doing anything about the past events is not an option. — Corvus

Are scientists sure about this? Time travel is not possible at all? Like, imagine a professional physicist, who understands theoretical physics to the utmost degree. Time travel is not even possible at the level of theoretical physics? Maybe it would be technologically impossible to fabricate a time-travelling machine, but are we really sure that it's completely impossible from a theoretical standpoint?

Even God cannot intervene. — Corvus

But that's what I'm saying. God, if He (or She, or They, or whatever) existed, that (divine) Being could indeed intervene. Think of God like a character in a novel. God is not really a character, but the author. The author can do anything with the novel (with the fictional world that such a Being has authored). I don't believe in God though, I'm an atheist. But is there no scientific equivalent to the notion of "something", whatever that may be, that makes physical time-travel possible?

These What-If, and Whys will never be altered no matter how you tried — Corvus

And that means, technically, that they are necessary. But at the same time, since they could have been different, they are contingent. That's what I'm saying. And it's an odd thing to contemplate, from a philosophical POV.

These are some of the factual properties and events in the universe that the PSR doesn't apply by another principle. — Corvus

And that's the scary part. The Principle of Sufficient Reason, it seems to me (I could be wrong, though), is an "all or nothing" deal. Either it applies to everything, or it applies to nothing. It cannot apply to some things, but not to other things. That just makes no sense to me. It just strikes me as an odd thing to say, from an ontological POV.

Or can it (apply to some things but not to others)? What is your opinion on that?

I guess my ultimate frustration is that sometimes it seems like science and religion are essentially talking about the same thing/process — MrLiminal

Are they, though? Not trying to be a contrarian just for the sake of it, I actually have a different impression here. I mean, I understand what you're saying, but think about it as rationally as you possibly can: they're not literally talking about the same thing/process. That very same thing/process has a divine nature, according to religion (whichever religion that might be). For the scientist, it doesn't have a divine nature, it just is Nature.

Not on its face, no. But I'll think about it.

edit: yes, that makes sense — ToothyMaw

But it's somehow "unsatisfactory", innit. I mean, if that humble first-order formula is all that I can possible contribute to this conversation, then that makes me quite sad. I take that as a personal flaw about my own persona, though.

That's interesting. If you would open a new OP for that topic, and analyse what the details of their findings are, I would be keen to read and jump in. — Corvus

Honestly, I don't want to monopolize the Main Page of the Forum. I already started three OP, and I'm actively discussing in about half a dozen or so. So, I'm reluctant to open a new OP, about anything. Besides, why not start that OP yourself? It might be better, since you can start it with your own question, and ask for the best answer to it. I can then contribute to the best of my ability.

For your why question, you could ask first, why do you find the question compelling too i.e. what made you to ask the question first place. — Corvus

A feeling of oddness, is what made me ask the question in the first place. It's just an odd thing to talk about, it's an odd thing to even think, and even more so it's very odd to become aware of it, to experience it "in the flesh", so to speak.

If you could answer that, and I am sure, only you could answer that question — Corvus

Science says that the answer is my parents. That's not enough for me. Again, I ask myself this question: why am I aware now, in the 21s Century? Why wasn't I aware in the Middle Ages? "Because I didn't exist in the Middle Ages", science will say. And science is right. But why? In principle, in theory, I could have been born in the Middle Ages. Science will say "no, because your parents were not born in the Middle Ages, they were born in the 20th Century". Right, but they could have been born in the past. Right? See where I'm getting at with this? There is a modal conflict here, there is a conflict of modalities. There are two modalities that are directly clashing with each other, and those modalities are: contingency, on the one hand, and necessity, on the other hand.

we don't know any details about the "does" part of brain. I mean when you say 2+2=4, what exactly is happening in the brain with which chemicals, which links to what cells — Corvus

There's scientists working on those sorts of problems, that's all I can say about that, honestly. We don't know the exact, detailed mechanisms of such processes. But scientists do have more or less a general picture of what's going on. We know what parts of the brain are responsible for language, which parts are responsible for memory, which parts are responsible for feelings, etc.

getting back to the OP - answering what the factual properties of a person are, and why the factual properties cannot be altered. Science will simply not be able to answer the questions. — Corvus

I disagree, and not because I want to fight. I disagree here because I think that science does give the answers to those questions, but those answers are "unsatisfactory". As you correctly said, the reason why I have the factual properties that I have, is because of my two biological parents. That's the scientific explanation. But it's unsatisfactory. Why was I born in 1985 and not the Middle Ages, or the Future? It just makes no sense to me, from a First Person Perspective.

