause of death had something to do with all the blood loss from the beating and whipping and spikes and spear in the gut. There was a burial. As far as walking around afterwards, that’s up to you to trust, but you would need a lobotomy to say he wasn’t dead.

What is it that makes a painting appear as a painting? — Moliere

Doesn’t it matter why we are asking? What purpose will the answer serve?

If you are tallying the number of paintings, drawings and sculptures owned by the museum for purposes of a security audit, wouldn’t the right answer have its own criteria that might even insult one of the artists? In such case, there has to be one specific answer, boiled down to a number, or there will be no way to insure or protect the museum.

So you set the criteria and draw the lines. And that is that.

Likely, with artists being artists, the auditor will be forced to throw certain works into a fourth miscellaneous category because painting, drawing and sculpture are not going to capture all that artists can do with paints, pencils and solids. At least not to an auditor type person.

But, a painting is an art form where an artist uses paint applied to what is usually a flat surface (such as a rectangular canvas) to create a visual experience.

So now, what is art?
What is an artist?
What counts as paint?
How flat is flat?
Why “usually”?
What does “visual experience” mean?
Are colors essential, or can white paint on a white surface make a painting?
Is there anything else? What else?

I googled Moliere - he was a playwrite described as a “literary painter” because of how vividly he painted his characters.

I guess we’ll never know now. Thanks Moliere. And Moliere.

Personally I know that what I say is in the face of an absurd world -- so it will only matter locally. — Moliere

How locally? Just for you, in your own head so to speak, or how wide can the local go, and why do you think that? (Aren’t all humans on earth throughout all of human history just a local blip? - where do you found your local boundaries if they extend beyond your own head at all?)

I don’t agree that it is necessary that what matters locally couldn’t matter universally. I know you didn’t say that expressly, but you said it will “only matter locally.” It will have to matter locally for sure, but only? Are you certain about that? I know you said “personally” but is that part of the substance of the rest of your assertion?

"I can't think otherwise" is usually a hint at a kind of transcendental argument going on, if it be articulated. — Moliere

Is that a red flag or something? Banno liked it, so I must have stepped into some forlorn corner. (You are focusing on “how” I am making my arguments, not “what” the arguments are saying. I usually try to let the how emerge from a focus on the what.)

Before characterizing the argument or doing the work to articulate it, can you think you are not thinking? Or can you think you both exist and do not exist in the same sense of “you” and “exist” at the same time in the same manner?

I’m more interested in what those experiences might be, or conducting one of those exercises, described in whatever ugly terms you could muster. I mean, maybe you can show me how not to think I’m thinking when I’m thinking. I can’t do it. That’s what I described as an example of something absolutely all who speak can always say. If you can undo that, I might find more credence on “only locally” in the notion that “I know that what I say is in the face of an absurd world -- so it will only matter locally.”

knowing, understanding, thinking, seeing, being just, but they all have (specific) ways we judge them and philosophy is the way we talk about what is essential to us about them. There is no fact that ensures those discussions even will be resolved, but that doesn’t annihilate the ability or process to do so, nor make it a matter of individual “opinion” (or a sociological matter). — Antony Nickles

:up:

It’s like wanting to agree on the terms of discussion before you can start a conversation. We may not come to an agreement on criteria, but there is at least some substance to talk about. — Antony Nickles

However, this desire for terms beforehand only arises after the conversation has already started (something Banno always points out). So it seems to me that when we want to start a conversation, we need to treat the start as actually a middle and move backwards from the middle of the discussion looking to clarify the criteria, while moving forwards in the discussion to develop some substance to talk about. And each step in either direction informs each step in the other direction (criteria informs what substance is identified, and substance identified begs clearer criteria in support thereof) - so we need to juggle both directions at once to soundly and validly move at all.

This thread has been better — Banno

Sure. I agree. I won’t speak for you, but I tried and failed. That makes me one of the others I guess, who agree with your application of ‘better’ to something other than this part of the thread.

But do you think there are still others who could reasonably argue against us? Showing how this was the best part of the whole thread? Is that reasonably possible? (You know you can’t answer no and be consistent.) And if so, don’t you see how that just won’t do? How is that a rigorous use of “better”, one that is reasonably disagreeing with you and me about how this part of the thread stinks in comparison to other parts?

