This down and up refers to their spin right? I'm no physicist.

Again, how can there be change when there are no parts? Please, please, please! Answer the question! Explain to me the process in which something changes when it has no part at all! What changes? In which property of this "simple"is there a variation of such nature that it can be said it experiences change? Change is of something, and it implies a "transformation", that takes place in this something, from one state to another that if able to affect its environment would affect it differently from its original state. What is different in one state compared to the other so that they affect their environment distinctly?

Why do you assume that existence presupposes a relative difference from another existent? — absoluteaspiration

Because the idea of something existing when all of its properties cannot be differentiated from each other (the quality of difference does not exist) makes no sense to me. To be honest with you, that is the best answer I can provide, so far (a weak one, I admit). Now, I would like you to pay attention to that state (if a state, at all) in which the quality of difference does not exist, where all is the same. What would exist in such a universe?

Couldn't A be different from (in this world) non-existent nothingness? — absoluteaspiration

This is a hard question (in my opinion), and the "naive" answer would be no, because how could something be different from "something" which does not exist? I have not been able to imagine or think about such scenario; hence my assumption that something exists different from something else, which I think would also exist.

Beautiful, and I agree.

But what is not-A? If it would be something, at all. How do you conceive of this thing which is not A?

By "no parts", do you mean no separable parts or no parts at all? — absoluteaspiration

If by separable parts you mean that it has parts but they cannot be by any means separated (I'm aware this would be the literal meaning of "separable parts", I just wanna be as clear as possible), then I would say that by "no parts" I mean no parts at all.

If state B was reached because the atom was previously in state A, would that manner of causation qualify as "affecting itself" in the sense you intended? — absoluteaspiration

Now, I will answer with another question. Could there be change in an entity that has no parts? What sort of change, or transformation, would this be?

I wanna recommend At the Mountains of Madness by H. P. Lovecraft (or most of his stories) if you'd like to experience a bit of dark suspense.

Hard to talk about such abstract and foundational things, it's as if we don't have the proper language to describe it — Jerry

That's very true. Do you (or anyone) have by any chance writings on the kind of metaphysics we are talking about? I understand many ancient philosophers deal with this kind of stuff, but it is so spread on their works that it can be a bit hard to find... do you have any sources, modern or ancient?

Also, if you want you should read some of my discussions (not posts). I think we have a somehow similar thinking and you would probably enjoy them; they are not very organized or clear but I think you still might like them.

Lastly, I would ask, how can things be varied if there is no commonality between the things upon which they vary? — Jerry

Excellent question. I am thinking about it, and it makes me wonder if you are asking if it is possible for two things to have nothing in common.

Imagine a pendulum hanging from your ceiling, for example. Let's assume the pendulum oscillates in two dimensions indefinitely without ever coming to a stop. Now, imagine we could somehow shade the area of space which is occupied by the pendulum during its oscillations, giving it some kind of coloration. If the weight is dropped from a height equal to ceiling's height, the area of the oscillation will be a semicircle; anything lower than that will form a pizza-slice shape that gets smaller and smaller with decreasing dropping height. If during a pendulum's oscillation one were to block this area with a finger, for example, one would eventually interrupt the pendulum's oscillation with certainty. Now, imagine one dropped the pendulum several times, each from the same height but varying on the angle with respect to a coordinate plane drawn on the ceiling with its origin at the fixed point from which the pendulum hangs, limiting the oscillations to a two-dimensional plane, as in the previous example. If one rotated the pendulum an infinitesimal distance and shaded the area of the pendulum's oscillation for an entire rotation of the pendulum, each of the shaded areas would add to the volume of a semicircle. Again, blocking this volume would eventually interrupt the pendulum's oscillations, given that it rotates. Now, do you think the oscillations occupy a space?

Could you explain that a little more? You mean that as relations to exist, it first presupposes "things" to exist as to get related? That's why you think variety of things more fundamental?

Ok. First, to be honest with you, I cannot say I completely understand what I am trying to say; lest's just say it is work in progress. Second, I am equating a relation to a transfer of information (an interaction - a change/deviation from the ground state/behaviour/nature/properties/form of an entity/particular/object/thing/individual due to an external effect*). That said, imagine a scenario in which information is being transferred. The mere action of transferring information disturbs the environment/space in which the transfer takes place; this disruption requires the possibility of variation. If no change, either in the environment or that which is affected by the transfer of information - which is ultimately part of the environment -, can take place (for x or y reason), I do not see how there can be a relation, at all. Again, change requires the possibility of variation, for change is between two different states. If relations depend on change, then they depend on variation.