And the third stage of the plan was the craziest: Bring the actual Australian people over here. Just bring them. Offer them land. Offer them money. Marry them. Kidnap them. Just bring a population of literal Australians to Argentina. It was an insane plan of course, with bogus ideas, which fortunately didn't succeed. — Arcane Sandwich

Argentine: "You want some land, mate? Just travel to Argentina, it's yours."

Australian: "Nah mate, I'm good."

Argentine: "You want some money, mate? It's yours if you step foot on Argentine soil."

Australian: "Nah I'm good, mate."

Argentine: "You wanna marry me, mate? You'll get a free, lifetime Visa, you'll be both a resident and a citizen of Argentina."

Australian: "Nah mate, I'm fine here in Australia."

Argentine (angry, violent, threatening) "You're traveling to Argentina whether you like it or not, mate." (proceeds to kidnap the Australian.)

Yep, a flawless plan, I don't see how it could possibly fail.

When you claimed your mind is simply what you brain does. It was not clear. It sounded like,

1) Your mind is your brain, or
2) Your brain does something to the mind, or
3) Your brain tells your mind to do all the things, or
4) Your mind is simply what your brain does.
5) So you have your brain, and also the mind which sounded like the Cartesian dualist.
6) But then you say, your mind is your brain. — Corvus

It's option (4). I am effectively saying that your mind is simply what your brain does, because the mind is a process (a neuro-cognitive process) that the brain undergoes.

I am more interested in the discussions of perception, consciousness, reasoning, propositions, belief, truth and logical proof in philosophy. Not really into biology or neurology at all. — Corvus

Fair enough. Is that what you would like to talk about? Explain your point of view to me, then, if that's what you would prefer to discuss.

This dovetails with a theme that Arcane Sandwich has taken up: whether ontology can be sensibly expressed in ordinary language. — J

My own view on that topic is actually far more extreme that what you said, and that's precisely why I'm suspicious of my own view. I shouldn't feel so strongly about this issue, but I do, and that makes me suspicious of myself, if that makes any sense. Anyways, here's what I would say: ordinary language is the only language in which ontology can be sensibly expressed. In other words, ontology cannot be done within the context of a formal language alone, be it math, logic, or a combination of both. You can utilize math and logic, you are free to do so because formal languages are mere tools, that's what they are to the professional physicist. Mathematicians and logicians do not automatically get the last word in matters of ontology "just because", without any reason.

Your logic looks correct to me. — ToothyMaw

Thanks. But I think that there might even be a third option, which would be the three terms as individual constants, and then to use a three-place predicate whose only purpose is to be an application predicate, if that makes any sense. If not, allow me to formalize what I'm saying. Suppose:
1) That "h" is an individual constant that stands for "honey",
2) That "s" is an individual constant that stands for "sweet",
3) That "t" is an individual constant that stands for "sweetness, and
4) That "I" is a three-place predicate (i.e., a ternary relation).

If so, then:

I(h,s,t)

Which means "There is a relation between honey, the property of being sweet, and the property of having sweetness).

Does that make any sense?

Muchas gracias, debo decir que este es el mejor Foro que jamás he visitado, lo cual es curioso, dado que me registré hace menos de media semana. De Casares no tengo una opinión. En cuanto a Borges, creo que fue un genio, hablando con propiedad y objetivamente. Sin embargo, en lo personal, prefiero al mentor de Borges: el escritor y filósofo Macedonio Fernández.

Some erudite mates (under Franco's era) did the same decades ago in Spain. Aussie Eucalyptus represents now 28% of Galician flora. Eucalyptus and pines were chosen by the caudillo to dry out swamps. Good choice back in the 1950s, mate! — javi2541997

Swamp desertification is a good use for Eucalyptus trees. But the problem with that, objectively, is what you correctly say in the following quote:

But now that green and tall Aussie tree is controversial in Spain. You may have heard about our heavy desertification and how Catalunya is literally running out of water. Well, some folks blame the eucalyptus because they dry out the territory surrounding them. These trees now dominate the Iberian flora and don’t allow local plants to develop properly. — javi2541997

It's a real problem. And it's a problem at a very "low", "basic", or "deep" level of Reality itself, because it's a problem at the level of ecology. Like, this isn't a purely political problem. It's not a purely religious problem. It's not a purely psychological or social problem. This is an objective problem, at the level of biological ecology itself. Potentially, it is extremely de-stabilizing for everything that is directly above it: economics, social relations, political structure, etc. I may be wrong, of course.

Shall we blame Australia because of this? Nah. — javi2541997

Nah, I agree with you there. Australia itself has nothing to do with this problem.