Maybe the best part of this thread is yet to come, making those other better roasts pale. Maybe if we shoot for the absolute best, meaning full agreement from all parties about undeniable validity and soundness, clear and concise truth about the world, captured for all time, maybe we might actually make a little progress, actually say something better, that is worth saying.

Naaa. Let’s just be content to cut our losses. As usual. (At least this time we aren’t cursing each other - that’s something better maybe? :hearts: )

Science is not trying to give an account of what the universe would be like were there no observers. It is trying to give an account of what the universe is like for any observer. — Banno

If something can be seenby any observer
— Fire Ologist
Nuh — Banno

?? How nuh? You have to really want to disagree with me to find these disagree.

You are talking about a view from nowhere in particular. A view from anywhere is a view from nowhere in particular. What’s wrong with that? It doesn’t refute what you said.

Folks can be too stupid to see science. That’s a non sequitor.

Science looks for the common. We agree on that.

The pattern, were you agree with the critique of your position, only to snap back of a sudden to were you started, is repeating. — Banno

I see what you are saying. That’s where we agree.

But I see more than that. And I don’t see it as contradictory. This is what I can’t get you to see.

What is odd to me is not that you don’t agree with me, but that you see your own position as coherent.

You can’t say “better” in any meaningful way. I agree we could all agree something is better, but who really gives a shit what we think? Certainly nobody in 100 years.

I’m trying to say something, anything, one thing, that someone might give a shit about in 1,000 years, or if they were an alien race of persons 10,000 years advanced, or a god.

I think they would all agree the LNC will always help clarify reasoning.

I am going for it, anyway, despite stepping out too far over the precipice.

And I see you doing the same but you won’t admit it.

Science is not trying to give an account of what the universe would be like were there no observers. It is trying to give an account of what the universe is like for any observer. — Banno

See, I like that. That rings. Truth found must be the same truth for any seeker, or there may be nothing there to be found.

Science seeks to give an account that works for any of us. — Banno

Yes. Not my truth. Nor the truth absent all of us. But the same truth for any of us.

That "perspectiveless abstraction, stripped of embodiment, situatedness, or any first-person particularity" is a philosopher's invention. — Banno

Now hold on. If something can be seen by any observer, and each observer has their unique situatedness, embodiment and particularity, but that same science can be seen by any observer, then doesn’t it follow that the observer’s particularity is not part of the scientific observation? Like if the view from anywhere shows the same science, science remains nowhere in particular?

Although I would agree science only rests in an observer. It’s just that any observer from anywhere will do. This is like saying the view from nowhere is still a view (still has an observer). So it is really ‘a view from nowhere in particular’, but a view nonetheless.

Something to hang the door from. — Banno

Stipulations are functional, temporary versions of absolutes.

But if we never seek to convert one of these stipulations into something that just is, then you are right - “this conversation is too suppositional to be useful.”

What is a stipulation but a form of supposition?

Stipulations work really well when hanging doors. But nothing is forever, and all stipulations can be undercut, dissected, or shown to have been il-constructed and so serving no purpose at all.

Absolutes are suppositions. But suppositions we expect to remain as if fixed and permanent despite our desire to say we doubt they are absolute.

The LNC is an absolute. Maybe someday we’ll find we can use reason while contradicting reason, but probably not, so I see no need to say the LNC is merely stipulated and temporary and provisional awaiting its revision. It’s absolute - I can’t think otherwise and be thinking.
“I exist” is true absolutely. Again, I can’t think otherwise and be thinking.
Therefore, ‘absolutes exist’ is absolute. I can’t think otherwise and know I exist and know that while I exist I cannot simultaneously not exist.

I wouldn’t continue doing philosophy if I concluded absolutely that all we say is based solely on temporary stipulation. If there was no truth despite any and all stipulations, why would I care what anyone else think. I’m willing to stipulate that none of you are any better at life than me, so why should I stipulate things with you. I’d rather focus on less profound problems of there was nothing profound but a profound stipulation.

These are still assertions, but ones I can’t deny meaningfully, or without guile and misrepresentation. I can’t tell you what I see, but I just showed you how I see it, so maybe you can find it yourself. Such is the nature of the absolute - there whether we are looking or not, and not known until we see for ourselves.

