Anger is an instance, a habit is, well, a habit :D.

To use a Scriptural example, Jesus was angry with the moneylenders at the temple, but he did not have the habit of being angry.

When something which you perceive to be inferior to you harms you, or presents you with the prospect of being harmed in the near future, the natural response is anger. (If the agent doing the harming is perceived to be superior to you, you feel fear).

It is better to be Aristotelian when examining these matters. The problem is not anger per se, it is the habit of wrath. Any emotional response can be proper at a given situation, but the habit of wrath impairs our judgment and prevents the best use of our reason.

Meaning isn't derived at all from context, but from the intent of the speaker or writer. It is up to the listener and reader to discover the intent, not the context, being used. When we misunderstand some use of a word, it is because we misunderstood the intent, not the context. — Harry Hindu

Meaning is not derived at all from context? Not even a little bit?

Let's test this theory.

Trump.

What do I mean by that word?

@Wayfarer

Values are both subjective and objective. The dichotomy is not applicable to them. To that extent, my wording was imprecise, especially when I mentioned "objective truths about value"; a better way to put it would have been "if there were objective truths about a given value".

It is important to keep in mind that values are subjective and objective, simultaneously. They are not "neither". Any given value will be 100% subjective and 100% objective.

Like... what topics would you suggest for the average toddler <2 years old? — Bitter Crank

Whatever he or she experiences, of course. The world is full of wonders. Look at this car. Look at that tree. Our job is to open the curtains.

Also, if I was raising a small child now, I would curtail the amount of time they spend playing with electronic devices - smart phones and the like. I see toddlers on trains, transfixed by some game or another on some device they're holding. They need more time with good old fashioned objects, dirt, dogs, toys, building dams with rocks in a creek, going fishing and climbing trees. //end rant. — Wayfarer

Like everything else, moderation is important here too. But the electronic world is full of wonders too. And one may use it to show stuff which the kid would never see otherwise.

Truth be told, no parent can avoid the confession that sometimes you must give the kid some cartoon to watch, if only to catch your breath :D. We have lives too, and kids don't know that. I agree that it is important to restrain it a bit (otherwise the kid will always reach for the tablet or phone, it is simpler and closer than going outside, and we are Occamists at heart). We have had success by determining that cartoons are not to be watched in the morning. The time for cartoons is after the return from school (around 6 PM), for about one hour. But if we are in the mood, we invite him to watch a movie with us rather than just watching some cartoon. He enjoys it much more.

So a reasoning method - which gives an articulate basis to the self examination - is indeed the core. We step back in a formalised manner, one taught as Socratic method, so that we can return to the thing in itself, our own experience, with some clear hypothesis about what that experience should actually be (or how it should function pragmatically as a sign relating our formal constructs to the measureables we articulate - the factual results we then claim as what is the case). — apokrisis

If I understand what you are saying, you think that philosophy involves the development of hypotheses from an abstract viewpoint and then a testing of those hypotheses against the concrete experience. I strongly disagree with that. I never read the work of any philosopher who worked like that. I know I don't. In my experience (both as a thinker and as a reader) philosophy involves the close attention to the concrete experience, but not the attention of a scientist who tests hypotheses; it is much more like the attention of a lover to the object of his love. A philosopher contemplates his experiences and tries to articulate them in discourse.

It is not a free for all, as you said, because this "tries to articulate them in discourse" involves rules (like those I mentioned, as well as others), but it is an activity grounded in the concrete experience.

Teach them to always look for, enjoy, and revere Beauty, Goodness, and Truth.

Anything that can exist, can be explained. Likewise, with the value of a human life. — intrapersona

Sure. But there is no single value. All of those values can be explained. They coexist. All of them are true, but one does not trump the other.

Value is an ethical notion, and ethics require free agents. Free as in "capable of developing their independent evaluations". If there were objective truths about value, there wouldn't be any ethical freedom (or, the ethical freedom would be comparable to the freedom of believing that 2+2 = green).

