No, it is an incorrect interpretation of special relativity. Special relativity cannot be interpreted as allowing for only one present. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you insist. Seems to put your presentism on shaky ground then, if relativity contradicts it. It requires you to reject it. Seems harsh.

Either you take the standard interpretation that there is no such thing as the present (eternalism), or if you approach with the assumption that there must be such a thing as "the present", then you find a multiplicity of presents.

Well, I stand on the eternalism side of that fence, so it would not bother me to see presentism be contradictory like that, but since I cannot think of a single falsification test for it, I suspect your analysis is in error. If they're incompatible, there must be some test that falsifies one or the other.

Right, that's why the standard interpretation is that of eternalism, no "now". — Metaphysician Undercover

Standard interpretation, yes, but not the only one.

That is incorrect. If you interpret special relativity with the assumption that there is such a thing as "the present", then "the present" is necessarily specific to the frame of reference. This means that there are multiple "presents" according to multiple frames of reference. Furthermore, events which are simultaneous in other frames, are really simultaneous in those frames. To say this, what you say here, that moments which appear to be simultaneous in other frames "are not really simultaneous" is to violate special relativity which stipulates that they really are simultaneous, according to the frame of reference.

I think what you're described here is an inconsistent set of assertions. You describe an assertion of "the present" like there is one of them, and then go on to describe other different presents, which means there is more than one. That is inconsistent, unless I'm interpreting your words wrong.

For what I said to be incorrect, it would similarly need to be self-inconsistent.

Again this is the same incorrect assumption. Special relativity, like all relativity theories, dictates that there is no ontologically "correct" frame.

It uses the word 'ontological'? That would be news to me. That would indeed be a metaphyscial statement.

I thought that Special Relativity implied Eternalism — Devans99

It probably does imply it, but does not assert it.

If you interpret it that way (as did Einstein), then it would be logically inconsistent with "There is something that distinguishes 'now' from 'past' and 'present'"

Special Relativity asserts the existence of multiple 'nows'

No, this is blatantly false.

I disagree; Eternalism is primarily about the existence of past and future.

Also false. It has gives no such distinct status to any event. None of them are 'past' or 'future'. Such labels are only potential relations between two arbitrary events. A preferred frame makes that relation objective, not just potential. Presentism on the other hand makes those labels a property of an event, not a relation between two of them.

If both the following hold true:

- Einstein's Relativity is correct
- There is something that distinguishes 'now' from 'past' and 'future'

Then we need a flavour of eternalism that distinguishes 'now'. — Devans99

Einstein did not assert eternalism in his TOR. I know he held that metaphysical view personally, but the theory was about empirical physics, not metaphysics. The theory is about the map, and the metaphyics is about the territory. Einstein stated that a spacetime map corresponds very well to what we observe, but the theory makes no assertions about the correspondence of that map to the metaphysical territory.

If you assert a 'now', then you are discarding the eternal view whose sole premise is non-reality of that very thing. Einstein's theory still stands, but you've added two new things to it: A preferred frame and also a preferred moment. Einstein's theory says the former would be undetectable and makes no mention of the latter.

I'm repeating myself now, so I may drop off.

Suppose "now", the present, is the principle which defines what is happening, the events which are occurring, presently. "Simultaneous" implies that numerous events, are occurring at the same time. The different events are necessarily at different places, if they are at the same time. Under the precepts of special relativity, depending on the frame of reference, the events which are occurring simultaneously, now at the present, vary. — Metaphysician Undercover

SR has no concept of 'now at the present'. You can add that to it, but it doesn't presume it, nor does it forbid it. In fact it makes no mention of it. I says that local physics works in all frames of reference, and that a preferred frame (not to be confused with the preferred moment) if it existed, would be locally undetectable.

Therefore the interpretation of now varies according to the frame of reference, such that we can have multiple presents.

No. If there is a present, there is probably only one of them, and a frame that does not correspond to it is simply not the preferred frame. Moments that appear simultaneous in the other frames are not really simultaneous.

I suppose there could be an interpretation with multiple presents, but I've not seen a name put to it. There is no logic that forbids it. One simply has to not refer to 'the present' and instead refer to 'this present and that other present'.

There is no interpretation of special relativity which renders "one present", because it makes no reference to said present because this implies a preferred frame of reference, which is strictly excluded by special relativity.

No, it doesn't exclude a preferred frame. It just says you can't do a local experiment to detect it, if there is one. Physics works in all of them (principle of relativity) and SR just extended that principle to electromagnetism. GR also says the preferred frame is undetectable. There is a unique frame which has the property of local isomorphism, but there is no way to demonstrate that if there is a preferred local inertial frame, it is that frame, especially since the frame is different everywhere.

Special relativity specifically disallows a preferred frame of reference, that is the fundamental principle of "relativity". So any interpretation of time which uses such a preferred foliation is inconsistent with special relativity..

Sounds to me like you're attempting to disprove the presentism I know you to hold, while I am defending it despite thinking it wrong.

As I understand special relativity, it is stipulated that simultaneity is dependent on the frame of reference. There appears to be two approaches to this assertion. One is that there are multiple presents, depending on frame of reference, the other that there is no such thing as the present. So I do not see how you can make special relativity consistent with presentism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, multiple approaches (I count three), or interpretations of time, but they are no presents, or one present. No view has multiple presents.

One is 4D spacetime (no present), and the latter is 3D space that changes in time. Eternal vs Present view. They both work, but the present view demands a preferred foliation (which typically corresponds to an inertial frame only locally) and only one frame, coupled with a current event, defines local events that currently exist. The spacetime view says all events exist equally, and is pretty much how Minkowski and Einstein envisioned things.

The third interpretation is 4D with preferred foliation, but no preferred current moment. This corresponds to something like Lorentz Ether theory (LET). That interpretation, lacking an assertion of a 'now', also is grouped under eternalism, but there is an LET interpretation that posits in addition a preferred present, at which point the view becomes straight presentism.

Point 6 asserts that time clearly passes. I'd argue this is true for both Presentism and Eternalism: — Devans99

Umm... No. There is nothing that 'passes' under eternalism. Maybe you should read up on it,

There is clearly some distinction between present, past and future, because we can tell the difference.

Thus asserts the presentists, and you seem to be one, despite all your 'nails'. I would say that there is no moment that holds a distinction as 'present', and the existence of a present moment is in no way empirically distinct from the lack of it, so not at all clear.

So the world must be Presentist or it must be a flavour of Eternalism where there is some sort of 'now' cursor(s) that allow us to recognise the present. So either way, time passes. — Devans99

There is no flavor of eternalism that recognizes a 'now'. The lack of it is the primary premise. There are only temporal relationships between some pairs of events.

I think your mistake is that you intend to argue against an infinite past, and you mistakenly associate 'presentism' with the view.

2. Has 'now' existed always?
3. No. Implies a start of time. — Devans99

Begging. You're just asserting your conclusion here.

4. Implies time was created.

Logical contradiction. For it to be created, it must not have existed at some point, and later it existed. There is no 'and later' if time is not already there. Creation is a temporal verb.

6. Implies Presentism does not hold

Presentism doesn't assert that the preferred moment was started at some time in the finite past or was always there. It just asserts that it is currently this moment. As I said, you are clearly a presentist arguing against an infinite past, which is a valid position. But you need to find different labels for your views.

1. What exactly is an eternal being? — Devans99

I consider myself to be an eternal being: From the non-presentist viewpoint (the one your title claims to be arguing for), I didn't start to exist, nor will I cease to exist. And yet I have a birthday and count a finite number of seconds from that moment until the moment I make this post.

