This post has two components, one is an attempt to sketch the construction of a ridiculously inclusive mathematical object which serves as the background 'model of things' in the OP, and the other attempts to situate what an ontology is in relation to the ridiculously inclusive object. — fdrake

Pretty much agree. That the universe is a mathematical structure (and is not merely modeled by one) is not new. The latter half seems to be what I've been exploring, and one which I have not necessarily seen litterature, let alone even a name for the stance.

If you take any particular, there will be various different types of relation that apply to it. Every event can be related to any other event through the relations of antecedence and subsequence - occurred before and after interpreted as an ordering relation. Each proposition can be related to every other proposition through the relation of consistency partitioning arbitrary well formed logical formulae into consistent and inconsistent models. I think it's reasonable to posit that every particular can be related to every other particular in some way, and all relations can be related (and so on).

Good so far, but the particulars you speak of here are components of the structure. The structure itself seems to be neither a particular nor a universal. Earth exists as a particular within my simplified uni-world QM model. It exists in relation to the structure, although not completely. It has no absolute coordinates for instance, only relative coordinates, and for that reason it is arguably a universal of sorts. I probably digress from where you're going with this.

Imagine that we have access to the set of all particulars and every n-ary (generalised) relation between them (a construction similar to this but allowing 2-morphisms to map to 1-morphisms and introducing such 'cross' relations of arbitrary order and scope). This collection is a mathematical abstraction, but let's say that all of its elements are as real as any other, and every concrete particular and every relation between concrete particulars and abstract particulars (including all higher n-ary relations thereof) is contained within it. This is essentially the universe as considered in the OP. It's a jumble of everything in the broadest possible (or at least ridiculously broad) mathematised sense of a jumble of everything. Unsurprisingly that kind of object is not well understood.

I think I followed that, even if I could not have written it.

Examples of elements in the jumble to remove the jargon - rocks are in it, the relationship between rocks and hills as 'currently rolling down' are in it, the relation between 'currently rolling down' and every possible physics-based description are in it, the individual rock's relation to every physics-based descriptions are in it, the rock's relationship to the mathematical abstraction of a group are in it.

OK. I have only an objective description of the mathematical abstraction, so the B-series wording seems more appropriate. "The rock is rolling down the hill at time X" is better than the use of 'currently' which carries implications of time not being part of the abstraction, but something within which the abstraction exists. The whole idea is that the fundamental abstraction doesn't exist in any deeper abstraction.

The abstract relationships between groups and every possible pairing and sub-pairing between these abstractions and rocks are in it. Everything in it is considered as an object in the same sense. Is anything interesting gained by asserting the existence of the whole thing or denying it? Probably not, as Quine noted:

A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put in three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: ‘What is there?’ It can be answered, moreover, in a word—‘Everything’—and everyone will accept this answer as true. However, this is merely to say that there is what there is. There remains room for disagreement over cases; and so the issue has stayed alive down the centuries.

OK, "Everything" is just a tautology then. Of course. But what if that list is empty, and there isn't even a list? So poorly answered. Mine was simply that it makes no difference, at least not to the relations.

...

Unfortunately, the task of ontology is not to decide whether the giant jumble object exists or does not exist, it is to filter what obtains (questions of relation) and how/why it does so. In this formal sense a question of whether something exists in any sense is really only answerable to the sense in which it operates - Pegasus and a stick operate differently, who cares what we call existent and not, the operational difference suffices.

I didn't quote your entire post, but it doesn't sound like you're trying to disagree with this view, but attempting to formalize it and see where it fits into works done by several others.

Ontology neither begins nor ends with a decision on what exists, it concerns itself with the hows and whys of those things. So when you say 'it doesn't matter whether it exists or it doesn't' - you're missing the sense of why in question. Even if it doesn't matter there's still a hell of a lot of work to do interpreting the thing.

This makes sense. I've had my ontology expressed as a version of existential quantification, but I'm not sure if that term applies to the sort of structures of which we might be a part. So there is still ontology, but it isn't able to be simplified to "what is there?".

I have returned. Can't be online all the time.

How we know what we know is epistemic (the starting point as Descartes showed), it must precede (in time) what we know, our ontology, but once we have decided on our ontological stance, then we can understand how it formed the conditions of our epistemology. — Cavacava

This sounds reasonable. Suppose I have decided on a relational stance on ontology. From that I am forming the conditions of our epistemology.

I think the assumption "there is nothing", would need to be supported, and this would be impossible to support. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would have perhaps worded it as "Not anything is", and I'm not asserting it, but just asserting the viability of it.

All the evidence indicates that there is something, therefore "there is something" is a more sound premise than "there is nothing". And, "there is something" is the premise which supports the cosmological argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

But that evidence is based on only relations, so the premise of "there is something" is unfounded since the same empirical evidence is had in either interpretation.

There is of course something. There's you and I, and the world which we inhabit, and everything in it. This is known, at least in part, empirically. I can see people and other stuff. — Sapientia

Those are all relational observations. Subjective observation has zero access to absolute reality, else platonism would not be philosophy, but would be empirically verified one way or the other by noting if something like numbers actually exist.

If there was nothing, however, I wouldn't see people or other stuff or anything at all, because there would be nothing there to see. It would be impossible.

The nonexistent structure would still have those relations. There is something to see.

You can call it "bias", but it's what I know.

Isn't that what a bias is? You know it, but can't demonstrate it without presuming it. I've given examples of how structures have relations independent of their ontology. To assert that an abstract square does not have right angles unless instantiated seems to be just that, an assertion that is a different interpretation. Show why it is a contradiction of logic for the angles of an abstract square to be right angles, or why the analogy is invalid.

Ontologically, either you're a realist or an anti-realist.

So why not a 'real' Mind that emanates its 'real' ideations, being in essence not-two, as per Idealism? — snowleopard

'Realist', unqualified typically refers to the position that there is an existence independent of human mind. Anything else would need qualification, so idealism is 'realism of mind', and a theist is a realist of God, and a presentist is a realist of a preferred present.

What is "real", and is "reality" which must be for us, the same as the "real". — Cavacava

What is real for us is each other and the moon, but none of that is just 'reality' since that is not a relation, so they're not the same.

How we know what we know must precede what we know, even if what we know provides the conditions for how we know.

No?

Try to say it fast!. Kindly rephrase a bit. Got lost there. Sounds like an argument I might have expressed in opposition to idealism.

This Leibniz question of 'why is there something rather than nothing?' it seems can't be answered unless we first agree on what precisely is meant by the terms 'nothing' and 'something.' As for the idea of 'nothing', the very act of giving it a name -- i.e. a 'mathematical structure' -- seems to render it as 'something', in an abstract sort of way. — snowleopard

Well, it has a name relative to me, but it isn't a mathematical structure. Nothing is the lack of anything. There is no thing that has objective existence, not even the fact of there not being anything. Not only is the set of things that exist an empty set, but that set itself doesn't exist.