Value is subjective. If you want to conceive of the value of [human] life "outside of a human perspective", you will still require an evaluating subject. In the eyes of God, one human life is worth more than the universe; in the eyes of the Devil, the worth is similar (though for different goals); in the eyes of Dracula, one human life is worth as much as a nice steak for us. In the eyes of the Matrix, we are worth plenty. And so on.

Since the term, "artificial" is a term created when man thought of himself as separate from nature, and we find out that we aren't, then the term itself loses its meaning... — Harry Hindu

That's the point. It loses its meaning in some contexts (when we are discussing metaphysics) but not in others (when we are discussing, say, environmentalism). "Artificial" is a useful word when it is properly used. When it is not properly used, of course it is less than useful.

Note that "properly" here does not refer to rules of grammar, etiquette, or something like that -- it refers to the transmission of meaning. If a word is useful to transmit some meaning in a given context, then it cannot "lose its meaning" because it is useless in another context.

What is the meaning of "supernatural" in the absence of the "natural"? — Harry Hindu

"Natural", both in Latin and in Greek (phusis), was originally related to birth. Natural was "whatever is born". Many things, not limited to gods, were not conceived as being "birthable" back then. The word was useful; and its derivatives (supernatural, unnatural, preternatural, and the more rarely spotted subnatural) were well defined in accordance to the original meaning, referring to birth.

Translating this ancient worldview to a modern, atheistic worldview, "supernatural" would apply to things like (ironically) natural laws. And the question then becomes, is it important to distinguish between "the world of birthable things" and "the world of non-birthable things?" If this distinction is still useful, and if we still want to discuss these worlds hierarchically, then "supernatural", "unnatural", etc., are still useful. Even within an atheistic worldview. All that is required is for those who profess this view to purge the word from its theistic aroma :).

Or, if they prefer, to coin new words. The main point is, to simply discard a word and not replace it with an equivalent is a curtailment of our semantic possibilities, and this is usually a loss, probably a grievous one.

Any description of the supernatural would have to include it's causal relationship with the natural. When that is done, we will no longer use the term, "supernatural". Everything would simply be "natural". — Harry Hindu

And then a perfectly useful word like "nature" and its related concepts would have become useless.

To see the point from another angle. "Natural" is often opposed to "artificial". Obviously, everything which is "artificial" is also "natural" (if we are looking at "natural" as a distinction from "supernatural"). But that does not mean that we can discard the notion of artificiality.

Perhaps the notion of "naturality-as-distinguished-from-supernaturality" is useful in a similar way.

I'm having difficulty putting these two together. If language is ontology, then speaking differently is an act of creation ex-nihilo - is that right? That puts the poet/ novelist/ playwright at the heart of things... — unenlightened

Yes, very much. Though it is not "ex nihilo" -- we work with existing materials -- it is very much an act of creation.

The best essay about this that I know of is Tolkien's lecture, "On Fairy Stories". (You can find it on the web).

And one of the best examples that I know of, in English, is Blake's Marriage of Heaven and Hell.

If we were talking about Portuguese, Fernando Pessoa would rank very high.

The fact that people talk about a bicameral theory of mind shows that the Cartesian allure is really too strong.

Yes, I think that we can learn to speak differently, and that how we speak about stuff like that determines our interpretations of the world and of ourselves.

The trick, though, is to recognize that the distinction between "social-language" and "actual ontological" is a social-language distinction :D. Language is ontology. The words we use and how we use them are constituents of the world, they are not superimposed on it as a separate layer. Words are not a blanket, they are more like atoms.

An emotion is very much a narrative style. You were taught (by family and culture -- mostly culture) to explain certain inner events by recourse to the language of emotions.

If you look at the Iliad you'll see that there is much less talk of emotions there. Agamemnon is not a jerk in his own eyes -- "the gods made me do it". Different narrative styles. The wrath of Achilles is more like a force of nature than our modern subjective "I'm really pissed off".