On a side note, Eucalyptus trees are also good for selling their wood. You can plant them, grow them, chop 'em up and sell them, repeat. That's what people did in my hometown for several generations, and other towns in the area have been doing the same thing for generations. I think no one does it currently, though. They just left the Eucalyptus patches as if they were "artificial forests", so to speak. Now people buy up those parcels of land and they just build houses. I don't think that anyone can complain that "we're destroying the Eucalyptus patches" when someone removes them to make a house. Like, this isn't Australia, mate. I'm allowed to cut down a God damn Eucalyptus in Argentina and not feel bad about it.

Thanks, I see where you're coming from now. I think equating "existence" with "physical 'thingness'," no matter how many scare-quotes we use, is debatable, though not for the reasons you suggest. I don't know whether forms or concepts are really "out there," but I'm pretty sure that the term "existence" only takes on meaning when given the sort of contexts you and Banno are discussing. But what about Existence?!, we of course want to know. Yes, well . . . that takes us out of the Philosophy Room entirely. — J

Does it? It just takes us out of the Math & Logic Room. We're in the Ontology Room when we discuss the topic of existence from an ontological POV instead of the limited POV of formal languages in general (as in, both math and logic). Ontology, simply put, is done in ordinary language. Literally. You are of course within your epistemic rights to utilize formal languages as tools, just as the professional physicist uses math and logic merely as formal tools.

Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation in logic that transforms a predicate into a relation. For example, "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". In this example, it might be thought of that 'sweetness' is now a 'property' of honey. — Mapping the Medium

Here's how I might go about this from a formal point of view (again, I might be wrong about this, so, grain of salt and all of that sort of cautionary talk).

"Transforms a predicate into a relation". Using "honey", "sweet", and "sweetness" as the three basic terms, I would symbolize "honey" as an individual constant, "i", next I would symbolize "sweet" as a unary first-order predicate, "S", and finally I would (controversially) treat "sweetness" as an individual constant, not a predicate. Here is how that would work. There's two steps to it. The first step is this:

1) S(h). This means "honey, as an individual thing, has the property of being sweet."
2) S(hs). This means "honey, as an individual thing, and sweetness, as an individual thing, are related by the relation of "being sweet".

The problem here, however, is that you cannot say (1) and (2) at the same time. You cannot define "S" as a unary predicate and then attempt to use it as a two-place predicate. Either you use two different predicates, or you go about this in a completely different way.

Can you see the convergence between cognitive science and idealism? — Wayfarer

What do you mean by that, @Wayfarer? I can definitely see a convergence between them, but perhaps I would articulate it differently. Not that it matters, though, if I agree that there is a converge between them.

Well, you posited brain as mind saying that brain tells your mind to do things — Corvus

No Corvus, brain does not tell mind what to do. Brain does mind. Brain undergoes a process, and that process is mind. And that is what my brain is telling your brain, right now. You are free to disbelieve it. But I am just as free to believe it. Right?

But Philosophy can still examine on all the subjects and topics under the sun, to investigate what they claim to be true is making sense from logical point of view. — Corvus

Yes. Exactly. That is what philosophy does. At least, that is how I practice it.

I’m going to assume you meant “the meaning of ‛existence’” as in “what the term means,” as opposed to “the meaning of existence” in the more existential, what-is-my-life about? sense. If that’s right, can you explain how “existence” could be anything other than a concept of a formal language? — J

Sure. Existence is an ontological, or metaphysical concept, if you will. It's what analytic philosophers working in the field known as "Metaphysics of ordinary objects" study and discuss. In doing so, they use formal languages, most notably second-order predicate logic, and I'm averse to it for personal reasons (which are theoretical in nature), which is why I prefer to translate anything that is said in second-order language into first-order language. But that's beside the point. The point is that existence itself, not the concept, but existence itself, is a physical "thing", if you will. And in being a physical "thing", it cannot be formal. Now, there are some metaphysicians who dispute that last claim that I made, but they do it for metaphysical reasons. They will argue that forms are really out there in the world, that they're not just "in your mind" or "in your formal language". So it's a metaphysical debate. It's the same debate, more or less, about the literal existence of quantities in the objects themselves, which is the same debate regarding Natural numbers: do they exist in Nature, in some sense? Are they "out there", like apples and trees are? That's the actual "existence debate", as opposed to the debate that people have regarding the concept of "does the existential quantifier have ontological import or not?"

Not sure if anything that I said there was of any help. I can quote some books by smarter people than me, if not.

Thanks.

Let me preface this by saying that I'm from Argentina. I'll also tell everyone a silly anecdote, just to ease up the mood. So, oddly enough, there's Eucalyptus trees in the town that I live. Someone brought them from Australia ages ago. I always thought they were part of the local flora, until someone told me many years later that someone brought them from Australia ages ago. Crazy stuff.

