...."Unable to express itself; unable to be spoken for." You won't find your definition in any dictionary. "X is inexpressible" does not mean "X is unable to speak." — Leontiskos

Point taken. Granted.

not capable of being expressed : indescribable — Inexpressible Definition | Merriam Webster

"Indescribable". I claim that my table is "indescribable", and by that I mean, whatever the Merriam Webster Dictionary defines as "indescribable".

The example of my table still stands, @Leontiskos

If Wittgenstein or anyone else claims that X is inexpressible, then they have already expressed the inexpressible. — Leontiskos

I'll take that bet. I claim that my table is inexpressible. And in saying that, I have not expressed the inexpressible. If you disagree with me on these two points, then I kindly ask you to define, for the purpose of this conversation, what the word "inexpressible" literally means, and I would like a credible source for the definition of that word.

If X were truly inexpressible then it could not be identified and deemed inexpressible. — Leontiskos

I believe that proposition is false. "Truly inexpressible". What do you mean by "Truly" here? Your argument sounds like the "No True Scotsman" fallacy.

if Wittgenstein or anyone else claims that X is inexpressible, then they have reasons why they think it is inexpressible. — Leontiskos

False. The antecedent of that conditional statement is true, while its consequent is false. I claim that my table is inexpressible, but I have no reason why I think it is inexpressible: I'm just going on intuition, not reason.

the putative grounds for its inexpressibility are already contained within the claim that it is inexpressible. — Leontiskos

That is false, as I have just demonstrated.

we don't claim that X is Y for no reason at all. — Leontiskos

It depends on the case. Sometimes we do, sometimes we don't. The conditions and the circumstances of the case matter in such instances.

That's a good way to think about it actually. I guess what I'm suggesting is that magic is real, it's just all "hard magic," and is thus explainable. — MrLiminal

But here's the problem. "Hard magic" is a term that people from the world of Fantasy literature just made up, on the fly, as the "Fantasy equivalent" to Hard Science Fiction. Because there are two basic kinds of Sci-Fi literature, as far as I'm concerned (I could be wrong, though): Hard Sci-Fi and Soft Sci-Fi. I'm not a Science Fiction person myself, so I wouldn't know how to "best" explain that difference. But, what I do understand, is that authors of Fantasy literature wanted to sort of capitalize on that distinction (and mediatic debate) to advance their own "cause", which is the improvement of sales of Fantasy books. Because Fantasy as a literary genre competes with Science Fiction, it always has, and probably always will (well I'm being really reckless with my language in those last sentences, but you get my point in general)

Once we properly understand it, it ceases to be magic — MrLiminal

Exactly, it ceases to be Hard Magic and instead it turns into Hard Sci-Fi. Which I, as an amateur Fantasy author, is something that I have to reject on principle, because it could affect my earnings. That being said, there's a hybrid genre called Science Fantasy, or Fantasy Science, but it's just not my thing.

magic only exists in ignorance. — MrLiminal

And that is the sad truth. Ignorance is something that should be "solved" through education, which means that if you're a Fantasy author, there is magic in your world, even if you write in the Hard Fantasy subgenre. But that means, by the rules of Hard Fantasy, that in your world, most people are ignorant. Now, are they existentially ignorant? If so, then in those worlds there is room for fantasy religions, as in, made up religions, with made up gods. Think of it like Hesiod's Theogony.

What frustrates me is the way science and religion so often approach similar truths but refuse to work together because of their ideological differences. — MrLiminal

Yes, I know what you mean. I never had that problem myself, I'm 100% on the science team. But what you describe is an experience (since you actually feel it, if it's literally a frustration) sounds like the experience that William James had when he was attempting to reconcile his beliefs as a scientist with his beliefs as a spiritualist. The solution is, from my personal POV, to abandon spiritualism and become a literalist. That's what I am, a literalist instead of a spiritualist. Think of it like the difference between the Letter of the Law and the Spirit of the Law. Which team sounds more "legit", from your personal POV? (Don't take my word for it, though, I could be wrong about this)

We're learning now that the alchemists were right about an awful lot if you actually bother to follow their instructions, they were just wrong about the reasons why, as it turns out. — MrLiminal

Yes, Alchemy was never a pseudo-science. It was a proto-science. You have three basic scientia or episteme, if you will: science, proto-science, and pseudo-science. The difference between the latter two is that proto-sciences can eventually become sciences, and this is by definition, while pseudo-sciences can never become sciences, and this is also by definition. Alchemy turned into chemistry. It's not a case of a pseudo-science becoming a science (that's impossible), it's a case of a proto-science turning into a science. Those who practiced alchemy in the Middle Ages came predominantly from the Muslim world. They did not see their own practice, -alchemy-, as magic. They saw it as scientia, as episteme. In simple terms, they never saw their own craft as Witch-craft. They saw it as similar to what the ancient Greek scientists were doing, think Archimedes or Euclid.

On the topic of wolves: I agree. Wolves should not be demonized. No animal should be demonized. Animals are not demons. To demonize animals is to commit a moral crime as a person. I would go as far as to phrase it in those terms, but I'm passionate about Nature, so maybe I'm going too far here.

Still, to me this smacks of the old empiricist view you find in Locke. A sort of atomization at odds with how learning actually occurs. Even brutes have a grasp on wholes. Sheep need not be exposed to many wolves in order to piece together "bundles of sensation" into an "abstracted image" of some whole. The sheep sees or smells their first wolf a bolts, and it is quite good for it that it has this capacity (St. Thomas makes this point in the commentary on De Anima). — Count Timothy von Icarus

As far as semiotics are concerned, especially philosophical semiotics, and especially philosophical semiotics that lean towards scientism, I gravitate towards Charles Sanders Peirce's philosophy of the tripartite sign and its corresponding areas of study and application: semantics, syntax, and pragmatics.