The distinction between symptoms and the language being used to articulate them is quite artificial if you ask me. The problem (as you correctly identify it when you allude to Cartesianism) is that we are not used to assimilate our bodily reactions (they are re-actions, note, they are not actions per se) as part of our psyche. Blame Descartes for it if you will. We are not used to think of ourselves as bodily entities. We think that the self has a body (rather than being, perhaps partially, a body). This is a narrative style with strengths and weaknesses. I don't like it.

What's been your experience, if you don't mind? — Mongrel

I remember a conversation I had some 15 years ago, with a very close friend (I'm the godfather of his 18 year old (!) daughter by now). We were talking about philosophy, quite nonchalantly (we were walking along the beach), and I made an offhand remark that amounted to "well, I, as a philosopher, think that..." He was a bit taken aback. "You are a philosopher?" I guess people don't think that guys on their 25 years can be philosophers. I remember my reply: "Of course I am. There is no doubt about it. You may say that I'm a bad philosopher, and you'll probably be right, but there's no mistaking the experience of being a philosopher, good or not, with its absence".

If I tried to pinpoint the experiences that turned me into a philosopher, apart from the many books -- Schopenhauer has a point but it shouldn't be stretched too far --, I'm sure they predate my consciousness of it. 15 years ago, I would say that unrequited love and walks along the beach were the stimulus, but I know better by now. (I'm a better philosopher too :D). Watching my 4-year old son grow up has shown me that I was very lucky in the very early experiences. I'm doing my best to give him what I received. Perhaps I am more conscious and articulated than my parents and close relatives in transmitting that experience, but it was not created independently by me.

I think that a philosopher is made by the sum of circumstances and openness. I received the first from my environment and the second from God (or heredity or inner nature if one does not want to be religious about it).

So there is no general and undeniable truth, views and rules about, for example, what is the meaning of life, how the world came into being, what is true? The principles concern only technical things like logic etc? — kris22

On the contrary, the problem is not that there is no general and undeniable truth, it is rather that there are too many, none of them is quite undeniable, and we must make commitments in order to keep on searching.

In other words, we should not go searching for stuff to be denied -- that would cover basically anything. (The human will is a many splendored thing and can deny the most obvious notions). We should go about searching for the way to articulate our own, personal and very much non-communicable experiences about these matters (meaning of life, origin of the world, etc.).

Philosophy is much more akin to poetry than to science.

So, just as physics has its undeniable principles, so in philosophy there are rules by which I can not say, for example, my views on the various aspects of human existence, because they will be in conflict with these undeniable principles?
What are these rules? — kris22

People have mentioned logic. Logic is an important part of it. For example, you cannot state "your views" if the views are not yours. If "your views" are the views of your family, group, race, country, religion, class, then they are not "yours"; they are "received wisdom" (not that there is anything wrong with that, as Seinfeld would say).

In other words, there is an immense matter of responsibility when one raises his voice to say "these are my views". One should really examine his views very closely, and separate what was developed in his individual experience and what was received from antecedents.

This examination (which is the core of the Socratic "know thyself"), on the other hand, also follows rules. Closeness to the experiential basis. Sincerity with self. And reason, which is often taken as the core but which is mostly a method.

Your third point resonates with me, but I wonder then about the way a philosopher speaks for a certain culture or generation. It's not a private perspective is it? — Mongrel

No, it's not private, but it is certainly individual. An individual does not exist in a vacuum, and there is no objective viewpoint from which he can pronounce as if from on high, but any philosophical utterance will come from the individual viewpoint, warts and all, or not be philosophical.

This links with the first point. This intrinsic limitation of the philosopher's activity is a big part of the reason why it's not a science, but a search. We are always striving to divest ourselves from the accretion from external authorities and to refer to the immediate experience.

