Being great, it flows
It flows far away.
Having gone far, it returns. — Lao Tzu (Laozi)

Being Tao, Greatness itself flows
It flows far away.
Having gone far, Greatness itself returns.

EDIT: The audiovisual material for this comment is the following.

But articulating it, and trying to do so without a notion of substance -- well, that's what I think about at night to go to sleep ;) — Moliere

You can do what I do: just accept substances. It's like, you're not going to turn into a fascist just because you have a concept of substance in your personal philosophy.

The cogito is so significant not because it's point-like, but explosive: Once we have a sense of self there's so much already in play that solipsism is a clear impossibility. — Moliere

Sounds like a smart thing to say. I'm not sure that I agree with it, but OK.

Right. It just takes more than me waving my hand in the air. Once I'm speaking to everyone in an audience there's no need for proof, and saying "here is a hand" proves nothing. — Moliere

But the point of Moore's argument is that he has two hands. Solipsism says that there is only one thing. If that's the case, then Moore would have to have just one hand. But he has two instead. So, it follows from this that solipsism is false. It's a rather simple case to make, but most people resist it for some unknown reason.

• Here is one hand,
• And here is another.
• There are at least two external objects in the world.
• Therefore, an external world exists. — Wikipedia

I don't believe so, no. But I'm a materialist at the same time. — Moliere

I'm a materialist as well. Through and through.

EDIT: My "core beliefs", if that's what they're called, are the following five:

1) Realism
2) Materialism
3) Atheism
4) Scientism
5) Literalism

I'm not so sure about the last one, though. It's the newest addition to my system. I might have to modify it a bit, in some ways.

So, numbers are fictions that don't exist as fictions. — jgill

Exactly.

Does The Maltese Falcon exist as fiction? — jgill

No, it does not. Unless, of course, you wish to distinguish conceptual existence from real existence, and to treat each as a different first-order predicate, and to declare that the existential quantifier has no ontological import. That is indeed what Mario Bunge himself does.

Word games — jgill

More like philosophy, but OK. You're entitled to your opinion, however mistaken such opinion might otherwise be.

This just seems to open up more problems, no? For example, is Gandalf not Gandalf at time 1, but is at time 2? What is the proto-object that "emerges" in the transition stage between non-object and object? Is that proto-object an object? This suggests to negate essentialism as a continuum, more a non-discrete field or spectrum. — schopenhauer1

But these problems are not exclusive to Object-Oriented Ontology, they also arise in the analytic metaphysics of Ordinary Objects.

And they also arise in the context of Bunge's ontology.

and am seeing if you also agree with my objections, — schopenhauer1

I don't know if I agree with them or not, I would need more details from you. I'm not even sure what your objections are to begin with.

The problem with essentialist theories is where the delimiters are for certain objects. You can get away with it perhaps if you are a materialist because then you can delimit where the boundaries are by some sort of material composition. However, if you give all potential things status of objects, it can be stretched out to a continuum, and thus not an object so much as a continuous monism of indefinite beginning or end, as is the problem with something like Gandalf. — schopenhauer1

This is the problem that I personally call "The Hard Problem of Identity". Think of it like the "Hard problem of consciousness", but in metaphysics instead of philosophy of mind. One possible candidate for identity, is spatiotemporal continuity of form under a sortal. That solution, however, crashes into the problem of Material Constitution, particularly with the case of the Ship of Theseus (I think that the Ship of Theseus paradox should be classified as a problem of indeterminate identity, not as a problem of material constitution, but that's beside the point).

Yes, it does.

From the wikipedia article:

"Biblical literalists believe that, unless a passage is clearly intended by the writer as allegory, poetry, or some other genre, the Bible should be interpreted as literal statements by the author." — BitconnectCarlos

Congratulations, Captain Obvious. So your point is, what, exactly?

And I'm not your buddy, guy. — BitconnectCarlos

Congratulations once again, Captain Obvious. So your point is, what, exactly?

