Sure. I thanked him. I'm reading some of the essays he pointed me toward as well.

Chalmers wrote back that he agreed with you. None of the lesser known philosophy people wrote me back. Yet.

I haven't looked at any of them. I'm a little worried that they'd just turn my stomach.

When were the old days? — Bitter Crank

Tom Brokaw? Am I wrong? Did he spin the news every night?

I'm the universe
& I'm ok
I'm me all night
& I'm I all day... — mcdoodle

:)

There's no way that reporter was not a self-identified liberal who's voting for Hillary. — Thorongil

Could be. I don't know. I watch streaming CBS. They have a reporter named Sanchez who is a Republican strategist. She reported that Clinton "obviously" was engaged in pay-for-play while Secretary of State. It wasn't marked out as a editorial, although there were several people talking to each other.

The news has opinion all mashed into it. I don't remember it being like that in the old days.

As mentioned, I started sending the question that troubled Pierre and I to professionals to get the low down. The answer from Scott Soames is below. The email was:

Paris is the capital of France.

Could this statement be necessarily true?

Viewpoint A: Yes. It depends on the intentions of the speaker. If the speaker means by "France" the actual France, then there is only one possible world that includes this object. Therefore, if the statement is true, it's necessarily true. If the speaker meant an object that is included in multiple possible worlds, then it would not be necessarily true.

Viewpoint B: No. When we speak of the "actual France" (with Paris as its capital) we aren't talking about a object numerically distinct from any "alternative France" (e.g. France with Toulouse as its capital). In all possible worlds where France exists, it is the same object having various determinations, which is just to say that we are considering the very same object (that we refer to in the actual world) having counterfactual determinations. Hence the speaker's intentions alluded to above seem irrelevant to the question. Secondly, this question of the necessity of the statement "Paris is the capital of France", as interpreted in English, is ambiguous since it appears to conjoin two distinct claims of de re necessity: (1) regarding France, that it has Paris as its capital necessarily, and (2) regarding Paris, that it be France's capital necessarily. Both claims seem prima facie false although a case could possibly be made for the second one being true if Paris had arisen historically as France's capital (and depending on one's ideas about city individuation.) — email

The criticism of viewpoint A given in viewpoint B is correct.

However, the question Is the sentence 'Paris is the capital of France' necessary? is not ambiguous -- provided we are asking about the necessity of the proposition that is the semantic content of the English sentence. Since the sentence isn't ambiguous, it has a single meaning or semantic content. Either that content is a necessary truth or it isn't. In fact it isn't.

Qualification: Sentences with proper names typically can be used by speakers to make different but related statements. That is, assertive utterances of the same unambiguous sentence can result in different propositions being asserted. This is not a matter of the linguistic meaning of the sentence, it is a matter of slightly different uses of the sentence. However, the slightly different uses imagined in viewpoint B are alike in expressing slightly different propositions, neither of which is necessary.

Finally, your query indicates that you need to think about how words like 'actual' and 'actually' work. Different theorists have different views. Mine is given in a paper titled "Actually." You can find a manuscript version of it on my website. The published version is most easily found in my Philosophical Essays, Volume 2. — Scott Soames

Many of those on the Alt-Right may be genuine racists, I have no doubt about that, but to cast the whole movement in such terms shows once again that the left is only capable of smears. — Thorongil

CBS is a mouth-piece of the left? I think it's just a content purveyor looking for a market. News is entertainment.

If not, then how would you draw a line from CBS to some leftist entity? I'm not saying you're wrong.. I'm just asking how you connect the dots.

Dennett is quoted as saying...

Philosophy in some quarters has become self-indulgent, clever play in a vacuum that’s not dealing of problems of any intrinsic interest. — jamalrob

Isn't Dennett an eliminative materialist? He thinks the self is fiction. So what is self-indulgence?

Because the media and politicians want you to be afraid. Very afraid! — Thorongil

You're saying the same thing Erik did... I think. That bringing up Alt-right is an attempt to spin the facts against Trump and toward Clinton.

