https://www.amazon.co.uk/Retrieving-Nicaea-Development-Trinitarian-Doctrine-ebook/dp/B005GMY9X6

This is a good book about the subject.

I'm disturbed by the fact that the enemy is hell-spawn, so our heroes can get their slaughter on without worrying about killing somebody's father or brother... somebody's son. It's just a monster. That's not how it really is. — Mongrel

This issue also bothered Tolkien. When he began to write his stories, in his teenage years, the bad guys were modeled after the bad guys in his beloved old myths, i.e., there was no sympathy or concern for their underlying humanity. But in his late years (cf. Morgoth's Ring, Volume X of The History of Middle Earth, edited by Christopher Tolkien) he grew unsatisfied with the then-canonic (inside-the-tale) "version" of the origin of Orcs as being corrupted Elves. (This version is what ended up in the Silmarillion).

Tolkien wrote about how this version was hard to reconcile with the idea that the Elves and Men (and later Dwarves) were endowed with free will by Ilúvatar (=God). And he was inclined -- in his late years -- to ascribe the origin of Orcs to the corruption of non-free beings, namely, animals. Orcs would then be "vicious beasts", endowed (by Melkor) with the capacity to mimic the free beings (by talking, planning, cunning, etc.), but not really free to repent and therefore to be the objects of pity by the good guys.

Note, also, that the idea that the enemy is 'hell-spawn', even in the published works, is not really applicable to other enemies than Orcs and Trolls. Sam has an important moment of compassionate reflection about the possible blamelessness of the "Southron" that he sees getting killed by Faramir's troops. Along the Tale of Years (Appendix B of LOTR) there are diplomatic efforts between Gondor and hostile nations -- something that belies the idea that they are not to be reasoned with. Etc.

In the old PF I received some PM's about having changed some hearts. In the main, they were about how I opened their eyes to a different way of looking at some issues. Usually, there were not of the kind "Yeah, I have seen the light, thanks, I'm now wholly changed!" (with one exception).

In any case, as unenlightened has pointed out, this was not the goal of my posting there. It was a welcome side-effect (who wouldn't like this ego boost?), but to be honest I guess I infuriated as many people as I persuaded.

Persuasion does not happen in a public forum in any case. It happens in the silence of the night, and not only as a result of arguments. We're not that kind of creature (Mr. Spock?), thank God.

Unfortunately the best works that I know of are in Portuguese. "Pitágoras e o Tema do Número" and "Platão: o Um e o Múltiplo". Fantastic works.

Perhaps the SEP entries on Pythagoreanism and associated notions can shed some light.

Using a symbolic language to summarize the point:

Being comes from Nothing, i.e., 1 comes from 0.

The begetting of Being (1) begets polarity (2), automatically, as a result of the coexistence of Being and Nothing, and later as Being becomes individualized in a variety of modes (all of them dependent on polarities for existing).

When someone understands being and nothing as "partners in existence", this understanding, by conjoining both partners, supersedes them (and is symbolized by 3).

Pythagorean tradition goes on in this fashion up to 10. The set of insights (one associated to each integer up to 10) is called the Pythagorean tetractys.

To lead the discussion back to your question in the thread, God is not 1, he is 0. The creative abyss our of which all Creation sprang forth. 1 would be something like the Platonic Demiurge, rather than the Christian God.

If God exists in a similar sense that justice, truth, beauty, etc. exist, then why is it that some cultures and religions have no notion of God (in a transcendent sense, I'm not talking about the immanent Devas) - for example, Buddhism? How could they have missed it? — Agustino

I don't think that God exists in a similar sense that justice, truth, beauty etc. exist. Those are merely examples to underline the point that "X exists" is equivocal, that X may exist in many different modes.

The apophatic theology has it right. God is not a proper subject of any sentence; we cannot speak of Him without falling into equivocation. The best that one can hope for is fruitful analogies (and these depend on experiences, of both speaker and listener).

The teachings of Pythagoras about the Monad and the Dyad are probably the best non-Christian attempt to refer to God as He is (as opposed to God as He reveals Himself to us). Are you familiar with them?

As for the point about Buddhism, I would have to have some evidence that they have truly "missed" the Pythagorean Monad. As far as I know (which is not a lot), the Buddha-nature shares some traits with the Monad. If that is correct, then there is nothing being missed.