- Presentism it means the past and future don't exist, only now. — Devans99

Yes, but only two of your 'nails' (5 & 6) talk about that, and one of them argues for it, not against it.

- Has 'now' existed always?

Both presentists and eternalists might give different answers to this question. It is a different topic. You seem primarily concerned with arguing against an infinite past. Talk to the cosmologists. They have theories on both sides of that fence.

- No. Implies a start of time. Implies time is real. Implies Presentism does not hold.
- Yes. Implies an infinite past.

Time is real either way, whether it flows or is a dimension, or whether it is finite or infinite.
If it flows, it will probably stop. There is no forward flow of time given heat death, so it was probably thermodynamically bounded at the other end as well.

If you have a fault with my logic, please tell me what rather than just saying I'm wrong.

You haven't presented much logic. There is a series of what seem like begging assertions, and I question the assertions, not the logic that connects them. I don't personally hold to presentism, but I've never seen a falsification test for it. I've seen them proposed, but you're not attempting even that.

OK, yazata pointed out the same thing. Your reply:

The existence of only the present means time did not have a start, which means that things have been around eternally. Hence some of my arguments. — Devans99

No, presentism does not assert a lack of start to time. Maybe it started with the big bang, or maybe it was created by the prime mover.

The posts by Dfpolis point out most of the misconceptions you hold with presentism, and lack of awareness of its alternaitive eternalism which simply states that there is no present moment.

I've not read all the replies, but wanted to comment on my first impression of the OP:

1. What exactly is an eternal being? He has no start in time (no birthday so does not exist). Ask him how he came about. He cannot tell you. So he can’t exist. Because eternal is impossible

2. Say you meet an Eternal being in your Eternal universe and you notice he is counting. You ask and he says ‘I’ve always been counting’. What number is he on?

3. Take any physical system with a clock/timer. Make the system Eternal. What does the clock read?

4. Assume time is eternal. If it can happen it will happen. An infinite number of times. No matter how unlikely it was in the first place! So all things happen an infinite number of times. So all things are equally likely. Reductio ad absurdum. Time is not eternal

7. The universe follows rules that are described by mathematics. Negative infinity does not exist mathematically; there is no number X such that X< all other numbers because X-1<X. Hence the universe is not Eternal

8. If the universe has been around for ever then it should be in thermodynamic equilibrium by now. But the universe is not in thermodynamic equilibrium so time had a start — Devans99

Do you know what presentism is??? These six points all seem to argue against an infinite past, which is not something asserted by presentism. They also seem to be variations of the same nail, so to speak, but nevertheless a nail in a different coffin.
I find none of them valid. Mathematics supports an infinite past, just like it supports an infinite set of integers in both directions.

5. Relativity suggests the existence of multiple presents, whereas Presentism demands one present

Suggests, yes, but not asserts. It works either way. This point is actually about presentism.

6. Time clearly passes. Time cannot have started passing infinity long ago because there is no way to get to today (IE -oo +1 = -oo)

This one seems to argue for presentism.

9. Presentism is just so depressing why would anyone want to believe in it anyway?

The majority find the alternative more depressing.

So do you think that the preferred moment should be equated with the set of moments picked out by the CMB? It seems like one moment you think that it should (like in your previous response to me), then the next you think it shouldn't (like you are here). — Mr Bee

I am totally in the dark as to how the CMB would pick out a specific moment.

Since there is no difference between the CMB frame and any other in that sense, then that should give us reason to not take the former to represent the preferred moment that the A-theorists want.

How does a selection of a frame suggest there being a special moment in it? The block model has a objective frame, independently discoverable by observers elsewhere, but no preferred moment is similarly discoverable by other observers.

At least, this is part of the reason why I feel hesitant to call the CMB frame anything more than one that has some interesting properties.

Yes, that's why I called it an objective foliation, not necessarily a preferred one. By objective, I just mean it can be independently discovered by any observer anywhere. I don't mean a foliation that orders events in actual order. That would perhaps be that preferred frame.

It would be a different matter if that wasn't the case though. If the laws of physics do single out a particular foliation of events then it seems to be more of a stretch to deny that the present moment picked out by such a foliation is not the same as that of the metaphysical present, at least in my opinion.

I don't see how any foliation picks out any particular moment. It is a thing you've arbitrarily decided to add.

I suppose I don't find anything wrong with an infinite past, or infinities in general really, but I don't want to argue that here. There's also the possibility of cyclical time as well, if one doesn't want a first cause or an infinite past

Mathematically, I have little problem with either. Have to explain entropy though.

I feel like you're being obtuse at this point. I see no ambiguity in the use of "time-ordered". It means that causes always precede their effects in time. The author has been pretty clear in referring to time-order in that sense. — Mr Bee

That's why I wonder about before-before, which blatantly puts cause well after effect, and in any reference frame. Or at least it does in non-local interpretations.

they assume that each event has a cause preceding it in time, they actually dispose of the freedom of the experimenter

This seems to explain it. If measurements are taken yesterday, and Victor's decision as to how those measurements correlate not yet made, apparently the interpretation is that the results of the measurements cause Victor to decide to correlate them, despite complete separation (no causal path) from measurements made by Alice and Bob to Victor making his decision.

It apparently satisfies time-orderedness by switching labels of cause and effect.

As far as I can tell, the CMB frame is not a physically distinguished frame in the sense that a preferred frame in SR is physically distinguished (as in the laws of physics are observed to be different in that frame). In that sense, so much as it is preferred, such a fact would be undetectable.

Agree

It solves the problem of truthmakers for the past. In saying that the past exists and is real, the Growing Block Theorist has the resources to talk about it unlike the Presentist.

OK, that makes some sense. If the past is gone, is "Einstein existed" a true statement? Being a past tense, I don't see why not. It definitely changes the truth value of "Einstein exists".

Sorry, I thought you were just referring to QM interpretations

No, none of those seem to depend on any particular interpretation of time. I might be wrong about that.

In that case, the alternative interpretations to the Minkowski Spacetime such as the Neo-Lorentz interpretation of SR do include a flow of time as it is supposed to preserve the traditional view of time as a dynamic succession of events in a 3D universe.

It has that. Is this something different than Lorentz Ether Theory, because I found no mention of flow in any description of it. Maybe Neo-Lorentz adds that on top of LET. Lorentz himself seemed not to see things that way, especially since he set a lot of the groundwork for Minkowski's model.
Lorentz's model is older than knowledge of the expanding universe, so I wonder how he posited his preferred frame or foliation.

It's not really the A-theorists who are making that claim, but the B-theorists who are objecting to the CMB as a means of defining a preferred moment because it appears to be arbitrary to do so.

How could CMB possibly suggest a preferred moment??? A preferred frame, sure, but not preferred moment. The A-Theorists similarly do not base their definition of the preferred moment on the CMB. Their moment is simply 'now'. Easy-peasy.

According to them there is no clear link between the CMB and the preferred moment in metaphysics that should lead us to equate one with the other. In a sense, I can see where they're coming from, as noted above, the CMB is not physically distinguished like we would want it to be. In that regard, we have just as much reason to prefer it over any other alternative foliation of events.

Of course, if the CMB were to be physically distinguished and people are making the same objections then that'd be another story altogether, for one could very well have made such an argument prior to relativity in the 1800s with respect to the absolute time of Newtonian physics. At that point it would be unreasonable to require that there needs to be a neon light sign that says "This is a preferred moment of metaphysics" over the preferred moment picked out by physics in order to say that they are both equivalent.