So, years forward, I go to this philosophical Congress in another province (they're called "provinces", not "states", in Argentina). In one of the presentations that I just happened to wander into, a team of philosophers, biologists, historians and geographers were explaining that at the end of the 19th Century and the first decades of the 20th, a series of Argentine politicians wanted to turn Argentina into "the Australia of South America". Literally, mate. Now, what do I mean by "literally" in this story that I'm telling? I mean that the team in question, explained to us, the audience, how Argentina was to become "the Australia of South America". And it was a three-stage plan. Stage One: bring the Australian flora, and plant it in Argentina. It's why there's Eucalyptus tree in my hometown, and in other areas as well. The plan never got past this stage. And they didn't bring all the flora, just the Eucalyptus. But there were two more stages to this plan. Stage two would have been to bring over the Australian fauna. Complete ecological chaos would have ensued. And the third stage of the plan was the craziest: Bring the actual Australian people over here. Just bring them. Offer them land. Offer them money. Marry them. Kidnap them. Just bring a population of literal Australians to Argentina. It was an insane plan of course, with bogus ideas, which fortunately didn't succeed.


Having told the preceding story to ease up everyone's mood, here's the main problem that I have with mainstream Australian politics, though it's an idea that's not exclusive to Australia. The very idea that Australia is a continent bothers me. The continent in that area, as far as I'm concerned, is Oceania, and Australia is just one more country among others in the continent of Oceania. To say that Oceania is "just a region" and therefore not a continent, is like saying that Europe is "just a region" and therefore not a continent. How can Great Britain be part of Europe, but the Pacific nations not be part of Oceania?

Cheers.

U(x)~((Gx⊃Ax) & (Ax⊃Gx))

Looks fine. — Banno

I don't think it does. It seems to have a missing operator. Take a look:

https://www.umsu.de/trees/#U(x)~3((Gx~5Ax)~1(Ax~5Gx))

Understood. Everything I said about transcendental idealism specifically, applies to phenomenology in general. Having said that, phenomenology is not like a single animal, it's more like an ecosystem. There's a ton of variety to it. I myself prefer Hegel as a phenomenologist. I mean, if we're allowed to say that Kant did phenomenology, then surely we must be able to say that Hegel did phenomenology as well. That's not to say that phenomenology is all they ever did as intellectuals. I take it that Kant had other interests as well, the same goes for Hegel.

What phenomenology do I personally dislike? That's a tough question. I would say (and this is certainly controversial) that Husserl is the low hanging fruit of the phenomenology tree. At least what we know about his work. Personally, I'm not going to go through the thousands upon thousands of pages that make up the Husserliana. I don't think it would be necessary for me to do such a thing.

Do you agree with the argument that science has a blind spot? — Wayfarer

Of course I do. I might articulate such a notion differently, but I agree with the substantial part of the claim, not necessarily with the details of the case.

You gave the kind of objections that a Burge might give, but then you say you don’t agree with Burge on that score. — Wayfarer

And I don't. Again, I can "play the harp", if you want, but I see no need for that.

So do I take it that you are in agreement with the authors? — Wayfarer

Maybe I am, maybe I am not. I don't think it's a substantial point of disagreement between the authors and myself. I would prefer to disagree with them on other intellectual fronts. I choose my battles, if I can. I have no quarrel with transcendental idealism as a philosophy. So I see no point in arguing with its core premises.

Does that make sense?

Greek myth(Pegasus)
For all x, Greek Myth(x) ≢ Aztec myth(x)
Hence
~ Aztec myth(Pegasus) — Banno

But here's the problem. Let's try to translate that to first-order language. You can't. You literally can't. Why not? Well, the closest you could get is the following:

First premise: G(p)
Second premise ∀x((Gx) ≢ (Ax))
Conclusion: ¬A(p)

The second premise is where the problem is at. You can state that premise in higher logics, but not in first-order logic. You can't declare that there's no identity between the variable "x" as the subject of a predication (Greek Myth), and that very same variable "x" as the subject of another predication (Aztec myth). It just makes no sense in the context of first-order logic, it's an error at the level of syntax. It's not a well-formed formula. And I specifically said the following:

My only suggestion on this, is that you should be able to say, in first-order language, that Pegasus exists (is an item of) the domain of Greek mythology, to use your vocabulary, and that at the same time it does not exist (it is not an item of) the domain of Aztec mythology. — Arcane Sandwich

But we're just squabbling over details at this point. Fascinating conversation, I don't mind it, in fact I love it, but for the purpose of the OP, I already conceded and acknowledged that you have effectively solved the problem: Infinitesimals exist if and only if Pegaus exists in the exact same sense. So, you're right. Now, what that sense might be, is where our disagreement is to be found. But that's insubstantial for the purpose of this Thread and its main objective.