At some point we will have to point at something and say, "This is the fundamental block. It cannot be explained by recourse to something else. If you are asking what it is, you already know it". Experience is my candidate for that fundamental block. If we try to explain it, we will always be going around in circles.

We can describe it, of course. (Which is not the same thing as explaining it). "Have you experienced X?" means, "did you, as a conscious subject, become aware of the presence of X?" But this description is already mixing the concepts of consciousness and awareness -- and we know (by experience!) that experience does not require, absolutely, either acessory notion. (We can experience a kick in our face while asleep. And we will wake up with a big pain in our face, perhaps missing teeth, etc. All of them aftereffects of the kick: but they are not the kick itself).

In some sense, our consciousness can retrieve unconscious experiences, going back (at least) to early childhood. What is the nature of that which is being retrieved? The fundamental blocks of our lives (not merely mental lives). I can't go further than that.

You can believe things to be true by either, fact, reason or faith. — Rank Amateur

At the basis of all three there is experience.

(This is not a disagreement. It is just an observation that explains how one can transition from one mode to the other without discontinuity. They have a common root).

Mostly, it is that the answer to this question (sorry to sound so Clintonian) hinges on the meaning of the word "exists". God certainly exists if this word is taken to mean, let us say, the "big sense" of exist -- the one which encompasses transcendent and imaginary beings (not to distinguish between these right now to make a clearer point). And God certainly does not exist in the "restricted sense", the one which encompasses objects of sense perception, but which excludes abstractions, concepts, and other notions which are not objects of sense perception.

The subjacent reason for so much vitriol in God-debates is that the participants are not addressing God's existence per se, but what follows from it. A God-debate in the format "Does God exist?", in principle, is no different from a hobbit-debate. Do hobbits exist? In some senses, yes, in other senses, no. But we don't see people disagreeing vehemently over the issue. That is because the existence or non-existence of hobbits does not impinge on, say, other people's freedoms, or on the organization of society, or on the meaning of life, or on the destiny of souls.

God (for people on both sides of the debate) is a powerful little word. It addresses much more than dogma and history.

One observation (quite empirical) that sheds some light on what is going on in God debates is that we don't have to explain to toddlers what God is. They appear to have an innate notion of, let's say, "external and universal authority"; and this is the crux :D of the God debates. The discussion is much more about authority vs. liberty than about the definition and properties of God. (In other words, we don't have to have a clear notion of God to use the notion in an instrumental fashion -- as toddlers do).

The way in which these concepts and sensations are used are completely different. — GreyScorpio

Precisely. They are different, which is not a reason to consider one of them more fundamental than the other, to try to reduce one to the other, or to disregard one of them.

Remember: A's and R's agree that God is not detectable through the senses. The question is where do we go from here. To claim that "since God is not detectable through the senses, he does not exist" is a problem of ontology and epistemology (not of theology); one must try to defend the principle "only what is detectable through the senses exist", which is the hidden major premise in that claim, before espousing it.

But the examples of beauty, justice, knowledge, etc., run counter to the premise -- and you agree with that. Beauty, justice, and knowledge exist -- though they exist in a different way than pieces of wood, trains and balls.

"Physical" is something relating directly to the senses. Something that we directly observe. — GreyScorpio

So, examples of notions which are not referring to physical objects, besides the aforementioned beauty, justice, virtue, knowledge, would be:

Triangularity
Britishness
The United States
Atoms

Right?

After all we do not directly observe any of those. To see a triangle is not the same as seeing triangularity; to see a british city (or a british person) is not the same as seeing britishness; and no one has ever seen "the United States" with the naked eye. At most one has seen some lines in a drawing that purport to represent the United States. But one can play that game with gods, angels and demons too.

Atoms is a cute one too.

So, If God can not be comprehended in a physical sense then that means that, logically, he can have no effect on human experience I believe? — GreyScorpio

Would you apply this reasoning to "justice", "beauty", "knowledge", "virtue", etc? None of them can be comprehended in a material/physical sense, but they appear to have lots of effects on human experience.

The non-physical cannot interact with the physical. — GreyScorpio

This presupposes a meaning of "physical" that turns the sentence above into something tautologous. If we eschew this meaning and examine the issue more closely (see observation above), we see that the non-physical interacts with the physical all the time, non-stop.