One obviously needn't be a racist of xenophobe to feel bitterness towards the growing disparity in wealth and power between the absurdly wealthy and everyone else -- but of course no respectable white person wants to be accused of racism or xenophobia, so we distance ourselves from those uneducated dolts and whatever they stand for. By doing so, we prove our own sophistication and membership amongst our 'respectable' and progressive fellow citizens. Pretty straightforward but effective strategy. — Erik

A number of my friends are saying stuff along these lines. They think of Clinton as the face of the establishment... or a servant of it. Trump's suggestion that the US should back out of NATO is an attack on that establishment, which promotes US dominance in the world as some sort of quasi virtuous adventure when it really just provides the means for certain parties to engage in exploitation.

But what I see is that Trump actually does come across as either racist or stupid. The answer I get back is that that's because what I know about either candidate is influenced by a biased media.

I guess what I'm saying is that I see how the puzzle pieces fit together.. but I think that this organization must partly be accidental?

What it reminds me of is the way that there were no books about Karl Marx in the school library when I was a kid. Yes, this benefited the Kings of the Status Quo, but the USSR really was a gravely diseased state and it really did have an aggressive stance. If you look at the whole thing naturalistically, the world has just been a very rich and nutritious environment for a certain type of organism: Exploitative Americanus (direct descendant of Exploitative Britannica.) Some of the success of this genus is its own genius. Some of it is just amazingly good luck.

I don't know about "taken over." I does appear they're being accommodated.

Why would right-wing nationalism be rising around the world?

What was it about the 1893 panic and depression that disrupted progress toward racial harmony? — Bitter Crank

It gave white supremacists an opening. By that time frustration was deep-seated in the South. There was some pretty serious grinding poverty. During any depression the crime rate increases. The crime rate amongst black men went up in the 1890's. White supremacists combined concern over that increase with a fascist message. 'Stop feeling so badly about yourself. It's not your fault. It's what we've been telling you for years... it's black people." The white supremacist message is that white people are endangered by association with blacks.

The cure is to separate the races. That was primarily the point of Jim Crow. I used to know a lady whose mom remembered the change. She said it became dangerous to be seen in public with a black person. Definitely couldn't eat publicly with them and couldn't even share a carriage.

Whites who didn't conform received death threats. The point of lynching was to suppress and control the black population.

These expressions, the chromatic quality of race as well as our lack of comfort with difference in general are ingrained in who we are as a people. We can outlaw racial discrimination, but we cannot stop it. — Cavacava

People who appear to be able to hire a lawyer will be treated better by cops no matter what color they are.

To some extent, I think we're swinging to and fro on the dog's tail. The dog is a broken political system that allows too much economic disparity. People of any color who have money will find life pretty enjoyable in the USA.

Not that money is power. Knowing who you are.. that's power.

Very little was done to undo the racial rift until roughly a century after slavery ended. — Bitter Crank

I used to think that too. It's more complicated than that. Black people in the South were making progress entering into politics, starting businesses, accumulating wealth (it takes time to do that.. generations.) Blacks and whites were working side-by-side. They associated as friends.

That all came to an abrupt stop in the economic depression of 1890's. White supremacists rose to prominence and hired thugs called red-shirts (the KKK wasn't active at the time.) The thugs were used to stop blacks from voting by scaring the crap out of them. That was one method for taking over Southern governments. Another was to run standing governments out of town (as happened in Wilmington, NC. Black votership dropped from around 50-70% to 3% in the South.

Whites who protested (such as a professor at UNC) were threatened. The vibe was: you're either with us or you're against us.

But where was the National Guard when this was happening? Why didn't anybody in the rest of the US object?

1. They didn't know.
2. They knew, but they didn't know what to do about it.
3. They knew and they agreed with it.

You've qualified your view thus: "Any statement about actuality that is true is necessarily true."

I am not going to understand your position any better if you are unwilling to clarify it. There are no contingent facts, on your view, it would seem. The only contemporary philosopher I can think of who has endorsed a view that comes anything close to this is Timothy Williamson, but his thesis is restricted to the predicate of existence. He has argued that anything that actually exists exists necessarily. But things that exist can still have some of their properties contingently, on his view. — Pierre-Normand

Sometimes we look at things deterministically. Sometimes we don't. Modal logic can be used to examine both modes of experience and expression.

Have it your way then. "Determinism" in your sense is equivalent to necessitarianism, or to actualism in M. R. Arers's sense. It is a contentious metaphysical doctrine that I dont know any living analytic philosophers to be endorsing. I wonder what your ground might be for endorsing it, if it isn't the mistake in modal logic that I have highlighted. — Pierre-Normand

Yes. Determinism is an interesting viewpoint. No living analytic philosopher has proven determinism to be true or false.