@Wayfarer understood, thank you for the clarification. So how can I help? What do you need me here for, philosophically? There does not seem to be anything that I can contribute to make any sort of improvement here. Unless, of course, if you would like to state your argument as a list of premises from which a conclusion is deduced. I can then tell you what strategies someone might employ for denying the premises of your argument, and what counter-strategies you might employ yourself for defending your premises. Other than that, I fear that I cannot offer you much on the topic of the OP.

@Banno, here's the response that you wanted from me (well perhaps it's not the one that you actually wanted, but this is the best I got on this, mate. That doesn't mean that I'm right, so, grain of salt and all that standard nonsense.) Please excuse my style, of multiple quotations. I see it as a dialogue, actually. So, no disrespect from me, at least not intentional. Alright, here are my answers to your quiz, mate:

Pegasus is an individual in the domain we are discussing. — Banno

Agreed.

So not a predicate. — Banno

Agreed. But only for the sake of argument. I've been experimenting with the possibility of treating the term "Pegasus" as a predicate, but in a different manner than Frege, Russell, and Quine. Just an anecdote, mate. Nothing substantial.

We can write ∃(x)(x=a) were "a" is a constant that refers to Pegasus. It says very little. — Banno

Right, but it leads to the problem of literally saying that "Pegasus exists", if by that you mean that there is an "x", such that "x" is identical to some individual constant "p", such that "p" stands for "Pegasus". As in: ∃(x)(x=p). To me, all that means is that there is an "x", such that "x" is identical to "Pegasus". That's all it means to me. It has no ontological import as far as I'm concerned. It doesn't literally say "Pegasus exists in the real world, as a living horse that has the wings of a bird." It doesn't even say "Pegasus exists". That's not what existence is, in the context of Ontology. At least not how Bunge understands Ontology. And here I take his side. And he's not alone here. Graham Priest, for example, might argue something along those lines as well, I believe. Not that such appeals to authority mean anything, what I'm saying in my last sentences is a fallacy, granted. But I'm just saying, mate. It's possible to make a valid, sound case for it.

Since it is true that Bellerophon rode Pegasus to Mount Helicon, there is something that was ridden to Mount Helicon, by existential introduction. — Banno

Of course. But you see, that's what I'm arguing here: semantics. That rule is fine. It's legit, innit. All I'm saying is that it shouldn't be called "existential" introduction. It has nothing to do with the concept of existence, which is something that concerns Ontology, not Logic, and certainly not Mathematics. That's all I'm saying, mate. And some people sometimes make it seem like I'm saying something brutal or whatnot. You know what I'd call it? The "particularizing rule of introduction", or simply "particularizing introduction".

Something like "Pegasus exists in the context of Greek mythology, but it does not exist in the actual world" says little more than that Pegasus is an individual in the domain of Greek Myth, but perhaps not in the domain of chairs and rocks. Do you see a problem with such a simple and direct approach? — Banno

You're 100% correct in your interpretation of that statement. And yes, I do indeed see a problem with Bunge's simple and direct approach here. I'm just going on guts, instinct and intuition here, but I think that we should distrust individual constants for some reason. Quine distrusted them. And he was a smart man. I don't care if my argument here is a fallacy. I'm thinking this from the perspective of sound common sense now. Which is not to say that I'm right, but my suspicions aren't unfounded.

Note the dropping of the words "conceptually" and "really". They do not appear to be doing anything. — Banno

See, here's where I'm on the fence. I go back and forth on this one. Sometimes I think they do nothing. Sometimes it seems to me that they perform different functions, which, by "existential introduction", as you call it, there would be at least two "things", "x" and "y" such that they are performing different functions. I know this sounds cryptic, I can try to clarify it, if that sounds like something that might add anything positive to this Thread.

If needed, we could well put Pegasus and Mount Helicon into the same domain, and add a predicate something like "real", and say that Mount Helicon is real, but Pegasus is not real. But that has no implications for Pegasus' existence, as set out. It remains that Pegasus exists, but this amounts to little more than that Pegasus is one of the things about which we can talk - it is an item in the domain. — Banno

My only suggestion on this, is that you should be able to say, in first-order language, that Pegasus exists (is an item of) the domain of Greek mythology, to use your vocabulary, and that at the same time it does not exist (it is not an item of) the domain of Aztec mythology. In other words, you need to be able to say that Pegasus is neither in the domain of Reality nor Aztec mythology, etc. Bunge's approach allows you to say exactly that, since his existence predicate is a two-place predicate. But, as I've told you, I'm leaning towards Quine's approach here: like Quine, I simply don't "trust" individual constants like Bunge does. Not that such manner of speaking demonstrates anything at this level of the conversation, mind you.