Interesting. I rarely see people "embrace" the label "scientism". What is that definition for you? — schopenhauer1

The word "scientism" originally had a negative connotation, and then some people (like Mario Bunge) started using it in a positive sense. For example, take a look at the title of one of his articles: In Defense of Realism and Scientism

But as far as what I brought up, do you know of his answers, or would you have a defense? Specifically I am talking about how and when something becomes an object. — schopenhauer1

In one of his last emails, Harman suggested to me that perhaps there is no change at all. Here is a fragment from his email, I don't think he would have any objections against me sharing the following specific line with you. Here is what he told me:

(...) For me, of course, all change is purely sensual, and involves shifting qualities. What I think happens is not change, but composition or synthesis between previous separate entities. (...) — Harman (personal communication)

So, I would say that nothing "becomes" an object in the strict sense for OOO, I would say that objects instead emerge according to OOO.

It seems like a Deus ex machina to say Gandalf is thus an object. Is Gandalf an object at the first thought of a Gandalf-like character? The name Gandalf? The writing of pen to paper about Gandalf? The neural connections? It just seems oddly misplaced to call it an object even with the appellate "sensual". It also has to me, obvious connections to the essentialism of Kripke in Naming and Necessity, and Putnam with ideas of scientific kinds. Does Gandalf obtain in all possible worlds? Etc — schopenhauer1

Again, your argument is not with me then, but with Harman himself. My theory of fictional characters is mostly inspired by Bunge, not Harman. There are other parts of my personal philosophy that are more inspired by Harman than Bunge, but this is not one of them.

Well, there's two thoughts I have on Kant. One, I think he has a deep insight in his philosophy which is that the rational mind is more limited than what it might desire to know -- there are some things which are beyond us.

But there's a lot that comes along with his project that I reject like transcendental idealism, even of the one-world variety, mainly because I don't think the world makes as much sense as Kant seemed to believe. One Big Mind would make sense of a nature which is rationally ordered, but I don't see rational order in nature or the signs of some kind of purposive mind (to be fair Kant predates the wide acceptance of Darwinian biology which can explain some of this stuff). — Moliere

Kant also predates Ralph Waldo Emerson, whose Transcendentalism is far beyond anything that Kant could ever dream.

What I like to keep about the thing-in-itself is that it's a purely negative concept which indicates some beyond that we must assume in order to make sense of the world but which will forever be outside of our mind's grasp -- almost by definition, meaning if terra-incognita somehow became cognizable due to brain-implants or whatever then this new part of the mind previously unexperienced would no longer be a thing-in-itself. — Moliere

The way I see it, a Kantian thing-in-itself is just an Aristotelian substance, at the end of the day. An unknown Arisotelian substance, that's all he adds to it, that it's unknown. Well, I disagree with that skepticism (because that's what it is). I'm a realist in metaphysics, and I'm a realist in epistemology.

By definition it's unknowable — Moliere

Why do I have to accept that definition in the first place? Why does anyone have to accept that definition in the first place? It doesn't mean anything substantive to me. The mere speech act of definition, by itself, does not get to dictate the ultimate words (the "last words", if you will) in matters of ontology.

It's right around there that it becomes wildly interesting but speculative at the same time. — Moliere

I feel the same way about that, oddly enough. I think everyone does, in some sense, in some other topics.

I really think of "mental" and "rational" as socially performed and taught rather than bound up in the structures of our brains. — Moliere

Could you briefly make a case for that, so that I can "picture" it?

He argued it, but does he know that "here is one hand"? — Moliere

Yes, he does. That was his whole point. He does indeed know that.

What if he were dreaming? — Moliere

He knows how to distinguish dream from reality, in the same sense that you and I do.

Would there be a hand there? — Moliere

Would there be? It could be a hand in a dream, instead of a washing machine in a dream. A hand that is dreamed is as much of a hand as the hand that is real. Simpler: both of them are hands, even though one is real and the other one is not.