And talking about it at all implies some 'state' that can think and talk about it, therefore denying its nothingness. In a sense the question could be reframed as: why is there something that can conceive of 'nothing vs something' as opposed to there not being anything that can conceive ... aka 'the hard problem' and hence the attempt to resolve it with Idealism, positing the primacy of Mind.

We are talking about it in the context of this current Earth state which part of the structure that is this universe. I've attempted to illustrate just above how that is not impossible just because the structure itself exists no more than does the square that nevertheless has relations.

Buddhism addresses this seeming paradox, or dilemma, with its revelation that emptiness, or formlessness, or no-'thingness', is not other than form, which seems to imply an ontological primitive that must account for both, but then is unwilling to apply a name to whatever that is, perhaps recognizing that language, being a subject/object modality, is inadequate to resolve the apparent duality.

What I'm getting at here in a very cursory sort of way, is elaborated upon in the following blog post, which is surely of relevance and interest here: The Inconsistency of Nothing. Subjective or Objective?

Will read the post, and hope it contains the sort of analysis that attempts to demonstrate the inconsistency for which I am seeking.

There is a difference, since you exist. — TimeLine

I exist in relation to my thoughts. "I exist" (in any absolute sense) does not follow from that. This is pretty straight-forward relativism, except it is ontology this time, a topic rarely covered. Usually it is about morals or aesthetics or something. But a relativist would say that just because it is not objectively wrong to do act X, it doesn't follow that it isn't wrong. I still bear responsibility for doing X in the context in which X is wrong. Similarly I exist in relation to my thoughts despite absence of absolute existence.

I am having trouble distinguishing this 'clear line' between epistemology and ontology vis-a-vis this mathematical structure and you would need to explain this further. The problem I am having is that mathematics is our way of interpreting the world and not that mathematics itself exists outside of us. It is a useful heuristic we created to translate the patterns of physics and nature using numbers. This physical reality exists independent of you and I, but for you to claim this physical reality is a mathematical structure imposes the very invention of describing the universe you seek to avoid and thus quasi-empirical, particularly since mathematics is limited in articulating all possible realities in a cohesive formal system. Is realism and constructivism mutually exclusive? I have my reservations with mathematical realism and you would need to do somewhat better, however alluring Tegmark or Plato are.

Tegmark did a pretty good job of demonstrating how our universe could be nothing more than such a mathematical structure. I think he then went a bit into Plato territory and presumed the existence of this structure. Not sure of this, since the structure itself is all that matters, and that doesn't change with ontology. A square still has 4 equal angles whether it has platonic existence or is just abstract.

Thank you all for responding to my thread.

So I noticed the question presumes there is something. What if there wasn’t? What empirical difference would that make? While difficult to get past the bias that there needs to be something, it turns out there is no difference.
— noAxioms

The fact that the question can be asked rules out the possibility of there not being simply nothing. There could be no empirical anything if there were not anything to begin with. And it turns out that in order for someone to be around to even ask this question relies on there long having been a causal sequence that seems inextricably interconnected with what exists now. — Wayfarer

You are presuming the very bias of which I spoke in my quote taken above. This view stands in opposition to that premise, so asserting it is just begging a different position. Demonstrate why it leads to contradiction, without at any point presuming this absolute realist premise.

Let us presume for simplicity a single-world deterministic interpretation of QM and a monist interpretation of mind. In that view, the universe is a 4D mathematical block structure, but not one requiring absolute existence. A person in that block is a worldline, and there is another worldline for an apple. The person worldline is a series of states, and a state has no experience. Thought is a process, and process is the difference between states. So the person-worldline in this structure would have the exact same experience in an existing structure as it would in the same structure without absolute existence. The structure is no different, only the ontology of it, and the experience depends only on the difference between states within the structure, not the ontology of the structure itself.

By "objective" here, do you mean "absolute"? — Andrew M

Absolute, sure. I mean as opposed to exists-in-relation-to, not as opposed to 'subjective'.

On your view, numbers seem to have an existence independent of matter (and mind) which would qualify as Platonic realism about universals.

Platonic realism says they have absolute or objective existence in a third realm of abstract things. The relativist view says they are real only to each other. This is independent of matter, sure. Something like the color red (universal) has existence under platonism, but is probably not independent of mind/matter since the 'red' is pretty meaningless outside that context. I explored platonism (lower case) for a while, but it is still a position of absolute reality.

"Ontologically, either you're a realist or an anti-realist. Either you accept facts are real independently of the "human mind" (realist), i.e. objective, or you accept that reality is only subjective (anti-realist)." [from Research Gate]

I agree that absolute/relative is a different axis to realist/anti-realist (objective/subjective). Einstein's theory of relativity is a realist theory, for example.

This view is not the objective/subjective axis either, so your initial comment is relevant. Absolute/relative is the axis in question here. Einstein's theory of relativity works on all sides of the objective/subjective axis, so it doesn't necessarily seem to be a realist theory. It is a relational theory, but not an ontological one. Time is relative to a reference frame, and there is no absolute time. Similarly, I am proposing that ontology is relative to something, but not anything in particular. It is not limited to being relative only to consciousness, but that is one valid thing to which the relation can be expressed. Idealism is a subset of relational ontology.

Technically, "Not (the apple is red)" or "not (Swamy crossed over the fence)"
Is there a difference? Probably if there is no apple. The Not (the apple is red) is true, but The apple is not red isn't really true since there is no apple to be not red.

This is a spin-off thread from a side discussion in Wayfarer’s thread on particle-wave duality.

I think I'd like to take this offline and start a new thread since it only has small bearing on Wayfarer's OP. The relational QM bit was very relevant, and is a good answer to the OP, but what I'm pushing here goes way beyond the confines of QM, and thus seems off-topic. I want relational everything.

Give me a day or two to frame it. — noAxioms

I'll leave the rest for now and we can pick it up in the new thread. — Andrew M

I guess it was far longer than a day or two, but I wanted to attempt some research first. I found some dubious leads. The Stanford entry on Relativism doesn’t really go into it. It’s mostly about relativism of morals, aesthetics, truth and such. There is section 4.2 concerning conceptual relativism, but it seems to be again a form of idealism on concepts, not necessarily mind.

I found a Q/A on the Research Gate site.
https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_are_the_terms_for_various_ontological_positions_Are_realism_and_relativism_ontological_positions_If_yes_what_do_they_mean

They ask the question you see there in the link. Most popular answer was this from Luca Igansi,
Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos:

We need to draw a clear line between ontology and epistemology. Ontology regards the existence of facts and objects, while epistemology regards whether we can know them or not, and if objectively or subjectively.

OK, I am on track with that one. We’re not talking epistemology.

Ontologically, either you're a realist or an anti-realist. Either you accept facts are real independently of the "human mind" (realist), i.e. objective, or you accept that reality is only subjective (anti-realist).

Here I must disagree, and this seems to be the point of my OP here. He says the only alternative to an objective reality is one relative to (or supervenes on) human mind. How very anthropocentric. Ontological relativism means relative to anything, but not supervening on that thing.