What I've said here will be misunderstood and augmented by others, but to my eye it dissolves the issue of the OP. Infinitesimals exist, since they can be the subject of a quantification. Pegasus exists, since it can be the subject of a quantification. But neither are the sort of thing you might run into in the street. — Banno

Well I don't know if I would phrase it like that, but for the purposes of the OP, yes, I think you are correct: Pegasus exists if and only if Infinitesimals exist in the exact same sense. Now, if that sense is being "the subject of a quantification", that's where you and me personally begin to disagree. But that is not to say that you have not answered the question in the OP: in my eyes, you have.

And what is going on here is a clarification of what we mean by saying that something exists, made by looking at how a formal language can deal coherently with the problem. — Banno

Exactly, but it can't. No formal language can deal coherently with the problem of the meaning of existence. The concept of existence is not a concept of a formal language. It's a concept of ontology. And ontology is not a formal language. Now, there are some very smart people out there, who work in a place called "The Ontology Room", and they will tell you that there is such a thing as "Ontologese", which is a formal language, comparable to Portuguese as far as the poetics go. Those people, I believe, are wrong. And I take my cue here from someone smarter than me. Whatever the case may be, Ontologese is not a formal language, and there cannot be such language. You either get a formal language (like first-order logic) or a language with ontological import built into it from the get-go (i.e., "Ontologese"), you can't have both. You can't have your cake and eat it too, I would say. You have to choose one or the other, sadly.

You appeared to be saying that Quine had a problem with quantification. He didn't, he had a problem with individual constants, replacing them entirely with quantified variables. — Banno

Quine didn't have a problem with quantification. If that's how what I said came across, then I apologize for the confusion, I did not intend it like that. He did have a problem with individual constants, and I have a bit of a problem with them myself, actually. But Bunge had no problem at all with individual constants, as I hope to have shown.

If I have not responded to this , it's because I'm thinking about what you said, and I want to take my time. You're not exactly asking me a triviality like "What time of the day / night is it over there in Argentina?"

Allow me to quote Meillassoux at this point, @Wayfarer and @Janus. It might help, but I'm not so sure of it myself. I'll quote it nonetheless:

But now a final disputant enters the debate: the speculative philosopher. She maintains that neither the two dogmatists, nor the idealist have managed to identify the absolute, because the latter is simply the capacity-to-be-other as such, as theorized by the agnostic. The absolute is the possible transition, devoid of reason, of my state towards any other state whatsoever. But this possibility is no longer a 'possibility of ignorance'; viz., a possibility that is merely the result of my inability to know which of the three aforementioned theses is correct - rather, it is the knowledge of the very real possibility of all of these eventualities, as well as of a great many others. — Quentin Meillassoux

And immediately afterwards, he says:

How then are we able to claim that this capacity-to-be-other is an absolute - an index of knowledge rather than of ignorance? The answer is that it is the agnostic herself who has convinced us of it. For how does the latter go about refuting the idealist? She does so by maintaining that we can think ourselves as no longer being; in other words, by maintaining that our mortality, our annihilation, and our becoming-wholly-other in God, are all effectively thinkable. But how are these states conceivable as possibilities? On account of the fact that we are able to think - by dint of the absence of any reason for our being - a capacity-to-be-other capable of abolishing us, or of radically transforming us. But if so, then this capacity-to-be-other cannot be conceived as a correlate of our thinking, precisely because it harbours the possibility of our own non-being. — Quentin Meillassoux

What do you make of that?

EDIT: Tagging @MrLiminal as well, as this has something to do with the concept of Liminality, I think.
Tagging also @Corvus and @Mapping the Medium, as this point may interest them.

Did you mean ∃! ? But that's not a quantifier. — Banno

No, I meant the good old, classic ∃ from first-order logic. Let me show you what the problem is, with the notion that this quantifier has ontological import:

(1) ∀x(x = x) - Principle of Identity.
(2) p = p. From (1), by universal elimination.
(3) ∃x(x = p). From (2), by existential introduction.

Now, what does that mean? It means this:

(1) Everything is identical to itself.
(2) So, Pegasus is identical to Pegasus.
(3) So, Pegasus exists.

You arrive at the odd result that Pegasus exists. So what's the solution? To treat Pegasus like a predicate? Not at all. You can treat it as an individual constant, as I showed in my last example, while also claiming that it exists only in a conceptual sense, and in a specific context (Greek mythology instead of Aztec mythology, for example), and you can also say that it doesn't exist really, in the actual world. And you can say all of that at once, in the same breath, and with classic first-order logic.

Quine certainly used quantification, to the extent that questions of existence and reality are for Quine to be answered using quantification. — Banno

And I humbly think he's wrong. Better intellectuals than me have argued this point, I take my cue from them, but I don't simply take their word as one does in a fallacy of authority. I can see the actual reason why he's wrong. Then again, I should be humble, so perhaps I'm wrong.