I do not understand these paragraphs. I think you meant to say preferred frame.
What is 'physically distinguished'?

This is confusing to me. Becoming conceptually requires no uncaused causation, and even I see nothing contradictory about an uncaused cause.

Maybe I don't understand this notion of becoming. It's not a term I use regularly.
All causes seem to be effects of prior causes, but barring an infinite past, there must be a first cause, uncaused. Surely you've heard of that. Block theory has one, but it is just a (perhaps blank) initial condition. Not sure how becoming is expected to fit into that.

Again, the author refers to the preferred frame model of Bohmian Mechanics explicitly as one that is time ordered, and admits that it's empirical predictions are compatible with the correlations found in the before-before experiment. Take no offense, but at this point, I am more willing to side with his view over yours. — Mr Bee

A model is considered time ordered when it proposes that a cause event tomorrow can effect a measurement taken yesterday in the same place? Perhaps I don't know what 'time ordered' means, as used in that article. The one picture in there showed non-local influence arrow in a spooky-action setup, and without a preferred frame, the direction of the arrow would be ambiguous. So maybe that's what they mean by time-ordered: Not that the arrow always points forward, just that it doesn't point either way. In the before-before, it doesn't point in an ambiguous direction. It is consistently pointing backwards.

There's also the moving spotlight view of time as well, which says that all events in the universe's history exist but that there is a dynamic spotlight that shines on the set of events that represents the present. This is what I have told you at my first reply.

Well, to be thorough then, there might also be the one where only present and future exists, but the past, being no longer useful, fades away. I think the Langoliers movie depicted something like this.
The spotlight people definitely need two kinds of time, else how did the future come to be if it hasn't happened yet? How long ago was it created? How far did that part get before the spotlight started? Strange questions like that...
For that matter, I don't understand what possible problem is solved by growing block as opposed to presentism. I looked up the wiki page, and it defined it, but went no further in pointing out a single benefit of it.

No interpretation says anything about the existence of the block universe either. None of them have any direct say on the matters of the metaphysics of time.

The Minkowski model is one specifically of a block scenario. It is a straight metaphysical interpretation of time, making no empirical predictions distinct from the flowing model. Einstein drew on the mathematics of this model and Lorentz's work in producing his theory of relativity. But yes, the theory of relativity does not itself assert those metaphysics. It just uses the mathematics of spacetime, and refers regularly to spacetime as a unified whole.

Yeah, the direct implication of Relativity's postulates is that if there were such a preferred frame, it would not be empirically detectable, which some have taken to be evidence of it's nonexistence.

Only SR says it is undetectable. GR does not, since it isn't just a local theory. There are non-local tests for an isomorphic foliation, which isn't an inertial frame, but seems to be the most viable candidate for some kind of preferred ordering of all events anywhere.

The CMB is taken by some to be a preferred foliation of the universe in a sense,

Careful with your wording. The CMB is not a foliation and, being light, is certainly not stationary relative to any frame, but a foliation is suggested by combining the local frames in which the CMB appears to be isomorphic. Hence my calling it the isomorphic foliation.

but it is debatable whether it is good enough for the A-theorist's purposes.

Really?? Do any of them suggest another, like the frame of the solar system perhaps? That would suit the purpose of some people that would seem to have a requirement for A-theory.

The concept of becoming seems required only for the flowing model, but doesn't fit well at all with the block model. That's a good deal of the appeal of the block model is it doesn't need to explain the becoming.

I would actually argue that, in rejecting the idea of becoming, the block model has more trouble accounting for why the universe appears to become in time (given its structure), and that this is a weakness of the view relative to its alternative.

It does? I wasn't there at the time. Couldn't say. Yes, the A-theorists might say that, but doing so begs a different view. I find becoming to be difficult to explain, with all the uncaused-cause contradictions.
The block guy, if he posits that the block IS, needs to explain how it is, but not how it came to be. A different question, but still not an easy one. Platonic realism sometimes is invoked. My relational preference doesn't presume that anything IS, just that it relates to something, so I need to posit what the universe stands in relation to.

The article very explicitly addresses the before-before experiment and clearly states that preferred frame models such as that of Bohmian mechanics do not violate time-ordering. You're free to disagree with that but that is what the article states. — Mr Bee

No frame, preferred or otherwise puts cause before effect in the Bohmian interpretation of before-before results. So I guess I don't understand where the article addresses that. The two events are separated time-like, so there is no ambiguity to their ordering that can be disambiguated with a preferred frame.

Presentism is not equal to the A-theory.

From what I read, A-theory includes growing block and presentism, which differ in the ontological status of past events, but both posit the flow of a preferred moment, so all my comments about presentism so far also can be applied to growing block. Perhaps you can explain the distinction if it is more than that.

I'm saying that no QM or relativistic interpretation seems to propose flowing time. I'm probably wrong, but I'm just unaware of one. Some assert a preferred frame, but that isn't flow.

A preferred frame/foliation allows us to define an absolute order of events, and in turn the preferred moment.[/quote]First of all, no inertial frame foliates all events, so it would have to be some non-inertial foliation like the obvious comoving one. Yes, it allows (seems necessary for) the preferred moment, but does not need one.

The reason why Relativity undermines the idea of a preferred moment is because it states that there is no way to choose one frame or foliation of events, and that therefore there isn't any preferred frame/foliation.

Relativity just says it isn't locally detectable. Non-locally, one does suggest itself, and GR very much acknowledges it. It is the foliation where spatial expansion is symmetric/isomorphic.

Now there appear to be some who dispute this, who claim that a concept of becoming can exist without a global now but for the most part I am just going off of the traditional opinion on the matter.

The concept of becoming seems required only for the flowing model, but doesn't fit well at all with the block model. That's a good deal of the appeal of the block model is it doesn't need to explain the becoming.

BTW, none of this directly relates to presentism, or A-theory as you call it. A preferred frame is not a preferred moment, even if a preferred moment seems to require a preferred foliation if not a frame. I know of no interpretation of QM or of relativity that asserts (or explicity denies) a preferred moment, although the presentist crowd does seem to congregate around absolute frame notational interpretations like Lorentz-ether-Theory, despite it not proposing a preferred moment in time.

Contrary to your claims, it would appear that preferred frames are the only the thing that saves nonlocal interpretations like Bohmian Mechanics from being refuted by the before-before experiment. This paper is very relevant to that. — Mr Bee

I got to the paper finally with the new link you provided. The term Leggett-like model is new to me. I don't see a description of before/before. I see it named, but not described. It interestingly defines a 'realism' as theories where 'results of observations are a consequence of pre-existing properties', i.e. cause before effect.

The article then goes on to describe relationships between measurements done by Alice and Bob respectively in space-like separated events, that only a preferred frame keeps the non-local influence time ordered.

Unfortunately, the before-before experiment (which I didn't see described) very much violates time-ordering since the effect measurement events by Alice and Bob are separated from the cause decision event by Victor in a time-like separation, not a space-like separation, and thus any proposed non-local influence is necessarily not going to be time ordered.

I'm not sure how Bohmian mechanics describes the before-before experiment. I thought it explained spooky-action through hidden variables, not through time ordered non-local influence, but I don't see how hidden variables can explain before-before.