OK, the challenge is to come up with something that is both a) inexpressible, and b) whose inexpressibility can be explained. — J

I'm just going on intuition here:
In response to the first point, my table is not expressible. It's literally inexpressible. It cannot express anything by itself (because it's an inorganic object), and I cannot express it (because I cannot speak for it, since it's an inorganic object). What I can do is talk about the table, I can tell you about it. I can describe its features, I can explain why it has them, factually. I can speak highly of it, in the manner of a poet or a wine salesperson. But, technically speaking, I cannot "express" it. Therefore, it's inexpressible.
In response to the second point: I have already explained its inexpressibility in the preceding paragraph.

You are welcome to disagree. That is what philosophical debates are about. But it would be better if you could explain why you disagree, rather than just saying you disagree from your "instinct". — Corvus

I know, I'm sorry. But sometimes I just genuinely don't know, so all that I'm left with is basic instinct, or "intuition", so to speak. I'd like to have a reason for some things, but I don't always have one.

Your mind is simply what your brain does? I don't get that at all. — Corvus

Think of the mind more like a process instead of a "res cogitans", if that makes any sense. It's Bunge's psychoneural identity hypothesis: every mental process is a brain process. The brain, on the other hand, is not a process, it is indeed a thing. But you don't have two things here, a brain and a mind, instead what you have is a thing (a brain) and a process (a mind). The confusion here stems from the very word "mind", which we tend to treat as a noun, but should instead treat as a verb. As in "to mind", as in "I am minding my own business, you should mind your own business, etc." It's unfortunate that the word "mind" is a noun and not a verb, is all I'm saying.

Brain is just a biological organ of physical body, which makes mental events possible. Not sure if it does something. — Corvus

But you just said it yourself. The brain is just a biological organ of the physical body, which makes mental events possible. That is what the brain does. It makes mental events possible. And a mental event is something that happens, because an event is literally "something that happens". What is it that happens? A series of processes in your brain, which quite simply are your "mind", so to speak.

Perhaps you could explain how your brains tells your mind to have all the mental events and operations, it would be helpful, and then I could decide whether to agree or disagree with your explanation. — Corvus

You brain doesn't "tell your mind" anything, you brain is what minds, so to speak. For example, when you tell me to "mind my own business", you are giving a direct order to my brain, not to my mind. Does that make sense?

Sure, Quine would be an interesting guy to have drinks with. He spoke a few foreign languages, and traveled the world extensively. He wrote many interesting Logic books. And I agree with most of what he said. — Corvus

A very interesting individual, no doubt about it.

Memory, isn’t it? And the consequences of all of the preceding acts that gave rise to your particular existence? — Wayfarer

But that's what I'm saying, all of that is factual. And what is factual is contingent. However, from my personal POV they don't seem to be contingent, because I can't change those baseline facts about my existence. I was born in Argentina (space). I can't change that fact. I was born in 1985 (time). I can't change that fact. That's just part of my "essence", if you will (pardon me Heidegger and all of the Heideggerians). I mean, how could I not have essential characteristics, if I can't change them, and especially if I didn't even choose them to begin with? They're factual and essential at the same time, because they're contingent and necessary at the same time. It's a very odd modal experience to become aware of this, and to become aware of this, is to experience it (in my case) as an oppressive force. It is a very unpleasant feeling, to put it in aesthetic terms.

Hindus and Buddhists believe otherwise. — Wayfarer

They are free to believe whatever they want. Are they willing to discuss their beliefs from a philosophical point of view? If yes, then it's a discussion that genuinely interests me.

And all of the specifics you mention a consequence of karma. — Wayfarer

But (and I ask this genuinely, no offense meant) is there any scientific evidence that karma exists? I don't think there is. Which means that if you wish to convince me that karma exists, you will have to do so by way of reason, not of poetry. Logos instead of Mythos, if you will.

By the way, enjoying your contributions thus far. — Wayfarer

Yeah, I can "play the harp", so to speak. I know how "to muse", if that's even a verb. But I'm here because I want to learn how to be more rational. You are clearly more rational folk than me here at this forum.

Cheers.

things cannot be pragmatism and convention "all the way down." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course. What a sound thing to say. Brilliant, I would say. I'm not trying to be funny here, I believe in good common sense myself.

The world, and truth, imposes itself on how we deal with things. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Absolutely. I agree with this. It's funny that I should agree with Eco and not Rorty on this point, but I'm a metaphysical realist before being a pragmatist. That being said, I'm also a materialist, an atheist, a literalist (in some sense of the term), and a staunch defender of scientism. Not just of science as a body of knowledge and what have you, but of scientism itself as a mentality. I'd put it like this: I'm a simple person interested in complicated ideas.

The reason that you cannot be born in any other place at any other time is because every particle of your physical body is bound in space and time. — Corvus

Hmmm... Do I agree with this? I'm not sure. It sounds reasonable and easy to understand, but I "feel like" something's missing from the picture. I could be wrong, of course.

Time never allows any physical objects to travel to the past. — Corvus

Hmmm... Are we (as in, the entire scientific community of planet Earth) sure of this? Are we really sure of this? It's not even possible at the level of theory? It's not even possible at the level of wild speculation? I'm not sure.

you are bound in time to the present in time heading to the future just like all of us in the universe. — Corvus

Yes... this sounds reasonable... but again, my "instinct" just tells me that something about this is... "off"...

