That Mario Bunge thinks Husserl is obscure is not an argument, but again, an attitude. He simply takes it for granted that anything that sounds like idealism is wrong, because any sensible person would think so. But Husserl is making a case. Tackle that case. — Wayfarer

(Note that 'lumpen materialism' is not intended as an ad hominem, it is the description of an attitude.) — Wayfarer

You just described my attitude as "lumpen materialist". So if I'm literally a lumpen materialist, why should I even tackle that case? I am a lumpen after all (you just said so, by calling me a lumpen materialist), so why would I put in the work to being with?

I'd be happy to get some more explanation. We all have different points of view, and all with some merit, no doubt. — Janus

Ok. The final Verse of Chapter 25 of the Tao Te Ching, in my honest opinion, literally means the following:

First premise) If one follows Man, then one also follows the Earth.
Second premise) If one follows the Earth, then one follows Heaven.
Third premise) If one follows Heaven, one follows the Tao.
Fourth premise) If the Tao follows what is natural, then one follows what is natural.

That is what the final Verse of Chapter 25 of the Tao Te Ching means to me. From there, I am arguing for a new proposition:

Fifth premise) One follows something that is not the Tao, because One follows what is natural, and "what is natural" is what the Tao itself follows.

You have it exactly backwards. It is the factual world which is dependent on the processes of transcendental consciousness. Husserl was not a realist. The factual world was for him a product of the natural attitude, which concealed its own basis in subjective processes. — Joshs

If @Wayfarer can say that the brain-stomach metaphor is lumpen materialism, then I can say that what you just said in that quote is lumpen idealism.

This thread is titled " How can one know the ultimate truth about reality?"

The title itself is the question of the Thread, and of the Original Post itself. The author of the post then says:

My senses can deceive me, so if I cannot trust my senses, I might as well conclude that outside reality doesn't exist; It's just me and you; but if my senses cannot be always trusted then your existence must also might be an illusion.

As always, one can only deduce one truth: "I exist", whoever "I" is... :-) — A Realist

The first thesis ("My senses can device me" is a skeptical premise), from there the author asks a conditional statement: "If p (I cannot trust my senses), then q (I might as well conclude that outside reality doesn't exist".

That's questionable. That very statement. For it could well be that "p", the antecedent, is True, while the consequent, "q", is false. In other words, it could be true that I cannot trust my senses, but it does not follow from there that "I might as well conclude that outside reality doesnt exist." That part of the sentence, is false. Why? Because your senses are not the only thing through which you are connected to other res extensa. The very act of breathing, the physical act of breathing, demonstrates that from a purely Physical point of view (as in, what professional physicists study), you are not an isolated physical system, you are instead merely a closed physical system instead of being an open physical system. That's thermodynamics.

If we can agree on that, then I can explain to you the last Verse in Chapter 25 of the Tao Te Ching, and what it has to do with Propositional Logic. If not, then I cannot say much more on that subject.

Arcane Sandwich
I still don't know what you are talking about. — Janus

Ok, do you have a moment, then? I could explain it to you, but it's just my point of view. It has errors, I'm sure of it. But it's not without merit, if I may say such a thing.

If you could make lumps from air.... :rofl: — Wayfarer

But you see, this is something else that I've been "secretly" arguing about, in other Threads. You know what it feels like? It feels exactly like this:

↪Arcane Sandwich
It was not an "appeal to the stone" I simply don't understand what you are trying to say by translating the verse into propositional logic. — Janus

And I said, "Welcome to my world, dude". This is the kind of "intellectual stuff" that I have to deal with, lately.

@Bob Ross would you be so kind as to weigh in with your honest opinion, here? In your honest opinion, who is right in this discussion, @Janus or myself? Or neither of us?

'Mind is what brain does' is lumpen materialism. — Wayfarer

Phenomenology is lumpen idealism.