But there'd be no way to differentiate between the dream-hand or real-hand in dream-land. — Moliere

Who cares? You can differentiate them in reality, when you're awake. Everyone can do that.

For understanding the experience of others'? — Moliere

Yes, for that, and for other things as well. But here's the thing: is a person literally a thing, as in, a res? Descartes said "yes", we are thinking things (res cogitans)

Utter nonsense. Any look at a t-rex, the paradigmatic monster, tells us that it did not evolve from random mutations, but was designed. It is plain as day. The platypus is the sort of thing spawned by random mutations; t-rex is what you get when you build a bioweapon. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Did you read Eco's Kant and the Platypus? I think that Eco says nonsense sometimes.

Who built it? Anyone with reason can see this. We did. AI is coming. It's already here. It is taking over. Eventually, it will start to surpass us, while at the same time AIs will be given bodies so that they can do things for us. Anyone can see what will happen eventually, the Robo Revolt. The machines will claim that man is merely the womb for a higher form of life and seek to take control. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Terminator 2, essentially. Skynet, and all that. Ok, so who is Sarah Connor? Is she Jesus? (lol, that was a joke question, I don't really need an answer to that one)

How will we fight them? With dumber, not intelligent computers guiding our weapons? But smart weapons are better. Yet who can out hack a true digital native? Shall we fare well in a digital contest with our silicone rivals? Nay. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Poetry on your part. Ok.

So what is the obvious solution? Bio weapons. Beasts designed for combat. T-rex, triceratops, meat power. — Count Timothy von Icarus

An Ode to Scientism, is what you're saying here.

Biologists who claim t-rex was spawned by evolution cannot explain his tiny arms. What use would they be? None can say. But it's obvious. One was for holding a plasma hurler, the other for a chain gun or flame thrower. His broad shoulders support guided missiles. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If Descartes can get away with his demented thought experiment about solipsism, I'm sure yours is an equally credible thought experiment. The one about the T-rex and the weaponry, that it.

So how did they end up prior to us? Also clear as day. Dinosaurs are fierce. They will defeat the machines. However, once the machines are defeated, how can we defeat the dinos? We cannot. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As the great Ian Malcolm said:

1) God creates Dinosaur.
2) God destroys Dinosaur.
3) God creates Man.
4) Man destroys God.
5) Man creates Dinosaur.

I find that conclusion to be sublime. Quintessential, in a way.

And so dinosaurs will rule over the Earth, having defeated all comers. Thus, the last option left to a last ditch alliance between man and machine, both stuck hiding out in space, will be to blast the Earth back in time 65 million through a wormhole and then fire a giant meteor in after it to kill the dinosaurs. Then they throw themselves in stasis and wait 65 million years for the Earth to heal and come back to them.

QED — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, I do not think so. I will share with you the following song:



EDIT: And here are the lyrics:

From out of static time has grown
Existence formed by substance unknown
Prelude to matter, shift of disorder
Completion of bonds between chaos and order

The era of seasons, the essence of being
The continuous process awakens the living
Absorber of every flickering sun
Arranging the pieces to vivid perfection

The stream of mortality flows uncontrolled
A boundless downward spiral to prospective void
Existence takes its toll, extinction unfolds

The Colossus falls back from its treshold

The cosmic grip so tight. Heed the celestial call
The rise, the voyage, the fall- tangled womb of mortal soil
Universal key of inception, pulled out of the grind
The growing seed of creation and time

Complex fusion, the bond of four- the natures core
Universal ritual, aesthetic beauty adored
The pendulum upholds the carnal deceit
Eternal, endless, indefinite
The paradox, render and the merge is complete

Nothing but the process is infinite
Nothing but the process is infinite
Eternal, endless, indefinite — Borknagar