While your physical body is bound by space and time, your mind is free. — Corvus

Hmmm... but my mind is simply what my brain does, just as my digestion is simply what my gut does. Right? Or do you disagree? Feel free to disagree.

Your mind can clock back to the past ancient Greek and Roman empire, meet Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, go to a pub, and have some philosophical chats while drinking beer. — Corvus

I don't think they would be good drinking partners, if I'm being honest. I think I'd rather talk to Willard van Orman Quine, for example, while I'm drunk. I figure he was a rather odd man in his thinking. Did you know that he says that Pegasus does not exist, but that the very reason for why that winged horse does not exist is because, -and these are Quine's literal words- "nothing Pegasizes". There is no object or creature in the world that "Pegasizes". Now what does he mean by that, "Pegasizing"? I can't even imagine it. Someone smarter than me ridiculed him on paper, asking him if the reason why president Truman exists is because "something Trumanizes". I figure Quine was an odd intellectual, is what I'm saying.

Hello, kind folk, do you mind if I jump in?

I'll cut straight to the point: I believe in good common sense. Is it perfect? No. But other than science, it's the best we got so far. That, and perhaps some forms of entertainment.

Can I kindly request that you put me up to speed on the state of this Thread? Where is the discussion at, currently? What is the "Main Thing" (so to speak) that you are currently discussing, and how could I possibly contribute, either constructively or destructively? Forgive my mannerisms and figures of speech, I'm "simple folk", if you want to call it that.

They are performing the physical act of emitting sounds, in a way that sounds pleasing to the human ear. — Arcane Sandwich

Note to Self: Well the irony here, of course, is that such way of speaking sounds "non-human", if that's even a thing. But if it is, then it would have a de-personalizing effect on the listener. Is that true? Do I even agree with this idea myself? But how couldn't I? I'm the one that has thought it. However, it is a thought experiment. Anyone can perform it, at least potentially. Thought experiments, that is. They are objective, though cerebral, and hence, physical.

@Banno Free Logic is not the only option. You can keep classical logic while tracing a distinction (as Bunge does) between real existence and conceptual existence. You can then say that God doesn't exist really, but He, or She, or They, exist conceptually, in the same sense that a Beethoven sonata exists conceptually. What are musicians doing, when performing a Beethoven sonata? They are performing. They are performing the physical act of emitting sounds, in a way that sounds pleasing to the human ear. What are religious leaders doing when they speak to their "human flock"? They are performing. They are performing the physical act of emitting sounds, in a way that sounds pleasing to the human ear (but for a different reason than Beethoven). What are mathematicians and philosophers doing when they speak of numbers? They are performing. They are performing a physical act that sounds pleasing "to the human ear", in a somewhat literal, somewhat poetic (non-literal) sense (but different from the musician, and different from the religious preacher).

Hmmm...

@Banno That's what Quine thought, that "to be, is to be the value of a bound variable". But physical objects existed before logic (propositional, first order, second order, etc.) was invented. Unless you are also Platonic about logic. In that case, I would say that the existential quantifier, symbolized by ∃, should be distinguished from a first-order existence predicate. I can provide examples to how that would work, in the context of first-order symbolic logic. I can also explain why interpreting the existential quantifier as if it had ontological import necessarily leads to a contradiction.

I can imagine Frodo walking into Mordor. I can imagine the number Pi (up to a certain point).

Is there a small, barefooted humanoid in the world, walking into a territory somewhere in Europe or some other place on planet Earth, that is a scorched landscape with a tower that has a supernatural Eye at the top (the Eye of Sauron)? I would say no. Is there a thing or property in the world, that "answers" in such a way to the number Pi that I can imagine (up to a certain point)? I think there might be. That would be the difference between Pi and Frodo. Unlike Bunge, who actually compares linear equations to Donald Duck as far as their ontology goes, I believe that natural numbers might indeed have a one-to-one correspondence with the "one-ness" of each ordinary object. Natural numbers could well exist really, outside the mind, in the things themselves. Our intellect merely "reflects" them or "abstracts" them or "represents" them in some way. We pick up on them, we become aware that they are there, just as we become aware that these four apples still exist -as four apples, not merely as a non-numerical bunch of fruit-, when no one is in the house.

@Banno I just think that mathematical fictionalism, as articulated by Bunge, can withstand Austin's philosophical and linguistic analysis of the word "real". And I mean no offense by that. Is Bunge right about everything involved in this issue? I don't think so. I think natural numbers could indeed be real in the sense that, if the human species suddenly became extinct for some reason, the four apples on my table would still be four apples (and not, five or three). I'm aware that I'm the habit of explaining things from the point of view of common sense. That is not to say that common sense is applicable to every problem: it isn't. But I, personally, as a creature, am inclined to approach common sense as a moth is inclined to approach a flame. And yes, the irony of that metaphor is not lost on me.

@Banno I don't agree with Austin's diagnosis. I think it makes sense to distinguish "real x" from "non real x", it depends on what "x" is, in each specific circumstance. For example, is there a difference between real basilisks and non real basilisks? The question assumes that there are real basilisks to begin with, and it's asking how are they different from non real basilisks. But it's the assumption that's mistaken: there are no real basilisks to begin with, just as there is no x, such that x is (or is not) the current king of France, to phrase it in Russellian parlance.
However, it does make sense to trace a distinction between real fruit and non-real fruit, as in, plastic fruit, not actual parts that were collected from a living plant.
If Mathematical Platonism is right, numbers are more like real fruits than plastic fruit, if that makes any sense. If, on the other hand, Mathematical Fictionalism is right, numbers are more like fake plastic fruit instead of real fruit from an actual plant.

Does that make sense?

My take is that numbers and logical principles are necessary structures of consciousness. — Wayfarer

That may well be the case.