I’m waiting for something to click in you, because I am sure you would be better equipped to argue it.

What kind of line would separate being in the middle with being anywhere else (like a start)? There is an absolute difference between middle and start.

Starts make a line.
Middles need no lines or distinctions.

must start instead from where we are.

Hence the relevance of Ramsey, who shows us a way to start from indifference. — Banno

Where we are, is already in the middle - neither starting nor at an end. But instead, already using language and reasoning and willing and wondering…

We can stay here.

Or we can do philosophy - which, inevitably remains already in the middle, but ALSO adds a new “start”. We construct it. And to do so, introduce the fixed “start”. We identify an absolute and stand on it or aim for it.

we find ourselves already doing philosophy — Banno

How is that universe you’ve just thrown me into any clearer a picture than what I am trying to acknowledge and talk about.

If you want to further clarify “finding ourselves already doing philosophy”, in my experience, at least one of not many absolutes will appear (also vaguely, but not with me in the middle but with me conceptually so I can call something a “start”).

There is no way to be perfectly clear about “that which lies outside of analysis”.

But if there was nothing to it, we would never build any agreement whatsoever. And we build agreement all of the time.

I can't really "disagree" with something that is so unclear. — Banno

First, I bet you could.
But more to the point, I bet you can agree to something unclear. I think agreeing on the unclear is part of your point about indifference. Careful, rigorous, moves, but ultimately in the middle with unknown beginnings and ends.

Did it just click? — Banno

Well, no. I’m still trying to figure out why you disagree with me.

To "lie beyond analysis" in this sense doesn't relieve us of the responsibility of making sense. — J

Yes. I’d rather call the two anspects 1) analysis of analyzing (logic, language), and 2) analysis of the world (what language is about, why we speak, agreement itself).

So nothing need be outside of analysis.

whether we find ourselves already doing philosophy, and must start instead from where we are. — Banno

I started a post titled “Being in the Middle”.

Why do you think what we are doing should be called “philosophy”. Are the ends so remote here in the middle that we may as well call this “making cookies”?

No. We call it “philosophy” whatever philosophy absolutely turns out to be, whether we ever get there, however it may ever be known, but still, we don’t call it “automotive engineering”. We call it philosophy.

How is that?

There is something absolute involved, though I haven’t and maybe can’t define it.

But if we don’t aim for it, your next reply might be anything at all and neither could know of it was or wasn’t doing more philosophy.

I'm suggesting that it's more accurate to talk about a type of philosophy -- Nagel's, perhaps -- which avails itself when necessary of all the rigorous, analytic tools, but is aiming to discuss topics that lie beyond analysis as such. — J

I love it. That’s philosophy to me. Analysis, but not just analysis of analysis, but also analysis of living in the world or “topics that lie beyond analysis as such”. I’m good with that.

None — Banno

Maybe none?

So… that’s it then.

What a mess.

Ok, what you assert is true.

Then there's not much point in continuing this conversation, is there. — Banno

I could be wrong.

What a mess? You seem to have more to say…

I think the Williamson essay is itself a good example, though I suppose some would dispute its rigor.

Or for a broader example, Thomas Nagel's work is my ideal of how philosophy can be remain rigorous and also ask questions that go beyond clarifying what is consistent or coherent within a given model. There are certainly others. — J

I agree with that. Williamson himself didn’t think his essay got any significant philosophic work done and lacked rigor, but I agree - it’s a work for philosophers exclusively and gets some work done.

Nagel keeps the questions alive.

One thing to notice: The requirement to "completely forego the devotion to . . . " is surely too rigid, and also tendentious. By putting it in terms of "devotion," you're already building a rhetorical case against it, aren't you? Couldn't we just talk about "a type of philosophy that doesn't primarily concern itself with . . ." ? — J

You said “though it need not” and so I asked if you were saying “completely forego” since it need not.

You changed “relegated” to “devoted”.

I am not building the case as much as confirming your case.

You ask, “Couldn't we just talk about "a type of philosophy that doesn't primarily concern itself with . . ." ?”

Well yes, but two points in the context of this thread. Isn’t this thread about more precision, so “doesn’t primarily concern” doesn’t seem rigorous and begs further details about what is the primary concern and how secondary or tertiary is the less concerning.
Also, I think this contradicts you saying “though it need not.” (Which is why you sensed a case against it.)