It depends on what you mean by "support" then. If by the term you meant that you find that interpretation more useful as a practical tool for understanding QM, then that's one thing. — Mr Bee

QM is science, and not aided much at all with any interpretation. That is why a QM class will perhaps touch on the various interpretations, but not promote or dwell on one since none of them are QM. The "shut up and calculate" refers to this. Shut up about the interpretations, and calculate what QM theory actually says, because it made most amazingly accurate predictions right from the beginning. Interpretations are philosophy, and the QM class is not teaching philosophy.
I on the other hand am more interested in the philosophical implications of QM, so I don't shut up, and I have opinions, but recognize that my opinions are only that, and that different opinions are not wrong just because the differ with mine. Being an X-ist is not a denial of Y-ism.

However, if you mean that you believe in one interpretation being true, then if that interpretation is logically incompatible (as in mutually exclusive) with another interpretation, then you believe that other interpretation to be wrong.

Agree, so I think that when I say I'm an X-ist, it isn't a statement so strong as to say I assert it is true. Lacking any evidence, it would be a very poor thing to assert. So it remains a mere preference. If there was a way to actually know in the future, I would place my bets on certain views over others, and I suspect as probably many of us do that I would fare better than most in the horses I choose to back.
And I am also aware that there are horses that nobody has even suggested. Nobody would ever have suggested something as unintuitive as MWI before QM experiments forced the hand into a series of mutually unintuitive choices. The horses everybody chose back then were all proven wrong, but one of them still probably beat the others, even if they didn't win the race. So I'm more betting on my horses beating the other guy's horses, and not so much on them actually winning the race.
This is a pretty arrogant statement as I back some fairly unpopular horses.

MWI is effectively a special case of the Relational interpretation, as related only to the universe as a whole, or more specifically the big bang singularity event, so in a way, a subset of it. The only difference between the two would be that MWI would say the universal wave function is real, and Relational would say it is real in relation to the universe.

It should be viewable without download in the link provided. Just scroll down. — Mr Bee

Both chrome and IE show no page, just the download.

Just giving my own side thoughts about the relational interpretation since it was brought up and all.

OK, but your thoughts were only that it doesn't have collapse. It does.

I might say I support this interpretation, but you'd then say that means I find the other interpretations wrong, and I don't. So I am again agnostic by the way you explain above. To deny other interpretations is to deny that they are inconsistent with themselves. That they are inconsistent with my preferences is evidence of nothing if I have no empirical evidence that my preferences are correct.

I never said it was idealistic, just that it has a very idealistic tone to it since it makes everything observer dependent. I suppose the same problems I have with it are similar to that of the copenhagen interpretation. — Mr Bee

Neither of those interpretations require the observer to be a living thing. As I said, a rock will do.

You know that quote about the moon not being there where you're not looking at it? That's what first came to my mind.

It wouldn't be there if you had never looked at it, but it cannot be un-looked at. If you completely stop interacting with it (impossible), it would drop into a superposition of damn-likley existing, but possibly not. It's the moon. It isn't going anywhere. Both relational and copenhagen say this. Even if the moon by chance spontaneously decays into nonexistence, surely that would leave behind some energy wad that would still be the moon.

So it is. What I wanted to say was that I thought the copenhagen interpretation allowed for some observer independent states after collapse, unlike the relational interpretation, but that may not be correct.

Well, after collapse, no state is totally observer independent. Example would be nice I guess so I might comment on the different interpretations. We're getting kind of off-topic here.

And if you look at the paper I linked the author seems to suggest otherwise.

Cannot read it. It downloads a pdf with an unreadable font.

He brings up the problems with the preferred frame view (it's empirical unobservability, the free will problem), but he does not mention the lack of a time order which he considers to refute the other non-local views.

I'd have to look to see what you mean by that. Maybe you can find a more readable version.

Regardless, I still checked the citation list for the article to see what others thought of it (a habit of mine), and I found some objections (here is one of them) to the unpredictability argument that Tegmark promotes in his paper. Not sure what to make of it, but I'd thought I'd throw it out for people for those who do understand it to look at for themselves. — Mr Bee

A good habit to hunt down critique. Helps point out which parts on which focus should be placed. I do it myself for papers whether or not I agree with them. I'll try to look at that link closer, but a good deal of it is beyond me.

Tachyons, though weird, are not completely impossible from what I can tell but I have no idea how they work to say one way or the other.

I was actually more concerned with 1D life form, let alone one comprised of only stuff that can't go slow. But who am I to say that just because it is incomprehensibly different that coherent structures cannot form in it. 3D of time, whatever that means, is plenty of room for complexity. But I don't even follow the argument that only tachyons result.

If one is looking for a more practical definition of "life" then sure I am willing to grant that temporal persistence is necessary. But I wasn't trying to argue with those kinds of definitions.

I was thinking dynamics more than persistence. I cannot think of a single thing distinguishing life from non-life that doesn't involve dynamics (a reference to time).

My concern is with the possibility that we could, as conscious beings, be located on a single static moment of time.

That, if it were a being, would not be conscious. Yes, I had thought of Boltzmann brains when this was brought up, but even those have momentary dynamics. A Boltzmann brain is not a life form, even if it technically qualifies as conscious for a very brief duration.

Hmm, the relational interpretation sounds pretty idealistic to me. From what I've read it seems to suggest that there is nothing to the physical world other than our own observation of it.

Idealism has to do with relations to consciousness. The relational view, being non-anthropocentric, is relative to anything at all. A rock does fine, co-existing with the things with which it interacts. Hence no contradiction about how we came about before we gave existence to what was before us.

The only nearly anthropocentric QM interpretation I can find seems to be the Wigner one, which posits consciousness, but not necessarily human consciousness causing wave function collapse.

That is, there is no noumenon, no red ball in itself, since there is nothing to it if we are not looking at it.

Except for the 'we' part, yes. Look up the principle of counterfactual definiteness. It says that the red ball exists even unmeasured. More formally worded, "counterfactual definiteness (CFD) is the ability to speak "meaningfully" of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e., the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured)". That's straight off the wiki page, my bold.

This goes further than the copenhagen interpretation since at least that view allows for the collapse of the wave function.

Relation interpretation has collapse. Collapse is what makes the red ball real. MWI does not have collapse.

I don't know what to make of that (especially since I am qualified to look into it more deeply), but with regards to the topic in the thread, it doesn't seem to undermine the concept of time as we traditionally define it.

It relates to the state of the universe in the block, but also in the flowing view. You're right, it doesn't really come into play until you start bringing up determinism, which can be asserted one way or the other with either view of time.

No, I don't think this is correct. Contrary to your claims, it would appear that preferred frames are the only the thing that saves nonlocal interpretations like Bohmian Mechanics from being refuted by the before-before experiment. This paper is very relevant to that.

Bohmian mechanics is not refuted by any experiment. I never claimed that. It just denies locality, and so allows effect before cause, as does any interpretation that denies locality. That makes the interpretaion invalid only if you assert otherwise.

Try this, which was the first item on my little google of it:
https://www.quora.com/If-there-are-3-physical-space-dimensions-why-arent-there-3-time-dimensions

That isn't what I'm asking for, but it does address the other concern that I had about why we should prefer a 3+1 Universe on anthropic reasons. I am assuming you're referring me to the first answer in the post, which references Tegmark, but if not then please direct me to the appropriate answer. — Mr Bee

I didn't even see that there were other answers. Yes, the first one.
I got that myself from Tegmarks book The Mathematical Universe which spends about 80% of its content explaining physics to the layman, and about 20% on the subject in the title. Part of that 80% uses that diagram and has the whole list of things that vary when selecting a tuning, and another list of things that don't.