That doesn't mean they're the product of the mind i.e. they're not neurobiological structures but intentional structures in Husserl's sense. — Wayfarer

That may well be the case, as well.

But then I have another follow-up question. There are four apples on the table. I claim (I might be wrong, of course) that those four apples are still four apples even when no one is looking at them (i.e., "intending" them in any way, as in Husserl's concept of intentionality as a subject-object relation). I would say, the number "one" exists, like an "Aristotelian accident", in each of the four apples. And that "one-ness", if you want to call it that, doesn't somehow "dissipate", or "cease to be", when no one is contemplating the apples, or thinking about them in any sort of way. It's just a brute fact that there are four apples on the table instead of five or three.

Not sure if I'm being collaborative here, Philosophy of Math is quite arguably the toughest branch of philosophy.

Sure, one doesn't need to use imaginary numbers to count apples. Why should that make them more or less real than integers? — Banno

True, that's an excellent point. I agree.

Moreover, what does "real" do here. — Banno

I'm not sure. The adjective "real", as far as I'm concerned, has an external referent: it refers to the quality of being real. And what is that quality, exactly? It's hard to say, and it's a contentious issue in the literature. Should we define "real" as a concept, as that which exists outside the mind? Outside the brain? Is it instead that which belongs to a res, a thing? Would weight be a real property? Perhaps mass would be a better candidate. Or even energy. You could say that the difference between real things and mere concepts is that the former have energy while the latter don't. But how can they not? Can there exist real things without energy? Do numbers, as you understand them (as real but not material) entities, have energy in the physical sense of term? I prefer to define "real" as anything that has spatiotemporality (in other words, that it is somewhere in space and "somewhere" in time, even if such locations are not entirely clear-cut). But all of this is up for debate I think, at least inside the "Ontology Room".

Never mind me, carry on. — jorndoe

I'll mind, I'll take that bet. I think you have an excellent point when you say that "objective idealism" is a contradiction in terms. Plato would not be an objective idealist, then. He would be a "metaphysical realist". But that sounds somewhat "odd", at least to my ear.

So my view would be that, wherever rational sentient beings exist, there must be a core of real ideas that they are able to grasp, and these are discovered, not invented. — Wayfarer

OK. I can understand that (I think?). It's something that I can agree with, if only for the sake of argument. Numbers are real, and they're not material. My follow-up question would be, are they physical? Like, are they somewhere, in spacetime? Are they in our head, in some sense? Not necessarily in the brain, but then where? In "the mind", assuming that "the mind" is something other than the brain? Are they outside the brain? Where are they? In the things, themselves? I think that might be true of Natural numbers, I can agree with Aristotle's notion that "quantity" is a real accident, a real property of "substances" themselves. Is that what you are saying? Or are you saying something different?

My sole philosophical commitment is to what I consider an elementary philosophical fact: that number is real but not material in nature. — Wayfarer

I think I understand. It's like objective idealism, in some sense. But I'm just having a hard time trying to wrap my head around the underlying concept here. Something (i.e. a number) can be real without being material? How can that be? I'm admittedly a scientific materialist. The specific philosophy of mathematics that resonates the most with me is Mario Bunge's specific brand of mathematical fictionalism. He says that the number 3, for example, is just a brain process. And the same hold for every other abstract concept: from a humble number, to a tautology, to a scientific hypothesis, to a scientific theory, all of them are brain processes, but we feign that they exist as "autonomous ideas", as it were. It's like we're "fake Platonists", if only because all of our concepts are sort of like "useful fictions" in Nietzsche's sense of the term, if that makes any sense.

But I'm not so sure that this is true. Unlike Bunge and other mathematical fictionalists, I think that there's a very solid case that can be made for Platonism about, at the very least, the set of Natural numbers. Complex numbers are a more contentious issue, I think. Are they even "numbers", or are they just concepts? Is Infinity really a number, or is it "just as concept", as some folks say? It's a tough thing to argue, either way.

But I'll definitely read the references that you shared, thank you very much.

Hmmm... I guess my question is, if I agree or disagree with Mathematical Platonism, is it an all or nothing deal? I mean, does it make sense to say that Platonism might get it right for some mathematical objects (i.e., natural numbers) but not others (i.e., complex numbers)?

Is Platonism in mathematics, as you folks are discussing it, strictly restricted to a specific area, like Arithmetic? Or does it include all areas, like Geometry for example?

Does it make sense to agree with Platonism on some intellectual fronts but not on others?

@Banno But that's kinda my point, there's no "ordinary" object that one can pinpoint to have a more "common sense picture" of what the imaginary number "i" stands for. Like, it's something that's used in very technical, specialized fields, like electrical engineering and quantum physics. But if you had to explain the concept of an imaginary number to me, using an ordinary object like an apple, how would you do it? Sorry if I'm being rude.

Speaking from a purely personal POV, I think that Natural numbers might objectively exist, and perhaps Real numbers as well. But when you get to stuff like the set of Complex numbers, things just don't make sense anymore. Like, if I look at the four apples on my table, I understand that each of them is a unit (and hence, I can represent that with the Natural Number 1. I can also count them as Four apples). I understand that if I cut an apple in half, I have two half apples, I have two 1/2 apples in total. I get that. But if I ask you "What physical, ordinary object in the world, can be accurately referenced by the number that stands for the square root of minus one?" There is no such object. Imaginary numbers have no correlate in the external world. Or do they?

Hi, can I jump in here? I'll just go for it, apologies if I'm intruding.