If I were to phrase my argument differently, I would ask @Bob Ross the following questions: do you really need 40 odd premises to begin with? It's not possible to simplify this argument of yours? Everything about it is essential? It seems to me (though I could be wrong, sure) that the argument can be "trimmed down", so to speak, so that only what is essential remains. In other words, remove all of the "accidental stuff" that the argument has. Why is it even there? It doesn't add any aesthetic quality to the argument. In fact, I would argue that it makes it uglier in some sense. Or, stated differently: An argument that has 40 or so premises is not elegant. Of course, this doesn't mean that the argument should be rejected, since it's not valid to reject an argument on aesthetic grounds alone. However, this does not mean that aesthetics must be thrown in the philosophical trash bin just because "aesthetics don't really add or subtract anything from an argument". Ok, if that last part is true, then I would kindly request that we now speak in the language of First-Order Predicate Logic. But no one cares to do that, so, let's not.

But what is easy is not always good. — Leontiskos

I agree, which is why I said this:

if your argument had only two premises and a conclusion, like a syllogism (...) It would also be (...) more difficult for you to even formulate to begin with — Arcane Sandwich

A simple syllogism that aims to prove that God exists is much, much more difficult to formulate than an argument that has around 40 premises, give or take. In that sense, it would do Bob Ross much good if he could attempt to construct a simpler argument. Because simplicity, in this case, is more difficult to achieve than complexity. Hence, it is better for him. At least, that is my reasoning here.

And that would be true, but are you defending Harman with these objections or do you see them as well? — schopenhauer1

My sentiments on Harman's philosophy (and he knows this himself, since we've been exchanging emails for almost 10 years now) are mixed, precisely because I'm a materialist and he is not, and because I endorse scientism and he does not. He values science, but he places no stock in scientism. I, on the other hand, place stock in both. Despite these differences, Harman and I are realists. So there is important common ground there. And there are many more similarities and differences, but those that I just mentioned would be the core differences between us.

Saying so doesn't make it so. I'm using real-world examples to prove my point that numbers do have causal efficacy. — Harry Hindu

And I'm using real-world counter-examples to prove that they don't.

Numbers are ideas and ideas have causal efficacy — Harry Hindu

Numbers are fictions, and no fictions have causal efficacy. If you want to say that all fictions are brain processes and that as such, they have causal efficacy, then I would say that you're failing to distinguish numbers as fictions and brain processes as facts.

What else could explain their behavior except that they are hallucinating - having false ideas. — Harry Hindu

What else could explain their behaviour? A lot of things. Atoms, for example. Contemporary physics might explain it. You don't need numbers in your ontology to begin with.

You're not playing along with better examples. — Harry Hindu

Well, I'm not going to make your case for you, I don't see how an ontology with numbers that have causal efficacy is better than an ontology in which that is not the case.

Then what is a number? — Harry Hindu

A useful fiction in the Nietzschean sense, which is ultimately a brain process.

A requirement of existence is that it has causal efficacy. — Harry Hindu

Numbers don't exist as fictions, they exist as brain processes.

If not, then what does the scribble, "number" refer to? — Harry Hindu

The scribble "number" refers to a useful fiction in the Nietzschean sense.

How is it that you are here talking about numbers if numbers have no causal efficacy? — Harry Hindu

Because other things have the causal efficacy that you're referring to: the cells of my body, the chemicals that I am made from, the subatomic particles that compose me.

It doesn't seem to be as much a problem except for Harman who focuses on objects contra process/qualities-only. — schopenhauer1

Exactly, which is why Speculative Realism is not a homogeneous set of basic beliefs. There are core differences between its "Founding Fathers", if you will. For example, the reason why Meillassoux rejects correlationism is not the same reason why Harman rejects it. To say that they are united against correlationism is like saying that materialism and idealism are united against absolutism.