You can also look at Tegmark's paper referenced at the top of that answer. It is 400 pages and I think only deals with the dimensionality aspect.

I don't think he actually demonstrates that life cannot work in a universe that does not contain one time dimension. In fact, the author seems to indicate that a world that contains 3 time dimensions and 1 space dimensions is possible, albeit very strange, for life.

The 'tachyons only' choice? You can publish that if you can think of a way for tachyons to interact coherently to be structure, let alone one that is a life form. The author Mauro seems to think so, but he omits Tegmarks commentary on that. I think Mauro is mistaking the condition for 3 space and 1 time, but everything moves faster than light, not slower.

Not a photo of a dog, but a state of a universe containing a real dog while it's alive. Perhaps one can debate whether or not a single instant is sufficient for life, but I see no reason why it doesn't.

I think it violates every attempt at a definition of life that I've seen. Perhaps you'd like to give one that would include this timeless configuration of state.

At least with respect to the Many-Worlds interpretation of Everett it would appear that the number of states that exist would be multiplied, since they would all be realized together.

So yes, can be thought of as one collective determined state. I call that soft determinism since the future measurement of some trivial experiment still cannot be predicted even given perfect knowledge of the system and infinite computing capability. It's determinism only because every possible result happens, and that list of results can be (and already is) computable. The relational interpretation is similar, but says the results that were not measured are not real (they didn't happen 'elsewhere'), and is therefore not a deterministic interpretation.

As for the Bohmian interpretation, I don't think that adopting non-locality would require rejecting causality, provided one introduce a preferred frame to preserve it.

No, there are quantum experiments that seemingly effect past measurements by decisions made in the future of those measurements. The before-before experiment is one of them. Only interpretations with locality explain that without reverse causation. A preferred frame helps not at all. The issue is not ambiguous ordering such as spooky action between two events outside each other's light cones. The issue here is blatant cause after effect between events that are within each other's light cones.

If you're an Eternalist then you think Presentism is wrong. That's what it means to be an Eternalist.

Fine. I'm an agnostic then, by the way you use the terms.

Note that first, I am not claiming to provide a proof of the A-theory, just an argument in it's favour.

Second, ...

Finally, third, your argument for the B-theory — Mr Bee

I said I wasn't arguing for it. Just comparing mostly.

How so? I'm curious to see you try.

I interpreted the comment wrong. I see what you're saying now.

It isn't a dimension at all if time flows. — noAxioms

Why? The Presentist (nor the A-theorist) again does not disagree with the representation of time as a linear series of events, so whether they all exist together or occur one by one is irrelevant. It wouldn't be a dimension like space of course but that is not to say that it cannot be described as a dimension at all.

The representation as a dimension would not reflect reality. Yes, it still can be useful to describe it that way.

Really? It seems very obvious that time is a series of events.

If there were no space, then yes, there would be just this linear series of events. But most pairs of events are ambiguously ordered (at least in the eternal model), so time would then not be a series of events. Time seems to be relevant only to causally related events, so time seem more to be a a product of a structure with causal relationships. That's how I tend to view it at least. YMMV.

The former has no slices, just a changing 3D state. The latter has a block with no slices other than abstracted considerations that can be oriented any way one chooses, similar to the way the 3D universe has no mandatory choice for the X axis. — noAxioms

As stated before, the Presentist would still agree that time can be described with the features mentioned above.

I would think not. If there is a present, it is an absolute state, however undetectable, and other abstract slices of the block are simply misrepresentations of reality. There is no arbitrary choice about it. An arbitrary guess if something preferred suggests itself, and yes, it does.
Maybe the present is some wrinkled wiggly thing. So long as it foliates a map of all events, it works.

As for Eternalism, the fact that, under relativity, we can slice spacetime up in practically an inifnite number of ways does not change the fact that no matter how we look at it (under any given slicing), that time is a series of 3D slices of space.

Well, you could slice across one of the other dimensions and get 2D space and 1D time.

Not sure about this. I've heard inflation being used as a way of solving the cosmological constant problem, but varying constants is not the same as varying dimensions of time.

There's a list of stuff that can vary, and a list that cannot. Yes, the cosmological constant is one, and the hardest one to get to a workable value if you're just pulling random values out of your arse. I guess that implies a lot of bubbles.

People have also spoken about the "dimensionality" varying between universes, but as far as I can tell, this "dimensionality" that people speak about as varying refers strictly to space, not time, which is what I am concerned about. Do you have a reference that says that the time dimension can vary across bubble universes?

Try this, which was the first item on my little google of it:
https://www.quora.com/If-there-are-3-physical-space-dimensions-why-arent-there-3-time-dimensions

The idea of a multiverse is still debatable (at least of the stronger forms involved here), but if there can be other universes that exist along our own that contain more than one time dimension (or none at all), then that would undermine the linearity feature of my argument.

Technically the bubbles relate, being part of one QM structure, so different worlds in one universe. But other bubbles have completely different physical laws (especially the classic laws), so most qualify them as other universes.

This just sounds plainly wrong to me. I don't see why life would require 3+1 dimensions in order to exist.

The article I linked gets into this.

For one, such an idea would falsify string theory on the basis that the latter requires alot more than 3 dimensions of space to even work,

Yes, but most of them not macroscopic. We're counting the macroscopic ones here.

I also fail to see why life would require a single dimension of time in order to operate. Although it isn't clear to me what it would exactly mean to say that there is more than one dimension to time I do not see what about it's nature would preclude conscious beings like us from existing in it.

I tried creating a simulation of that, and could only manage it with 1 space dimension.

With respect to a world that contains no time at all, the same reasoning applies. It could be that that some form of temporal solipsism is true, where one 3D slice of time exists and only that time, but that time can in theory describe a world where living animals and conscious beings such as us exist.

Makes no sense to me. You seem to describe a photo of a dog, which is not a living thing. It isn't life if there are no dynamics.

Don't see how quantum indeterminacy undermines or accounts for any of the features of time. A block universe with quantum indeterminacy (assuming that an indeterministic interpretation of QM is true) is still just as problematic as one that doesn't have it. Can you explain how it is relevant here?

Well, take the relational interpretation then, which has no meaningful state except as measured, and nothing measures the universe (the big bang is a point of view that sees nothing), so the universe has no state, just relations. Everett would say it has solutions to Schrodinger equations. Neither of those has meaningful state. The Bohmian interpretation has it (hard, single-outcome determinism), but it does so at the cost of cause before effect (locality). I personally find the latter more offensive, but that's just my taste.

I prefer the eternal model, but I don't assert that the presentist model is wrong. — noAxioms

Then you are a presentist then?

No, a presentist would not prefer the opposing model.

My assumption is that you're a firm eternalist, but in that case, you would believe that presentism is wrong.

I am a squishy eternalist. I only take firm stances against positions which don't seem self consistent.

In the philosophy of time, there are two major positions, the A-theory and the B-theory. The A-theory is often considered to be in line with the traditional view on time, where things change in accord with the passage of time and reality is dynamic. The B-theory on the other hand does not take the passage of time to be real at all and considers all events often taken to be past, present, and future, to be real in a static block universe. — Mr Bee

A terminology note. The A/B this is more correctly known as A-series and B-series, and they're not a philosophical stance, just a relative vs. more absolute way to speak of time.