I'd like to quote a passage from the book After Finitude, by Quentin Meillassoux. There he says:

"(...) the Tractatus maintains that the logical form of the world cannot be stated in the way in which facts in the world can be; it can only be 'shown', that is to say, indicated in accordance with a discursive register that cannot be bound by the categories of science or logic. Consequently, it is the very fact that the world is sayable (that is to say, liable to formulation according to a logical syntax) that cannot be bound by logical discourse. Whence proposition 6.522: 'There are indeed things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.' But the mystical does not consist in other-worldly knowledge -it is the indication of science's inability to think the fact that there is a world. Hence proposition 6.44: 'It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. (...)" (Meillassoux, After Finitude)

What do you folks make of that? Does any of that make sense to you, or not? Not sure if I'm actually helping here, in the sense of being collaborative. If not, then I'll excuse myself out.

Where it gets really tricky is in the ethics department, because Fairy Tales are supposed to teach you a lesson. For example, in Little Red Riding Hood, the lesson, or moral of the story, is that you shouldn't trust strangers. But the stranger is a wolf. So what's the lesson here, exactly? I don't trust wolves to begin with, you could say. I mean, the reason why I don't trust wolves is because they're dangerous animals, not because they're human-like strangers. They aren't, at least not to me. So I fail to see the point why the antagonist is an actual wolf in the story of Little Red Riding Hood. I mean, if the role of the antagonist will be played by a non-human animal, why not a fox? Aren't foxes somehow smarter than wolves? Why not a hyena? Is it because the people that invented Little Red Riding Hood were not familiar with hyenas? And if they were, did they seem too exotic? Like, you can go down this Rabbit Hole for a while, this is certainly a deep one. But my point is that, if I asked, from the POV of soft magic: "How does a wolf know a human language, and how is he able to talk to a human? And the answer is: It's just a Fairy Tale, animals talk, it's no big deal. The moral of the story is that the girl shouldn't trust strangers." But then why is the villain an animal? And if it's an animal, why is it a wolf instead of a fox or a hyena? I don't get it. Etc.

EDIT: And I think I can answer my last question. It's because wolves are "the bad guys". Like, if I was a farmer from the 1700s, and wolves were eating our flock of sheep, and my daughter asked me why the "bad guy" in the story of Little Red Riding Hood is an actual wolf, I would say "because wolves are bad, they eat our sheep, and if we let them, we cannot eat the sheep ourselves." Ok... but then, are you sure we're the good guys, then? That's a Pandora's Box by itself, I think.

Hi, can I jump in? I'll just go for it.

In my opinion, what you folks are discussing here, is the problem known in the world of Fantasy literature as the "hard magic vs soft magic" problem. Ultimately, it's the problem of reductionism: is it possible to reduce soft magic, as a literary style, to hard magic, as a literary style? What would that even mean? Well, it would mean that you would be explaining the inner mechanisms of soft magic as a literary genre with the conceptual framework and tools provided by hard magic as a literary genre. I mean, it can be done, sure, but to quote a friend of mine, it's like you're in a boxing match against a puppy: you're going to win, it's no big deal, Fantasy literature isn't an elaborately crafted Sci-Fi simulation, it's just baseline Feudalism with Eerie Things in The Woods. Like, let's take one of the theoretical, artistic problems that they discuss: why do animals talk in works of Fantasy? There's two possible answers, one is the hard magic explanation, the other one is the soft magic explanation. The former says that they talk because they are under a magic spell, that has a mathematical formula, yadda yadda. The latter says "Why do animals talk, as in, why do Rabbits speak in English in some Fairy Tale? Because it's a Fairy Tale, they just talk, deal with it, end of story."

So, I guess my point is, why is the idea of magic important to you, from a philosophical standpoint? What do you "get out of it", to use common parlance?

Ok, let me see if I can get this Thread back on track.

Considering what we have just discussed, about Bakhtin's process philosophy, or philosophy of the act, or however you want to call it (sorry, I'm kind of reckless when I speak like this, I do it for the sake of clarity).

Considering also what is under discussion in the case of the part-whole relation, from a mereological as well as a metaphysical point of view.

Let's address a question, to paraphrase Mr. Liminal: What defines what one is? As in, myself? What am I, insofar as I am One in a mereological sense as well as a metaphysical sense? What does the fact that I was born in Argentina in 1985 have anything to do with it? And why were you, dear reader, born where you were, and not some other place? Why where you born in the year that you were born, and not some other year? The only scientific explanation (without getting kooky) is that there's just a bunch of brute facts that explain all of that. But then, here's my question: is the fact that I was born in Argentina in 1985 contingent, yes or no? And this is where it gets odd. There are good arguments both for and against those positions. So what should I make of that? How should I "take it", to speak in common parlance? I just have to "deal with it", as folks from the United States say? "Those are the cards that I've been dealt, deal with it"? But then there's this ominous quality to those words, they sound like poetry to me. Like, they sound eerie, magical. And I, being a scientific materialist, believe in no such things. So what do I make of that? And so on, and so forth, and I can't get out of this Rabbit Hole, God damn it. That's what I meant when I originally said that I "experience" such things. It's like, it starts as a state of awareness, but then you somehow "experience" it in your mind, like intellectually. I don't know if I would call that "intellectual intuition". I'm not sure that I believe in such a thing. What are your thoughts on that?