Hello
I have some questions:
1. Is philosophy as a science having some basic principles or some undeniable truth about the things that it examines?
2. Is there a discussion among other people in the methodology of philosophy?
3. Are there strict rules in philosophy such as in mathematics, or can anyone create his own philosophy and worldview?

Thanks — kris22

1. Does philosophy have basic principles? Yes. Are there some undeniable truths about the things that it examines? Yes.

Does that mean that philosophy is "a science"? No (not even if we go beyond the confines of post-XVII century natural science). Philosophy is a search. It is a search guided by basic principles, and starting from some undeniable truths, but it is a search rather than a science; a philosopher (friend/lover of wisdom) is very unlike a sophist (wise man).

2. Not really. Of course philosophers disagree all the time. But you don't see philosophers disagreeing about the requirement of free enquiry, about the primacy of the individual viewpoint, stuff like that. (There are some methodological principles which cannot be disputed without clear contradiction, and avoiding contradiction is one of those non-negotiable methodological principles!)

3. Well, one strict rule (in philosophy) about creating philosophies and worldviews is that you must do it yourself, on the authority of your own conscience, i.e., not by following external sources. The immense majority of people (including philosophers when they are not engaging in The Search -- it is not an easy demand!) does exactly that, they lean themselves upon a crutch provided by history, culture, politics, religion, or some other impersonal shortcut. But the philosopher as a philosopher cannot do that. It is a strict rule :D. It is not such a strict rule on my say so, or even on Socrates' say so, but it is a constituent aspect of the philosophical activity.

I don't know if I could persuade our good friend Mariner to give his explanation for why materialists and non-materialists aren't as different as they appear to be. But who knows?
14 hours ago ReplyShareFlag — Mongrel

I would rather say that both materialism and idealism cannot be entirely consistent; any materialism involves, usually inadvertently, some grains of idealism, and vice versa. This can be demonstrated, since both positions involve (non-material) concepts and (material) defenders.

If we are going to be fixated on isms, put me in the column of good 'ole Realism. Things are as they appear to be.

For a realist like me, these discussions are often assuaged by a careful semantic (and etymology is a big help here) inquiry. What is a thing? Are things the only objects (watch out for this word) which exist (another tricky word)? Is "every-thing" composed solely of things? If it is not, what is the word that we should use to denote "all existents", whether they are things or [something!] else?

Our languages were developed from everyday concerns and perceptions. They were not designed for metaphysical inquiry, and we should keep that in mind when we use them for that purpose. It does not mean that it is impossible to use them for that purpose, but it does mean that we should keep an eye for instances in which our non-reflexive use of some words can deceive us.

Do you think it's all the same? — Kai Rodewald

No, it's not all the same, but any talk of "benefits of that project" will refer to (and be based upon) emotional aspects of it. Your dichotomy is looking at different aspects of the same phenomenon. When someone presents verifiable proofs for the benefits of X, he also likes this project and finds that idea sympathetic. (Even if X is, in the opinion of others -- others who are quite able to follow the reasoning -- abhorrent).

Try to fill the bare skeleton with any current political proposal and you'll see how it is easy to find groups which will oppose, rationally, any given project, regardless of whether their opponents can present verifiable proofs for the benefits of that project.

Note also that there is no single scale for measuring "benefits". Some people think that contraception is a benefit, others think it is an evil. The problem is not that one group is more rational than another, it is rather that they are proceeding from different conceptions of what is and is not a benefit.

Yes, but emotional preferences and fears are less rational than rational arguments by definition. — Kai Rodewald

The point is that if an argument starts from emotional preferences and fears, it does not become less emotional just because it proceeds rationally.

If you look closely, any argument, as long as it is "an argument", is rational. "Reason" is not the blood of the Lamb, which washes the sins of arguments.