The philosophical positions you are describing is presentism and eternalism, with the former asserting a flowing preferred moment in time separating all events into 3 distinct ontological states of happened, happening, and yet to happen. The latter gives equal ontological status to all events and disallows references to the nonexistent preferred moment.

Essentially I want to argue that the A-theory is better at accommodating certain features of time, those which seem to depict it time as flowing series of events, that would give reason to support it. — Mr Bee

It is certainly more practical, which is why A-series is used in everyday language and intuition. I can similarly argue that B-series gives a more practical framework in which physics can be discussed. But lacking an empirical distinction between the two, I don't see a proof being likely. Everyday life can be awkwardly described in B-series, and physics can be awkwardly described in A-series.

- History: The most defining feature of time is the fact that it describes the different states of the universe. If you were to take one slice of time and another, you would find that they contain the same matter and objects, just organized differently.

I can say the same with slices of space. The word 'history' carries an implication of a past, which is a presentist interpretation.

- Connectivity: There is a relation between adjacent times that we capture through the laws of nature. The slices of time and states of the universe are not just ordered arbitrarily, where each time is completely independent of the other, but they are connected together in specific ways (for instance, the state of the universe in 2018 would not be adjacent to a state very early in the universe's history in time).

Spacetime has connectivity yes. Calling them slices is from the eternalist interpretation. The presentist would only have the one current state of space, with no other 'slices' to connect with it.

- Linearity: We often talk about time as a line going from one end to the other. Unlike space, which contains three dimensions, time is one dimensional.

It isn't a dimension at all if time flows. 4D spacetime can have all four axes oriented arbitrarily, so yes, there's one time axis, but its orientation is arbitrary within the confines of the speed of light. Rotate beyond that, and a different axis assumes the role of the time axis. Fun factoid: This switching of roles of axes actually happens in black holes, which I think don't exist yet under presentism.

- Order: Under time there is also a preferred direction, which some refer to as the "arrow of time". We talk of events going from 2000 to 2001 but never the other way around.

Entropy defining the direction of the arrow. If entropy stabilizes, there would be no arrow.

It is these four features of time that I take to be better accounted for in the A-theory than in the B-theory. As far as I am aware of there is no explanation of why time is structured the way that it is in the latter.

Both account for it all just fine.

Why is time a series of slices depicting the history of the same 3D universe?

??? It isn't in either view. The former has no slices, just a changing 3D state. The latter has a block with no slices other than abstracted considerations that can be oriented any way one chooses, similar to the way the 3D universe has no mandatory choice for the X axis.

Why is there only one dimension of time and three (or more if we take string theory into account) of space?

From what I've read on inflation theory, this is chance. There are a lot of dimensions and some inflation bubbles have different numbers of macroscopic spatial and time dimensions. So maybe one bubble has 2 spatial and 3 time dimensions. Only the 3/1 configuration seems to allow the sort of physical mechanics that permits complex structures like atoms to form. Most of those strangely configured bubbles collapse immediately or explode into featureless fog. That 3/1 bit is part of a much longer list of tunings required to allow us to exist.

None of that answer really applies to presentism, which puts time outside the universe. There is no inflation theory under presentism that I know of, so the problems solved by it remain unsolved in the presentist view. The tuning problem is one of them.

Under the B-theory, all of the features seem to only be taken as a given in the block universe. It seems as though all events are simply laid out the way that they are with the relations between them, as a brute fact.

There is still quantum indeterminacy, so no brute fact implied by the block. A lot here depends on your quantum interpretation of choice. Hard determinism seems to be what you're describing here, and both time interpretations allow it but don't assert it.

If you're a B-theorist or at the least are actually familiar with the views, then I am interested in hearing from you.

I prefer the eternal model, but I don't assert that the presentist model is wrong.

I didn't mean it that literally, but rather like this: "Something which didn't come from anything has existed." I can't imagine what "coming from nothing" means if taken more literally, but I'd like to be helped by a description. — HuggetZukker

Much better. I came to the same conclusion, but then after a while even that seemed presumptuous to me, but that's just me.

I find an excellent model of the universe to be the set of all possible legal chess positions, which has 2D space, time, multi-world, deterministic, and entropy. Every state seems to be an effect of a prior cause (one move before), but to conclude that the initial state must have been caused would be an error. It didn't come from nothing, and it doesn't necessarily require platonic existence for it to be the set of all legal chess states.

Unlike our universe, it is very finite (8x8 discreet locations), finite discreet time (the longest possible chess game is about 10000 moves (counting each move, not each pair of moves as is normally recorded), but it is nicely illustrative of the sort of thing that we might be.

The argumentation goes:

If every effect has a preceding cause, as classical inquiry implies, there could have been no first cause, since it would constitute an uncaused effect, which contradicts the premise that every effect has a preceding cause. — HuggetZukker

Technically this doesn't follow. You would have to additionally posit that all causes are an effect of something else. It probably isn't unreasonable to do so, but it needs to be stated.

That said, there are known uncaused events like photon emission or radioactive decay. There are metaphysical interpretations that say there are hidden variables that make such events actually caused, if not predictable, but that is just one possible interpretation, sort of matching your option B below.

A) MOST effects have a cause, which always precedes the effect
B) Every effect has a cause, which USUALLY precedes the effect

Cause preceding effect requires the principle of locality, which is a different set of metaphysical interpretations than those that assert that all events are caused.

A) If there was uncaused cause then
...
4. Something has come from nothing.

This doesn't follow. It assumes that 'nothing' is the first uncaused cause.

C) If infinite things have happened then

Infinite things having happened doesn't imply infinite time. There are infinite events (no end to space), so only finite time is necessary for infinite things to happen. I'm suggesting that C be worded as just infinite (non-cyclic) past time.

3. The cosmos was infinitely sustainable in the past, since otherwise it would have collapsed by now.
4. The future cosmos should also be infinitely sustainable (and never-ending), unless the laws of nature, which sustained the infinite past, will some day go on a fatal strike for no obvious reason.

Any model of this needs to account for entropy. It defines the arrow of time, and something needs to reset it, or it doesn't describe the reality we see.

One has to wonder what a brain operation inside the Matrix entailed from the patient, since there is only a plug into the back of the neck, and not the machines opening up pods and doing actual brain surgery. — Marchesk

Well, the simulated brain could be kept in sync with the vatted one, which works most of the time. An aneurysm in the vat could be reflected in the body, but there are certain scenarios like the effects of high G forces that would make an accelerating brain behave (black out) very differently that the one in the vat. Concussion comes to mind. That is not just fake experience that can be fed to the organ in the vat.

Matrix movie, like all entertainment, is not science. It is founded upon unrealistic premises and works only because the writers make it so. For instance, one purpose of envatting people was to harvest their heat and electrical energy. Guess what... People consume energy, they don't generate it. Far more efficient to just burn whatever they're using to keep the bodies alive.

On a Denettian position, it's difficult to see how being envatted and experiencing a fake physical world is possible. And in fact, Dennett has denied this is actually possible, because he doesn't think a computer program can handle the combinatorial explosion of interacting with a fake physical world. — Marchesk

It is pretty easy to disprove a literal brain (a pink biological thing like in the pictures) in a vat scenario. Everybody would have two brains, one in the vat (in charge) and one in the body (epiphenomenal). Somebody would notice the difference that signals from the body one are severed abruptly at some point in the brain stem to be replaced with uncaused signals controlling the motor functions.
Defects would be a distinguishing point. Bob has an aneurysm in the vat and displays the physical symptoms of that, but doctors find a brain with nothing wrong with it. Sue on the other hand has an aneurysm in the body brain, and yet continues to function normally, even after doctors notice the event (for whatever reason).