In another attempt, if God cannot be comprehended in a physical sense, then what sense do we comprehend such a being to be able to parade his existence. "God is watching over us", "God is speaking to me" implying that he is interacting with the physical and this seems to be entirely impossible and God cannot do the impossible. So what are we to believe? — GreyScorpio

Quite simply, we should re-examine the dogma :D that the non-physical cannot interact with the physical. Let's do it by steps. What does "physical" mean?

As in God cannot be comprehended in a material/physical sense. — GreyScorpio

Yep, I see no problem with that assertion (and neither do the major tradition religions, including Christianity).

It is important to observe that God is far from being the only member of the set of "notions which cannot be comprehended in a material/physical sense". The Socratic problems alluded to earlier (virtue, knowledge, justice, piety) are all about this kind of notion.

If so then I'm also guessing that 'transcending the universe or material existence' also means that he is beyond material comprehension? — GreyScorpio

What does "material comprehension" mean? I am not familiar with that expression.

The dictionary is a good first step. Merriam-Webster:

Definition of transcendent
1 a : exceeding usual limits : surpassing
b : extending or lying beyond the limits of ordinary experience
c in Kantian philosophy : being beyond the limits of all possible experience and knowledge
2 : being beyond comprehension
3 : transcending the universe or material existence — compare immanent
4 : universally applicable or significant

We see a common theme: words being used to point at something beyond words. (Exceeding limits, beyond comprehension). But the common theme is, of course, empty if one does not presuppose that reality is already composed of "perceivables and non-perceivable", "comprehensibles and non-comprehensibles", "experienciables and non-experienciables", etc.

Dictionaries can help us from straying into fruitless discussions when we are not really speaking the same language, but they can't solve the problem itself, since this problem is about the limits of language (even though we may be speaking the same language all along).

A good way to address transcendence is Platonic philosophy. The Socratic discussions in the early dialogues, about "the nature of" virtue, piety, justice, etc. are attempts to bring "into language" the problem of being-beyond-ordinary-experience. They are also good in that they emphasize that the roots of this being are present within ordinary experience itself: Socrates is not a preacher, someone who brings revealed truth; he is the midwife that helps something "in seed" to burst into conscious being.

In the context of this thread, I pointed out some notions, way back at the beginning, that could be explored as exemplars of "being-beyond-ordinary-experience". The notion of britishness, of sevenness, were mentioned. What kind of being is britishness? Is it "merely imaginary"? Does it, er, transcend the people and the isles, or does it not? Etc.

God is an imaginary being but they still believe that Religious people are putting their dependence and faith into something that is not real, whether it be transcendent or not. — GreyScorpio

That is precisely the issue. When A says that X is "not real, whether it be transcendent or not", he is presupposing a notion of "reality" that R disagrees with. "Transcendent yet not real" is an oxymoron in a R's worldview. If something is transcendent, then it is real, with a reality that is actually "more real" than the reality of everyday objects (observable through the senses).

"This does not make any sense", says A. However, the issue cannot be decided before the criteria of reality are settled between the disputants. What is real, in what form or shape is an imaginary being (to use A's worldview) "real"? After all, an imaginary being is not nothing, i.e., it is something.

These words -- reality, being, existence -- are very slippery. And the problem with A-R debates is that both sides presuppose that their worldview is "obvious" (a dangerous word) and refrain from doing the hard work of examining their worldview through philosophical reflection.

Christianity always refers back to God being physical, transcendent or not. — GreyScorpio

"Physical" is another slippery word. Christian dogma is adamant that:

a) God is not physical
b) Jesus was/is physical
c) Jesus is God

This can be dismissed as mere contradictory sentences, or studied as a meditative tool (akin to a Zen koan).

...they don't agree with the fact that there could be a being out there that we are not able to sense — GreyScorpio

But all the major religions agree that we should not be able to sense God.

In other words, this objection is talking about something other than "the major religions' God". As a matter of fact, there is agreement between, for lack of a better term, "religionists" and "atheists" on that point: God is not the kind of being that we can sense. The divergence then is, what kind of being is God? Atheists reply, "an imaginary being". (Note that this is not the same thing as "nothing"). Religionists reply, "a transcendent being".

