Time exists only for as long as things move. It's an emergent abstract property that we detect. It's what follows from movement intensity. So if everything keeps moving and has moved in some form somewhere then time is eternal. And if at some point nothing moved or stops moving time stops existing.

So things just exist and move and the velocity changes we recognize which we call the adjustment of time. Is really just matter and forces interacting on the capacity to move. Just like matter affects matter with gravity. So does matter affect matter by changing it's capacity to move. Movement creates time. Time need not and doesn't exist separately without movement. Unlike matter or space. Hence I don't think that time is part of the fabric of space. I think matter just affects things such as matter and space which then affect their ability to move through gravity or other means

Empty (don't know how to delete comment)

I agree. We see something. We coin a new word. People ask us to define it and it will fall short. Over time we use the word in different ways. And we give different definitions. And the different definitions help us bridge some of the imaginary boundaries we create in our sense of reality.

So yes I agree it's useful to see different ways words are used then to argue about a definition being the absolute king. One definition won't describe everything the word game or knowledge is used to describe.

I was arguing your idea that my proposition regarding me being new was "made true by direct experience"
— Jack2848
If it is true, it was made true by taking place in your consciousness. It still your knowledge, and no one else's, so stop dancing around that mulberry bush.

So you meant it like this then?

Me:
"I rode a bicycle"

You:
Sez you who made it true by direct experience. For all I know. You didn't ride a bycicle. (Added: I can have no knowledge of it even if it is true)

So you meant that if I rode a bycicle the riding (experience) made it true but it doesn't mean you can know.

If that is what you meant form the start, honestly. Then I misunderstood you. (To be frank there are those that would conflate truth perception with separate truth value) I thought that was you

The experience of being on the forum the first time can be put into information via a thought. It's equivalent enough. I agree that I have direct experience but it might be my memory is incorrect so it's not necessarily the case that me having the experience
— Jack2848
Why should I care how true it is for you? You made the statement and I had no reason to disbelieve it. That's where its importance begins and ends.

Hence the cat is on the mat is true not if you believe or not believe it but if the cat is on the mat.
— Jack2848
I don't see a cat or a mat. I have only your word. I have no reason to doubt your statement and, since its truth or unrtuth doesn't matter to me, I am not motivated to investigate further. Whether it's true or false, I don't know.

The experience of being on the forum the first time can be put into information via a thought. It's equivalent enough. I agree that I have direct experience but it might be my memory is incorrect so it's not necessarily the case that me having the experience
— Jack2848
Why should I care how true it is for you? You made the statement and I had no reason to disbelieve it. That's where its importance begins and ends.

I'm not arguing for the importance of whether I was on this forum before or whether you should care. That would be a strawman of my intent.I was arguing your idea that my proposition regarding me being new was "made true by direct experience"

To which I said that it isn't.

Whatever is the case is the case. Regardless of direct experience or justifications. That is what I was arguing for. And that was I brought up the example of the cat on the mat. Not to assume that you can know whether I am new or not.

That’s why belief and justification were part of the traditional definition: not because they’re philosophically tidy, but because they reflected what it means to know in actual life. We’re not passive containers of truths—we’re engaged agents who must assess, trust, challenge, and risk loss in the pursuit of knowledge.

That’s why Gettier cases are troubling. They show that something can check the boxes—justified, true, believed—and still feel wrong. The problem isn’t just with the definition; it’s with how knowledge is entangled with our perspective, our stakes, and our vulnerability to error.

Gettier cases show not that we can have "justified true belief" and still don't have knowledge.
If so define me the word you assume we don't have when we have a gettier case.

Ofcourse what we really intuitively grasp is that the gettier cases show us that having knowledge (having justified true belief) doesn't mean that you know you have knowledge (doesn't mean you know you have justified true belief.

Whereas if you said knowledge is true information.
Then in a gettier case. You'd have someone have true information. And of they then say that they know they have true Information. We could say you don't know even if you have a strongly justified belief.