* In my opinion, an interaction requires a change in something due to the interaction, a change that would be absent in the absence of the interaction. In other words, an interaction occurs when a change in some point of space causes a change in another point of space, or spacetime if you want, and considering objects as properties of space.


Now, I want to apologize for the very vague language, I guess I am trying to generalize as much as possible, which might be a huge mistake; nevertheless, I'll do it once more just for the fun of it and say that a relation cannot occur between the exact same thing(s), and the possibility for variation must exist before a relation can take place. So, even if things exist, if they do not change in any of their properties relative to each other simply because they cannot vary (they cannot adopt other conformations other than their ground conformation) and hence cannot be affected, there won't be a relation between them. I am gonna stop here cause I am sure I am making it more complicated, but if you'd like to continue the discussion on the necessity of variation, I am glad to do it with you or anyone else. I think is an overlooked phenomenon in metaphysics for its ubiquity and our habituation to it as a result, and I think it should be looked at more seriously, better than how I do it, for sure.

0 = the mind; or the mind and 0 belong to the same category of things?

Maybe with the help of a taxidermist.

3. As such, there cannot be one thing. — Jerry

I agree with Jerry here. I think variety/diversity is a "law of nature;" it is absolutely necessary that there exists more than one thing (it cannot be the case that there exists only one thing, as Jerry said). However, I do not think relations are strictly fundamental in the sense that they depend on variety while the opposite I think is not logical; this is metaphysics though, sorry (although thinking about it, I understand that there cannot be interactions between objects beyond the cosmic horizon and us EDIT: I am not sure about fields; their value is supposed to approach zero as distance approaches infinity, but do they expand with space?).

I have to ask; how the fuck do you divide a boner?

The neurons encode the model of the body's world. — apokrisis

@T Clark, although I do not have any papers on the topic, I would like to bring up a point that I think is often overlooked (I might be wrong here, again I have not done much research on the topic) when talking about the relationship between mind and brain. I am quoting apokrisis because I think I can use his wonderful example as a tool to explain what I wanna say.
Following the structure of the quoted sentence, we could say that the rates at which neurons perform their functions and their change (of the rates) in time encode the model of the self. I know it is a pretty bold statement, but my main objective here is to steer your thought/thinking towards the rates of change of physiological processes concerning brain cells (neurons and supportive cells). If the number and organization of brain cells within the brain encode the model of the body's world, changes in their organization, number, and physiology might encode something else, and we gotta keep in mind that these changes are maintained within certain ranges (homeostasis) so that there is some constancy, as seen in the mind. We could say that the change in the model of the body's world encoded by neurons encodes the mind or affects it to some degree. So, in addition to the spatial distribution, number of cells, and the change in these two factors, there are also physiological processes taking place in these cells which are also changing in time (they are not constant), and this change is kept within certain ranges. Is there a relationship between rates of change of physiological processes and the mind/self?

It follows that minds are not extended things. — Bartricks

How can something that has no extension be able to have states, as in the states of mind? Are they states of an expanse-less thing? Try to imagine that.

The mind is a thing. — Bartricks

If the mind is a thing then it occupies a space. Or are there things that do not occupy a space?

A while I ago I asked myself if there was a basic unit of thought, but I never really pondered about it. Your OP brought me back to it, and somehow I wondered if the mind was thought. Now, in the case there was a basic unit of thought (the building block of ideas), and the mind was thought (i.e., the mind is an idea of the brain), it could be possible that the mind is composed of several basic units of thought, and it would be divisible. Now, is there a basic unit of thought, and is the mind thought?

Edit: You could also ask I guess if an idea is a composite or a unit or if there can be ideas of the two kinds.

What about voting for none of the options? Don't you have that option in your country?