↪Arcane Sandwich
There's some value in Thomism. But recent posts have relied on appeals to Aristotle and Plato as if they were authoritative — Banno

They are. Those appeals, I mean. Technically speaking (since we love debating "the semantics of the rules" so much). They're fallacies.

There's some value in Thomism. — Banno

I'm not a Thomist myself, since I'm an atheist. But the mere fact that I'm an atheist doesn't mean, by itself, that I won't comprehend religious philosophers when I read what they wrote. That's just not being charitable to my own intellect.

Thanks, but the translation into propositional logic made no sense to me. — Janus

Well, what you just said there is technically a fallacy, since it's an appeal "to the stone". Welcome to my world, dude.

Plato's theory of the mind is outdated. — Arcane Sandwich

You've happened on the forums at a time when the fashion is towards mediaeval thinking. — Banno

That's a bunch of nonsense, as far as I'm concerned. Medieval thinking, that is. It has no ontological relevance, nor does it have any ethical relevance, nor any moral relevance. It's not important.

By that's just my honest opinion. I could be wrong.

I have never read it that way. "Tao (the way) follows what is natural" means the way is just natural, in other words nothing over and above nature itself. So it is not following the natural "instead of following the Tao". — Janus

What can I say? I read Chapter 25 literally. I'll quote the relevant part, once more:

Man follows the earth.
Earth follows heaven.
Heaven follows the Tao.
Tao follows what is natural. — Tao Te Ching, Chapter 25

I'll translate it to Propositional Logic first:

1) If p, the q.
2) If q, then r.
3) If r, then s.
4) If s, then t.

And what I'm arguing, is the following:

5) If t, then u.

The difference in what we want to say about this division, however, is this: You want to use the term "existents" for the phenomenal domain, and I'm recommending we stop doing that, as the word is so fraught and unsatisfactory. I'm simply urging us to notice that "the distinction is discernible" no matter what terms we use, and that is what counts. On the important point -- pistis and dianoia as picking out two different areas on the conceptual map -- we agree. And when we examine the various relations between the objects of pistis and dianoia, we may find yet further agreement. So we shouldn't let logomachy get in the way! — J

Yeah but it's like, I hate to play the role of Devil's Advocate here, but Plato's theory of the mind (i.e., pistis, dianoia, episteme) is outdated. Was it scientific when Plato first discussed it? Yes, it was, and it remained scientific for some time afterwards as well. But, today, that's not a respectable scientific theory, because it's no longer a scientific theory to begin with.

Arcane Sandwich
I don't disagree. Although the way Husserl expresses it is unnecessarily obtuse. — Banno

He wasn't a good writer, that's an Aesthetic defect that Husserl had. Peirce had the same problem.

But not existing. There is gold in those hills, even if it remains unsaid (unbelieved, undoubted). — Banno

I didn't even know that Australian Paraguayans even existed before I joined this Forum a few days ago. Why not? Why didn't I know that? Well, the Peircian inference-to-best-hypothesis here is simply that Realism is true: objects exist outside of your own brain, "out there", along with all of the other res extensa of the Universe. And some of those, are also res cogitans, because they are living brains inside the bodies of individual homo sapiens just like you. So, Realism is true. That's not to say that materialism is true, it only means that realism is true.

So far.

"Hungry" isn't something stomaches do. Being hungry takes an organism. — Banno

So does the act of thinking, being aware, and being conscious of something. All of them require a living organism. Intentional consciousness as Husserl understands it is necessarily (in a modal sense) dependent upon the factual world in which the Living Subject in the phenomenological sense is immersed. And that factual world, most of the time, is the world of ordinary life. The "Lifeworld" of Phenomenology is just ordinary life. So why is it morally wrong to be a lumpen?

Wayfarer has a point - you will not find seven by dissecting a brain. — Banno

So? Bunge's point (and Searle's point, perhaps) is that you won't find "hungry" by dissecting a stomach either. It's no big deal. The mind is a series of events, which compose series of processes. In that sense (metaphysically, ontologically) it does not differ from what the stomach (the digestive system, actually) does when you digest something.