It is not that the gettier cases show us that

A.
we can't have knowledge (justified true belief)
nor that

B. we can't have knowledge (true information) and know (have good justifications for it) we have knowledge (true information).

Gettier cases show us that even with extremely good justifications and true believe or true Information. Our claim that we -know- could still be false. If -know- means to have good justifications and true believe/information. It humbles our ability to know regardless of how you define knowledge as true information and add the requirement for justification to the act of knowing or of you add that requirement to both knowing and knowledge as with JTB.

This obvious since we don't have direct awareness which would be required for ultimate rather than practical knowing.

However I do agree with you that it wouldn't be practical to change the definition. And it seems more accurate to include justification requirement in the act of knowing AND knowledge assumptions. Even if one could easily separate the act of knowing from a piece of true information.

Truth-maker? No, I never referred to any such thing. What I said was that a statement may be true and we can believe it, which makes it our belief. But information doesn't become knowledge until it's been verified and incorporated with our data base.

Sez you, who made it true by Direct experience

You did. I've tried as best I can to clearly layout what I mean when I use words like knowledge. (Even if implied this is problematic.
And I have stayed clear from mixing truth perception and actual truth).

Earlier you said something is made true by direct experience.
— Jack2848
Not that much earlier, and not quite as you put it. The experiencer of a sensation knows that sensation to be true, without making any statement. It's not made true and it's not information; it's true because it's inside of the experiencer. It's not true for anyone else. It can be communicated to others and they may believe it, but they cannot know it.

The experience of being on the forum the first time can be put into information via a thought. It's equivalent enough. I agree that I have direct experience but it might be my memory is incorrect so it's not necessarily the case that me having the experience

a. The experience makes it true in my experience unless I don't have that critical thought so I can't necessarily know. As I said earlier (if that final statement is true depends on how you'd define "know")
B. It may be so that it isn't true in the perception of everyone else , but as I said earlier that doesn't make it actually true or not true

Whether or not you believe that a cat is on the mat. It is or isn't there.. or in other words it is true regardless of your or anyone's perception. Because it refers to a part of the universe that is a way that is different from the rest at some level of that universe.

Hence "the cat is on the mat is true" not if you believe or not believe it but if the cat is on the mat.

P if p

Truth-maker? No, I never referred to any such thing. What I said was that a statement may be true and we can believe it, which makes it our belief. But information doesn't become knowledge until it's been verified and incorporated with our data base.

Well if you say :

it's true because it's inside of the experiencer. It's not true for anyone else

It's true BECAUSE it is in the experiencer and not true for anyone else.
Then hopefully you mean that it is true regardless of anyone. And it is perceived of true or not true depending on a subject

I'm all too keenly aware of that. If it gets much more lax, we might as well give up on verbal communication, since any word can mean whatever anyone chooses

How do we know if a word necessarily means what you say it means? How do we know this? Do we look at instances of knowledge? Because if so turns out as I said. That those instances are more "akin to information assumed to be true" or "beliefs assumed to justified and assumed to be true"

Definitely not justified true belief.
At least not if we are to take a purely descriptive account.

Are you familiar with the idea of a family resemblance? How much success would you have if you set out to define your family by listing their attributes? Blonde hair and a hooked nose, maybe, except for cousin Philippa, with their less aquiline features and mousy hair. Or all descended from Grandpa Jerome, except the adopted twins. Supose that for whatever feature you choose, there are exceptions, or you include folk that you would not want included.

The idea is that we can talk about our family, despite not being able to give a strict and explicit definition that includes all and only those members we want; and this can be generalised to claim that for some terms there is no explicit definition that sets out all and only those things that are to be included. The other example is "game" - without resorting to mere stipulation, can we provide a rule that includes all and only those things that we have described as a "game"? Not all games involve winning, nor competition, nor amusement. And yet despite this we make good use of the word.