According to QM the moment one entangled particle is measured the other's orientation or measured properties are determined by the measurement of the other, instantaneously. — Ben St Clair

QM says nothing of the sort. QM simply predicts that the two measurements will correlate when compared at a later time.

Anyway, yes, relativity denies the arbitrary simultaneity and simply says that the ordering of the two measurement events (assuming both are measured) is ambiguous if the events are outside each other's light cone. Other experiments blatantly appear to 'change' the past based on a future decision, altering measurements taken unabiguously in the past of some decision event.

No, Platonic existence is abstract and immaterial. — Andrew M

Being abstract and immaterial is just a relation to our universe. To the number 7, the moon is abstract, as is 'red'.

Almost everything seems to be a relation. Redness seems to be a 3-way for instance. The banana and my avatar (particular objects) evoke the experience of yellow (the universal) to you and me (subjects). Take away the particulars and we'd not know of yellow. Take away the yellow universal, and I suppose it would not be platonism. Change the subject experiencer, and the truth of it goes away. The banana, but not the avatar evokes the experience of yellow to a squirrel, a being that actually senses the yellow wavelength. My avatar does not emit any yellow light. So the relation to a human is necessary.

I have a hard time coming up with an example of a property. A proton (not even a particular one) has X much rest-mass. That seems to be a property, relating possibly only to "in the physics of this bubble of spacetime".

The meaning of '2+2=4' derives from particulars — Andrew M

Seems not necessarily so. Our knowledge of the truth of it (an epistemological thing) stems from interaction with particulars, but I was after the truth of it, not our knowledge of the truth of it or what meaning 2+2=4 has to us.

I realize that there are stances where sans-particulars, '7 is prime' is false. I might even agree, since insufficient relation is specified. Better is '7 is prime in the set of whole numbers'. The truth of it is now not objective, but only relative to something.


I think I'd like to take this offline and start a new thread since it only has small bearing on Wayfarer's OP. The relational QM bit was very relevant, and is a good answer to the OP, but what I'm pushing here goes way beyond the confines of QM, and thus seems off-topic. I want relational everything.

Give me a day or two to frame it.

I don’t really claim anything one way or the other on universals. I need to see how this fits in, since you seem to lean on the problem of universals as a counter-argument to my idea here. — noAxioms

I rescind this. The position does stake a claim here, that the universe is a universal, and that it does not have Platonic existence since that would be something concrete.

The Aristotelian position is that cases like '2+2=4' derive from concrete particulars, they don't have an independent existence. For example, there are two apples in the basket and I add two more. By generalizing from apples to any object and abstracting away physical constraints, we derive a formal rule for adding things without limit. — Andrew M

Then the position I am proposing is not compatible with the Aristotelian position. To frame what I am proposing in such terms is to say that our universe is a (non-Platonic) universal with no necessary particulars. For it to be a particular, said particular would need to be in (relative-to) some container universe which again would be a universal at its foundations.
As for the apples, I don't see how 2+2=4 would necessarily not be the case just because there are no apples (or any other concrete particular) to instantiate the relationship.

This is an empirical account of mathematics that doesn't require positing a Platonic existence for abstract mathematical entities.

I am absolutely not proposing Platonic existence for what I see to be universals.

As an example, I see two apples on the table but I don't see the number two. The apples are concrete particulars, the number two is an abstract quantity. — Andrew M

Because you share the same structure as the apples, and not with the number two. It is abstract to you (and you to it), a weaker or at least different relation than the one you have with the apples.

I agree that the universe doesn't need an observer. But given that we are observing it, it follows that it is concrete (since we can't observe universals). Just as the apples must be concrete in order to observe them.

You’d observe them the same if they were not concrete. The exact same relations would exist, just between two things (observer/apple) in the same structure that happens to not be concrete. If the empirical experience is different because of this, the relations would be different, meaning it was not the same structure. I’m assuming a closed structure here, but I think no more.

Now your claim seems to be that that is just us humans talking about the universe in our human way - the universe could really be something else in itself. But my argument is that abstractions (and representations) have an essential logical dependency on concrete particulars in our language use. So we can't then just posit something as being purely abstract (which we never observe) and expect that to be a meaningful statement.

I observe it, being part of it. Indeed, I could not observe it from outside, lacking a particular ‘it’ to observe. It could be simulated, but then it is the simulation being observed, not the structure itself.
Again, I reach for the simplest cases like 2+2=4, which has no particular, but the relation between 2+2 and 4 exists, particular or not. I can simulate (perform the addition) to observe this, but doing so is just for the benefit of the performer of the operation and has no effect on the truth of the relation.

I do disagree since, on my view, an uninstantiated (purely abstract) universe would be just nothing.

It would not be at all, which is different from being nothing.

But I do also agree that we are internal experiencers of the universe and that dualism is mistaken. While my specific arguments are the observation and coherency arguments above, generally speaking it's really just the philosophical question of the problem of universals.

I don’t really claim anything one way or the other on universals. I need to see how this fits in, since you seem to lean on the problem of universals as a counter-argument to my idea here.

"Bob cannot predict himself, even if he had this unobtainable state. It would require a mechanism to simulate itself faster than real time. Alice of course would just be waiting for Bob’s prediction, at which point Alice will choose the opposite thing. I can make a small mechanical device with only a couple parts that does that, and Bob will fail to predict its behavior. That doesn’t demonstrate that the device has free will, however you might define it."
— noAxioms

It doesn't. But I don't define free will as implying unpredictability (nor predictability as implying its absence), but as choosing what one wants. The point is that there is no outcome that Alice must accept if she doesn't want to. — Andrew M

I agree that your definition is enough to assign responsibility for one's actions. The average argument defines free will differently, but then incorrectly concludes that I should not be held responsible (on Earth) for my actions. "You shouldn't jail me, physics made me do it!". This is bunk. Physics will also toss your sorry posterior in the clink, and by the same argument, is not wrong for doing so.

So the question seems to break down into the nature of self (am I a soul or a physical construct?), and the thing which is holding you responsible for your actions. I think of three primary cases, and the definition of free will seems to apply differently to each of them, making it a mistake to apply one argument to all the cases.

Case 1: Physicalism: Your definition works fine here. Alice definitely can choose as she wills, and held responsible for her actions by physical society. Not completely. Alice wills to fly, and physics prevents that. Alice cannot be held responsible for failing to fly.
Free will is rarely defined your way. The argument typically points out that Alice's will is determined as well, being a causal effect of prior state, which makes it not free. I have no idea why it would be a bad thing for my will to be based on prior state. Example: Alice sees a person cross the road in front of her car. She's more responsible for her actions if she ignores that state? Physics says Alice sees the person and wills to hit the brakes because of that input, but a free willed person will base the decision on something other than the detection of a person crossing in front of her. This makes no sense. Why is that a better thing?