I would then say, for the sake of argument, that the Supreme Court is not like a Man-o-War jellyfish, precisely because the Supreme Court is not a living creature, while the Man-o-War jellyfish is indeed a living creature. I myself, in addition to being "a substance", am also a living creature, unlike a stone or a chunk of iron. The Supreme Court, if it were indeed a single unit, would be more like a stone or a chunk of iron than a jellyfish: it is not alive, only its "parts" (the nine justices) are alive, but the Court itself would not be alive. It's like, how many "lives" would you be counting there? Just nine? Or ten? But the latter makes no sense to me: nine individual lives, plus "the life of the Supreme Court". There is no such thing as "the life of the Supreme Court", as something over and above the lives of the nine justices, that are are simply known collectively as "the Supreme Court". It's like when you say "there is a pile of clothes in the room". It's not as if the pile itself were one more item of clothing (i.e., a jacket, a pair of socks) that you can wear.

Right? Or would you like to push back on whatever point it is that I'm trying to make?

I suppose my larger point is that all of these questions are rooted in the fact that we experience life as a singular experience, and I am questioning if it is possible for larger, gestalt consciousness to arise from the collection of individual minds. — MrLiminal

I wouldn't use the term "Gestalt" since I don't agree with one of the premises of the Gestalt school: the one that says that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Technically speaking, from a metaphysical or ontological POV, some things compose something, and some things do not compose a further thing. It depends on what's your answer to van Inwagen's Special Composition Question (SCQ): When do objects A and B compose a third object C? There are only three possible answers to that question: never, sometimes, and always. I believe that "sometimes" is the correct answer in this case, but feel free to disagree. There's also plenty of room for you to agree with me that the answer is "sometimes", and you're free to disagree as far as the technical details go.

A family is made up of individual people but can act as one. Army units and sport teams can be trained to act as one, despite being many. Is that so different from our own personal biological experience, where so many different organs and chemicals make up what we consider our singular self? — MrLiminal

Yes, I believe it is, but feel free to disagree. Here's my argument, it's a modus tollens:

1) If the Supreme Court is a single unit composed of nine justices, then the Supreme Court is a single fleshy object that has nine tongues and eighteen elbows, among other parts.
2) It is not the case that the Supreme Court is a single fleshy object that has nine tongues and eighteen elbows, among other parts.
3) Therefore, it is not the case that the Supreme Court is a single unit composed of nine justices.

If you wish to resist the conclusion, you have to deny either the first premise or the second one. Due to how the truth table works for conditional statements, you can't deny both at the same time. If you deny one of those two premises, you must accept the other one, and vice-versa.

As for myself, as a substance in the philosophical sense of the term, I am indeed a fleshy object composed of different organs and chemicals, that make up my singular self as an individual in the biological sense, as an individual in the chemical sense, and also as an individual in the physical sense of the term.

for so long there was confusion about who within the 'Bakhtin Circle' actually wrote what — Mapping the Medium

Yeah that's brutal... It's like the discussion that I was having with @MrLiminal about a question that he asked, (I'm paraphrasing what he asked) "Where does one end and other things begin?" Hypothetically, it could be at the level of chromosomes. At that level or layer of Reality itself. Like, you can draw "the line" there, between determinism and free will, but I'm asking something different in my original post. Again, MrLiminal phrased it better than me: "Why am I this, instead of that?" Like, why this, specifically? And this ties in with the Question of Being: Why is there Something (the Universe) rather than Nothing?

And the other question, at the end of the day, is:

Why is there This Universe, instead of "Some Other" Universe? Why is the world the way it is, and not some other way? Why are we in the Milky Way, instead of the Andromeda Galaxy? Why do Galaxies form spirals? Why do black holes exist? Why is there a force of gravity? Could the Universe have had different physical laws? If not, why not? Are the Laws of Physics factual in the sense that they're just as contingent as the fact that I was born in Argentina in 1985, yes or no?

Hmmm...

Ok, let's see if there is a disagreement between our POVs (there is a factual disagreement, as in, you're inside your own brain, I'm inside my own brain). So let's see if we agree on everything that you said:

First point, I am one person. I experience life from one perspective. Yes, I agree with both of those claims. Let's proceed.

"My family is made up of several people, including me." Yes, I agree.
"My family is one unit" Hmmm... I'm not so sure. My family is just a plurality of individual people. For example, think of a pack of wolves. How many "Aristotelian substances" (to use a philosophical term) are there in this example? If you think that "the pack of wolves" is something over and above the six individual wolves, then you should count at least 7 "substances": the six wolves, plus the pack of wolves itself. But that would be wrong (I have a paper published on this topic in case you're interested). So, to get back on track: I am an individual, I am quite certain of that. And it is my belief (one among several) that I, as an individual, am quite literally not a mereological part of a larger "substance" or "whole" insofar as I myself am a "substance" (in the philosophical sense of the term) as well as a "whole" (in the mereological sense of the term).

So, it seems that our baseline disagreement is there. Would it be possible to reach an agreement? Can we "work it out", or "squash the beef", or whatever manner of speaking people use outside the Ontology Room? Or is all of this factual, not up for debate, as in, it's factual that I was born in Argentina in 1985, that's not up for debate. Or is it? How could it be? I can't change those facts about my existence, I didn't even choose them, etc., we have stepped out of one Rabbit Hole just to jump inside of it again. I guess what I'm trying to say is, it's not easy to discuss "things" at this level, or using this particular language (some professional philosophers call it "Ontologese". Like, Portuguese, but we're speaking Ontologese when we're inside the Ontology Room.

To quote the Beatles though, "I am he as you are he as you are me and we are all together." — MrLiminal

Hmmm... "I am he, as you are he"? I mean, if we take that literally, then it's an analogy. But an analogy (I might be wrong about this, though) is a comparison between two things: A and B. The analogy is "Thing A is like thing B because they have something in common, called C." In the case of "I'm him, just as much as you're him.", I would interpret that as a mutual conditional: if p, then q, and if q, then p". In other words, p ↔ q. And the truth value of that statement, from a logical point of view, is contingent. It could be false, it could be true. Under what conditions would it be false, and under what conditions would it be true? What does the world have to be like, in order for it to be true? If that part can't be solved, the rest of the Beatles' quote can't even be taken into account, let alone interpreted correctly from the POV of propositional logic.