Bottom line to me, philosophy must concern itself with consistency and coherence of language and argument - that is logical validity. But philosophy must also concern itself with the world and the persons in it and their existential/metaphysical questions - that is where soundness of arguments is measured.

If you seek validity with no concern for soundness, you live in a hypothetical world at best, and further, like math, we all must think the exact same thing about what is valid. If you seek soundness but no concern for validity, no one will ever be able to follow your reasoning and logic and understand you, and we all may think totally different things. But if you can communicate both validity AND soundness, well maybe there is something truly interesting to talk about.

This isn’t an argument. It’s just why I bother to seek something valuable by talking with other people.

The sound experience conveyed validly.

I'll help. I think your intuition is along these lines:

1. Making any comparison requires a standard.
2. That standard must be fixed
3. That fixed standard must be independent on the things being compared
4. to be both fixed and independent is to be absolute
5. hence any comparison requires an absolute standard

Something like that?

Can you see why this is incorrect? — Banno

That is the intuition. I think I see that it is not valid. Something about 2 and 4 seems tautological so nothing new can be concluded.

But…

Mere assertion. — Banno

How is ANY use of “better” anything more than mere assertion?

I AM merely making an assertion.

I’m basically asserting that language doesn’t work unless it refers to absolutes.

To call something misleading is to say it leads somewhere—but crucially, somewhere we didn’t intend, or that doesn’t fulfill the function we took ourselves to be engaging in. That’s not the same as saying there is a metaphysical end-point we ought to be led to; rather, it’s to say that a particular use diverts us from how the practice normally works or what it aims at internally. — Banno

That looks full of absolutes to me.
Absolute “misleading”.
Absolute “function we took ourselves to be engaging in.”
An absolute “normally”
Etc.

These are your assertions. I’m okay with assertions, depending on what follows from them. I think what follows from the assertion “we don’t need absolutes” is “we cannot communicate”.

I think the way you intuitively talk demonstrates my intuition about the reliance on absolutes essential to meaningful, useful language in the world of rational speakers.

The argument I could use help with is that two rational agents cannot communicate absent a medium separate from the both that lies between them and is fixed with absolutes; language is that medium, full of references to items named, relations rationalized, and absolute concepts binding these to the two rational agents at once.

Something must be fixed in this mix, or nothing like a communication would ever occur. And it already has occurred. I agree, it’s not much of an argument, but I think it is more than an adequate demonstration. We both need help with our assertions.

Better entails worst and best, in itself, by definition, in every appropriate use. We need that to be the case, to use “better” at all.
— Fire Ologist
I'm interested in the limitation. Can you give me an example of an inappropriate use? Do you mean that in the inappropriate uses, better does not entail worst and best? — Ludwig V

Everyone seems to be comfortable using the word “better” and understanding what it is intended to add to a conversation. I am saying, by saying and using “better” appropriately, one not only must understand what better means and how to use “better”, one must also know what “best” means and how to use it as well. Better is defined by best. The better tends towards the best, while the worse tends towards the worst. You don’t know one of these, you don’t use one of these appropriately, without knowing the others.

So now I ask you, may the good philosophy devote itself to identifying and clarifying consistent/inconsistent and coherent/incoherent relations internal to systems/models?
— Fire Ologist

Yes. Though it needn't. — J

So good philosophy can completely forego the devotion to “ identifying and clarifying consistent/inconsistent and coherent/incoherent relations internal to systems/models”?

Or is there more to it that can still be rigorous and can be the work of philosophers?
— Fire Ologist

Yes. — J

Can you give an example?

The simple point is that we can deal with our present situation without positing some absolute. — Banno

Ok. Did you argue that somewhere without positing some absolute?

The goal should be equality for humans. — MoK

I agree ‘equality before the law’ is a good political ideal. That’s one whole conversation, about politics and the formation of the relationship between citizens and the state and the law.

I agree equal opportunity would be nice, but practically will never happen. That’s economics and maybe sociology. Totally different discussion and use of “equality”. We will never be able to create a world where all people have all opportunities equally because of the nature of people and the nature of the world, and the nature of people in the world.

I disagree people are by nature equal to each other. Quite the opposite, I believe all of us are each unique, and unequal. This is biology, psychology and theology.