@Wayfarer Yeah, so? What's the big deal with what Armstrong is saying there? As I read that passage, all he's saying there is that one must recognize that subjects and objects are "on a par", ontologically speaking. So what? It's not as big of a deal as some folks suggest.

The way I read that, and I might be wrong, is that it's essentially a demonstration that the determinism-freedom continuum exists. Freedom is indeed an actual "thing", like, it's an objective feature of Reality itself because it allows the subject to arise from the objective in a completely different ontological sense, even though they are ontologically "on a par", so to speak. In other words, the brain is a res extensa and a res cogitans at the same time, it's no big deal. Why is that "lumpen materialism"?

But this seems to be an error Wayfarer is prone to. — Banno

Well, I mean, not to get overtly political or anything, but he just said that Searle's and Bunge's opinion on the brain-stomach metaphor is "lumpen materialism". I mean... :lol:

↪Arcane Sandwich
"Mind is to brain as digestion is to stomach". Searle. — Banno

Yeah, I took that from Bunge, actually, and Bunge took it from Searle, surprisingly. I mean, if you read Bunge's Matter and Mind, he has some really scathing things to say about Searle. But regarding the brain-stomach analogy, he agrees, again quite surprisingly. At least that's how I read that part.

'Mind is what brain does' is lumpen materialism. — Wayfarer

:rofl: Why are you being so mean to me when you say something like that?

But while there is a plausible and comprehensive account of how the gut digests nutrients, along with many other basic functions of metabolism, there is no corresponding account for the relationship of brain and mind, of how and in what sense the brain produces mind, any more than how, or if, matter has produced life. As Liebniz said, if you could make the brain the size of a mill and walk through it, and nowhere in it would you find a thought. In order to even examine the brain and to begin to raise questions about how it does this, the very faculties which you wish to explain, namely, those of reasoned inference, must already be deployed in the pursuit of that question. And you can't see the elements of rational inference from the outside, so to speak. They are internal to thought. See this post. — Wayfarer

I'll make you a deal. I'll respond to what you said there, but you first have to explain how and why "lumpen materialism" is even a thing to begin with. Deal or no deal?

"Beauty lies in the eye of the beholder.", is a well-known saying that might come to mind here. — Prometheus2

And that can be a scary thought, for some people. (Hi, by the way. Great Thread)

Why would that phrase be scary? Well, think of the following hypothetical scenario. A group of friends get together to play tabletop D&D. Meanwhile, a lone person in her room is playing a computer RPG. That person visually encounters a beholder, in her game. But, she's smart. She knows that the very concept of a "beholder" is intellectual property of Wizards of the Coast, the parent company that owns the Dungeons & Dragons game, and nearly all of its licenses. She shrugs, and randomly thinks "Beauty lies in the eye of the beholder. Yeah right, so what is beauty to these guys?" ("These guys", that she's referencing, are the spherical, multi-eyed beings that she encounters and usually fights against in her game.

Now, imagine a different scenario. A group of friends gets together once a week to play tabletop Pathfinder, the largest competitor that D&D has, as a brand. Imagine that this group of friends are somewhat superstitious (i.e., they believe in luck, just as a Christian would believe in God). Why do they believe this? I have no idea. One can establish a conversation in that context, while playing some dumb tabletop game. All I'm saying is that tabletop games are, by their very nature, social games. Computer games are not (controversial statement, I know).

Witt goes over this in his account of rule following. — Joshs

OK. So is it like a literal "game"? Like, if Wittgenstein speaks of "Language Games", are they really games, from a scientific standpoint? Because there is a science called Game Theory.

I think Metaphysics could discuss such topics e.g. Demons, Ghosts and God, Souls and Freedom etc. — Corvus

I agree. I already said in another thread, that whoever proves that the existence of the Evil Demon is modally impossible, should win the Fields Medal. Why? Because, in order to prove that, you would would have to prove that logic itself cannot be doubted. And that is the reason why the recipient of the Fields Medal should receive such an outstanding award.