It's basically saying we are all connected to everything (infinity) but also connected by death (0), while also maintaining our own individuality (1). Everything dies (infinity becomes 0), and from death new potential is created (0 becomes infinity). — MrLiminal

"We are all connected to everything (infinity)"... Are we? Why? I'm not sure that we are. I'm not connected to my table. Maybe I'm connected to the planet, except when I jump. I'm not trying to be funny or amusing here, I'm just trying to picture it.

"We are also connected by death (0)" Are we? In what sense? In a poetic sense, for example? Or in a literal sense? Because, in a literal sense, I would need to know what that means, because I can't even picture it.

Everything dies (Here I would qualify: every living organism dies, not literally everything: stones don't die, for example). And then you say: "Infinity becomes 0". And I ask: How so? Mathematically? Physically? Ontologically? Or how else?

I'm genuinely sorry if these questions come across as defiant or confrontational, or aggressive in some way. I just don't know how to ask them any better.

Thank you for your having taken the time to consider and respond to my thoughts. — Mapping the Medium

How could I not? It would be un-philosophical of me to not consider and respond to your thoughts. At least that's one of the things that I personally believe.

About Bakhtin, I'll just say it: when people explain Bakhtin to me, I feel like I'm not understanding even half of the things that people are trying to explain to me. Like, there's some parts that I get, there's other parts that I even agree with, but then there are some parts that I just don't understand. Can you please clarify, in simple English, as if I was uneducated, what is the philosophical importance of Bakhtin's work?

Speaking of reckless, I had a thought a while back that started off as a joke, but I can't help but feel like might have some truth to it. It's essentially that the grand unified theory boils down to 0 = 1 = infinity. — MrLiminal

Hmmm... Let me play Devil's Advocate here. I would say that, technically speaking, Zero is not equal to One. It's a different number, and we use different symbols for them. And neither of them is equal to infinity. For all we know, infinity might be just a concept, not an actual number. Or would you argue that? I'm aware that there's some good arguments to the contrary, for example the one that starts with the premise (they all start with this premise, oddly enough) that Infinity itself is not just a concept, it's an actual number. And they can prove it, mathematically. And you and me can prove it as well. It takes a bit of studying and thinking abstractly, but it's definitely something that non-mathematicians can comprehend.

Essentially: Infinity is endless and has no boundaries. 0 is endless and has no boundaries. Therefore, 0 is infinite. Things that have boundaries are not endless. Things that are not 0 are defined by their boundaries and therefore cannot be 0 or infinite. If 0 is infinite, then everything is both part of 0 and infinity, including my individual sense of self, the 1. — MrLiminal

Do I agree with this? "Infinity is endless and has no boundaries." I'm not sure. What do you mean by that?

Then you say: Zero is endless and has no boundaries. Again, I'm not sure what that means. Can you explain it to me in simple English?

Then you say: Things that are not Zero are defined by their boundaries (I'm not sure that I agree with that), followed up with ("if so, cannot be 0 or infinite", I don't get that part either).

Lastly, you say: If Zero is infinite, then everything is both part of Zero and infinity (not sure what that means), including my individual sense of self, the 1 (not sure what that means either)

Can you explain all of this to me as if I'm uneducated, and as if I lack a sense of humor? Like, I'm genuinely struggling to grasp what the underlying concept is here.

Speaking of metaphors that evoke pictures, you know which is my personal favorite? The North Pole / South Pole one. Like, go to Antarctica, go to the literal south pole of the planet. When you get there, you can't go further south. If you move outside of the literal south pole, you're going north.

Of course, you can also exit the planet without leaving the south pole, so that means that your spaceship will not be in physical contact with planet Earth anymore.

It sounds wacky, I know, but I can picture it, and that's no small feat. A good metaphor is like a good wine: they're hard to craft. Agree or disagree?

Yeah, I like it. It's a good analogy. Again, I'm not sure that I'm following you 100%, there's some things that you're saying that I'm struggling to grasp. On a side note, the movie that I really liked about this part (relativity, general and special) is "Interstellar". It's a scary movie at some parts, like, it's sci fi but there's parts that are quite scary.

But here's the thing: physicists haven't figured out yet how to combine Einstein's theories of general and special relativity, with quantum physics. They came up with something trendy called "Quantum Field Theory", and I think that's the most legit thing they have going on (way more legit than, say, String Theory). Man, I'm being really reckless with my language here, excuse me, please.

Hi MrLiminal,

In response to your first post:
Wow, I've never head of that analogy. Thanks for sharing it. It kinda does make sense. Like, I can certainly picture the scenario that you describe: we look at the Moon, we then imagine it moves really fast, so it creates an optical illusion, it looks like a Moon-colored dome (what color would that be? White? Gray? Beige? I'm just going with "Green", if it's a green Moon, then it would be a green dome). Yeah, I can kinda picture all of that, like what happens if we stop it, then the optical illusion of the dome ceases to be, etc.
About the experience that I'm describing, I'm not sure if it's an experience, now that I think about it. It's more like an awareness. Does that make sense? Experience and awareness, it seems to me, are not exactly the same thing. This "experience" that I was telling you about is more like a state of mind. It's an awareness.
I would phrase it like this, in simple terms: you're aware that your existence is under your control (in one sense) but at the same time you're aware that there are some features of your existence (your factual properties) that are not under your control. They are necessary components of your identity, because you can't change them, and you didn't even choose them, but they're contingent in the sense that you could have been dealt other cards, so to speak. It's just strikes me as being strange, weird, and odd, that's all.