Case 2: Non-physical interactive soul: The analogy here is Tomb Raider. The player is the spirit soul, and Lara is the physical avatar. Lara is not responsible for her mistakes, you are. You are punished (in the spirit realm) for screwing up by not finishing the game.
The soul is not part of the physical system, and can be held responsible by some similar non-physical entity, typically a deity. Most proponents of free will assume biases for case 2, but fail to understand that the logic only applies to case 2.
Alice (spirit soul) again can do what she wants since her soul is supposedly in charge. It means that physics must must include a mechanism for introduction of external change, else the actions of Alice's physical person do indeed come from physics, fully determined or not. I agree, determinism or predictability is irrelevant. It just makes the analysis easier, but doesn't change the answer.
Absurdly, the physical Alice in the case 2 scenario is considered to be free willed precisely because she's not able to choose for herself, but lets her actions be determined via remote control. "You can't jail me you honor, my soul made me do it!".

Case 3: Epiphenomenal soul: This one is dualism with no violation of physics. The analogy this time is Harry Potter being held responsible for wandering the grounds after hours. You are the spirit soul experiencing Harry. Harry can be held responsible by Snape, who is also part of the physics, but you the epiphenomenal experiencer cannot be held responsible for Harry's actions either by Snape nor by your society since you lack the ability to choose. Again, I like your definition. The viewer and Harry are two separate entities, not one with a agent/avatar relationship.

- - -

I may comment on the free will thing separately. Doesn’t belong in this post.
— noAxioms

I disagree. How one views free will is a reflection on how one views the passing of time. And that is central to this issue. — Metaphysician Undercover

That post was not about the passage of time. Neither is this one, but I agree that interpretation of time is relevant to the issue.

The point I wanted to discuss is that IF our universe is such a structure, it need not be instantiated in some larger context to explain empirical experience.
— noAxioms

I agree that it doesn't need to be instantiated in some larger context (since there may be no larger context), but I would argue that it still needs to be concrete, not merely abstract. — Andrew M

Being concrete would be an objective context, the larger context of all things that actually exist, not in relation to anything. I guess I’m trying to argue against your point, that concreteness is necessary.
What do you mean by ‘abstract’? Just not-concrete? The word has connotations of being a mental construct (thought or idea), which is not the direction I’m going. Our universe is not necessarily conceived of by something not part of the structure.

I'd like to highlight this part of Tegmark's (shorter) explanation of the MUH:

“Before discussing whether the mathematical universe hypothesis is correct, however, there is a more urgent question: what does it actually mean? To understand this, it helps to distinguish between two ways of viewing our external physical reality. One is the outside overview of a physicist studying its mathematical structure, like a bird surveying a landscape from high above; the other is the inside view of an observer living in the world described by the structure, like a frog living in the landscape surveyed by the bird.”
— Shut up and calculate - Max Tegmark

So I don't agree that there is a bird's eye view of the universe (i.e., a view from nowhere). We never directly observe numbers or mathematical structures, only concrete things that we can then describe in abstract terms.

Agree. Tegmark is speaking of an objective description of the universe, not a relational one. There is indeed no nowhere from which there is such a view. I find his bird analogy a poor one, since it is only panning back to a larger picture, but not one from outside. Telescopes and microscopes are both still subjective views.

One can consider the universe in objective terms, but it is not an actual ‘view’. At best, the structure can be simulated, and the simulation viewed. The simulation serves no purpose to the thing simulated. It only serves a purpose to the runner of the simulation, allowing examination. The fact that it does not server a purpose to the structure simulated is a primary motivation for realization that the structure being concrete is not a requirement.

Mathematical equations ultimately derive their meaning from those concrete things, they aren't dispensable "human baggage". So a complete mathematical description of the universe would need to be in human-observer terms (i.e., a view from somewhere).

The meaning might be indispensible human baggage, but the structure itself (not necessarily any ‘equation’ that describes it to an observer for whom it means something) seems not to require said observer. OK, ours comes with humans built in, so it seems to be a structure that finds meaning in itself, but that’s an internal relation, not ontology.

We seem to just be asserting opposite views. I don’t see either of us making good justification of our positions. Doing my best. I don’t claim that there is no ontology, just that it is not necessary. To me, that seems to put at least some burden on you to show (not just assert) that it is necessary. The humans in the uninstantiated universe would have the exact same observations and thoughts as the humans in the instantiated universe. Do you disagree? It seems to assume that humans are part of said universe, and not external experiencers of it, so kind of discarding dualist biases, which is hard to do.

The idea that there are pure abstractions or a view from nowhere seem to be claims without an empirical basis.

Not claiming this, so agree. From nowhere, there is no view at all.


I may comment on the free will thing separately. Doesn’t belong in this post.

We seem to be going down an irrelevant tangent.

And if both a line and a number (a point on the line?) can be a universe, does that mean that there are universes within universes? — Andrew M

I think the use of the word 'universe' is about as much loaded human baggage as the term 'physical'. The (our) universe could be a mathematical structure, but to call any mathematical structure a universe is to load it with meaning unintended.
The point I wanted to discuss is that IF our universe is such a structure, it need not be instantiated in some larger context to explain empirical experience. It needs to be instantiated in said larger context only in order for something in that larger context to examine it. I've given examples.

Yes, I was meaning the equation for a line. In this case, would the line have an infinite number of points or would it be discrete? — Andrew M

x=1 then means that for any x, the value is 1. So x can be a continuous line, an infinite series like the integers, or maybe a finite segment, discreet or not. It works for all of them. They’re all valid mathematical structures, and thus can be designated as a universe if you like.

And if both a line and a number (a point on the line?) can be a universe, does that mean that there are universes within universes?

There can be, sure. Our universe might be defined as our own chunk of spacetime as we know it, but inflation theory says that we are but one bubble condensed from inflation stuff, each of which is a non-interacting universe on its own, some as trivial as x=1. That bubble-space might be considered to be a larger universe that contains ours. In that view, our bubble is not a universe, just a bubble among others in this container.

My main objection is that you seem to be making a distinction between things in a universe, which are physical, and the universe itself which is not physical. But aren't the things in the universe themselves mathematical on your view? In which case, isn't the term "physical" merely human "baggage", to use Tegmark's term?

I like the term ‘human baggage’. I’m not calling contained objects ‘physical’, but in the example of CgoL, similarities can be drawn. In other ways, the similarity are thinner. CgoL has no concept of inertia or force for instance. Time has an arrow at the quantum level, not just at the entropy level.
Another mathematical structure example is the set of all valid chess states. This is a finite set (there is a maximum possible chess game of around 5000 moves), and there is time, entropy, and the possibility for the addition of dualism to the universe to allow ‘players’ which designate which of the states are real (in relation to the player) compared to the other states. But sans-player, the states as a universe unto itself is all equally real.

I think it's worth considering something like Rovelli's (and Bitbol's) relational approach here. Bob may be able to secretly predict the outcome of Alice's choice with certainty, per Bob's deterministic theory. But there is no specific outcome that Alice should regard as certain, since she can always reject that outcome and choose differently. — Andrew M

Wanted to comment on this. Where is Bob in relation to Alice? If outside (non-interacting) with closed Alice system, and if hard single-outcome determinism is true and Bob has access to full state and the resources to make the prediction, then yes, Alice, in the deterministic contained system, can be perfectly predicted and has no ‘predicted outcome’ to reject. Bob cannot divulge the prediction to Alice as that would be interacting, making the system not closed.