Point being that we do not need to be able to present a definition as a prerequisite for using the word.

We use the word "knowledge" quite adequately, and widely, and yet when we try to tie it down we end up in these interminable philosophical meanderings.

So, do we need to provide a definition of knowledge at all? Perhaps it would be better to just map out the different ways we use the word, as you have begun to do.

One thing we can do is to mark the difference between knowing an believing. We can believe something that is not true. We can't know something that is not true. If you thought you knew something, but it turns out you were mistaken, then you didn't know it at all.

.........
We don't always find it easy to have a clear definition yes. We teach kids what a tree and a car is by showing them pictures of different trees and cars. And then of toy cars and so on.
So we intuitively understand the pattern but it's much more difficult to explain it. However suppose someone called Jack says to his daughter: ''I'll give you a present next year and it will be a car''. Then since he means a car in GTA 6, he'd better mention to his daughter that he means a car in GTA 6. Otherwise she might assume from context that he meant an actual car. Similarly we use the word 'knowledge' in similar ways. Hence sometimes it's better to move beyond the word.

(Although the family description example begs to be vague. I would say a family is a descendant (or we can say descendant until x generations). Trying to define family by their attributes is pointless as mutations probably happen and culture effects individuals and so on. And for game. One could choose to only include games where one can win and have a different name for the others such as recreational activity that isn't a game. but I get your point and I did fairly address it above)

And I agree. We can map out different ways the word can be reasonably used. So we all are more aware that we are arguing on definitions to attach to a word rather than over what the actual thing is.

Although one pattern arises across them all. ''Knowledge is something assumed to be true by an individual or by a group''. And the something for some is JTB or it can be true information. Or something other. So it's the most likely descriptive candidate.

Knowledge (beliefs assumed to be justified and assumed to be true) have often be wrong.
— Jack2848

Knowledge claims are sometimes disputed, disclaimed, or proven wrong, as the case may be. The JTB proponent would deal with this issue by emphasizing the distinction between knowledge claims and knowledge as such. Justified Belief is sufficient for a knowledge claim. The Truth requirement is what is supposed to certify that the claim is merited.

With JTB.

'the earth is flat' would have been assumed to be knowledge. But then layer turned out to be justified belief. So not knowledge.
With 'true information' as definition the same would have happened.

It would have been wrongfully (but understandably) assumed to have been knowledge (TI) but then later shown wrong.

The same happens really. It's just that TI there's a clear distinction between knowing and knowledge. Knowing requires (if one is less stringent) justified belief.
And if more stringent, direct awareness of said true information.

I'm definitely not advocating (although in my initial post I seem to have had a different mood) for it having to be defined differently. But I felt like maybe we have strayed to far from a more simple definitional approach. (And this also further from applying Occam's razor)

By recognizing that for knowing we require justifications or direct awareness or x. So that we can know or reasonably assume that we have knowledge (TI). We simplify the definitions.

To be descriptive and claim to be more accurate. You'd have to look at instances of when people say they have knowledge. Now and across time. And you'll see that it's belief assumed to be justified and assumed to be true.
— Jack2848

But here you seem to be saying the opposite: that JTB is how people generally use the word "knowledge."

So, which is it? Does JTB capture the meaning(s) of "knowledge" or does it not?

And if JTB does reflect the current use, then what is that point of your definition? Do you wish to reform language? Clarify an ambiguity? But defining "knowledge" as, essentially, fact, true proposition, is not only redundant, but confusing as well. According to the usual meaning, knowledge requires a knower, naturally enough. But with your proposal, most of what qualifies as "knowledge" is not known to anyone!

I wouldn't say most common people would say knowledge requires a knower. If you ask someone on the street and as them. ''Can I put knowledge onto a piece of paper. whilst not knowing for myself it is knowledge?"