The locus of the disagreement is the notion of transcendence and its relationship with (a) imagination and (b) empirical being. Atheists claim that "transcendence" is a species of imagination, and therefore that it is bounded by the same constraints as imagination (in most atheists' worldview, this includes a human consciousness, dependent on a brain for existing, etc.). Religionists claim that transcendence is a subdivision of being-in-general; that, along with immanence (and perhaps other subdivisions, it varies a bit), it maps out being-in-general.

Which is why any investigation about God necessarily begins elsewhere, in an investigation about things and concepts and abstraction and the psyche. As Plato famously said (paraphrased), one must study geometry before metaphysics.

Unfortunately, most contemporary discussions about this take for granted too many shaky presuppositions that almost guarantee a misunderstanding. Witness the so-called "New Atheists" books.

Ah, Schopenhauer, the World as Will and Representation... not the only work of his that I have read, but the only major work. What would you say it contributes to this discussion? (If you want my opinion, it was mostly a misreading of Buddhist ideas. Then again I'm not a big fan of Schopenhauer -- perhaps for lack of reading other works).

he mystic says that there's a way to understand that those lungs are not separate from you. — frank

The lungs are not separate from me, I am not separate from other beings, they are not separate from the lungs, the breath that was being exhaled centuries ago is not separate from me or from the breath that will be exhaled in another aeon, etc. etc. etc.

The consubstantiality of being (if we want to be technical rather than poetical; not necessarily a good thing).

In other words, @TheWillowOfDarkness, God is indeed dead if he is construed to be separate from anything. Which is how [Western] Christians, by and large, construed God in the 19th century (and some centuries before -- not all, though). Nietzsche's critique is dead on :D when it is aimed at the right target.

Haven't been able to find an online available version of "Philosophizing the Double-Bind". Pity.

@StreetlightX, it wasn't a reproach, or a critique. It was more of an analysis, or an inquiry. Indeed, inasmuch as I know what Nietzsche is criticizing (and as I know that it is not, as he thought it was, "Christianity"), I mostly agree with him.

To the extent that Nietzsche is emphasizing action over discourse, he is not as much of a contrarian as he perhaps supposed he was. It was Aristotle who emphasized that eudaimonia is a function of action ("contemplative action" is the expression he used), rather than of discourse (logos).

That said, even though action is greater than discourse, that does not mean that discourse is irrelevant (indeed, discourse is a kind of action, isn't it?).

In re: Immanence vs. transcendence, what you and Nietzsche present is a defense of the "recompactation" of the two: of the mythical worldview, in which both were united in myth (and ritual, which was inseparable from myth; action inseparable from discourse). That is truly a worthwhile enterprise at the individual, imaginative level. But it does not eliminate transcendence (or immanence). They are both present in the action, at a compact level. And the wish that the awareness of these poles should be sublimated by the individual is the quintessential wish to "turn the clock back". (To attribute this awareness to a supposed Christian poisoning is also, of course, quite false; the opposition between mythos and logos is not a Christian invention).

I was intrigued by this:

note that experiments, in their nature, are not the kind of thing that can be 'demarcated — StreetlightX

Can you explain further? I have no difficulty in demarcating experiments from non-experiments.

Anyway, the great value in Nietzsche is indeed in his actions: his style of philosophizing, "poetic and nebulous", is his greatest contribution to what was a stale and moribund philosophical landscape. (Actually, our current philosophical landscape could use a hefty dose of Nietzsche).

***

Early Christianity saw the universe as sort of breathing in and out. Everything comes into being in a massive exhalation that just naturally becomes a returning inhalation. Could you explain where transcendence is in that scenario? — frank

This worldview is not specifically "early Christian", though there are early Christian representatives of it. The transcendence in it is in the metaphorical separation between the air and the breather. An "exhalation" is something that "goes out" of some lungs, in literal speech; transcendence is the lungs, the source, of the exhalation. The cyclical aspect of the metaphor ("coming out and going back") does not detract from the identification of some being (which is emphatically not the everyday beings which we meet in our ordinary lives), which is exhaling and inhaling, and which is, well, transcendent to our routine experience.