And I'm pretty sure you misunderstand my position...

Determinism doesn't have the implication that whatever is actual is necessary. — Pierre-Normand

This is where your fascination with jargon is letting you down. Determinism is a concept that predates analytic philosophy. And yes.. it most certainly can be the thesis that every actuality happens necessarily.

Nope. It's deterministic.

If you notice, my view is deterministic. Any statement about actuality that is true is necessarily true. It's fun to think about how that works out in modal logic... for me, anyway.

it was scary.

Ok.

There are two problems. First, the "actual France" and some "alternative France" (as you might contemplate it in some possible world) are not distinct objects. — Pierre-Normand

I disagree. The actual France exists in a particular possible world.. the actual world.

(1) Necessarily, if I am thinking of France in circumstances where it has Paris as its capital, then in all those circumstances, France has Paris as its capital.

(2) If I am thinking of France in circumstances where it has Paris as its capital, then, France, as I am thinking about it, necessarily has Paris as its capital.

The first claim is a truism that fails to entail the second. The second claim is false since disregarding a possibility doesn't make it an impossibility, let alone an a posteriori impossibility. — Pierre-Normand

If I'm thinking of the actual France, it has Paris as its capital in all possible worlds where the actual France exists (which is exactly how many?)

And I learned aposteriori that the actual France has Paris as its capital.

Problem?

They aren't true by fiat — Pierre-Normand

Of coarse not. The speaker I mentioned doesn't know apriori what the capital of France is.

And the question being evaluated wouldn't be about what the capital of France is. It would be about something else.. like the possibility of Paris, France hosting the Olympics.

.

How about I write out my position and you add yours?

I wouldn't ask Scott Soames to read this thread.

I'll write it out and give it to you for approval. OK?

And if you have any philosophers you want on the list, just let me know where they work.

"... over a limited number ... as opposed to all possible worlds" would appear to contradict "...in all possible worlds." — Pierre-Normand

It's only in the light of aposteriori necessity that we limit our assessment.

Traditionally, there was no limitation. There is no possible world where a bachelor is not an unmarried man.... you don't need the existence of bachelors in a world for that statement to be true (at that world. :)).

It is generally understood that it doesn't have Paris as its capital essentially. — Pierre-Normand

True. I don't believe there is anything that precludes a person talking about an object, France, for which it is essential (to that object) that its capital is Paris.

I'll tell you what. I'm going to write out the question and send it to a bunch of living professional philosophers... obviously with Scott Soames being one.

I'll get back to you with the answers (if any). If they all disagree with my assessment, then you'll have that gratification. If even one of them says nothing precludes the scenario, you will be obligated to at least try to understand what I'm saying instead of shoving every word I say back down my throat.

Deal?

Yes. That's what I am claiming. And that's what you seem to have been denying consistently: — Pierre-Normand

Point to where I denied that.

Think about why necessity was once (and by some still is) thought to entirely overlap apriori and analytic. If you do that, you should get a hint as to why it matters if a statements shows up non-truth-apt in a possible world.

But in that case, once it is established what de re necessity it is someone is purporting to express, you haven't shown how this claim being a posteriori necessary could depend in any way on the intentions of the speaker (beyond specifying what she means to say), or -- what has been centrally at issue between us -- how it could depend on some arbitrarily restricted range of possible worlds being single out for special consideration by the speaker (e.g. worlds in which France has Paris as its capital city) — Pierre-Normand

Is there some reason a speaker could not say "France" and mean a country that has Paris as its capital?

This is the state of this conversation... I really have no earthly idea how you're likely to answer that. You keep trying to think three steps ahead of me instead of just logically evaluating the questions I asked. You say one thing and in the next post say "Of coarse I don't think that..."

I'm honestly finding it tiresome. Aren't you?

That seems rather trivial to me. If someone purports to make some statement of a posteriori necessity, then, in a first step, you may indeed have to pay attention of the circumstances of her utterance, and her communicative intentions, etc., in order to understand what it is that she is claiming to be a posteriori necessary. Then, in a second step, by dint of the fact that her claim can only be known to be true a posteriori, you have to investigate what it is, in the world, that makes it true (e.g. investigate the nature of water, or seek out, by means of investigative journalism, if Clark Kent and Superman really are the same person, as she claims them to be. — Pierre-Normand

Having determined the meaning of a statement, one need not at any point abandon that meaning for some convention for the sake of predicating truth.