In response to your second post:
I'm thinking about it. It's a good picture, a really good one. I'm not sure that I understand it entirely. Let me ask you some questions, if you don't mind. The rock is at the peak, because that's the highest it can go and still be in physical contact with the peak? If so, the analogy would be that there's a point in time in which you can't go further into the past, because then time itself would not be in physical contact with space itself? Does that question make sense to you? Let's start with that.

Corvus, thanks for jumping in. Great observation. You ask: "Could it be space and time which makes every objects and events in the universe unique and contingent?"
My reply: In a sense, yes, because I have control over my current spatio-temporal location. I can choose to be in the kitchen, or the living room, or I can go outside, etc. That's under my control, it's something that I'm free to choose. What's not under my control is the fact that I was born in Argentina in 1985. That's just a fact about my existence, it's one of my "factual properties", to use one of the main technical terms of this discussion. I can't change the fact that I was born in Argentina (space) in 1985 (time). Could have I been born in some other spatial area, in some other time? Yes, I could have. Therefore, those facts (place of birth: Argentina, date of birth: 1985) are contingent. But since I cannot change them, I "experience" them as necessary facts. Actually, "experience" is not the right technical term to use here. It's more like an "awareness". It's like I have a "double awareness": I'm aware that I could have been born somewhere else, and in some other time, but at the same time I'm aware that I can't change "where I was born, in a spatial sense", just as much as I can't change "when I was born, in a temporal sense."

Does that sound like nonsense to you? It kinda does to me. It just strikes me as odd. Not necessarily "wrong" from a theoretical standpoint, but just plain odd from the POV of plain and simple English.

Hi again Mr. Liminal, thanks for continuing to discuss this topic of conversation. Electrons are electricity. OK, I can kinda see how that would work. But what's a quark? If an electron is electricity, is a quark... quarkiness? Quirkyness? What is it? Is it like a tiny marble? How do I even picture it? I can imagine an atom like a bunch of red marbles (protons) and gray marbles (neutrons) all clumped up together, forming the atom's nucleus. Somewhere around it, there's an electron. How do I picture it? Is it a tiny green marble, orbiting around the nucleus? Is it like a green cloud instead? Is it more like a green storm around the nucleus? Is it more like a hurricane than a calm, peaceful cloud? How do I even picture it? I've talked to a few physicists about it, they basically just told me "forget about the picture, just try to understand the math part". And the same goes for quarks, and for other fundamental particles, apparently. And I find that somehow disappointing. Like, I've looked at the math. It doesn't make sense to me. Granted, I'm not a mathematician. But I kinda do "get it", at least some of the more basic equations. But then you have people talking in a sort of kookish way about "the collapse of the wave function" (as in, the wave function collapse) and whatnot. Like, just explain it to me in plain and simple English, please. And they couldn't. They tried (my physicist friends) but they just end up saying (to my uneducated ear, at least) a bunch of nonsense.

But anyways, you said in a previous comment: "now that I'm on the same page I think we can kick up some fun topics around this subject."
My reply: Please, kick up one fun topic around this subject, perhaps that will help us steer this discussion in the right direction (whichever direction that might be, I'm at a total loss here).

I think that to theorize about this "level" or "layer" of Reality is like exploring an uncharted territory on a map. It's like, people don't spend much time at this level. They argue at "upper" ontological / metaphysical levels: politics, policies, economics, agendas, etc. Like, from an ontological POV, those discussions are "way up the ladder", there's tons of more "baseline" discussions, as in, what are professional physicists talking about today, in the most prestigious scientific journals, like Nature and Science? Like, literally, what are they talking about when they talk about electrons? What is an electron, exactly? I, Arcane Sandwich, do not fully understand that concept, not even IRL. True, I'm not a physicist myself, I didn't study Physics. But it's like, I can understand Newtonian physics if you explain it to me, like, I get it. But when I try to understand post-Newtonian physics, I just can't wrap my head around their most basic concepts. So, I guess what I'm asking is, whose "fault" is that? Mine? It has to be mine, right? But then, I face an ethical dilemma: is it ethical for me to do "Deep Ontology", if I can't even understand the science that talks about the base of Reality itself? And I truly, honestly, don't have an answer to that question, sadly.

Thanks, MrLiminal.

My impression is that it's not just you, it is indeed a foundational truth. Because, as I said in my initial post, this discussion is something of a "Love Letter" to Quentin Meillassoux's book "After Finitude". He was the first professional philosopher to raise this problem, and it's quite recent. His book is from 2006 I think, it was published in French before it was translated to English almost immediately.

You ask: what defines what I am? What one is? And I would say, these are Deep Ontology questions. Like, metaphorically speaking, we're in the "Ontology Room" when we talk at this "level" of Reality, I don't know how else to describe it in terms of ordinary language. It's "Deep Ontology", if that's even a thing.

You then ask: "Where do you stop and other things begin?" My reply: Yeah, that one is brutal, I've wrestled with that one myself a few months ago. Again, it's Basement-Level Ontology. Like, imagine Descartes' metaphor of philosophy, he said that philosophy is like a building, first you lay down the foundations. Well, I think these discussions are below the foundations. It's like we're in a Cave, or something. It just feels that way to me. I'm somewhat of an instinctual creature, I will admit that freely. But I blame my chromosomes for that. So, maybe we could draw the line there, at least hypothetically.
You then ask: "Are experiences you have but don't remember still a part of you?" Hmmm... I honestly don't know. I mean, I can see solid reasons for, as well as, against. I've no idea.