Sadly, that person won't be me.

That is what Metaphysics is about. No one would suggest to discuss these topics under Physics or Chemistry. If you say, even Metaphysics cannot discuss them, then what is the point of Metaphysics? — Corvus

That's an excellent argument in defense of Metaphysics as a profession, as a specialized area within professional, academic philosophy. The problem is, if you publish a paper on the metaphysics of demons, people laugh at you. But if you publish a paper on the metaphysics of Pegasus, people at least have the basic decency to tell you why your ideas are wrong.

Can you summarize it, please? I did read it when you posted it, but I just don't get it. Really, I'm not trying to be disingenuous here (I've already been accused of such, in another Thread). So, just explain it to me, man. Like, in plain, simple English.

None of these aspects
can be neatly disentangled from the others, but the fact that the meaning of pi is only partially shared between us explains why its use by either of us can always be contested by the other. — Joshs

But that brings back @Count Timothy von Icarus's point about the debate between Rorty and Eco. Things cannot be pragmatism and convention all the way own. That's what Eco said to Rorty. And it's an excellent, sound, reasonable thing to say. Why? Because it's true, that's why.

This is a cut-down version of the private language argument. π is not private thin in each of our heads, but a public thing that is used openly to make calculations and settle disagreements. — Banno

Right, but that's what I'm saying. Explain this phrase to me: "remanens capax mutationem". Those are Heidegger's literal words, they make no sense in the English language nor in the Spanish language (not if we're being charitable towards them). And those are the only languages that I speak as an individual. I don't speak Classical Latin. But that's how Heidegger "means it", that's the intent of those words. But that phrase itself, never appears in classical documents. Better classicists than me have argued this point quite strongly, and historians back up such claims. So what's Heidegger saying? It's incomprehensible to me. What it means, according to Google Translate, is "remaining capable of change" in English, and "Siendo capaz de cambiar", in Spanish.

And that doesn't make any conceptual sense to me, but it does make grammatical sense. What he's saying is grammatically correct, but semantically meaningless.

Hi @ToothyMaw, thanks for continuing to engage with this Thread.

I mean, are we going to swim out there and stop the orcas? Is the orca lawyer committed to waging a campaign to end the unnecessary killing of seals? Is that feasible? Would that be a wise way of spending resources if we want to reduce suffering? Or should we just not kill animals in the tens of thousands in slaughterhouses? — ToothyMaw

I think you've refuted the orca lawyer's case with what you just said there. So, yeah, to the RL "orca lawyers" out there, in the world, reading this Thread: we're not stupid.

EDIT: Ok, back to the Main Topic of the OP: the philosophical and political ideas of the band Earth Crisis. In that sense, I'll share their "War Call", if you want to call it that. I'm post the lyrics as well.

Without further ado, their song titled "Firestorm":

Street by street.
Block by block.
Taking it all back

The youth's immersed in poison--turn the tide, counterattack.
Violence against violence:
let the roundups begin,
a firestorm to purify the bane
that society drowns in.

No mercy, no exceptions, a declaration of total war:
the innocents' defense is the reason it's waged for.

Born addicted,
beaten and neglected,
families torn apart,
destroyed and abandoned,
children sell their bodies,
from their high they fall to drown,
demons crazed by greed,
cut bystanders down.

A chemically tainted
welfare generation
Absolute complete
moral degeneration

Born addicted,
beaten and neglected,
families torn apart,
destroyed and abandoned,
children sell their bodies,
from their high they fall to drown,
demons crazed by greed,
cut bystanders down.

Corrupt politicans,
corrupt enforcement,
drug lords and dealers:
all must fall.

The helpless are crying out
We have risen to their call.