OK, so if Bob is within the closed system, there are several reasons, determinism or not, that he cannot make such a prediction. 1: State cannot be known, per Heisenberg uncertainty. 2: Bob cannot predict himself, even if he had this unobtainable state. It would require a mechanism to simulate itself faster than real time. Alice of course would just be waiting for Bob’s prediction, at which point Alice will choose the opposite thing. I can make a small mechanical device with only a couple parts that does that, and Bob will fail to predict its behavior. That doesn’t demonstrate that the device has free will, however you might define it.

Sorry! What I was actually drawing attention to in that quote was that observer O' measures particle S with spin-down. But, earlier, observer O had measured particle S with spin-up.

In quantum mechanics, subsequent spin measurements of a particle in the same basis give the same result. So there would seem to be a paradox here, since (in realist terms) the measurements by observer's O and O' contradict each other.

But, per RQM, no comparison can be made until observer's O and O' physically interact and compare results. And when they do, they will find their two spin measurements are in agreement, just as quantum mechanics predicts! So there is no paradox in relational terms.

That should seem a bit fishy. Is there any possible mechanism by which that agreement could come about without bringing in many physical worlds? — Andrew M

There are two states in superposition (in relation to O''). That superposition has always been many worlds. The photon takes both paths and then interferes with itself. The cat is both dead and alive, and does not interfere with itself. The latter macroscopic picture is closer to many-worlds than is the one where interference is still likely.

- - -

Looking for inconsistencies in the view. I really like the view since it removes the need for instantiation, which always seems rationalized, and not actually rational, when I see it explained for other views. Cosmological argument for God is such an example.
— noAxioms

OK, I'll take up the challenge. :-) Are the physical things in the universe also merely formal? Or does your ontology have two kinds of things - the formal structures (the universes) and substantial (physical) things in the universes? — Andrew M

Well, I'd have to say two kinds of ontology: The structures themselves, which have no ontology, and the things in it (galaxies, cups, photons, gliders) which have a relationship to the structure as a whole. That relation is 'is a member of' as best I can articulate it, and is effectively as close as you're going to get to ontology. So 5 exists in the set of integers because it is a member of that set.
This here glider exists in some CGoL block, having perhaps finite duration. It seems appropriate to use 'physical' to describe that since it has analogies to our universe. But other cellular automata don't really have objects or sub-structures like that, and it becomes less appropriate to use the term 'physical' to describe states or movements of 'objects'. At least it is a temporal structure. The universe of the Mandelbrot set has an obvious 'physical' object in it, but it isn't temporal. So is it appropriate to use that term then?

Also is the equation "x = 1" a universe? How about just individual numbers, like the number 1? Or 0?

I think they can be trivial universes on their own. Does x=1 mean anything that just '1' doesn't? What is '1' if the set has no other members? The universes are so trivial that there seems to be no way to have any relations except the identity relation. The universe have no requirement to have meaning, lacking something external to give it that. But we're considering them here, so in the context of this discussion, '1' should have meaning to us I think. Don't think I was out of line to ask it.

Thanks for the replies.

Which is to say, multiple measured outcomes can occur, but this can't be coherently expressed in relational terms since no interactions between the worlds occur. That is, in relational language, the other worlds are not real for observers in this world and neither is our world real to them. — Andrew M

Wow, a lot of context is missing here. Had to go back to the wiki entry to figure out the scenario being described. O' is observing system O and S. One could say that O is the cat, and O' is the guy outside the (initially closed) box.

As you quote, no paradox was described in the scenario when the question is correctly framed. A full description of the interaction between O and O' (with all worlds in superposition) can always be expressed by some outside O'' so long as interaction with O'' does not take place.

OK. So to clarify, you're saying that CGOL (as a formal and non-instantiated structure) nonetheless has its own internal physics. And from inside the structure, gliders are physical but, from their frame of reference, their universe is formal.

And similarly for us, birds, trees and human beings are physical. But our universe is formal. — Andrew M

Yes. Except I'm not sure about the necessity of the frame of reference. Both universes are formal structures from either frame of reference, but each is its own local reality. So CGol structure is not part of my personal reality, and our universe is not part of theirs. Each is not real to the other, but there is no objective (instantiated) reality to any of them.

Looking for inconsistencies in the view. I really like the view since it removes the need for instantiation, which always seems rationalized, and not actually rational, when I see it explained for other views. Cosmological argument for God is such an example.

It would seem so, but I'm not really sure. Per RQM, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily for an external non-interacting observer (i.e., the superposition is maintained) while at the same time the quantum state reduces to a single definite outcome for the interacting observer (where that outcome is undefined, not merely unknown, for the non-interacting observer). — Andrew M

While at the same time, but not in relation to the same things, so the they cannot be compared like that. To the noninteracting observer (the guy outside the box), no observation has been make and the odds of the outcome of the eventual measurement is still 1. In relation to the more local observation (the geiger counter and the cat it didn't kill), there is only one outcome, not both. RQM seems to never allow multiple outcomes.

Conway game of life is such a structure. Not a physical thing, just formal construct. It does however have physical things in it, with particles that zoom around at varying speeds with casual laws, etc.
— noAxioms

If Conway's Game of Life is instantiated on a computer, then gliders and the like emerge. But without that instantiation, it's just a formal construct where nothing happens at all.

I must disagree. This lack of need for instantiation is critical to the view that the universe is such a structure.
The CGoL needs instantiation (via simulation by us on a computer for instance) only for us (not part of it) to view the structure. But the structure is unaltered by said instantiation. Time is built into the structure (I'm picturing 2d space and a third time dimension, an eternal view), just like it is in this universe. An eternal view is necessary since we are not part of the CGoL and the block has no 'current state' from our point of view. The simulation might, but not the structure itself.
I would agree that instantiation of sorts would be needed to define a 'present', something external that moves that present along. Presentism doesn't fit well with the view, nor does dualism, both involving things external to the structure.

So the ontology of the structure need not exist for the physics of the thing to be there. The gliders and such exist as 'physical' parts of that universe. If the structure was sufficiently complex, thinking beings could be part of it, that deduce the nature of their world and contemplate their ontology. But the instantiation of the structure is unnecessary for any of these thinking-relationships to be part of it, just as surely as 3+5=8 does not require numbers to have Platonic existence in order to be true.

Actually Copenhagen takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function and so denies there is ever more than one photon. — Andrew M

How does Copenhagen describe the cat in the box then? The cat is in superposition, both dead and alive, despite the measurement being taken from the cat POV. I realize that is a relational description, but I've known no other even before I knew the name for it.

Defining reality as a relation only shifts the basic claim. The claim now is whether there is one measured outcome or whether there is a measured outcome for each relative state. Copenhagen and Bohm (and most other interpretations) deny the latter, contrary to MWI.