Going back to Nietzsche, when he underlines, to use StreetlightX's words, "the perpetual engagement and renewal of value-creation as an art unto itself", he is reallocating transcendence in the individual spark of value-creation. And he is quite right (IMO) when he does that. Curiously, it is not that far from the Aristotelian notion of "immortalizing oneself", or from the Christian notion of "becoming divine" (theosis). It could only be considered as a stark deviation from these other notions if the emphasis were put on the content of the "created values" rather than on the act of creation itself. To that extent, I think that StreetlightX's defense of Nietzsche's worldview (a defense with which I have great sympathy) is, ironically, one that brings him closer to a longstanding philosophical (and theological) tradition.

Thanks for both replies, but the problem is still not addressed (perhaps not even recognized). Immanence is a meaningless concept without the concept of transcendence. I'm sure both of you know that, but this creates a problem for any project involving both (a) the affirmation of the immanent and (b) discarding the transcendent.

Your replies, with all due respect (and I have plenty of respect for both of you guys as thinkers), amount to hand-waving. @frank talks about a synthesis of creativity and compassion in a kind of humanity that will.... transcend us. And @StreetlightX claims that, in Nietzsche's understanding (a caveat that also applies to frank's answer, I suppose), the transcendent is always pitched against the worldly, and ladens the world in guilt, fravity, etc... so, StreetlightX restates the seed of the problem (how can one affirm the immanent without acknowledging the transcendent?), in other words, but makes no headway in dealing with it. Sure, Nietzsche affirms the joy of the immanent; and sure, he denigrates the transcendent. But the question is, can one do this consistently, considering the very meaning of these concepts?

How can Nietzsche (or anyone) demarcate "the immanent" without a clear acknowledgment of the transcendent (which is, after all, the boundary of the concept of immanence)? And how can any "joyful affirmation" of immanence not include a joyful affirmation of the transcendence that demarcates the immanent? In other words, how can Nietzsche know and love the immanence which he is talking about without knowing (and loving!) the transcendent?

Nietzsche's project involves the rejection of old-fashioned theology. I suppose we can agree on that. But shouldn't we also be agreeing that it involves the creation of a new theology, taken in Plato's sense (i.e. the proper way of talking about the gods)? Isn't Nietzsche's entire ouevre dedicated to that? Isn't he basically saying that we should talk about the gods in a different way? This is a necessary condition for any joyful affirmation of immanence.

Summing up, I don't think Nietzsche's ideas involve a rejection of any and all theology, a theology-less world, but rather the acceptance of a new theology. An affirmation of both the immanent and the transcendent -- but with the affirmation of the transcendent taking place in a new way. (frank is talking about that... but perhaps without realizing that it is a theology).

P.S. The two small examples of the "self-poisoning chalice" are very far from representative of the entire tradition of Christianity. And I'd bet they would also be very far from representative from any major religious tradition. Not even Buddhism, which gets a reputation (bad or good depending on the onlooker) for being world-denying, could sustain a society without world-affirming aspects. In the specific case of Christianity, it is quite easy to find quotes (from the OT, from the gospels -- in Jesus' words! --, from the rest of the NT, from the Fathers, from the saints) affirming the world rather than denying it. I realize that a critique of Nietzsche's opinion about Christianity is off-topic, but that could not pass without comment.

P.P.S. That P.S. is not intended to mean that Nietzsche was wholly misguided about Christianity -- particularly about 19th century's Christianity. Kierkegaard had much the same criticisms, in a different style. They were right about that Christianity, but Christianity always were, and still is, more than just that.

...a moment of decision: continue to wax nostalgic for some other-wordly paradise so as to better secure the triumph of nihilism, or affirm instead the joyful immanence of this world, freed from the stifling and deadening (non-)sensibilities of Platonism. A very welcome crisis. — StreetlightX

How can one "affirm the joyful immanence of this world" without acknowledging the transcendent?

Not a rhetorical question. I'm curious to hear more about it.

If "to know that one knows" means "to be conscious that one knows" (which is how I would interpret it), then the principle would apparently deny the possibility of unconscious knowledge. Which, as the OP says, seems wrong.

If there is some other reading of the meaning of "knowing that one knows", I may be persuaded otherwise.

Maybe that's a bit of a cardboard cutout of Hegel, but it perhaps offers a different way of dealing with the trilemma. — MetaphysicsNow

And this different way, what would it be? Circular, infinite regression, or a definitive conclusion?