A firestorm to purify — Earth Crisis

The Philosophical Exercise here would be:

1) In your honest opinion, is it fair for Earth Crisis (and Straight Edge in general) to blame societal problems solely on drugs? Or are there other elements of "society" that need to "take the blame" here, so to speak?

2) What, if any, is the actual intent behind the lyrics of their song "Firestorm"? Whatever that might be, would it be feasible and morally correct? In other words, what would be the Ethical justification for such acts? Would they even have a rationale to begin with?

3) The philosophical and political ideas of the band Earth Crisis can be accurately described as Vegan Straight Edge. It's not representative of the larger Straight Edge community (due to their commitment to Veganism), and it's not representative of the large Vegan community (due to their commitment to Straight Edge). Could you, as an honest reader, imagine a hypothetical scenario in which Earth Crisis' Straight Edge premises, together with their Vegan premises, deductively entail a contradiction?

I was saying they are the perfect topics in Metaphysics, and why is it impossible to explain or discuss. That was what I mean. — Corvus

Right, but here's my question, as a professional metaphysician (I think I've earned the right to call myself that, I have enough metaphysical publications in professional journals to qualify as such),

why is that?

I mean, since they are indeed the perfect topics in Metaphysics (I agree with you on that), I ask, as a metaphysician myself: why is it impossible to explain or discuss? What is the reason for that? Is it just ignorance? Is it superstition? Like, consider my own case: I'm a professional philosopher, I dabble a bit in Metaphysics (my forte, so to speak, is in Philosophy of Science, but that's beside the point).

The preceding being the case. Why can't I explain or discuss them? Why is it impossible for me, specifically, as an individual human being? Are there people out there, in the world, that are somehow under another impression? I'm extremely curious about that. I'm a bit of an amateur anthropologist, you could say. What do you think? What is your opinion on the Metaphysics of ghosts and demons?

I assume he means , that which truly is is that which remains self-identical in its substantive qualities as it undergoes quantitative change in spatial or temporal location. I’m with Heidegger here. I don’t believe there is anything in the world which retains its exact qualitative identity over time. It just appears to us as if this is the case because things can remain SIMILAR to themselves over time, and that’s why we invented number (same thing, different time). — Joshs

Yeah sorry, I genuinely don't understand that. It sounds like Heidegger and you are on to something there, but I don't know what it is. That's always been the case with Heidegger and I. It was even like that for himself, since the literal reason why he didn't write the conclusion for Being and Time is because he didn't have the language to do such a thing.

And his point was, that no one does. However -what follows is extremely important, if you're a Heideggerian (which I'm not)- that situation has historical limits. It's not a static thing. It changes. Think of it like Hegel's Absolute Spirit marching through History, think of it more like that. At least that's how I read it, but I could be wrong, of course.

I think this is what Kant had been talking about in his CPR - if Metaphysics was possible as a Science, when it deals with the topics of non material existences such as God, Souls, Freedom etc. — Corvus

That, is an extremely important question, and, to the best of my knowledge, has not been solved as a genuine scientific problem. Is it one? Is it a scientific question to begin with? Or is it a Meta-scientific question, if you will?

When you are talking about God, Souls, Freedom, and even Demons or Ghosts, we are not saying they do exist in the external world. But rather what Metaphysical inquiries are asking is, how is it possible for us to think about those concepts when they are not existing in the external world, and what if they do exist. — Corvus

This is a "Gnoseological" question in the Spanish sense of the term, in English it's called an "Epistemological" question. I don't what more I can answer on this point, sorry.

If they don't exist in the external world, then could it be possible that they might exist in our mind? — Corvus

This is an ontological question. And it's a good one. This is the type of problem that interests me as a philosopher.

These are perfectly reasonable questions to ask and discuss, and especially if you are a Modalist, — Corvus

Am I? Yes, I guess you could call me that. See, my philosophical hero, Mario Bunge, was not a modalist. So, this would be a difference between our philosophies (there are many other differences as well). And not only am I a modalist, I'm also a modal realist (I figure if Bunge had been a modalist, he would have identified with the other camp, the "modal fictionalists". Is that even a thing? Hmmm...)