This is my point: every time people mention ethical concerns they actually mean their own emotional preferences and fears and these are irrelevant compared to the rational arguments about benefits and risks. — Kai Rodewald

You'll have a hard time in explaining why a "rational argument about benefits and risks" is completely detached from emotional preferences and fears. Benefits and risks are loaded in these.

There's nothing in the Qu'ran on "laws" against blasphemy and apostasy, as matters of faith are the provenance of Allah to judge. There are no wordly punishments on these things. In fact, the freedom of belief is repeatedly mentioned in the Qu'ran. — Benkei

You'll see I did not say otherwise. I said that "traditional and modern fundamentalist Islam" has such laws.

The idea that Islam should be judged by the Quran, as if the traditional praxis of the religion were unimportant and could be ignored, is strangely similar to fundamentalist Christianity if you ask me. It is certainly unanchored in reality.

Islam (in its traditional and "modern fundamentalist" varieties) includes instructions for rulers and for governments. It includes laws against blasphemy and apostasy. Any "updating" of Islam in this regard will require a major, major upheaval of interpretations, scholarship, etc. etc. It's not impossible, of course, but it is a hard struggle for Muslims who aim at that. The "Islamic conservatives" will always have plenty of references (both in the Quran and in the opinion of scholars) to buck that trend.

The 'relaxed' attitude of Western civilization towards other faiths is a byproduct of the great secular success of this civilization (in a global scale); it is not written in stone. As the West fades away, it is likely that the defensiveness against other faiths will return. (It is already happening).

Jesus' teaching is not what most impressed contemporaries (though it impressed them somewhat. in some occasions -- not so much in other occasions). Jesus' personality is what mattered.

"He doesn't speak like the scribes – he speaks with authority!"

If we wanted to single out the most important aspect of his teaching, it was probably the announcement of the Kingdom of God -- a continuation of John the Baptist's message asking for repentence and conversion. However, although this may be the core of Jesus' teaching, it is not the core of the Jesus event as conveyed by those who were most impacted by it.

First of all, no one actually met a god (some claims so but without evidence). — FLUX23

Lots and lots of people claim so and present what they consider to be evidence. But whether what they consider to be evidence is, indeed, evidence is a matter for inquiry -- it is not a given. Which is why part of the problem is an examination of what is evidence and what is not.

(Note that it is possible, and even very common, for evidence to be ambiguous, and also for it to support contradictory theories).

The concept came before observation of the actual object (unlike Indica rice).

Nope, the "concept of God" certainly developed later than the experience of gods -- and any experience of gods is (in the viewpoint of the subject) "observation of the actual object".

No disagreement with any of that; what you pointed out are the symptoms of tension. The tension is real and, like the process of immigration, shows no signs of slowing down, which means that the peacefulness of the process is probably at an end.

Not really. There are majorities in the UK and Europe that want less immigration. The elites don't care, though, because they aren't affected by it. — Thorongil

The [political] elites were put there by majority vote. My comment is not supposed to mean that there are no tensions, or that there won't be violent reactions soon; it is only an observation that so far the process (assimilation of foreign elements and discontentment with that) has been peaceful on the larger scale.

I still think that these are concepts, things that do not exist to the extent that they are apprehend able. — GreyScorpio

Sure, but they exist in some other way. right? They don't exist "to the extent of...", but, somehow, they exist. Right?

"Reality is not composed only of stuff that can be grasped by the senses." Can you agree with this sentence? Note the dilemma here -- if you disagree, you will basically shut down communication (which is done through concepts which cannot be grasped by the senses), but if you agree, then you'll have to explore the gradient of reality; some things are "more real" than others.

Note that this is still far from looking at the matter of validation and evidence. You must explore this situation by yourself; I won't be able to give you validation, or evidence, that shows that reality has a gradient. All I can do is to form some sentences that plant the seeds of inquiries into your mind.