I imagine many saying something like this. "Yes because if it is knowledge as you say. Then since it is true (information). Then whether you know it or not doesn't matter. It is still true."

I've the luck in this case that I have a very ordinary job. And yet when I tell people knowledge is defined as ''justified true belief''. It doesn't sound like the first thing they think of.

Ofcourse if you ask people. Do you have knowledge? And then ask them how do you know you have knowledge? They might say . Because I have good reasons to believe it.

So knowing then is 'personally assumed justified belief' that they have knowledge (true information).

But here you seem to be saying the opposite: that JTB is how people generally use the word "knowledge."

So, which is it? Does JTB capture the meaning(s) of "knowledge" or does it not?

Hmm.
''belief assumed to be true and assumed to have justifications for"

''information assumed to be true''

''Information assumed to be true''

Those seem like the most descriptive options for what knowledge ultimately is.

Whereas JTB and ''true information'' would be more (useful) inventions rather then descriptions.

I found that a bit hard to follow, but it looks to be a galant attempt at elucidation and analysis.

The justified true belief account comes from Socrates in the Theaetetus, and even he wasn't happy with it.

You're on the right track, I think, in looking to the way we use the word "knowledge". But here's a puzzle for you: must there be one statable phrase that covers all our uses of "knowledge"? Could it be that we use the word in different ways, such that no fixed definition is both accurate and compete?

Moreover, will we say is the correct uses of "knowledge" are only those that conform to some stated definition?

At the least, that rules out any novel uses. Do we want to do that?

I re-read my comment and I could have made some bullet points or something. I hope you at least got the gist of it. But moving on to answer your questions

1. As I added in the edit in the OP and in some comments to others. I am acutely aware of different ways that we could hold the word 'knowledge'.

I've determined at least a few.

A. Knowledge= a belief assumed to be true and assumed that we (or I) have good justifications for it

B. Knowledge= justified true belief

C. Knowledge= justified belief

D. Knowledge= true information

Any of these can be work. And I'd say given the issues with language it might even be better to bypass it and just say what we mean at times.
(Take the word 'woke' how for some it entails radical behavior whereas for other awareness of social issues)
That is vastly different. And just the use of the word rather than just saying what one dislikes directly had caused much unnecessary issues.

Now from all of these options. I think 'A' is the only one that we can claim is objectively the most accurate of the four because it describes.


It can't be JTB, or true information or justified belief that is more descriptive. Because individuals or groups have called things 'knowledge'. That either wasn't true or wasn't justified. (Not really). Even our justifications at some point assume they are justified.


But in the case of A. Which acknowledges that it's an -assumption- of a belief being justified and true. This is rock solid as a description. Since then the lack of truth or lack of proper judgment of justification doesn't break the definition since it is merely an assumption.

2. Is there a definition that could help us limit whether some definitions for knowledge are acceptable and some aren't?

We could consider the negative effects of trivializing definitions. Any definition should seek to be clear. If the definition is highly inspired by psychological introspection. Then it should make clear the distinction between personal truth assumption and practical recognition of actual 'truth' .

Do you have a definition for your answer?

3.
I wouldn't rule out novel uses.
It would possibly limit new ways of understanding the process of putting out there our understanding of what is. As maybe someone has an insight we don't yet have

If a proposition is true then it is true information. So if we'd use the word knowledge for that then sure.
— Jack2848
But I'm not using one word when I mean a different word. Why should I?

You missed the point of the whole text.
I meant to show how people use the same words with different meanings. If you'd say that knowledge is justified true belief. Then that's objectively not a descriptive correct statement in that case you're equally choosing a definition per your preference. As others would.

To be descriptive and claim to be more accurate. You'd have to look at instances of when people say they have knowledge. Now and across time. And you'll see that it's belief assumed to be justified and assumed to be true.

Why? Knowledge (beliefs assumed to be justified and assumed to be true) have often be wrong.