Relational also denies the latter it seems. The other outcomes don't exist in relation to any observation.

If the physical universe is a mathematical structure, and humans are part of it, and not something separate from it but interacting, then humans are 'in' the structure, just like my engine is in my car. How is that a category mistake?
— noAxioms

A mathematical structure is a formal construct not a physical thing.

Agree. If the universe is a mathematical structure, then yes, it is not a physical thing. Doesn't seem to be one even if not. It contains physical things, but that's just how this structure works.

The analogy is saying that your engine is in an equation.

No, the car is, and it is a bad analogy because a car is thought of as a physical thing in a world of other things. The universe is not such an object.

Conway game of life is such a structure. Not a physical thing, just formal construct. It does however have physical things in it, with particles that zoom around at varying speeds with casual laws, etc.

Everyone has been pointing to the paper on relational quantum mechanics, which I read from the Stamford entry.

[Rovelli] also has co-written with Federico Laudisa the entry on Relational Quantum Mechanics in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. — Pierre-Normand

While I actually agree with the paper, it seems to relate measurement event outcomes to observers, and not the more general case of relating is-real as opposed to property of is-real. So to illustrate, take something not part of quantum mechanics: 5 exists in the set of integers (existential quantification). That's a relation, not an ontological assertion. Do the integers exist? Two ways to answer: Existential: Sure, they exist in the set of rational numbers for instance. Ontological: The have (or do not have) platonic reality. I find that a meaningless distinction, lacking a relation. They exist to or in something, but that just defers the ontological question to the something, adding another turtle to the pile. There seems to be no need for there to be a bottom turtle (an objective set of all things that actually are).

As for relational quantum mechanics, they point out something I've always noticed: There is a quantum measurement that triggers the poison release that kills Schrodinger's cat. Surely the cat counts as having measured the sample. If not, put Schrodinger's underpaid lab assistant in the box. The wave function of the measurement collapses to the observer in the box, but not to the observer outside. Doesn't copenhagen interpretation (and any of the others) already say that? And there's always a larger box, so the outside observer peeks in and sees both a dead and live lab assistant. In what way does copenhagen interpretation allow for the cat to be both dead and alive without asserting that it does not count as a measurement?

Hi, I need a clarification. Do you think that our experience is totally illusory? — boundless

No, not at all. I perceive the cup. It is as real as I am probably. If it were an illusion, it would have a different reality-status from me. Can't rule that out, but not where I'm investigating. Just saying that it is a real part of this world in which I'm also a real part. It is a relation of reality to the world. If reality is related to my direct experience, then the cup is real only when experiencing it, and not otherwise. That's idealism of sorts, but still no illusion. The view is not in conflict with the former, just a relation to a different definition of reality. None of it requires objective (relation-independent) ontology. I guess there is still ontology, but only as a relation.

Mmm, do you follow Rovelli's interpretation? — boundless

Have to look it up.
Meta pointed me to MDR (model dependent reality), which I had not seen either. I find no references to Rovelli in it. His work is more on the QM level than just, um..., I guess macroscopic metaphysics.

I'm sometimes pretty slow to respond. Plenty of new things to read are being suggested.

So you assume that 12 and 6 exist. You don't think that this presupposes an ontology? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't think 6 needs to have platonic reality for 12 to be even.

If you can't say what you mean by "6 exists", then how are you using that word "exists"?

I think the term is 'existential quantification'.

Do you recognize that "a relation" requires things which are related? When you say that reality is a relation, don't you think that the things which are related are at least as real as the relation itself? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes to both questions. The reality of both things is probably the same.

Instead, ask why there is what there is, rather than something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are biases in the asking of this. I wanted to get below that. So wrong question.

If it is a description, it relies on an ontology, because the description must claim to describe something. Maybe you're just trying to deny that your description relies on an ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I think I'm denying that. I can describe the even numbers without the necessity of them having an ontology. 12 is even regardless of whether numbers have some sort of Platonic existence. It is even because there exists some other integer (6) that yields 12 when added to itself. That is the sort of existence that we require if the universe is a mathematical structure.

As for MDR (which does not assert this mathematical reality), that is another view that makes reality a relation, not an objective state, known or not. A thing is real to something else. I think perhaps the view denies an objective correct answer as to which model is in fact correct, be it proposed somewhere or not.

I'm, not questioning your view — Metaphysician Undercover

I am. I don't really hold to a specific view. I'm just exploring in this area lately, and looking for inconsistencies.

The quest comes from all the unsatisfactory answers typically offered for the "Why is there something, not nothing?" question. Taking a step back and noticing the biases in the asking of that question sheds a lot of light on a suggested solution.

Unitary QM does. If a quantum state describes a photon being emitted towards a 50/50 beam splitter then, per the Schrodinger equation, this initial quantum state evolves into a superposition of two quantum states with one state describing a transmitted photon and the other state describing a reflected photon.

Other interpretations provide different accounts because they alter or add to unitary QM in some way (e.g., adding collapse). — Andrew M

Wait, how is a collapse-interpretation not unitary? Unitary seems to mean that probabilities of various outcomes of measurements add up to 1. There are apparently some interpretations where this is not so, but I'm not very familiar with them. Granted, they all seem to describe superposition states.
I always wondered how they detect superposition of say macroscopic states. They put some object (a small bar just large enough to see unaided) into a superposition of vibrating and not. I didn't get from the article how they knew this state had been achieved.

There are either two photons emerging from the beam splitter in the scenario I described above (per unitary QM) or just one (per most other interpretations). Aren't they mutually exclusive claims?

The interpretations with which I am familiar say the photons are both there, in superposition, so long as they've not been measured. It is only after measurement where they differ. Mostly talking about collapse or not interpretations. Copenhagen is mutually exclusive with MWI only in its choice of reality against which the state is defined. If reality is a relation, this is no more contradictory than my location being both north-of and south-of something. Just different things.

OK, but the theory still has to be coherent. I think it's a category mistake to talk about "the human in the mathematical structure..." or to presume that humans and numbers have the same ontology.

If the physical universe is a mathematical structure, and humans are part of it, and not something separate from it but interacting, then humans are 'in' the structure, just like my engine is in my car. How is that a category mistake?

- - -

Demonstrate said impossibility please. In particular, which empirical observation would be different (rendering it a scientific falsification), or what inconsistency is there in the logic (rendering it a self-contradictory philosophical stance)?
— noAxioms

It's quite simple. Ontology puts forward the fundamental principles by which we understand reality, it determines how we distinguish true from false [...] because one's ontology (world view) determines how one describes what is observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly I do not take this assertion as a given. I just said that my description relies not a bit on the ontology of the situation. I do have a description, having just described it.
I think you don't understand the view, in the same way you claim eternalism is false because the empirical experience would be different.

Since doing away with ontology renders this as an impossibility, it is an unacceptable proposal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Demonstrate said impossibility please. In particular, which empirical observation would be different (rendering it a scientific falsification), or what inconsistency is there in the logic (rendering it a self-contradictory philosophical stance)?