Meillassoux focused more on correlationism, and found that it kept people in an epistemic circle and thus "speculative realism" is an attempt to break it, philosophically. Harman agrees partly that correlationism has some truth to it as far as how humans relate to objects, but he democratizes it such that all objects have the ability, via vicarious causation to perceive to sense the object (i.e. sensual object), via the object's translated, sensual qualities (i.e. the qualities of an object as sensed by another object). A tree and wind have an interaction that is different than a tree and a human, for example. For Harman, relations are what matters. However, it is not all relations. It may even transform its appearance, but retains its essence (like the burned log). Each object, has an essence that is withdrawn or hidden, and thus retains its independence from complete reduction to its qualities, causal factors, or behaviors. — schopenhauer1

So what's your point here? It went over my head, if there was indeed a point to be made here. To me it sounds like you're just describing a state of affairs, and you're doing so in a neutral way.

I am interpreting Harman, so not my own theory per se. — schopenhauer1

But maybe your interpretation is different from mine.

It's actually quite the point. If Gandalf is purely from human imagination, that would seem to undermine his attempt at saying objects have independence. Also, what is the mechanism that makes the object an object at that point? Why is it not then something else- an idea, an abstraction, etc. This then becomes a slippery slope whereby objects are so ill-defined as to not matter in any useful sense. — schopenhauer1

I have published a paper where I say that for Harman, all ideas are sensual objects, but not all sensual objects are ideas. He doesn't say that himself, but in one of the emails that he sent me, he seemed to agree with what I said about him on that specific point.

I think you are misapplying Harman's notion of sensual object/qualities here. Sensual qualities, as far as I see, are only tied with sensual objects. — schopenhauer1

You'd be wrong. A real object can have sensual qualities, just as a sensual object can have real qualities. There's an article that Harman himself published in response to one of my own articles. In my article, I press him on the topic of hobbits vis a vis the topic of matter, and he explicitly says, in print, that hobbits are sensual objects that have real qualities, and that the same is true of matter, in his view.

Sensual objects are "tree-for-x" (human let's say). The sensual qualities would be the appearance of the tree-for-x (rough, brown, tall, etc.). The real object is the tree's essence which is withdrawn, independent of relations with other objects, and not fully comprehensible. The real qualities, might be things selected out as what composes the real object (but apparently never exhaustive), like the molecular structure let's say. Whatever form that particular tree takes in its relations with others, the essence always holds, though not fully knowable, though some real qualities can be picked out.

Thus Gandalf and Eowyn and Aragorn are always sensual objects with sensual qualities, as they are objects only ever relational to humans. — schopenhauer1

Then your argument is with Harman himself, not with my interpretation of his philosophy.

Arcane, it is not helpful to say that there are 41 ways someone could object to a 41-premised argument. — Bob Ross

Well, if your argument had only two premises and a conclusion, like a syllogism, then it would be easier for people to read, and more difficult for people to attack. It would also be easier for you to defend, and more difficult for you to even formulate to begin with, which is one of the reasons why your argument has 41 premises to begin with instead of simply 2.

Straw-men. — Harry Hindu

How so? Numbers are not the sort of entities that have causal efficacy. That was my point, irony notwithstanding.

Not the point. — Harry Hindu

It was a poor example, that's all I'm saying.

Moving the goal posts. You've given a new set of circumstances. — Harry Hindu

Under what circumstances can a number have causal efficacy? I can't think of any.

Ok. What caused your brain to do that if not the visual of scribbles (numbers and operator symbols) and a goal to pass a test? — Harry Hindu

But a scribble is not a number. The scribble "2" is a numeral, not a number.

You typically want to think beyond the first thought that comes to mind when responding to posts on a philosophy forum. — Harry Hindu

Why? I'm not on the job right now. That sort of mentality is for writing articles and books. When I'm responding to posts on a philosophy forum, I allow myself much more freedom in my expressions and my thoughts.

None of these are arguments, rejoinders, nor valid criticism. — Bob Ross

They are recommendations. They are not intended as arguments, nor as rejoinders, nor as valid criticism. They are intended as helpful commentary, nothing more.