I would have thought that you would embrace the possibilities for the inquiries and discussions, rather than rejecting it. — Corvus

What do you mean?

remanens capax mutationem — Heidegger

Or just explain this part to me, @Joshs, what does Heidegger even mean by that? I genuinely don't get it. And I studied Classical Latin at the Uni for one semester. "Remanens capax mutationem"? What does that even mean? Is there any textual evidence to back this sort of claim up? Like, is that an actual phrase from ancient Roman times, yes or no? I think Heidegger wants to imply that it is, but I'm arguing for the opposite point of view here.

EDIT: According to Google Translate, "Remanens capax mutationem" means "remaining capable of change" in English, and "Siendo capaz de cambiar", in Spanish. That doesn't make any conceptual sense to me, so I doubt that it many sense for anyone other than Heidegger himself.

Res extensa forces onto objects the concept of persisting identity, which is also the basis of enumeration. — Joshs

Do I agree with this? I'm not so sure. Let's see what Heidegger has to say, in those passages that you quoted.

Heidegger argues that the fundamentally undiscussed ontological foundations of empirical science since Descartes are based on his formulation of objective presence. — Joshs

Does he argue that? I'm no so sure that he does. But let's continue. You then say:

Just like number, the notion of pure self-persistence is a fiction applied to the world. — Joshs

I don't think so. I think it's an objective feature of the world. The world was already like this, before I was born. And it will continue to be this way, after I die. And currently, it is that way, the fact that I'm alive has nothing to do with it, and since my mind does not live by itself (it requires my living brain), the world simply is that way tout court, so to speak. So, Heidegger (and you) are simply wrong about that. At least that's my opinion. I could be wrong, of course, but I don't see how anyone could possibly make a convincing case for it, let alone state it as an argument (i.e., an exclusive series of true premises that deductively entail a conclusion).

“Thus the being of the "world" is, so to speak, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality and in terms of an idea of knowledge which cognizes beings in this way. Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated.

Thus it is not primarily his dependence upon a science, mathematics, which just happens to be especially esteemed, that determines his ontology of the world, rather his ontology is determined by a basic ontological orientation toward being as constant objective presence, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp.” — Heidegger

What is Heidegger saying there, in your honest opinion?

Since I'm enjoying a fine afternoon of good, old fashioned Antarctic Climate (i.e., that's how I would describe it, it's currently summer here in Argentina, I'm next to the coast, I can see the sea, but there's a storm right now, and it's not a tropical storm, it's cold, there's a hailstorm outside, and I can't see the Sun: the sky is just one dull, shade of gray).

Meh. More a satirical take on human nature than anything. If even that. — Outlander

Hmmm... Fair enough. I hate the climate of the province that I was born in. Is that my province's fault, "geographically speaking"?

No? Not good enough?

These are hard, mkay? — Outlander

Sez u. Let me see if I can do better this time:

There once was a man from Nantucket. Or some bullshit. Who knows. That's the joke. Now you laugh. End of story. Learn the moral lesson that you had to learn, whatever that may be. No one knows what it is.

I think math is more than a tool for physics. Physics deals only with those aspects of the world which are mathemetizable. — Joshs

But that's my point: there are aspects of the world which are not mathematizable. They're called objects, in the literal sense of the term. They are "out there", outside of our brains, they are what Descartes called res extensa. We ourselves are a res extensa. But it does not follow that we are not also a res cogitans in the Cartesian sense. We are both. Our body in general, and our brain more speciffically, is a Cartesian res exstensa and res cogitans at the same time. So, by grammatical simplification, you can remove the word "res" from both of those terms. What that leaves you with, is two "disembodied" predicates: just extensa, and just cogitans. And the argument here, is that there is something to which the predicates extensa and cogitans apply. So, there is something. That something is the brain as a res extensa, and as a physical body more generally, which is physically related to other physical bodies, some of them containing human brains just like yours, just like mine. And the brain is the object to which the predicate cogitans applies as well. One thing (the brain), two predicates (extena and cogitans). The brain is a thing, but the mind is not a thing, the mind is simply what the brain does, in the same sense that digestion is what your gut does. Your gut is the object (the res extensa) in that case, but your digestion is not: your digestion is a process that your gut undergoes (it's more complicated than that, biologically, but that's "how this works" at the basic level of ontology)