So depending on what you mean by “equality for humans”, and unless you are only talking politics, I likely disagree with you.

Two alignments get involved when it comes to morality, namely, good and evil — MoK

I don’t know what that means.

Luckily for me you're responding to my posts. Which is proof in itself. — AmadeusD

I’ve outright ignored countless people, even you. Did they provoke me not to respond, then?
— NOS4A2 — Michael

Yes they did.

Directly in response to Amadeus’ post, in an effort to persuade us all with his words (ironically and contradictorily to his position), NOS has not responded to Amadeus.

It was a nice try. But the impact of Amadeus’ words is too apparent by NOS’ inaction.

Banno, J,
I know you have moved to some interesting discussion here, but the issues below still seem live to me, and related to where you are now.

And related to post on the Bernard Williams thread.

To call something misleading is to say it leads somewhere—but crucially, somewhere we didn’t intend, or that doesn’t fulfill the function we took ourselves to be engaging in. That’s not the same as saying there is a metaphysical end-point we ought to be led to; rather, it’s to say that a particular use diverts us from how the practice normally works or what it aims at internally. — Banno

So your last word “internally” seems to frame the whole position. Because phrases like “somewhere we didn’t intend” or “somewhere that …doesn’t fulfill the function we took ourselves to be engaging in” or “how the practice normally works or what it aims at..” seem to confuse the issue of whether “there is a metaphysical end-point” or not (since they all sound like euphemisms for metaphysical end-points or causes).

You appear to be saying that a philosopher’s best (or better) use of skills is to take models and language games and rigorously determine their consistencies and inconsistencies, confirm coherence, and root out incoherence. Philosophic language ought to be aiming at coherent and consistent models, internally, and can side-step judgments regarding correspondence type analyses that endeavor only to point externally to the world or “metaphysical end-points we ought to be led to.”

Are philosophers to frame their questions tightly focused on internal consistency, and build standards that are most uniquely philosophic when those standards are based on coherence, not correspondence?

You seem to be saying that all correspondence usages of “truth” or “facts about the world” should be left to physics models and agreed upon stipulated languages like biology, or mythology, or good literature. But philosophy remains best (or ‘better’ I should say to avoid reference to some ‘metaphysical end-point’) when it aims to weed out inconsistencies and incoherence from any language, from any logic.

To frame this another way, the better philosophical discussions are about whether a belief may be true because it is consistent internally with what it purports to say and actually does say as a model. Less rigorous philosophy unwittingly or carelessly falls back into discussing what is actually true, in the world, regardless of how things may have been worded (and regardless of the well-established epistemic and metaphysical problems correspondence entails).

Is that what you think, and somewhat what Williamson was getting at? Doing better means clarifying the coherent, not discovering the correspondent?

The reason for reading the canon is to improve on it. But in order to "improve" on it, one does not need already to have an idea of the perfect or ultimate item.
— Banno

Yes. In the arts, "improve" might better be thought of as "develop" or "enrich" or, of course, "react wildly against"! — J

I do agree that one “does not need already to have an idea of the perfect or ultimate item.” I agree because the subject of this sentence is an “item”. There is no ultimate item. At least not necessarily.

But then, how are we to ever mean “ultimate” - how is the word ever a valid part of a useful model? How, for instance, did I know there is no such thing as the ultimate item? How can we measure “improve” or “better” and apply them?

The point I was trying to make that for some reason seems to only interest me was that you in fact DO have the “ultimate” or “best” in mind whenever you say “enrich” or “progress” or “improve” - ultimate is your metaphysical measuring stick, or metaphysical end, or cause. It’s not an item, but a clear enough concept to tell you “that item over there ain’t the ultimate item.”

I suggested an example -- the battle of the bands -- in which we don't appear to need a constitutive idea of "best" in order to choose a winner. (Remember, we're both agreeing to reject that other reading of "best" which simply defines it as "top choice." That's not constitutive. That would be like saying that piety is what the gods love. It provides no content.) — J

I’ll get back to a constitutive example, but, I don’t think I rejected “top choice” as “best” - an idea like “top” will always be found near the idea of “best”. My point is that an idea like “best” will always be found near an idea like “better”.