Your post made me think about the following, but before I put it forward, I would like to state that it was thought based on the following premise, which I think agrees with your belief, "there is not a person, nor will there be, nor was there one, who can be certain about everything." Now, imagine any person. This person cannot be certain of everything, but there must be something this person is certain of; I mean, even if that is not the case - that a person can be certain of at least one thing* - a person must belief they are certain of at least one thing, whatever it is - even if it is just an illusion, hence the word belief; for I do not think a human being who cannot be certain of anything would be a person. This person - who is not certain of everything but is certain of at least one thing - is necessarily different to every other person there is/was/will be - they occupy a different space-time compared to every other person there is/was/will be; thus, the thing(s) this person is certain about is/are necessarily different to that/those thing(s) other people are certain about; and the same applies for every other person. Following this reasoning, imagine there was possible to find a mean of those things people can be certain about - something like an intersection of those things people are certain about. This mean would be the certainty of people, or what certainty means to people, as a collective. In other words, the mean would be equivalent to a concept of certainty based on the subjectivity of every person; it would be a concept based on the species. Now, imagine we could somehow do the same for every other species capable of being certain about something - it could be alien species. The end result would be a mean of certainty encompassing all subjectivity. What is this mean describing? Is the mean a truly subjective concept, or does it become more and more objective as the sample size increases? what is more certain, individual or collective certainty? what can we be certain about as a collective - this question makes me think of math and what it describes? what is certainty?

* Because it is physically impossible for a person to be certain of something - i.e., there is some physical law or divine providence or whatever that prevents a person to be certain of something.

I am not convinced by what you bluntly and carelessly state in proposition number 2. I cannot say 2 is false or true simply because I am not able to find on the literature any evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things or even a decent attempt to address the problem in question. So, I am asking you to provide an article or some other source of reliable information in which the topic is analyzed and in which it is demonstrated that in fact a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not take into the account normative reasons. I am not satisfied with you simply stating that a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not take into account normative reasons. Also, since you maintain that our belief in normative reasons is not evolving, I would like you to show that it is in fact not evolving.

Now, since you are the owner of this thread, I think it is your duty to at least from time to time seriously address the questions put forward by those of us who decide to maintain a conversation with you not by referring us to the op nor by repeating the same thing over and over but by offering evidence that backs up and clarifies the claims that you make. So, I would like you to present an evolutionary explanation of our belief to do things which does not posit any normative reasons, or at least direct me to one.

You need - without conflating normative reasons and causes - to show how an evolutionary explanation of our development needs to posit actual noramtive reasons. Not causes and not the belief in normative reasons. Actual normative reasons. — Bartricks

@Bartricks

And I think you must show if our belief in normative reasons is actually evolving or not. If it is evolving, you need to show if it is evolving under the constraint of natural selection or some other force or none other than by random chance - again, there is no point in discussing a relationship between natural selection and normative reasons if our believe in normative reasons is not evolving under the constraint of natural selection. If our belief in normative reasons is not evolving, you must show that it is not evolving. I also think you must provide evidence in favor of your claim that the theory of evolution by natural selection does indeed not take into account normative reasons in its explanation of our development - it is not enough that you state such claim. Please do not refer me to your OP since as I said before I do not think it clearly addresses what I am asking you to demonstrate.

@Bartricks

Would you agree that reasons to do things are founded upon knowledge about the outcome of an action. For example, let's say a person would not like the way they would look if they lost their teeth. Such person knows flossing and brushing their teeth would prevent their fall; so, such person flosses and brushes their teeth to prevent them from falling, and at the same time the person avoids an appearance they would not like. In this example, the person's reason to floss and brush their teeth (either not liking the way they would look if they had no teeth or mere precaution or any other reasons - i.e. they want to keep their teeth so they are able to eat or they want to avoid the physical pain of loosing your teeth, I dunno) is founded upon the knowledge that flossing and brushing your teeth prevents their loss.

Now, let's say a person believes in god. Following the logic presented in the previous example, such person's reason(s) to believe in god must be founded on knowledge about the outcome of believing in god. Be it personal satisfaction, or social acceptance, or psychological well-being, no matter the outcome, the person's reason to believe in god can only be a reason-to-do if the person knows about the outcome of carrying the action (believing in god).

Let's imagine now that there is a person who harbours in their mind the idea that there is a god but has no reasons to believe this; a completely possible scenario, I think. In this case, a reason for such person to believe in god would manifest only when the person knows about the outcome of carrying such action.

In all this examples, the person must be able to gather and store knowledge to be able to have reasons-to-do things. If a person did not have the faculties of gathering and storing knowledge, then the person would not be able to know about the outcome of actions, and therefore would be unable to form reasons-to-do things, in my opinion.

Following this logic, a question arises which is: is natural selection acting at the level of reasons-to-do things, or at the level of the faculties to gather and store knowledge, or at both, or are there any other levels we should consider first?