;)

But you can always question the discovery process behind the foundation. Why this or that decision? The foundation then needs to be reconsidered all over again. So again, it's arbitrary. — Uber

The "you can" in this sequence is about capability, not about reasonableness. Sure, you can question anything, but should you? If we ignore this aspect, this becomes a discussion about skepticism rather than about epistemology per se.

Regarding the two separate questions, here is my input.

1) The Trilemma is quite correct, but inconsequential.
2) It is a good demarcation of epistemological possibilities; keeping it in mind is sensible, because it helps us to classify any given explanation under one of the three headings.

What should be added to it is a moral (normative) precept: we should strive to reach final positions (i.e. to reach a state of knowledge in which there are no further unanswered relevant questions). We ought to be wary (i.e., not-satisfied) with any explanation that derails into circularity or infinite regress, as a matter of practical hermeneutics.

Note that this is not a precept that rules out the possibility that in any given investigation, circularity or infinite regress is the correct ending point. Indeed, there are some cases in which this happens. But we should look at these cases with suspicion, keeping in mind that a preferrable solution always involves a definitive end point.

The foundation (or ground) is not a given. It must be discovered. But once it is discovered, it is final (if it is indeed the ground of the issue).

The work of acquiring knowledge proceeds from the better known to the less well-known. What the Trilemma (and you) are criticizing is the upending of this process, by arbitrarily setting on a purported ground before the investigation gets going, but (from the OP) "the attempt to justify any philosophical belief can only end in three ways", i.e., we are discussing the end of an investigation, rather than assumptions prior to the investigation.

Having a foundational assumption that can no longer be questioned seems like just giving up. I suppose giving up is one way out of the whole thing. — Uber

When there are no further questions to be answered, isn't this finality?

And what would be the alternative?

Is empiricism of some kind a way out of the Trilemma? — Uber

It just shifts the locus of the ultimate ground (even apart from any criticisms of it).

An implicit point behind the Trilemma is that all of these ends are rather terrible, in the sense that they don't offer any satisfying finality. — Uber

How is (3) not a case of a "satisfying finality"? What would be a satisfying finality, can you give an example?

If you are interested in the science rather than the philosophy or the "pop-sci" approach, the best bet is a textbook. 20 years ago we used Douglas Futuyma's "Evolutionary Biology". These books usually have revised and updated editions. Check it out.

The 90's version of it was very thorough, not excessively mathematical, and grounded in a huge amount of sources.

What say you to your own question here? — Thorongil

I say that God's judgment is necessary (i.e. non-contingent), but that this does not reduce his freedom or his dignity. God cannot condone evil, because he is holy (and the definition of holy includes the inability to condone evil).

However, it must be noted that (at least in Christian theology) God's judgment is not the final word. There is also his mercy. Mercy, again by definition, involves a negative judgment (which is necessary), but mercy supersedes that judgment -- and this is the epitome of God's freedom.

The concepts under discussion really need some refinement. Liberty, judgment, God, man, are being used as polemical placeholders rather than as tools for understanding.

To give some examples of questions that would bring the main issues to the forefront:

Is freedom the capacity to do what you want, or to do what you should?

Is God's judgment a voluntary (i.e. non-necessary, i.e., contingent) action? If we posit that God does not partake of contingency (a common assertion in many schools of theology), does that mean that God is "forced to do" what he does; and does that reduce his freedom, or his dignity, or both?

What is the part of man that "sins"?

Teleological, not normative.

Hyperbole, not description.

The proportion of children lacking a powerful, instinctive "will to like" is precisely 0%, by the way; an observation that sheds plenty of light upon this issue. Unlovingness is 100% taught.

My 5-year old kid asked me something similar a few days ago. "Dad, explain love to me"' (It is a style of question that he enjoys, this "explain X to me").

I told him that love is the will to like someone else, regardless of what he does, or of what happens in the surroundings. So, for instance, even if he does something naughty that makes me angry or sad with him, as long as I keep the will to like him -- even though at that angry or sad exact moment I am "not liking him" very much -- then I still love him. The will to like is there even if the liking is not.

Then I explained that in our relationship, I don't think he will ever be able to do something so horrendously evil to make me lose that will to like him. And that this also applies to my relationship with his mom, or sister. But then I said that there are many kinds of relationship between people, and in some cases people give up on that will to like because the other person does something that really hurts.