No philosopher I know of would disagree with that. Do you know of one?

That something is necessary rather than contingent just means that it could not have been otherwise in any circumstance — Pierre-Normand

This is a confusing statement. Necessary modifies true. I guess it could modify false... that could be managed. You seem to be thinking of some.... thing? as being contingent or necessary. Some thing that could have been otherwise if it's contingent.

How about a statement or proposition can be necessarily or contingently true?

And if a statement is necessarily true, it's true in all possible worlds.

Aside from mountains of unresolved issues involving theory of meaning and reference, theory of truth, and theory of possibility... it's not brain surgery. :)

It's easy to imagine possible worlds where Clemens didn't exist. Clemens is Twain is not true at those possible worlds because it isn't truth apt.

To make a necessarily true statement, we need to say:

If Clemens exists, he is Twain.

That's actually necessarily true. (Assuming you approve of the concept of rigid designators and aposteriori necessity.. not all professional philosophers do.... obviously.)

I'm watching it now... not finished yet. Insanity used to be my biggest fear. I used to be unable to make it all the way through watching the Shining.

I've been reading Neil Gaiman stories lately. He's cool.

I certainly don't disagree with this either. I am questioning the inferences that you are drawing from this. It is one thing to evaluate what is said by a speaker who makes use of a sentence, accounting for pragmatic considerations and contextual features of the utterance, and another to evaluate the modal status of the claim being made. You wish to make the latter rest entirely on the former, but questions of a posteriori necessity obviously outrun mere considerations of the utterer's intentions. If they would rest entirely on intention and/or convention then those modal claims would be a priori, stipulated by mere fiat. — Pierre-Normand

I understand the concern you're raising, but I think if you followed the line of thought, you'd see that it's not the problem you're envisioning it to be.

As it is, your position seems to leave you endorsing a contradiction. Intention matters when discerning meaning, but not when evaluating modal claims. That just seems crazy to me.

I don't disagree. I quite agree. You misread me. I denied that the evaluation of this sentence at possible worlds where Samuel Clemens doesn't exist is relevant to the determination of the modal status of this sentence. — Pierre-Normand

It's relevant, and I would say critical to grasping the concept of aposteriori necessary truths that we're talking about statements that are true over a limited number of possible worlds as opposed to true over all possible worlds.

I think our discussion fell off the rails.

I hold that Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain can only be true at a possible world that contains an object picked out by Samuel Clemens.

If you disagree, we have an impasse, but all I can say is I think you're wrong.

I hold that in the case of any utterance, it will have to be sorted out somehow what it means. You can't just point to what you understand to be linguistic convention.

You apparently disagree with that as well. Again.. I think you're wrong.

Since you disagree with both the premises to the argument I think follows from here... you obviously aren't going to agree with the conclusion.

Good discussion. Thanks!

If the object mentioned in the statement does't exist in some possible worlds, then the statement can't be evaluated at all, so those worlds aren't relevant — Pierre-Normand

If the statement can't be evaluated at all at those worlds, then it certainly isn't true at them.

The statement is only true at worlds in which Samuel Clemens exists. And you would disagree with this.... why?

But before we evaluate the statement, it would be important to know what it means. Does linguistic convention preclude multiple meanings of the sentence? Of course not. So by some means, a particular meaning would have to be chosen. For instance, by some means, it would have to be determined that Mark Twain means a person, and the sentence is not answering a question about what Samuel Clemens' pen-name was.

How do you suppose that sort of determination is made (choosing from the various possible meanings of an utterance?)

So you're agreeing that we don't look at all possible worlds. We look at all relevant possible worlds... specifically where our rigid designators pick out objects that exist in those worlds.

It is still truly said of the man named Samuel Clemens in the actual world (de re) that he necessarily is Mark Twain (albeit not necessarily named Mark Twain!) in all possible worlds, and vice versa. — Pierre-Normand

But what about worlds where this man does not exist? Is the extension of the statement true there as well? It doesn't look like it would be truth-apt.

So let's go back to this issue of how Samuel Clemens didn't have to pick Mark Twain as his pen name.

Explain to me again how "Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain" is necessarily true.