I think I mentioned in some previous post that you were oversimplifying things, and I hope you understand what I mean with these examples. It might be the case that natural selection acts only at the level of organs in a given organism - i.e. it affects the eye, but not the faculty of vision as a whole (at least not directly) -, or maybe natural selection affects only independent structures - i.e. the cornea, the iris, eyelashes, the retina - and emergent features resulting from the collective functioning of these structures are not truly under the effect of natural selection. It might even be the case, that some features of an organism do not affect its fitness and can be passed over generations until one day such features might affect the fitness of the organism that has them. It might be that the faculty to form reasons-to-do things, which is dependent on the faculty to gather and store knowledge, is evolving not under the effect of natural selection, but some other force(s) (bottleneck events, genetic drift, artificial selection, etc).

All this might be out of topic, but again I just want to hopefully show you how complex is the topic you are trying to discuss, and how lightly you are arriving to your conclusion. So, I think that a better place to start is to demonstrate that natural selection and reasons-to-do things can actually be discussed together because it might be the case that there is no relationship at all between the two.

If I am mental, you are fucked.

COULD SOMEONE ELSE EXPLAIN TO ME WHAT BARTRICKS MEANS BY REASONS-TO-DO AND WHAT THE POINT OF THE OP IS?

It's impossible to understand. Your examples are very complex. No one can read your mind, and if you do not try to actually give simple examples is gonna be impossible to actually even know what you are trying to say. In addition, you are oversimplifying evolution (natural selection is not the only process that leads to evolution); furthermore, you are oversimplifying complex things like the faculty to believe. When you put an idea forward and several people do not understand it, it is not the people's fault.

Reasons to do things are dependent on evolution (a mind like yours must come up with them, and a mind is the result of an evolutionary process). Evolution is not dependent on reasons to do things.

Yes, I believe there are reasons to do things.

You are saying that a reason to do something is not a cause to do something, but a directive. What's the difference?

But to me they are rooted in natural processes. A reason to do anything is an invention of a mind.

Also, what is a reason to go a get some food.

Ok. Forgive me. I mean well. The thing is that I just cannot understand what you mean by reasons-to-do things. It seems to me that in your mind you picture these reasons-to-do things as...... what? Are they pleasures, needs, wants, or what? Could you explain in other words what you mean by reasons-to-do. Describe them to me as if I was an alien from a far far away world threatening to end life on Earth and its destiny depends on how well I understand your term.

In other words, I think I am alive not because there are reasons to be alive but because by being alive I have come up with reasons to believe I am.

The kinds of reasons you talk about are being caused. They are outcomes. That which you call a reason to do something is an outcome of a process and not what initiates a process. They are ends.

The molecular machinery that keeps cells alive gets worn with time. It does not last forever and needs to be replaced. New molecules are made of nutrients obtained from the external world (or recycled nutrients). How do you know that the molecules needed to keep your cells alive are getting old and that you need to replace them? how do you know if you have enough nutrients to replace those old molecules? how do you know if you need to acquire nutrients from the external world? How do you think you get that sensation of hunger?

Are you saying the reason one gets hungry is not a lack of nutrients but instead an idea given by god to those organisms that feel a need to eat?

If I don't eat, the cells that make me will lack the nutrients required for the normal functioning of the molecular processes that maintain such cells alive - that is, I will die. By the way, the reason we eat is not to feel full or feel some kind of pleasure, we eat to give our cells what they require for their normal functioning. Same reason we drink water. We feel hunger because our cells have developed a mechanism to alert us that we need to provide our cells with nutrients, or we die! (a mechanism that evolved many thousand years ago - bacteria eat and they have molecular mechanisms that alert them to eat).
That need to go and grab something to eat, like that delicious donut, that need that makes you get up from your chair and down the stairs, that need that makes you think of that marvellous, fluffy, juicy donut, that need is part of a molecular process (there is no denying that). The molecular process that makes you feel hungry has evolved because (among other reasons) without the nutrients you acquire through eating, you would not be able to maintain those functions that allow you to reproduce. Those thoughts you call a reason to eat are a consequence of your body communicating to your brain that you need to eat.

What is a reason here?

yes

You are confusing the basis upon which we have a reason to believe something with the reason itself. — Bartricks

Give me an example of a reason itself. I am asking because I truly do not understand what you mean by a reason.