You might say that those people only thought they had knowledge (and here you could have in mind JTB)
And that's true. But then you've intorduced a new definition and are no longer descriptive. This is what I tried to explain but you seem to not have fully understood it. Perhaps that's because I was being too vague.
Anyway. Once we move away form the descriptive the claim that you have the correct account dissapears. Since now I can claim equally that knowledge is to be defined as ''true information'' . Or something other

And then I can say that people only thought they had true information (knowledge) but didn't.

And it would be useful a definition but equally incorrect in a descriptive way.

'I am writing my first post on this board'' is true and is knowledge.
— Jack2848
Sez you, who made it true by Direct experience. I have no way of testing the statement. (You might have had 18 different online personae over the years.
(Welcome, or welcome back, whichever applies.)

''The truth value we can imagine not depending on your perception otherwise we'd have contradictions galore. Surely we can make a distinction between truth assumption by person x vs our recognition that x could be false anyway. (In a practical way)
— Jack2848
Exactly, which is why a piece of information, however true and correct, is not knowledge until it's verified by comparison to previous experience, tested against logic and probability and incorporated into a personal data-base. When you experience and remember something, it becomes part of your knowledge. When you communicate it to someone else, it doesn't necessarily part of their knowledge.

See. Earlier you said something is made true by direct experience. In other cases in short translation you say that we need justified true belief for knowledge. But since from what you said it follows that you're position at least how it's presented here is that 'the truth maker' is not something like 'p if p'. But rather direct undoubtedable experience. Or justified true belief.

But then the belief would become true because of justifications and belief rather than that you'd have good justifications for believing that x is true, or is the case.

I get that there's no physical property called 'truth'. But it serves a function. The function is to understand something like p if p. Regardless of whether I have a direct experience of p or wether you have justifications and a belief that p.

So either you stick to the idea that truth is made by justifications and belief or direct experience. Or truth is a tool we use to conceptually understand that a proposition can 'be true'' regardless of opinion. (So what you said in the later post). Or you keep both in the exact way as presented and contradict yourself. Since then you'd say that information x is true regardless of opinion. And that it's only true if you have good reasons to believe it. But surely people often thought from a 1st and collective 1st person perspective that they had good reasons to believe it. And surely that didn't make it true. Surely the earth wasn't flat just because people had good reasons to believe it at the time.

We can define the word knowledge in various ways.
Let's say someone x tells someone z , say Jane with all the right details (true information and thus propositional knowledge) how to ride a bycicle.

Jane can't ride. Not ever. She just can't learn it. (Just like an ant couldn't or some other creature with different cognitive abilities or physical restraints) She is the extremely rare human being that can't ride a bicycle. Yet most humans that take the propositional knowledge (true Information) are able to use it in order to ride the bycicle. And if we'd give purposefully incorrect information. This non propositional knowledge would have most people unable to learn how to ride a bicycle (at least when applying the incorrect knowledge, such as waving at strangers while sitting on the curb)

So what we learn is not that propositional knowledge or true Information isn't true information.

What we learn is that applying propositional knowledge which is the conceptual attempt to describe ability knowledge. But that for most it is close enough if the task isn't too difficult, to reach ability knowledge with the initial propositional knowledge combined with enactment over time.

And we learned that propositional knowledge won't necessarily lead to ability knowledge because 1. Prop knowledge is conceptual so just like a map isn't the land but can still help (for those that can read maps and so on) and 2. Ability knowledge is probably some kind of neuronal connection. And the learner has to have the physical ability both cognitively and qua physique to perform it.

So we learn propositional knowledge or true information exists. And that because it is different from the physical thing (neuronal connections of ability knowledge) it can cause issues for some. The exception that can't learn to ride a bicycle shows their inability to perform it. And the ones (most) that follow the wrong instructions and fail and then follow the right instructions and succeed over time confirm that propositional knowledge for learning how to ride a bicycle can often lead to ability knowledge because it is close enough to ability knowledge for most.