No, the model is not the reality. Turns out we don't yet have an accurate model, so I can hardly claim that say the current standard model is our reality.

My proposal of reality being a relation (not actual ontology) is something like model dependent realism, except the realism claimed is more like existential quantification.

To quote fragments from the wiki header:

"Where several models overlap in describing a particular subject, multiple, equally valid, realities exist"
That use of 'exist' is open to interpretation, but I agree, the stance would seem to be contradictory if 'exist' means 'is objectively real'. If used as a relation as I propose, then yes, all of the models (if they are accurate ones) describe existing realities. Idealism even makes sense this way.

"[MDR] claims that it is meaningless to talk about the "true reality" of a model as we can never be absolutely certain of anything. "
This is just acknowledgement of epistemology. Few stances claim that absolute certainty can be known. But does MDR take a stance that despite the inability to know it, there might be (must be???) a true reality?

I will look at it more, and what Hawking has to say about it.

Had to jump in on this. Quoting some of Andrew M comments and boundless's replies to them.

Yes. So what I'm getting at is that a notion of res potentia (i.e., a dualistic substance) does not arise in the Schrodinger equation. As far as the Schrodinger equation is concerned, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily regardless of observed measurement outcomes, with each state equally physical. — Andrew M

I don't disagree, but this is already stepping into interpretation territory. QM doesn't say what the states actually do.

Ok, with this I agree. In fact the problem arises with the interpretation of the Schroedinger equation. If you accept it as the "reality", then of course all branches are as real as ours. However, if we accept from the beginning that the wave-function is epistemic and not ontic, then the relation between "potential" and "actual" becomes much more relavant. — boundless

Epistemic, not ontic, yes. I find that ontic makes no difference to anything, and ontology itself is perhaps a relation and nothing more than that. It is meaningless to say something exists. It always exists in relation to something else, and there is perhaps no objective base to act as a foundation for relation-independent ontology. This is just a proposal of mine, not an assertion, but it does away with a whole lot of problems.

Neither the Schroedinger equation necessarily motivates one to take the wave-function as "the reality" (except maybe in the "Platonic" realm, if it exists). I admit that "simplicity" is a respectable motivation, but personally I do not see it as a compelling one. IMO QM, among many other things, suggest us that the "model" is not necessarily a "picture" of reality. And to me saying that reality reduces to "one wavefunction which never collapses" seems too reductionist. As I said, it seems a subjective issue. Of course this is not an argument. But IMO "simplicity" is not an argument for the same reasons. :smile:

They can both be correct. The wave function in its simplest form exists in relation to the whole structure of the Schroedinger equation for any closed system, but it exists in collapsed form for any isolated quantum state such as the point of view a human subjective view. These are just different relations, not mutually exclusive interpretations, at least one of which is necessarily wrong.

Not necessarily. MUH is an example of Platonic realism about universals. In his paper, Tegmark says:

Stephen Hawking famously asked "what is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?" In the context of the MUH, there is thus no breathing required, since the point is not that a mathematical structure describes a universe, but that it is a universe. — Max Tegmark - The Mathematical Universe

Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. The human in the mathematical structure will behave identically, asking the same questions about the same experience, whether or not there is some ontological status to the structure itself. That designation does not in any way alter the structure.

In a way I find myself to be a reverse Platonist. I believed numbers to be real for a while, but now I favor a view that ontic structural realism, where yes, we perhaps share the same ontology as those numbers, not that the numbers must exist, but that the existence of our universe is required much in the same way that numbers don't need it. OSR says we're made of the same stuff, so it presumes the two have the same ontology, but it doesn't presume that shared status must be some kind of objective existence.

Still, the physical duration of processes seem to me not to be perspectival in any one of the two senses distinguished above (i.e. "frame-perspectical" or "agent-perspectival"). — Pierre-Normand

OK, I see that. I was meaning that a worldline (not just one light-cone-laden event along it) is a perspective as a whole, and a person (a localized process) thus has a perspective that includes the duration of that worldline. That's isn't one of the two ways you are using 'perspectival' in your post.

The author displays a parallel misunderstanding of the barn-pole paradox. — Pierre-Normand

I had to look that up, and the flaw in the criticism was trivial. The barn and pole are treated as simultaneous objects instead of events. Using the latter, there is no paradox.

This crude mistake also appears to have led Robbins to a rather confused conception of what it is that it might mean for a duration to be "ontologically real" rather than its being merely perspectival or relative to a reference frame. — Pierre-Normand

Here is perhaps the disconnect between what fdrake has been addressing and what I've been denying, which is the ontological status of duration, or of time. So I think some clarification is needed, because I think the wording you put here is the more standard one.
When people ask me if they think time is real, I don't know how to answer since I don't associate ontologly with my understanding. But apparently it is in contrast to 'prespectival', and no, I don't think it is real in that sense.

The way I have been using it is my sense of presentism, that there exist a subset of events that are in 'the present', that this 'the present' is a boundary between nonexistent past determined events (how could they be determined if they don't exist??), and future undetermined ones. This view seems more ontological to me (only present events are real, the rest are not), but it proposes zero falsification tests (if worded well), and thus is in no way refuted by any empirical theory like relativity or any other.
On the other hand is the assertion that humans experience of duration is unique in experiencing not physical processes like clocks or anything else physical, but of the advancement of this "ontologically real" present. This would elevate it to an empirical claim, and despite being untested, would seem to be complete nonsense. It means that in the twins experiment, the traveling twin at sufficiently high velocity would die (of suffocation perhaps) because his physical processes would occur faster or slower than he could consciously tend to them. The view also tends to put Earth at the center of the universe, but that is not necessary. I find any view that necessitates heliocentrism to be one equating the universe to be all about us.

Sure, logically possible. I ain't believing in it though. — fdrake

Your thread seems to have been trying to demonstrate that relativity renders presentism a contradiction. Sure, I don't believe it either, but I don't consider it to be a proven thing. I just try not to be in the habit of believing in things that add to a model without explaining any of it better.

Sorry, but the equations did not quote properly.

Because this is interesting, let's have some maths for it.

The quantity 'proper time' is invariant between inertial reference frames.

If dτ2>0 between two events occurring at t1 and t2, then the separation between the events is called time-like. This occurs, roughly, when the temporal separation between two events is greater than their spatial separation.

if we wanted to find a frame of reference in which t2 occurred before t1, reversing the inequality here, it would need squared average velocity which can't happen, since it would be higher than c2. So, if two events have a time-like separation, there does not exist an inertial frame which has their ordering reversed. — fdrake

I follow what you wrote and mostly agree. There doesn't exist a valid frame which covers t1 and t2, but Zog is moving (proper distance increasing) by over 4c, which is not a valid velocity, so hence I say Zog doesn't exist in our frame. But it exists in the universe as does its frame, so I hesitate to assert that this frame that is invalid for t1 is nonexistent. Just invalid for t1. Yes, t2 is ordered before t1, and in fact both predate the big bang. This is what happens when you consider an object or frame in the context of an event for which it is invalid.