That statement is made from a point of view outside both, which takes the brain as one object among others. — Wayfarer

It's what Meillassoux calls "speculative materialism". Contingency is necessary, as absurd as that sounds. I think it's absurd, and false. Meillassoux's claim, that is. Which is why I prefer to say that contingency and necessity are different modalities, and that it its possible to be aware of both at the same time. And when you are aware of both of them at the same time, an unpleasant feeling ensues. That's what happens in my subjective case, at least. I don't expect others to have a similar experience, but I wouldn't be surprised if they did.

EDIT:

Yet amazing as it may seem, that is not an argument against transcendental idealism. There’s an anecdote that Bryan Magee tells about Karl Popper on this point, I’ll find it later. — Wayfarer

I believe you. I don't intend my version of materialism as an argument against transcendental idealism. I'm tolerant of other people's philosophical premises, as long as they don't lead to dehumanizing conclusions, to say nothing of the possibility of justifying ideas whose sole objective is to dehumanize humans.

Does that make sense to you? It sounded better in my head, before typing it.

Since another thread's topic is 'factual properties', I'll start off this thread with an example of what hypostatic abstraction is ... — Mapping the Medium

Yes, I'm the author of the 'factual properties' thread: Hello there. Thanks for your posts in that other Thread, they contributed much, and I found them highly intriguing, so I thought that I'd return the favor by stopping by this Thread that you started. Let me see if I can contribute something positive. I will have to quote your original post on multiple occasions, so please be charitable towards my persona.

Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation in logic that transforms a predicate into a relation. For example, "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". In this example, it might be thought of that 'sweetness' is now a 'property' of honey. — Mapping the Medium

I think I understand, and I think I agree with this. I'm not sure though, this is way above my current level of awareness as a person. It's very difficult for me to wrap my head around such abstract notions, that is the honest truth. Though that is a limitation of my personal intellect.

My question to you is this .... In this example, is 'sweetness' truly a static property of honey? It is true that we can measure the amount of fructose and glucose in a specific sample of honey, but can we discern the differences in quality of sweetness to the taster? Consider the same with the word 'beauty'. — Mapping the Medium

Is sweetness a static property of honey? Hmmm... I would say, yes. But I could be wrong, I'm just "shooting from the hip" here.

So, what we are discussing is properties, qualities, and attributes. In Peirce's scientific method of synechistic inquiry, he explains that there is hypostatic abstraction and precisive abstraction. How do these pertain to the perception and understanding in thought, dialogue, and the written word? — Mapping the Medium

That is way more complicated than anything that I have ever had to deal with in my daily life, and in my professional life as a philosopher. I have no idea what to say here, honestly. This is far from being my area of expertise, even though I try to understand Peirce on occasion.

And when you ponder this, you should also consider the average person walking around out there in society without a clue as to what any of this means, haphazardly abstracting, ranting on social media, and teaching their children all of their haphazard habits. — Mapping the Medium

Mate, I don't know what any of this means, and I do philosophy for a living, I'm not some average person walking around out there in society without a clue, in that sense. But as to what you're actually talking about, in that sense, I've not a clue what it is you're saying. It's incredibly abstract, I'm afraid I don't understand it.

Hi.

Can non-Australians participate in this Thread and can they voice their opinion? Because I, as a non-Australian, have something controversial to say about Australian politics.

EDIT: Actually, I have quite a lot of controversial things to say about Australian politics.

There is an extended, somewhat absurd, argument about whether there is gold in those hills, form about page 10. I won't blame you for not reading it, but thought I'd at least let you know some of the back story. — Banno

Thanks for the reference. I'll take a look at it. I'm familiar with this topic of conversation, though not with that specific reference, so thanks for that.

I'm just a realist at the end of the day. There are things that exist outside of my brain. Those things are still there when I go to sleep, and they are the same things that I find in the morning when I wake up.

Well, I'm glad we've got that straightened out! :smile: — J

It's a very small step, though. I'm not sure that it brings us any closer to reaching a general agreement on the status of Mathematical Platonism. It's just a tough debate to have, no matter if you've read all of the literature (well, all of the relevant documents, anyway).

EDIT: But thanks for the link to the Thread on quantifier variance, I'm a fan of Eli Hirsch, but more for his contributions to the Metaphysics of Ordinary Objects (i.e., his concepts of "incars" and "outcars". I don't believe in such things myself, but it's a fascinating debate nonetheless).

The argument is about whether things exist without minds. I say not, Banno references a gold discovery at a particular place as an example of a putatively mind-independent fact. This argument is interminable. — Wayfarer

I'd recommend Quentin Meillassoux's book, After Finitude. You might find his concept of "correlationism" interesting.