When I use knowledge defined/to be translated as true information

Then I'd not say that is just ''truth in the mind'' if by that you mean an assumption of truth.

Rather more abstract. If we write a letter. "Something exists because this letter, and the writer, whatever their actual nature is they obviously exist in some form or other.''

And that letter somehow gets made such that is encased in a nearly indestructible substance.
Surely ''truth value'' isn't something physical or magical in the letter. But we can use the word to understand that what the proposition states is the case regardless of belief. We can understand that it is or isn't so.

So information would be something like that proposition example. Whatever it is that complex entities eventually could decode even alien races given enough time and maybe some luck. (Like we'd decode stuff).

So knowledge defined as true information is just like that proposition + it being true regardless of opinion.

The earth is flat or it isn't. Regardless of opinion. So knowledge for me would be ''the earth is not flat'' (if it is not flat).

Instead we should split the two.
Knowledge is information that is true.
For example ''Superman can fly in the fictional realm of DC''. Is true if stated as such and thus is knowledge. It doesn't require a belief to be true. It just is.
— Jack2848

If knowledge doesn't require belief, then i can know Superman can fly even if I've never heard of Superman?

If we translate/define knowledge as ''true information'' and separate it from knowing as I said. You get this.

''you can have true information and not know that you have it. You can have true information and know that you have it but in order to know you have to be aware of the truth of the information"

Or the same but without translation

"You can have knowledge and know it or have knowledge and not know it. And if you know you have knowledge then you have to be aware of the truth of the information otherwise you don't know you have knowledge.

An example of being aware of the truth of the information in your possession being true information is "this what we are doing, is something, whatever its true nature might be, so something exists"

Or pre translation.
An example of knowing you have knowledge is "this what we are doing, is something, whatever its true nature might be, so something exists"

So can you be aware of whether the information is true (know) that Superman can fly even if you haven't heard of Superman? No. You'd need knowledge (true information) and awareness that the information is knowledge (true information).

So just because true information (knowledge) doesn't require a belief, doesn't mean that you can be aware of the truth value (know) of 'superman can fly' even if you don't know him.

If I've understood, ↪Jack2848 knows things he doesn't believe, while ↪T Clark knows things that are not true.

And neither account can explain what it is to know how to ride a bike.

Incorrect.

I separate knowing from knowledge. (In the case I originally used knowledge to be Translated as true Information)

So let's say something like ability knowledge. With propositions people explain how to ride. Eventually you manage to do so. I'd claim that the person who knows how to ride a bicycle is someone that can fulfill the task after having understood the true information that explained how to do the task and was able to enact the true information into action.

So I can know how to ride a bicycle. Some things I can know. Some things I can't know. Both with a stringent epistemological approach and a more practical one.

And my ability to know in the bicycle case is because I have applied true information and am aware that it is true because if it wasn't I'd not be able to ride the bycicle.

If you told me ''the way to ride a bicycle is to sit on your buttocks and wave your hand at random people and then you'll do what x does (points at x who's riding a bycicle). Then the information would be false in that definition of knowledge it would thus not be knowledge. And would not result in me riding a bycicle.

No, that's just accurate information. It doesn't become knowledge until you compare it with previous information you're gathered, test it for logical dissonance, evaluate it in light of your own sensory input and integrated it with a network of data on the subject that you've accumulated through a combination of reliable information from external sources, personal experience, reflection and memory. (You can't know anything you've forgotten, no matter how true it was or how convinced you were.)

We use the word knowledge to refer to things we use in the world. For example "something exist because this whatever this is is something" so we ask what is that ?
For ages the proposition ''green is something innate to the object" was deemed true. So we can say we thought it was knowledge (true information or JTB) or we could say it was knowledge (justified belief) .
Which is an accurate proposition as wether it was knowledge or not at the time to say' ''green is innate to the object'' will depend on what y
your definition of the word knowledge is.