I think the BIV idea is not meant to be taken literally like this. It means an experiencer of complete unknown properties being fed experience of this world and this physics, but not being envatted in a similar world. Dennett is correct that our physics is not up to the task of running such a fake experience stream, but we know nothing of the limitations of the reality with the vat, so Dennett's denial is baseless.

BIV is a model of dualism, and all the evidence for or against it is evidence for or against the other.

The problem for the BIV is that their perceptions are not of a physical world, but a mental one constructed by the false sensory and bodily impressions the vat is feeding the brain. So epistemologically, the BIV has no grounds for their position. — Marchesk

They do have grounds. They have their empirical evidence. Problem is, you not given any clue as to the nature of the false reality being fed to this actual brain in a physical vat. If it is a story about a physical world, then the brain has grounds for their position. If on the other hand it is fed experience of a non-physical world, then it would have no empirical grounds.

However, it's also true that the vat and the brain are made up of physical stuff. So our BIV physicalist, while admitting they could be envatted, could argue that mental states are still physical.

Assuming you are a BIV is not a physicalist position. You seem to say this yourself:

It can if one is a direct realist, because then you're perceiving the actual physical objects, instead of being aware of some mental intermediary. — Marchesk

OK, you call it a direct realist here, but that is more or less the physicalist position: that what one perceives is the stuff that we're made of. The physics of the empirical reality being fed to the BIV would need to be capable of producing a conscious observer for physicalism to be a defensible position.

Global warming is a nice example of the prisoner's dilemma, where cooperation gives the best outcome, but with a better personal outcome for ratting out your fellow humans.

Is there any valid interpretation of QM that asserts that the nature of the photon as it is emitted from the source is affected by the measurement that will eventually be taken of it? There might be. Experiments like before-before definitely show retrocausality under certain nonlocal interpretations.

Surely we can conclude time is real with 90% certainty? — Devans99

Proof of retrocausality would prove that time (an ontological distinction between past, present, and future) is not real, not the other way around. The experiment is no proof of retrocausality, just a demonstration of the nonlocality of some quantum interpretations.

OK, I think I understand what you are arguing now. You are saying that some metaphysicians such as presentists, claim that human beings experience the passing of time. Others. like eternalists claim that what human beings experience and call "the passing of time" , is not really the passing of time, it's something different. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't call all of them metaphysicians since most people have no idea that some of their assumptions fall under the category of metaphysics. I like to confine that word to those that have given the matter explicit thought, such as those on these forums.

Further, you have already claimed that there is something called "the passing of time", which physicists measure with clocks.

That was your claim. Mine was that clocks measure physical time (duration), and they do so accurately. Furthermore, I assume (cannot prove) that human experience is a physical (natural) process that measures time similar to clocks, so what we experience is physical time, not metaphysical time.

My opinion, is that this distinction you make is unwarranted. I think that what a metaphysician refers to as "the passing of time" is the exact same thing as what the physicist refers to as "the passing of time".

Yes, I've noticed this.

The two, the metaphysician, and the physicist, just utilize different measurement techniques, one the human experience, the other a physical clock. This is very clear from the fact that human beings synchronize their experience with the clock, in our day to day life. That the physicist employs a more accurate measurement technique than the metaphysician is irrelevant to the fact that the two are measuring the very same thing.

Agree that they're measuring the very same thing, but none of it is metaphysical. The interpretational difference (flow or not flow, 4D spacetime or 3D state that changes at some unitless rate) is undetectable, and the rate of that flow (if it exists) is undetectable since experience would be the same if the rate was halved, tripled, or there was no rate.

I think we are talking past each other. Sure, metaphysical time is an interpretation of empirical physical time. In that sense, they are the same thing. But experience and empirical tests are all the same thing, and none of that makes any difference to the various valid interpretations. If you think the 4D model would result in a different experience, then you don't understand it or the interpretation is invalid. If the universe changes in time, the rate of that change is inexpressible, let alone measurable. If the rate changed, no device or experience would detect that. That flow or the rate of it is nonexistent in eternalism, but is the thing that I refer to as metaphysical time.

That means there is no metaphysical time in eternalism. The phrase is simply a reference to an ontological addition made by a different view. Time is pure physical under eternalism, and is essentially a 4th dimension of a single structure that has no present state.
An eternalist would say time is real if the structure is real. Time has the same ontology as space.
A presentist would say time is real because there is a real current state of space.
Asking both if time is real results in them talking past each other, and I think we're doing that.

The train and diesel fuel example above, was not about sensing motion or acceleration. Rather it was about viewing two study state references after all the acceleration is done. Both parties go into the final references, blind to any energy balance. This allows both references can apply the relative reference assumption in good conscience. — wellwisher

Fine. The total energy and momentum is conserved in the frames of each of the observers, but they're not the same to each other.
A rock (as a sole existent) in a frame where it is stationary has zero total momentum, where in a different frame where it is moving, the same rock has nonzero momentum. Conservation of momentum is within one frame and does not mean that energy or momentum is the same in different frames. You seem to think otherwise. All this is Newtonian mechanics.

However, since a third party knows the energy conservation answer before the two references tell us what their reference appears to say, we have a way to prove if their assumptions are true or an illusion.[/quote]Wrong. The total energy was always different in the different frames. It changed in neither, since it is conserved.

If we did not know how much fuel was used such that the energy balance was left open ended, then the illusion would work.

Fuel consumption does not change total energy. It just changes form from chemical energy to kinetic energy and heat. Total energy is conserved in both frames, but was never the same in either frame.

The train and landscape may not be a good example, since rational common sense would say the landscape can't move, unless the entire earth was moved, which is unlikely due to the energy needed.

It doesn't take energy to move or even accelerate. It takes force. The Earth happens to move quite a bit with significant acceleration, all without expenditure of energy. The velocity of Earth is entirely dependent on the frame in which it is considered. Its acceleration is not frame dependent, and is about .06% of the acceleration of a dropped rock here on Earth.

When we look at the universe , we do not have an accurate energy balance. The idea of no preferred reference or center of the universe tells us that. We know the Conservation of energy applies, but we don't have a hard starting number.

We actually have a starting number for energy, which is zero. Gravitaional potential energy is negative, and it seems to exactly cancel out the positive energy. Total momentum also seems to be zero from any viewpoint or frame, which is unintuitive, but it follows from the universe being infinite, to which any finite adjustment for frame is meaningless.

Eternalism does not deny that the human subject experiences the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since there is no passing of time, the eternalist denies that it is what is experienced. So closer to say that humans interpret their experience as the passage of time.

It just does not provide an explanation for this experience.

Natural physics explains this, not metaphysics. Biological creatures naturally interpret their experience as the passage of time, else they'd not be fit. The rational part might realize otherwise (as Einstein did).

So yes, I am serious. The interpretation is a metaphysical difference only, and has no implications for empirical experience. The experience in both views must be the same.

It is the capacity to understand and to describe time which matters, not the name.

Yes, and the above post makes me question that capacity. I'm not telling you that your interpretation is wrong, but you seem to think the alternate interpretation (if it were the case) would result in a different experience, and that points to a lack of capacity to understand, and to distinguish physics from metaphysics.