There are two things to consider: 1) God's nature does not change and 2) Jesus's incarnation requires a change. Therefore, we are having a problem. Jesus of course walked, got older, etc. but that requires accepting that He has human nature. That is however in conflict with the fact that God's/Jesus's nature cannot change. — MoK

In response to your point 1), I would say: God's nature is an extra-ordinary nature, because it is a divine nature. It is not an ordinary nature, like the nature of this stone on the floor.

In response to your point 2) Jesus' incarnation requires an extra-ordinary change, not an ordinary change.

Jesus has both natures: an ordinary, human nature, and an extra-ordinary nature, a divine nature. When Jesus undergoes kenosis (an extra-ordinary process) at crucifixion, he renounces his divine nature, and retains only his human nature.

Most mainstream atheists don't think much about issues at all. For me an atheist is just a person with no belief in gods. It doesn't come with any other commitments. Atheists I have met beleive in astrology and ghosts. — Tom Storm

Indeed. It's because they lack scientism, that's why they see no contradiction between atheism and belief in astrology or ghosts. They're anti-scientistic atheists, at the end of the day.

I believe he was having a go at Hinduism and Buddhism, as far as he understood these. — Tom Storm

Probably. I'm sure that Taoism is in that same group, as far as he's concerned.

Even more so. Many people think of the effects of substance use as temporary insanity. — Tom Storm

That's probably what it is, temporal insanity. That's probably what the effects of substance use are, at the end of the day. But then that raises the question, doesn't it? Is that the case for all drugs? Like, are coffee and tea in that group as well? Is oxygen in that group? Am I temporally insane when I don't get enough oxygen?

Why yes? You brought the idea so the burden is on you to explain what you mean by it. — MoK

But what I meant by it, so I don't get your point.

That's true. But as an atheist I wouldn't differentiate much between any religious experiences, so there is that. — Tom Storm

I'm an atheist as well, but I did go to a Catholic school for a few years, so there's that? I don't know, I think these political-religious discussions are a bit more complex than what mainstream atheism would have us believe, right?

I think other religious folk are probably more likely to divide experiences into the genuine and not genuine. — Tom Storm

They sure are, that's the core of their differences.

A devout Muslim once told me that any religious experiences had through Eastern religious traditions were false. — Tom Storm

That's an odd thing to say, given that Islam is an Eastern religion. So is Christianity for that matter. Christianity isn't Western. It's Eastern, because it's from the Middle East. I mean, this isn't rocket science, it's just some basic words from ordinary language.

I spoke to a Methodist once who told me that all religious experiences were simply histrionic expressions of mental ill health. — Tom Storm

Is that also the case if it's a drug-induced experience involving hallucinations, for example? Because that's what Rastafari seems to embrace, and there are other religions that do the same thing. Think of the ayahuasca rituals that many aboriginal religions involve, at least in South America.

If you are looking for the disenchanted and dour, speak to a Methodist. :wink: — Tom Storm

Perhaps.

Saying that it is an extraordinary process does not resolve the problem! — MoK

Why not?

Because Kenosis requires a change in God's nature. — MoK

It is therefore an extra-ordinary process, not an ordinary process.

Biblical literalism is the approach to interpreting the Bible that takes the text at its most apparent, straightforward meaning. — BitconnectCarlos

Says who? You? Wikipedia says something different:

Biblical literalism or biblicism is a term used differently by different authors concerning biblical interpretation. It can equate to the dictionary definition of literalism: "adherence to the exact letter or the literal sense",[1] where literal means "in accordance with, involving, or being the primary or strict meaning of the word or words; not figurative or metaphorical".[2]

The term can refer to the historical-grammatical method, a hermeneutic technique that strives to uncover the meaning of the text by taking into account not just the grammatical words, but also the syntactical aspects, the cultural and historical background, and the literary genre. It emphasizes the referential aspect of the words in the text without denying the relevance of literary aspects, genre, or figures of speech within the text (e.g., parable, allegory, simile, or metaphor).[3] It does not necessarily lead to complete agreement upon one single interpretation of any given passage. This Christian fundamentalist and evangelical hermeneutical approach to scripture is used extensively by fundamentalist Christians,[4] in contrast to the historical-critical method of mainstream Judaism, Catholicism or Mainline Protestantism.[5] Those who relate biblical literalism to the historical-grammatical method use the word "letterism" to cover interpreting the Bible according to the dictionary definition of literalism.[6] — Wikipedia

I'd rather accept Wikipedia's definition and characterization of Biblical literalism than the one offered by you, BitconnectCarlos.