Knowledge=justified belief (x)
Knowledge=justified true belief (y)
Knowledge=(true) information (z)
Knowledge=a belief assumed to be true (m)

What we can do for example is
something like. (and to be clear we wouldn't add x y or z. We'd just naturally talk using the word knowledge and the definitions and as a result we'd get confused.

''knowledge (y) is not true information (z).
Knowledge (y) is justified true belief (y) (JTB= short version of what you said). And I could say ''no, knowledge (z) is true information (z)''.

Which would basically be like.

''no, it's not the case that y is z. Obviously y is y
And then I can say "no, z is z"

So then we are really just confused by language and arguing about definition. And one isn't necessarily true and the other false. They will only be more, less or equally useful depending on context and a desired metric and measuring method or goal.
In other words a definition of a word can't be false or true just be more or less useful.

If a proposition is true then it is true information. So if we'd use the word knowledge for that then sure. If a proposition is true but we prefer to say knowledge is tied to a belief and must be JTB then we could equally say it's knowledge. Because it is a JTB.

If we say that that proposition is justified belief and we want to use the word knowledge to describe it. Then since the proposition is a justified belief it would be knowledge if such defined.

'I am writing my first post on this board'' is true and is knowledge.
— Jack2848
Sez you, who made it true by Direct experience. I have no way of testing the statement. (You might have had 18 different online personae over the years.
(Welcome, or welcome back, whichever applies.)

The truth value we can imagine not depending on your perception otherwise we'd have contradictions galore. Surely we can make a distinction between truth assumption by person x vs our recognition that x could be false anyway. (In a practical way)

God exists'' is either knowledge (true information) or it isn't and then it's false information. Can we know whether it is knowledge or not? That depends on what you mean by know.
— Jack2848
No, it doesn't. It depends on on whether you're a theist. For them, the answer is obviously yes; for an atheist, it's just as obviously No; for an agnostic, it's a wobbly Maybe.

And would you say the theist, atheist and agnost each have different ideas as to what we can claim to know? And that this then affects their being a theist/agnost? And would you say that that confirms rather then refutes my position that whether we can know first depends on what we mean by 'know'

Since if we mean by 'know' 'having absolute certainty even beyond often assumed ridiculous doubt'. Then in that case we can't know. If defined differently (fallibilist type definition) then we can know.

I agree. Justified belief is probably what knowledge is if we take a descriptive approach.
But it's just a way of holding it , but we can define 'knowledge' in many ways that align with potential natural uses.
But one things seem quite clear and in need of little convincing.

If someone points to the gettier cases. And says that 'x' had a JTB 'y'. And then says "But surely we wouldn't say 'x' knew 'y'. He was just lucky. So JTB isn't knowledge.

Basically they're saying two things or we could derive. 1. That for them knowledge requires absolute certainty and godlike direct awareness of reality (so knowledge is then impossible for humans) so that there's no luck involved nor any doubt.

2. They say JTB isn't knowledge. i.o.w. (using their requirements as definition) JTB isn't such that it is direct awareness of reality in a godlike manner

For the definition of truth bypass the difficulty to define it and just say it's ''if p then p'' meaning if p then p is true.

I've had a similar view on knowledge to hold it has justified belief. As it automatically entails epistemic humility and explains contradicting instances of knowledge. But when they do arise. The concept of ''truth'' is still useful and not to be discarded.

If country 'a' says that x happened and country 'b' says that ''not x'' happened. Then both claim the propositions are knowledge (justified belief). But since they contradict it begs the question. So which knowledge (JB) is true? The word is just useful altough but not necessary in the definition of knowledge.

But if we can hold multiple definitions (perspectives). It could be more practical to use what most aligns with common understanding. And that is (I belief) that knowledge is information that is true. (But it could be that in some circles (minority) it would be justified belief. But that's just my intuition. Not sure could be the other way around.