And with that we're done. I'll be ignoring you from now on as you're either a troll or incapable of arguing sensibly. — Clearbury

And with that, you are now officially reported to the moderation team.

Your argument was demonstrably unsound. Premise 1 is false is artificial intelligence means one thing, premise 2 is false if it means the other thing it might mean. Either way, it is unsound. — Clearbury

No, it isn't. Because Artificial Intelligence means whatever the Merriam Webster Dictionary says it is, and ChatGPT is exactly that. So what did you actually refute, mate? Conventional semantics?

As I said, it depends on what you mean by an artificial intelligence. — Clearbury

Mate. ChatGPT is an Artificial Intelligence. That's a fact. That's what people call it. Is that what you want to debate? Semantics? And you have the nerve to call me disingenuous? How is this not an instance of Pot Calling the Kettle Black, mate? Do you see the irony in what you're saying?

On the other hand, if you think artificial intelligences are real intelligences - so actually do have thoughts and other mental states - but they're just artificially created, then premise 1 is true, but premise 2 will then be false, for then why wouldn't communication be possible? — Clearbury

Then what premise are you actually denying, mate? You said that you denied premise one. If that's what you deny, then my strategy for arguing with you won't be the same as if you deny premise two. So which one is it?

you owe a case. — Clearbury

I just gave you the case. The argument that I gave you, the modus tollens that I offered, is the case, mate. I hold it to be both valid and sound, as in, it's a valid argument (it's deductively valid), both premises are true, and the conclusion is therefore true as well.

And yet there is gold in those hills, even if no one says it. — Banno

What a sound thing to say. Brilliant, even. I'm not trying to be funny, I agree with the realism here.

I haven't followed Bung, and you provide no reference, so I've no clear idea what he might be saying, but that sounds like a variation on free logic. — Banno

Let me craft an example for you, then. Consider the following statement: "Pegasus conceptually exists in the context of Greek mythology, but it does not really exist in the actual world."

That statement (I've argued this on paper, in an article that I published in a Bungean journal), is troublesome for someone the likes of Frege, Russell, and Quine. All of them would treat the term "Pegasus" as a predicate, no matter what differences they might later have (i.e., regarding the very concept of "Pegasizing").

Bunge's existence predicate manages to symbolize that statement in a very neat way. Like so:

∃x((x= p) ∧ E(gp) ∧ ¬E(rp)

That formula should be parsed like so: For some particular x, it is identical to Pegasus, and it exists conceptually in the context of Greek mythology, and it does not exist really in the actual world.

Notice that the existence predicate, "E", is a two-place predicate. It binds an individual constant, such as "p" (which stands for Pegasus), and it binds it to a context (i.e., Greek mythology, the actual world, etc.)

Sure. Beats scientism hands down. — Wayfarer

Eh, I would go that far. It beats Bunge's "line" of scientism, or his "version" of scientism, if you will. It doesn't beat my version of scientism (I'm very immodest, mate. Delusional, even).

That's not a case! You're just asserting things. — Clearbury

It's called evidence. As in, facts.

you owe an argument. — Clearbury

Do I? I don't "owe" you anything. If you want me to craft a relevant argument, that's a different matter. You don't get to make up the rules of conversation just because this is "your Thread". But I'll indulge your request, since it is merely that, it is not a direct order that I have to obey. So, here goes:

1) If all that's required for a language is effective communication, then you can communicate with an Artificial Intelligence.
2) You cannot communicate with an Artificial Intelligence.
3) So, it is not the case that all that's required for a language is effective communication.

There's your argument. You are free to deny either the first or the second premise if you wish to resist the conclusion. You cannot deny both premises at the same time. I did not make up that rule. That is how the truth table works for conditional statements.

Yes, you're derailing the thread in my view. Unless you can make a case for the falsity of something I said, then you're not engaging with me or the subject matter. — Clearbury

Fair enough, then I apologize. I will make a case for the falsity of something that you said. You said:

All that's required for a language is effective communication. — Clearbury

False. I already told you what is required for a language. I already said it. Here goes:

What's needed for a language, in my humble opinion, is:

1) A system of symbols,
2) Speakers who understand meanings, and
3) A mammalian brain (and a tongue, and ears, etc.).

Those are the things that are needed for a language. — Arcane Sandwich

If you wish to ignore me, that is one thing. If you wish to accuse me of something, especially something formal, such as Thread derailment, and especially since you're not a moderator, then I will report your Thread. Drop the attitude, stop being so condescending, stop trying to engage in backseat moderation, and engage with what I said. Or, just ignore me, or politely ask me to leave this Thread. I won't warn you again.