...immigration into Israel and attaining citizenship are very difficult indeed, with the exception of the Law of Return, which gives Jews from anywhere in the world the right to go to Israel and become a citizen. So unless you're Jewish you're probably out of luck. — jamalrob

So, the substantive difference is a legal framework that inhibits immigration. Looks plausible. But is it really written up so as to favor Jews? In other words, is the letter of the law (rather than the enforcement of it) openly discriminatory against non-Jews? I've googled the Law of Return, but that is a positive piece of legislation (i.e., it favors a group, but it does not imply disfavor to other groups).

To keep with the theme of the comparison, is it really that much harder for, say, a family from Singapore to move to Israel rather than to Germany? Legally speaking?

I believe that if something has the ability to be apprehended, in any way, must be real and therefore exist. What reason does it have not to be. Saying something exists because it is there is not a contradiction. But, saying that something exists but isn't there is a contradiction is it not? I think of a chicken (For lack of a better example). The chicken is there and I can apprehend it. Therefore, I believe that it exists. The chicken somehow is not there when I look again. I believe that the chicken is still there. Is this a rational belief? — GreyScorpio

Well, "if A then B" (if apprehended, then existing) is a reasonable rule of thumb. But does it imply "if not-A, then not-B"? You later referred to concepts. Do they exist? How do they exist? Compare "British" and "Seven". Can we say that Seven existed before there was any mind that could count up to seven? Will it still exist if all of those minds are extinguished? And how about British (or, British-ness), did it exist before the Big Bang, and will it exist after the heat death of the universe?

We get back to how do X's exist, come into existence, and fade away.

Alright, this could be the explanation for God. But this would still make him a concept and that is what he will remain until we have validation. — GreyScorpio

"A concept" has many aspects. It exists in minds, sure, but it also has extra-mental references (if it did not, it couldn't be communicable). The "concept of God" is not merely (or even particularly) what is written in books about Him, or what is present in minds about Him, but it is also a symbol for the experiences that sustain it (the concept), and these experiences are the core of the "God-phenomenon". What must be explored is the experiences that lead people to God-talk, rather than God-talk itself.

I have shown how God could possibly exist, and yet I still cannot approach the question of whether I am certain of this or not because there is no validation. — GreyScorpio

Validation is an epistemological matter too. Look back at my first reply to you. Empiricism, Experience, and Evidence -- that should be the order of inquiry. Is reality restricted to what can be perceived with our senses? What is the status of experiences? And what counts as evidence? We are getting to the second question now.

Therefore, can we really say that we can apprehend God? — GreyScorpio

If we can't, does that mean that X does not exist? Is "apprehensibility" a requirement for existence? (Note, you can say yes or no :D. Both possibilities are in play).

Some might say that you don't need to see God to believe in him. But that just means that they are putting full faith into something that is not real. — GreyScorpio

If we cannot see X, does that mean that it is not real?

Search for counterexamples. I'll give you a few members of the class of "stuff which cannot be seen, but which is real". Justice. Seven. British.

Believing and knowing what is real/the truth are two very different things. — GreyScorpio

Sure. An analysis of belief (an epistemological issue) must follow upon the ontological inquiry. Belief is another member of that class, incidentally.

However, an interpretation lacks a certainty of truth does it not? But it does bring about a belief. Perhaps this is what people do with the issue of God. Instead of thinking of him directly, they think of how they interpret him to be leading them to develop a belief that this is the correct thing to believe in, resulting in the existence of X. However, I disagree with this because again, A belief is not always a truth. — GreyScorpio

Well, now you are exploring "certainty", which is a third concept. We have truth, belief, and certainty, and they are quite independent. But all of this is epistemology. Ontology must come first -- we must get to the heart of what exists, how it exists, how it comes into existence and ceases to exist, before we approach the question of how do we know about it.

Of course, our only avenue into those questions is through our intellectual acts; the ontological enquiry places epistemology "on hold", but it surely must return to it, sooner or later. However, it is quite harder to deal with epistemology if we don't begin by presuming the correctness of our intellect (a naive approach) and explore the world before we turn our focus into our intellectual processes.