It sounds like you seem to emphasize theoretically demons and ghosts can't exist metaphysically. I don't exactly understand what you mean by that. Why suddenly metaphysically? What does metaphysics have to do with the existence of demons and ghosts? — Corvus

For the reason that you just said: it has to do with the existence of such and such (i.e. stones, tables, trees, dogs, people, computers, the Internet, numbers, mathematical objects in general, fictional objects like Pegasus or Sherlock Holmes, demons, ghosts, poems, songs, music, sports, theater, history, Nature, philosophy itself, etc.). Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that deals with the topics of Being and existence. It also deals with other concepts, such as Nothing or Nothingness. So, demons and ghosts are "within the province", "within the domain", "within the realm", of what metaphysics studies. They are "elements of itself as a set", so to speak (poetically, not Platonically, of course).

And what I'm arguing is that ghost and demons do not exist. They do not have the property of existence, because in my personal philosophy, existence is a property. Ghosts and demons do not have that property, therefore they do not exist. I did not invent this idea myself, this is simply something that I took from Mario Bunge's philosophy.

The point being, when last checked a continent contained more land out of water than under water ( not ice like Antarctica) to achieve the geographic recognition of being a continent rather than an ocean ( at this scale). "Oceania" says it all. — kazan

Folks are talking about an 8th continent now, which they are calling "Zealandia". It's almost entirely submerged. Their main country is New Zealand. Some people go one step further and they read this politically: New Zealand, as country, does not want to be considered a part of Oceania (to say nothing of Australia).

What do you folks make of this? Does it make sense? Let's start with that. Thanks for letting me, a non-Australian, participate in this Thread.

It is clearly garbage reasoning, for the following reasons:

We have little to no control over orcas, and even if we wanted to prevent orcas from doing what they do, we would need to insert ourselves into an ecosystem and disrupt it which could have catastrophic consequences for that ecosystem. So, it is true that orcas cause suffering, but it isn't something we should or can prevent imo. This applies to any predatory animal.

Furthermore, humans very well can mold their behavior such that we don't give in to the darkest parts of our natures, and that is not possible for something like an orca. They just kill to eat because they have to. So, humans can act ethically apart from our evolved instincts, whereas other animals almost certainly cannot.

So, deflecting to orcas is pretty dumb. — ToothyMaw

Right, but this is the part where the "orca lawyer" steps in and says: "But mate, orcas kill for sport sometimes, they get a kick out of it, they think it's fun. So if the orca can hunt for sport and enjoy it, why cant I? Why can't I go and hunt whatever I feel like hunting? Why can't I shoot a 'roo or an elk or a guanaco or whatever it is that people hunt in their respective continents?"

What would you respond to the "orca lawyer"? This is an open question, anyone can join the Thread and answer it.

Thank you very much for taking the time and energy to contribute to this Thread, @ToothyMaw. Much appreciated.

Isnt the notion of spatiotemporal localization based on a mathematical abstraction? — Joshs

Well I mean, if you want to get technical about it, it has a lot of math to it, but it's ultimately within the domain of what physicists study. To them, math and logic are just tools, they have no ontology. Physics is the academic discipline that deals with the ontology of the world, not math. I don't expect you to agree with that idea, I'm not so sure that I agree with it myself, but that would be the "Bungean" answer to your question, I suppose. It sounds like a fallacy to me, but that's the best I got in relation to your question.