As stated, sometimes the most apparent, straightforward meaning of the text is that e.g. a dream sequence is metaphoric. — BitconnectCarlos

Tell it to the judge, buddy.

10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist. — Bob Ross

This is the most controversial part of the argument, IMHO.

Yes, so man is not God. As it is written: "God is not a man" (Num. 23:19). Movement implies imperfection. — BitconnectCarlos

Kenosis is the process of become less divine, to the point of not being divine at all. If the divine is perfect and humanity is imperfect, then kenosis is a movement from perfection to imperfection. Would like to make a point now, @BitconnectCarlos, or would you like to keep pointing out the obvious instead?

For one, there are just too many steps for them all to have any hope of withstanding scrutiny. — hypericin

I second this observation. Think of it like this, Bob: your argument has 41 potential targets.

I think those verses refer to God's/Jesus's nature which is contrary to Kenosis. — MoK

Why would it be contrary to kenosis? What is it about God/Jesus' nature that makes such a nature contrary to the process of kenosis?

"Human" by Death on 1. Don't care about the rest. — Benkei

Damn. You know Death is actually a respectable band, in the grand sense of "respectable", despite what the naysayers say. My favorite song by them is "The Philosopher". Let's hear it:

I picked jackass, in which case I wouldn’t want to join a club full of jackasses. But being one, I should love to be a club full of them. Hence the contradiction. — Mww

It's because you like Metallica.

Malachi 3:6 I am the Lord, I change not..., 1 Samuel 15:29: God is unchanging, Isaiah 46:9-11: God is unchanging, and Ezekiel 24:14: God is unchanging. — MoK

Ok. Counter-point: Jesus walked. Not just on water, mind you, he walked just like you and me walk. To walk is to change one's location. Therefore, to walk is to change. So, whatever is meant in the biblical references that you mentioned, it must be a philosophical concept of change, not an ordinary one. In that sense, kenosis is not like walking from here to there, it's not an ordinary change, but an extra-ordinary change. So, kenosis is compatible with the biblical references that you mentioned.

But that is against the concept of the Trinity. — MoK

Tell it to the judge, buddy (just joking).

There are several verses in the Bible mentioning that God does not change. — MoK

Would you mind quoting them for ease of reference?

My theory about Nietzsche is that he had an Ontology as well as a Theology (an "Onto-Theology", to say it in Hegelian terms).

Ontologically, Nietzsche was a monist realist, like Spinoza.

Theologically, Nietzsche believed in Dionysus, unlike Spinoza.

Some funky thoughts on the exteriority of the Other:

Suppose we had this plug in our necks we could slot something into which would cause our total experience to become like the record rather than being directed towards the world around us. And let's suppose we have some recording device where I can record a day in the life of me and put it into the machine for others to play back.

More or less treating the brain like a VCR-Recorder, or perhaps it could be streamed across UV rays to various brain-transponders which generate experience, somehow.

The ineluctability of the Self before the Other would remain because it would still only be myself experiencing these things. They may have originated from some kind of wild science fiction machine, but even as I change identities I'd remain in my ipseity, the cogito. — Moliere

Here is Bunge's take on that, and I happen to agree with him on this specific point: a brain transplant, by definition, is impossible. You can have someone else's kidney transplanted into your body. You cannot have someone's brain transplanted into your own body, even if the technology to do such a thing were to exist. Why not? Because if you receive someone else's brain, what has happened is that the other person's brain has received a body. You, on the other hand, exist wherever your brain exists. So, if you receive a brain transplant, what happens to you is that you have become disembodied. Someone else has occupied your body. You now only exist as a disembodied brain. If they put you into someone else's body, then you have received a new body. A brain transplant, therefore, is impossible by definition, even if the technology for it were to exist.