Interesting conclusion, that, since the expression "interpretation of God" is not present in the OP, and he refers to "my problem with God" (not "with other people's interpretation of God", or some similar expression). But I'll let GreyScorpio be the judge of what is and is not off-topic in his thread.

In the OP, GreyScorpio is clearly referring to X' (our interpretation of God). — FLUX23

I can see X'. It's right there in the computer screen. And I can see GreyScorpio's post, in the same place, a bit above.

Since I can see them, they exist -- right?

But the real question is not about X' (our interpretation of X), but rather about X. Any interpretation of X exists because there is an interpreter who conveys the interpretation (using instruments that reach our senses, such as pixels and sounds). But what about X?

Some questions you'll have to address:

1) Empiricism. Is it true that if we have not apprehended X with our senses, then X does not exist? Look for counterexamples.
2) Experience. If we can experience an unappehended (with our senses) X, what is the ontological status of X?
3) Evidence. What is evidence? Is an experience (even if unapprehended by our senses, or communicable to others) evidence?

Another item in the list, which is beautifully alliterative, is "Evil", but that is better left for a later stage.

Not all Muslim violence is state sponsored, though. The first Muslims were tribal. They waited in the mountains to pounce on caravans. States came later. — Mongrel

Well, Muslim states appeared in the first generation of Islam; Mohammed's career was defined by his relationship with states around his area; and there certainly were states (such as, the Roman Empire) before Islam.

Now, if you say that the nation-state came later, then I agree. This construct (a political entity that spans over a territory, representing a people -- an ethnos -- and responsible for enforcing laws through violence in that territory) resulted from a long evolutionary line which was barely starting in the 7th century AD. But there were states (non-national states) nevertheless. And the problem of violence lies there, in the notion of the state, rather than in the notion of any given religion. Any religion can become an ideological weapon to be used by a state (including in self-defense, cf. Khazars).

The political aspects of a religion, though, are a very small portion of what it is. Which is why to claim that "X is violent", when X is a religion, is only the beginning of the story, and it is always influenced by historical aspects. Islam was not particularly violent in the centuries between, say, 1300 and 1900. (The Turks were violent -- not particularly violent, but violent -- in these centuries, but Turks are not "Islam").

Primarily, I think, they were persecuted because of their contempt for and objections to pagan expressions of religious belief, such as public festivals held honoring the gods, violence towards temples, their refusal to participate in the imperial cult, their public criticism of ancient customs and traditions, their refusal (at first) to hold public office or serve in the legions. — Ciceronianus the White

Yes. In other words, apostates and blasphemers. (Remember that the Emperor was also Pontifex Maximus and, in at least some cases after Commodus, divine). As you say, they were not persecuted because they believed in X; they were persecuted because the rejected some core (sacred, crucial, essential) tenets Y.

Yes, they endorsed behavior and morals we find wrong, but the Christian and Jew have an interpretation that allows them to, at least, embrace an interpretation of the texts that is compatible with modern liberal states (or, those who are incompatible with the state, are fringe minorities). — Chany

I understand this viewpoint, and it is certainly the most pragmatic -- it is what politicians should be focusing on. But from a long-range historical viewpoint, I don't think the "modern liberal states" should be given a free pass. And from a short-range historical viewpoint, it must be noted that one of the main gripes of radical Muslims (one that has been presented by Bin Laden & Co., as well as by a host of imams) is the sheer existence of the "modern liberal states" and their trappings. (The other main gripe is Western meddling within their region -- which is, whether they realize or not, one of the trappings of the "modern liberal state").

Tom, all of those events (killings and marriages) have been observed in many other kinds of states than Islamic ones, including Pagan, Christian, Hindu, Communist, etc. You are looking only at a very thin slice of reality when you restrict these events to Islamic states.

Remember that a Roman persecution against Christians (for example) was a "killing of apostates and blasphemers".