Another consequence is that all events occur simultaneously for light. The orders can reverse for space like intervals - when dτ2 is negative.

It is meaningless (but not invalid) to reverse the order of simultaneous events. Either way they both happen at once.

Thus, two events can be said to be in causal contact if they are in time-like separation, but not in space-like separation.

Right. And any pair of events in causal contact can be said to be at the same point in space in some frame, and any pair outside causal contact can be said to be simultaneous events in some frames.

From the perspective of light, there is no duration. From other perspectives, there is duration.

Local spacetime collapses to a singularity at light speed. Not sure if it is valid to reference that as a 'perspective'. It is not a valid inertial frame.

A very distant observer moving in a particular way could see our history with some events in a different order. Why should the universe be seen from the perspective of a human, and not a photon or a distant observer (with space-like separation)?

Oooh.... Example please, because this seems totally implausible. What is 'our history'? Sure, if we colonize distant stars, event ordering starts getting ambiguous, but it doesn't take a distant observer to notice that. So presume our history is confined to this planet, and we're not just talking about milisecond differences that it takes for light to traverse the diameter of the planet. Sure, events on opposite sides of the planet within a milisecond of each other have frame dependent ordering, but again, it doesn't take a distant observer to notice that.

This is a fun way to smuggle in an objective ordering without justification. Why would it be contradictory for an event to happen before its cause as viewed from some reference frame? Contained within the series of cause and effect is the universal succession, only this time of equivalence classes of causes occurring before a given ordinate in the series. — fdrake

Had a hard time following this.
One property of relativity is that from any given event X, there is a fixed set of events in its direct past and future causal cones, and this set is frame independent. OK, the frame of Zog puts 2017 in my future, but I don't exist in that frame, so no contradiction.

Ok. What differentiates an objective ordering from one in obtaining in a reference frame in special relativity? — fdrake

It's an ontological assertion. Presentism posits not just a real ordering, but also a real boundary between past and future events. Just the objective ordering is not enough. Presentism adds a boundary that traverses the events in objective order.

SR make no ontological assertions. It just says that physics will be observed to work identically in any frame.

All reference frames have just as good a candidate for universal time. That is to say: they all suck for it. — fdrake

Yes they do. No inertial frame gets near covering the universe, so if there is an objective ordering, it cannot be an inertial frame. SR doesn't say that, but GR does.

Take planet Zog 60 BLY away. We don't exist in its frame and they don't exist in ours. Some other non-inertial ordering of events is needed to cover such places, and it need not even be smooth. Perhaps it advances only over there for a while and later on advances for us, making the the boundary a wobbly thing that makes uneven progress. So long as the boundary doesn't get so advanced one place that events happen before their causes, there's no contradiction. Light cones limit the maximum distortion of the boundary.

That there is a unique ordering of events with respect to time is something that is false because of the special theory of relativity. — fdrake

Totally agree. SR says physics is unchanged in all these different orderings. There is not a unique ordering of my children either. I could order them by height.

What stops the following from being inferred from special relativity: there is no objective ordering of events.

It doesn't follow. What follows is that if it existed, it would be undetectable. There is no premise of its nonexistence. I don't like its existence because it is a needless addition that explains nothing.

Reference frames can be attached to moving particles.

Yes, but any frame can be attached to any particle. It is moving in all but one of them. Yes, some object is typically used as a specification of a frame. There is almost no other way to do it. So we all know what we mean by "frame of the train platform" even though the platform exists just fine in the frame of the train. But I think it is sloppy to say clock C dilates relative to object R. It should more correctly say it dilates in the frame of object R, or even more anal, in the frame in which object R is at rest.

I agree that presentism doesn't imply SR. What I'm saying is that insofar as presentism claims that there is a unique objective ordering of events, it is contradicted by SR.

It says there is a unique objective ordering, not a unique ordering. None of the SR orderings are objective.

What stops the following from being inferred from special relativity: there is no unique objective ordering of events with respect to time. — fdrake

SR doesn't talk about objective orderings, so I don't see how the above can be inferred.

I don't see how these two things can be compatible:
(1) There is a unique order of events induced by the idea of the present in presentism.
(2) Events A and B can be ordered differently depending on the motion of a particle. — fdrake

The first speaks of objective ordering, and the latter means that the observer is free to order events differently, and physics will still work without detectable differences, rendering any potential objective ordering undetectable. The latter is about empirical observation, not about an interpretation of what actually is. And #2 should be "depending on the reference frame", not depending on particle motion. Motion.

I don't understand how you can say 'presentism is independent because it's metaphysics', when one of its implications is negated by how time works in SR.

Presentism doesn't comment about how time works in SR. Presentism was around well over a century ago, and SR was not in any way suggested by it. Not sure when the term was coined, since the interpretation is far older than the name needed to distinguish it from alternative interpretations.

You misrepresent what Everett proposes
— noAxioms

Well, perhaps the Wikipedia entry on the topic needs to be updated, because it begins:

The many-worlds interpretation is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that asserts the objective reality of the universal wavefunction and denies the actuality of wavefunction collapse. Many-worlds implies that all possible alternate histories and futures are real, each representing an actual "world" (or "universe"). In layman's terms, the hypothesis states there is a very large—perhaps infinite[2]—number of universes, and everything that could possibly have happened in our past, but did not, has occurred in the past of some other universe or universes.

The quantum-mechanical "Schrödinger's cat" theorem according to the many-worlds interpretation. In this interpretation, every event is a branch point; the cat is both alive and dead, even before the box is opened, but the "alive" and "dead" cats are in different branches of the universe, both of which are equally real, but which do not interact with each other.

So - this is all wrong? — Wayfarer

A lot of it is indeed misrepresented. The people updating the wiki perhaps have not actually read the thesis. The first half of the first sentence is a different wording of what I quoted, that closed systems evolved according to the Schrodinger's equation. The rest is implications of that one presise, not additional premises. Wave function collapse violates the premise, but is not explicitly stated. They put "universe" in quotes there, and that's OK, because they mean 'worlds', which most laymen take for 'planets' instead of the mathematical meaning. There is no implication of actual multiple universes. It is one wavefunction with multiple solutions.

Worlds do not have identity (there is no objective has-split or not state), so the cat being both dead and alive (in superposition) is a relation to something, not an objective state. So while still in the box, it is superposition from the point of view outside the box, but very much not in superposition from the cat point of view. From within the box, the live cat is in a different world from the dead one at all times, despite still being in superposition relative to the external point. Likewise, all worlds are just one universe in superposition from outside the closed system. There is never a new universe.

Not sure how copenhagen interprets the cat thing. Surely the cat observes the quantum event, and if that is denied, put the expendable lab assistant in there instead. Schrodinger's cat exercise has always been MWI of sorts it seems. They have had such boxes a long time, and recently have managed to put a macroscopic object in one, putting a thing visible to the unaided eye, in superposition. Never build a local one that can hold a cat. Trivial if non-local.