***

Child story aside, love is important because this will to like (places, animals, persons, God) is the core of a good human being ("good" in a teleological, rather than normative, sense). A person who does not "want to like" is a waste of atoms. Another way to put it: Love is the standard against which other movements of the soul should be judged. Joy, enthusiasm, camaraderie, and all other stuff which make life worth living is rooted in love, in the mature and constant disposition towards liking rather than disliking, towards empathy rather than contempt. And this disposition is never more noble than when it is directed toward your neighbor, including, obviously, your family.

***

A great, great book about love is Kierkegaard's Works of Love.

But what else is there? — unenlightened

Besides awareness? Humility, I suppose. When we don't know the answers, we look for them; if we can't find them, we still try to minimize externalities (a.k.a., "ecological footprint"), keeping a fairly open and critical mind about the ways we are trying to do that.

But that is not a prescription for environmental issues only, of course. The beauty of environmental issues is that they are so complex that we cannot really pretend that we know all there is to be known -- at least, not if we are remotely honest with ourselves. It is good practice for humility.

I think I have also a duty to make myself aware, but it ain't easy. — unenlightened

Amen.

One major beef -- rather, the greatest beef -- I have with mainstream "environmentalism" is that it mostly replaces one ideological discourse with another, rather than encouraging awareness. You are supposed to like wind power even though it harms thousands of birds and bats. You are supposed to hate nuclear just because. You are supposed to recycle just because. Etc.

These simple-minded rules dull one's awareness rather than enhance it. And they have a nasty habit of hitting you back in the derriere when someone does the gritty math -- which only devalues the "environmentalist position" in the eyes of Everyman, which is a very, very bad thing in my opinion.

So, whether you are connected or disconnected, how will you act? — unenlightened

As said earlier, with some added emphasis:

a. Reduce, as much as possible, externalizations. In other words, people who are responsible for X must pay the costs for X; people who benefit from X must be responsible for X.

b. When externalisation is (still) inevitable due to technical shortcomings of our engineering and scientific practices, act as if it could be reduced by the individual. This is an ethical imperative. People must increase their awareness of costs and benefits derived from their surroundings. Costs and benefits are not solely (or even mostly) economical in nature; the pleasure from a waterfall, the feeling of wellbeing from a well-preserved urban forest, etc.

If you are aware of some benefit accruing to you, take responsibility for it. If you are aware of some cost imposed by your activities, try to pay for it.

Summing up, if you are an agent (negative or positive) of externalization, be aware of it, and adjust your behavior so as to minimize externalization.

How about, "you have been unable to find an irrefutable fact?" Looks irrefutable enough to me.

I have no objection to anything you said in this post.

Stewards are a subspecies of managers (one with special responsibilities). The issue is "how should we act"; and the sooner every individual realizes his stewardship and his duty to minimize externalities, the better.

Once you accept that mutations can become stable in subpopulations of a species (as in the case of the moths), it becomes a case of special pleading (requiring justification) to argue that these mutations cannot establish interbreeding barriers. Why would that be the case?

The burden of proof is really upon those who dispute speciation. (And it becomes a really big burden when we consider that speciation has been observed in many different contexts; "X cannot happen" is a tough proposition to defend when X is all around you).

I refuse to shrug. — unenlightened

I shrug at the realization that management assumes a dominating position; not at the task of management itself.

As for the religious aspect, note that management can be replaced with "stewardship", an old Christian notion, with no loss. (That non-written book precedes my conversion ;)).

To use a concrete, relatable example: your excerpt mentions dams. Dams can be big or small. They can be much more eco-friendly than a farm, and also incredibly destructive. No one can be "for dams", but it is also silly to be "against dams". The analysis must consider the costs and benefits of dams and their alternatives.

It is not so sublime to see people dying of easily preventable diseases because they don't have access to clean (or, cleaner) energies; or to see that they lack good quality drinking water at critical periods of the year, for themselves, their livestock, and their farms. Yet these would be predictable results of any absolute "ban on dams".

...the externalised costs of our mismanagement... — unenlightened

Note also that while the imagination immediately runs to costs in this discussion, externalization of benefits is also very harmful. Free riders (people who benefit from X without feeling responsible for it) are probably the main obstacle in the way of environmental awareness.