You raise a good example of what I’m trying to point out. You said, “…’piety is what the gods love’… provides no content.”

So while I see that “piety is what the gods love” is a good example of circular reasoning or possible tautology between “piety” and “gods love”, which provides no content to “piety” internally and adds no measure of consistency to using “pious”; however, I also see that, for some other reason, you aren’t talking about say “brown” or “honey”.

“What is piety?” Piety is a sweet flavor, like honey. Or wait, piety is a brownish color, like mud. Or wait, “piety is what the gods love.”

So ‘what gods love” actually does provide some content, because I’m sure you know that, at the very least, piety is not like honey and brown. Piety is about the gods - that gets some work done. An idea like “piety” will only be found near an idea like “god”. This doesn’t ultimately define either, but the idea of “brown honey” is useless, that is for certain (somehow).

I think what I am trying to point to is indirectly reflected in this: just like it is hard to give a good constitutive example of a superlative ideal such as “best”, it is hard to give a good example of something wholly non-constitutive such “piety is what gods like” is not wholly non-consitutive. Speaking at all requires coherence AND a corresponding world for us communicate at all, for us to agree and disagree through language. (I think this needs to be developed, and its development would make distinctions between speaking and communicating where communicating requires a mind independent world in between two communicants, but I think I digress …)

But to finish my more general (but I think necessary for rigor) point. You and Banno seem to want to be able to develop content using words like “better” and “enrich” while avoiding inherent references to the ‘best’ and the ‘richest’. That to me is using words like “piety” without any orientation or end in site, in which case maybe piety is really green and smells funny. There needs to exist something upon which we both can agree, apart from us both, external to our language, about which we are speaking and possibly agreeing; not simply language. To use “better”, we need to see: 1) two things 2) being compared by some standard, to then form 3) agreement on which makes sense to call the “better” or not.

Analyzing 2) only, the standard, we are talking about a shoe-horning into the picture of a metaphysical measuring stick of worst-better-best. That is what “better” means in itself; it means that which is in between the worst and the best, but leaning towards the best (or something like that). Better entails worst and best, in itself, by definition, in every appropriate use. We need that to be the case, to use “better” at all.

But applying/using/testing this ideal laden measuring stick also requires items in the world, appraised by some standard (ie ‘music that is able to be danced to’ - which is ‘better’, x or y style of music). Marry the measuring stick of some specific standard, apply it to two or more items and you can debate and communicate which is “better”.

If we remove the metaphysical, we can’t have this debate.

And if we are always only looking for coherence and consistency, the content can always remain hypothetical and progress always means “yes, that’s coherent” or “no, that’s incoherent”. (Better becomes a weak judgement of something more plainly good or not good.)

Consider this: it is coherent and internally consistent to say this: ‘when comparing only two items, the one that is better is also the one this is best.’ This is a coherent understanding of “worst-better-best” in a context of two items, without any need to actually consider two actual objects in the world. I believe you are saying analyzing statements like this is philosophy’s best use, correct? So objects in the world are hypothetical, if needed at all, to do philosophy.

So now I ask you, must the best philosophy relegate itself to identifying and clarifying consistent/inconsistent and coherent/incoherent relations internal to systems/models? Or is there more to it that can still be rigorous and ought to be the work of philosophers?

The problem is that while "we all" can indeed make intelligible and rational claims in support of a given framework, another group of "us all" can dispute them, with equal rationality.
— J

How to you determine that every claim is made "with equal rationality"? — Leontiskos

Yes. No work can be done or progress made if one believes “equal rationality” applies to both sides of any dispute.

Rationality may exist on both sides, but how “equal”? The inequality of the rationality is what constitutes any dispute, whether one side (or both) are making invalid arguments and/or using unfounded facts.

Not a thing, but not nothing. — Wayfarer

That is the world I’m interested in. I don’t think the experts in speaking about this half-world are only priests and mystics and poets. I think there is rigorous philosophic work that can be done on whatever that is that you just referenced.

To give it some type of grounding, I call it, the personal. Persons don’t seem to equate to things, but can’t be denied as if nothing either.

Good stuff, Wayfarer. I’d love to be able to get rigorous about the unconditioned. I’d love to discuss “love” for instance, as a substance, like a thing, but not a thing, but not nothing. Seems eons away from where philosophy is today…