Folklore says it's heavy drinking during hot summers that results in a high incidence of violence in places like Louisiana. But the most violent state is Alaska, so... so much for that theory.In the US there is much more violence in the southeast, and in ghettos--both places where a, b, and c apply. — Bitter Crank
Let's hear it also for the ancient Greek dramatists. How shall we ever end cycles of revenge fuelled by beliefs in angry vengeful gods? — mcdoodle
Chris Stringer says there is evidence in our collective genes of prehistoric warfare. I'm glad I don't live in world where violent death is always nearby, but aren't there quite a few people in the world today who do live that way?People do seem to be more prone to resorting to violence to settle grudges where no governments exist. States provide the means of achieving justice without bashing in the brains of your enemies. States also provide police of some sort to stop angry people from bashing in a lot of brains. — Bitter Crank
Is the state's real job to squash us or to help us realize our ambitions? Both?But then, one could say that the creation of the state in the first place occurs because man is inherently political. This doesn't contradict Augustine. One of the objects of politics, seems like, is to control id-driven "sinful" individual behavior. Keep a lid on things, so that we can all go about our civic business more conveniently. — Bitter Crank
It's clear to me that we have governments to maintain stability and control over the land: a government is an entity that has monopolized violence. It's a necessary evil, because anarchism is quite unrealistic. — darthbarracuda
Their identity has disappeared for them--and if it has disappeared for them, hasn't their identity disappeared for us to? Who is a person who no longer knows who they are? — Bitter Crank
Yeah maybe not a 'meme' in the technical sense (if there is one). — Wayfarer
I take it that identity is not something basic to our psychological makeup, even as individuals. There are more basic operations of the human mind than our identity, such as perception, memory, desires, or inclinations. — Moliere
I say that each person is responsible for each other's actions. I hit you, I am responsible for you hitting me back, or you hitting another. I refuse your need, I am responsible for your despair. — unenlightened
Whether he advocated a positive thesis on the immorality of birth, that's certainly up for debate. — darthbarracuda
Or is it rather the case that a good and decent man cannot compete with an amoral power seeker? — unenlightened
You can't simply take that because you have conscious states that are emergent out of a complex system, that the presence of something complex and emergent also means the emergence of consciousness. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Atoms are obviously capable of consciousness, so how does the conclusion follow?IF all is [at minimum] 'atoms & void', THEN g/G too is [at minimum] 'atoms & void' maximally, or perfectively, configured, AND THEREFORE g/G is oblivious, or indifferent, to every non-maximally, or imperfectly, configuration of 'atoms & void' (e.g. mortals, stars). — 180 Proof
Frege's argument is meant to refute the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth not to refute the possibility of a correspondence account of meaning ( or perhaps even a correspondence account of truth). — John
True, we do usually distinguish between those things, but in the context we are considering, the apple is part of the experience of eating it, and is thus still distinguishable from the experience as a whole, as well as from other parts of the experience. There is also picking the apple up, seeing it, tasting it, biting it and so on and all those are also distinguishable from one another; but none of them seem to necessitate that there be any experience-independent existence of anything. — John
Well, do you think that all those ways of thinking about experience, particularly in the context of the case in question of wanting to eat an apple (which is wanting an experience), entail metaphysical realism? — John
Probably. ?Try this: do you agree that variously thinking of experience as 'mental states' (or 'activities') rather than, say, as 'the contents of mental states' or as 'bodily states' (or 'activities'), or the constituents of bodily states (or activities) is already to have accepted, and be employing, certain presuppositions? — John