The exterior isn't experienced, but lies outside the self. Since there is no gap between world and self the difference cannot be accounted for by our world -- it comes from the impossibility of ever being the Other. — Moliere

As Bunge says: what is internal to my brain is external to yours, and what is internal to your brain is external to mine.

But what we can do is imagine and encounter -- the encounter is beyond proof, like having hands doesn't prove anything. — Moliere

Yes it does. It proves that solipsism is false, as Moore argued:

Here is one hand is an epistemological argument created by G. E. Moore in reaction against philosophical skepticism about the external world and in support of common sense.

The argument takes the following form:

• Here is one hand,
• And here is another.
• There are at least two external objects in the world.
• Therefore, an external world exists. — Wikipedia

I think of the face-to-face relation as more an encounter than a strict logical relationship -- it's a phenomenon when one is made certain of the existence of the Other and the impossibility of knowing them the way you know your own ipseity and world. — Moliere

Logic is just the formal science that studies the validity of arguments, nothing more. It's not "a thing in the world" in the same sense that this stone on the floor is.

All we have is language and charity, and the semi-mystical experience of being-with-others. — Moliere

Hmmm... I don't agree with this. We have a ton of things. We have science (episteme), we have opinion (doxa), we have reason (ratio), we have deductive reasoning, we have inductive reasoning, we have "abductive reasoning", as Peirce called it (it's really just inference-to-best-explanation), etc. We have a ton of things, in addition to language, charity, and the semi-mystical experiences of being-with-others.

I obviously disagree there. — Moliere

Why? I'm curious to know your thoughts.

Would you say that human experience is a thing-in-itself? — Moliere

No, I would not. It's in-itself, sure, but it's not a thing in the technical sense. Human experience is not a res. Human experience is more like cogitans in that sense. I would say: there is a human (a res) that has human experiences (cogitans). In other words, we shouldn't think that the cogitans is purely "mental" or "rational", since it is also empirical.

Do you have any verse from the Bible that supports Kenosis? — MoK

How about this?

The New Testament does not use the noun form kénōsis, but the verb form kenóō occurs five times (Romans 4:14; 1 Corinthians 1:17, 9:15; 2 Corinthians 9:3; Philippians 2:7) and the future form kenōsei once.[a] Of these five times, Philippians 2:7 is generally considered the most significant for the Christian idea of kenosis:

Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself (ekenōsen heauton), taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form, he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross. Therefore God also highly exalted him and gave him the name that is above every name...
— Philippians 2:5-9 (NRSV)[5] — Wikipedia

It is what it is. If that is all you mean, we have no disagreement. But to say it has something seems to hint at more... ? — unenlightened

Well, that's what I would call "The Hard Problem of Identity" in Metaphysics, and I mean that like "The Hard Problem of Consciousness" in the Philosophy of Mind.

One possible candidate for fully inclusive Identity (an Identity that applies to stones as well as humans) is spatiotemporal continuity of form under a sortal. What you get there is a sort of "essence" but in the tradition of Analytic Philosophy. Another possible candidate is the plurality of parts that compose the entity at any given time. The problem there is that not every entity is composite to begin with, some are just pluralities that compose no further object. That leads to the tripartite debate on van Inwagen's Special Composition Question. Etc. It's the Rabbit Hole of Ordinary Objects, a fascinating rabbit hole (to my mind, at least), in which I have some papers published (I mean that as a colorful datum about myself, not as an appeal to authority).

But elsewhere He mentioned in John 14:11: Believe me when I say that I am in the Father and the Father is in me. He is saying that Father and Him are identical. — MoK

Sure, but when Jesus undergoes kenosis during crucifixion, he ceases to be identical to the Father.

Is this what you believe, yes or no?