Let me expand on this to make my point. We start with these two references; train and landscape. I place a person in each reference. Before the experiment begins, I place each person in a seal container so they can't see or feel what I am about to do. — wellwisher

Newton's laws are enough for the acceleration concepts you are describing. Relativity doesn't seem to come into play at all. You are about to accelerate the train observer. He'll notice that from inside a box. It is a local effect.

I use 1000 gallons of diesel fuel to propel the train. This fuel defines our two reference system energy balance. Lastly, I let each person out of their sealed container and tell each to do an energy balance from the POV of their relative reference.

As I said, the kinetic energy observed (of everything except the train) was always the same from that post-acceleration inertial reference frame (IRF). An accelerated person is the thing that changed, and the thing that gained or lost kinetic energy in one IRF or another. The fuel represents entropy. It could be done with a hill without change of entropy.

The person who thinks the landscape is in relative motion will assume more energy was added than was in reality.

No. He detects the acceleration and knows it is himself that is now in a different IRF, one where the landscape was always moving. You can make him not know that (by sleeping say), but that just forces him to forget a knowable objective fact: that he is the thing that accelerated. There is no symmetry going on here.

It will take more than 1000 gallons of diesel fuel to move that mountain. He will add imaginary energy due to assuming reference is relative and no reference is preferred. The experiment was designed on an absolute hierarchy, since only the train gets the energy. The other is an illusion.

Well, momentum was transferred to the landscape per Newton's third law, in proportion to their relative masses. Momentum is conserved whether fuel or a hill is used to get things up to speed.

The part below is relevant to relativity, unlike the part above:

In the twin experiment, only the twin who was given motion, based on rocket fuel, shows permanent time dilation.

Due to acceleration, not due to motion (which is frame dependent, not absolute), and not due to fuel consumption, which can be avoided if different means are used like springs and trampolines and such. A frictionless clock pendulum ages slower than a stationary one, all without fuel consumption, and does so because it accelerates more than the non-swinging pendulum. To be precise, it is the moment of acceleration (acceleration times leverage distance) that determines the magnitude of the dilation. Two things can both accelerate equally but age differently if the moment is different.

I'm a metaphysician, and that's my business, to analyze metaphysical theories looking for strengths and weaknesses. — Metaphysician Undercover

So your username suggests.

You are saying that if time wasn't passing, we would still experience time in the exact same way that we do. Are you serious?

To be unaware of this view (or for that matter, the name of the view that you do hold) seems pretty inexcusable for someone who makes metaphysical interpretations (they're not theories) their business. Look up Eternalism. Spacetime is an eternalist model if you take it as metaphysical, which you seem to.

I was operating from SR at that point. In GR we don't have inertial frames, but there can be a preferred foliation, which serves the same function with respect to this conversation as an absolute frame that describes the correct order of events in the universe's history. — Mr Bee

Yes, agree.

The differences you describe appear to be purely conceptual. Under the 3D view, time dilation and length contraction is a real effect on moving objects whereas in the 4D view it arises from moving through space-time.

Yes, the differences are metaphysical, and the equations are not, so there is no need to perform them the difficult way like that unless you are computing metaphysical values for things like which point on Pluto is the center of the side that is objectively facing us right now, and even this is not computable without an unverifiable assumption that comoving foliation is the same foliation as 'the present'. The only evidence of that is that there seems to be only two choices available: That one or anything else.

Hmm, you have a reference for this? The best example that comes to mind is Galileo's proposed experiment which involved lanterns but not clocks.

That lantern thing was an early attempt, but yielded no results. They might have measured sound speed with such a setup, but the distances were too small for the limited precision of the timing methods.

The clock was the moons of Jupiter or Saturn, and the distance to that varied mostly from Earth moving back and forth every half year. You could see the eclipses down to almost the second, so it made a pretty good clock. Observations on the increased delay of those eclipses vs. distance yielded the first reasonably accurate light speed measurements. The difference could be over 15 minutes, well within the precision of the clocks of the day.

If we open the envelope and see £10 then we know that the other envelope contains either £5 or £20. By switching there's a 50% chance of losing £5 and a 50% chance of gaining £10. Switching seems like the better option. — Michael

Might as well just not even bother looking in the first envelope then, and pick the second one from the start. Looking at the contents seems not to affect this decision. This tells me it doesn't matter if you switch.

My solution is to switch only if the amount in the envelope is an odd number.

With the exception of the absolute frame measurements. — Mr Bee

Keep in mind that the absolute frame is not an inertial one, nor accelerated or anything else. All the things you can do with a frame are not valid even in this absolute non-frame.

Other than that, the rest will be distorted due to a certain degree and will have to be adjusted, but they will all find the speed of light to be constant.

I thought about it, and light speed is constant only in an absolute sense. Of course light speed is constant, just as is sound in a stationary medium. But if you are moving at 1/2c, delta real light speed in one direction is .5c, and it is 1.5c in the other. The subjective moving observer will not notice that since he's perhaps measuring round trip, not one direction.. So he puts a mirror 300000 km away (they have these), and it takes 0.666 real seconds one way and 2 seconds the other way, which is 2.66 seconds round trip. But his clock runs slow and the mirror appears to be 346000 km away, so it says 2.3 seconds have elapsed and hides the fact that light in one direction moved slower than the other way.
I probably screwed up the maths somewhere, but it was my shot at it. This is what I mean by more complicated to do it in 3D. In 4D, it is just 2.3 seconds for a 692000 round-trip with everything being stationary in its frame.

Interestingly, the first light speed measurements were done in one direction by putting a clock very far away and then syncing a local clock to our image of it as its light arrives here at (unknown at the time) lightspeed. Now you move that distant clock even further away and notice the amount that it gets out of sync. You move it closer again and it appears to catch back up. In this way, light speed was measured by dividing the increase in separation distance by the amount of time the two clocks appeared to get out of sync. No compensation for relativistic implications (all unknown at the time) of accelerating clocks, but good enough for the precision they were after.

I bring this up because it would again be an interesting exercise to express that one-way measurement in absolute terms.

Of course, if one assumes a preferred order of events, then every other order that people find in other reference frames will be considered false. — Mr Bee

And all measurements of time and distance are false as well only if you consider them to describe the 3D metaphysical interpretation.

But to my mind there is no difference in the scientific approach for someone who has different interpretations of relativity, which is what you seemed to have stated earlier. Like with QM, the equations remain the same regardless of your metaphysical views and the maths aren't any different.

That's right. The equations are scientific ones that describe what will be observed. The reality of the universe as 4D or 3D is a metaphysical difference with no empirical implications, so the equations describing empirical expectations need not change depending on your metaphysical view. The equations are not metaphysical.

The train thought experiments are a demonstration of the relativity of simultaneity, describing a situation where two or more observers have differing views on the ordering of events. The presentist version of this situation would certainly describe it differently, as it will take one or more of these observers as being incorrect in their assessments.

It is an interesting exercise to do just that. Assume that the train is the thing stationary, which helps one see past the bias that the platform is always the stationary thing. The platform observer detects the two events at once and is equidistant from the marks left by the events. Why is he wrong in concluding simultaneity?

To be clear, both the 3D and 4D interpretation use the same mathematical equations, so one approach mathematically isn't any more or less complex than the other. — Mr Bee

Well, those equations describe a 4D model, even if a 3D interpretation is assumed. To do it in 3D, each experiment must adjust for inaccuracies of measured mass, length and time since all these are dilated if one is moving. The train thought experiments assume a non-absolute definition of space, which is incorrect in the 3D model. Incorrect conclusions of event simultaneity are drawn.