I must say this intrigues me mostly because I have no idea how you could achieve this or what it entails. Could you explain it more in depth? — Sentient
It's something you feel. In analytical philosophy truth is often understood to be a property of statements or sentences. Correspondence Theory uses the idea of a truth-bearer, which can be a statement or a belief. It says that a statement is true if it corresponds to a truth-maker. There is intuitive appeal to Correspondence although it quickly becomes a puzzle on closer examination. See the SEP entry: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/.How do you presuppose one finds 'truth' in art and in what way? — Sentient
It came to me recently because I was trying to understand something about Islam. I read three books about it and back up material to understand the books.. and one day I realized this path wasn't leading anywhere. I was on the verge of dropping it. All at once the Keats quote went through my mind. For a second I gulped because applying that idea to understanding Islam seemed like something that was way too arrogant for me. But as it settled in, I realized the truth. The answer to my question about Islam can only be answered by seeking aesthetic truth. And nobody can hand me that. I have to find it myself.How does it tie into the other disciplines you mentioned? — Sentient
To this end, it would be interesting gathering views on what 'bad art' constitutes and why. — Sentient
Are skeptical probabilities not enough to pragmatically determine if something is real or not? So being sober and fully rational would make experiences more probable of being true than experiences under the influence or while in an irrational mindset? — darthbarracuda
What do you mean, "interpretation"? Sorry, I was confused with this part of your response. — darthbarracuda
What if you are on LSD and see a zebra prancing down the street? Is that zebra real? — darthbarracuda
Yes. In fact, I won't ever deny the data of my senses. I saw what I saw. I heard what I heard. I will allow some flexibility with interpretation, though. Reason might conduct some negotiations where there's doubt.Presumably, if one can assume they are in a rational state of inquiry (not dreaming, high, or hallucinating), then things that are perceived by the senses can be seen as real, as in existing. — darthbarracuda
The problem that I see with this is that exiting the "reality bubble" has the effect of making all fictional claims seem like they are not truth-apt, not just the ones that we can't know the answers to. So at this point I'm not convinced that we can leverage that idea to support the notion that complete knowability is the criterion for unreality. — Aaron R
There remains the question of why should a historian ever decide to write a history. — Mariner
Because that's what a thing that was interested, and could understand would do. Pretending to understand is often considered polite, walls aren't polite. — Wosret
Tell me all about it, I'm a zombie, and only pretend to understand. — Wosret
OP: I suggest taking a look at the ontology of Alexius Meinong. — Ying
This had occurred to me. Fictional worlds imply unknown truths. But look at the statement: "Hamlet's hair-count was 90,000." Is that statement ever truth-apt? The term "reality bubble" comes to me to describe the way we enter fictional worlds, hypothetical situations, and even contemplate possibility. It's a kind of psychological act (to take Ying's inspiration).... to suspend disbelief and accept a fictional world as real. It's when we inhabit the reality bubble that it seems that there are things about Hamlet we don't know. Exit the bubble, and it's obvious that those questions don't have answers.Yes, I agree that "empirical" is not a property of objects. My point was that the real/unreal distinction is better understood in terms of the structure of justification rather than in terms of complete/incomplete knowability. I'm not convinced the latter is viable. For instance, does anyone know how many hairs were on Hamlet's head the moment he uttered "to be or not to be", or what Romeo had for breakfast the day before he died? — Aaron R
. So what I'm proposing is that we understand real objects to be the set of objects that are referred to by the set of claims over which we do not have such authority (i.e. that are not ultimately justified by appeal to anyone's attitudes). Thoughts? — AaronR
The only way a computer is going to guess your password is if it's a really bad password, and password crackers have the same chance of guessing your password whether they have the database or not. Hashed passwords do not help the guessing.
And libel lawsuits can happen whether justified or not. I'm not a lawyer but I'd think anyone involved in any official way with this site should be very careful not to actually accuse Porat of a crime for which he was technically found innocent, or this site might be targeted over it? But lawyers feel free to correct me.
Obviously I'm not suing anyone. — Paul
Libel against another website's owners is not a good way to get started. I suspect they have lawyers. And I find it very far-fetched that they're after anyone's password, especially since they'd expect passwords to be hashed. — Paul
So to give a simple example, justification for claims about Harry Potter will ultimately bottom out in appeals to claims about the attitudes of a particular person (i.e. JK Rowling), whereas the justification for claims about the chemical composition of DNA will ultimately bottom out in appeals to empirical observations — Aaron R
I'd suppose that from his point of view it's slander to bring up an incident for which he was found not guilty to make the implication that he was guilty. I doubt that it qualifies legally as slander, of course, as long as nobody actually outright says that he was guilty. — Paul
I wanted to start this thread, but considering my history it would be a bit too self-indulgent.
For you: — Mayor of Simpleton
Reality is limited by what we can know and experience. . — Thorongil
Would you say that empirical is a kind of justification? Statement X is true. The justification is empirical. Statement Y is true. This is justified by reason.I tend to think of the real as that which is empirical. What exactly counts as empirical is already a philosophical question, but I'd distinguish the real from the existent, and from being. — Moliere
This raises interesting questions about the role of the quite novel concept, the universal citizen, a class of individuals that really don't identify with any particular village, tribe, or nation-state, but rather identifies with humanity as a whole. This is actually reflected in material form with things like the previous League of Nations, or the United Nations today (although in practice it is merely an arena for conflicts over nation states), International Socialist Movements, Worker's Movements, Anarchist Movements, Marxism, International Solidarity, Doctor's Without Borders, and so on. The concept of the universal citizen has its roots, likely, in some sort of egalitarian thought, but was then co-opted by the nationalists into a concept that justifies empire and eminent domain over others. — discoii
What is the movement of the moment? — Bitter Crank
Someone suggested earlier in the thread that there is nothing that could not be a subject of history. The list of possible subjects you presented in the OP mentioned both human and non-human constructs. That's everything. Do you agree?So, to sharpen up the concern that led me to the OP: what is it that leads people to write histories of X? This is a personal decision; in theory, the historian has absolute freedom. But there must be some common trait or traits between salt, clothing, mammals, France, science, the West, the Universe and childhood; these are the stuff about which histories are written of. — Mariner
I started studying history because I came across the idea of social cycles. My ability to see and understand (broadly speaking) is dependent on my ability to see patterns. Early on in my attempt to see patterns in history, it occurred to me that my project was similar to seeing patterns in clouds. If I see a dolphin in a cloud.. where is the dolphin? Noticing that, I became bound to the contradiction. I'm blind without the pattern, but I don't have a passive relationship to patterns.The answer certainly points up to some movement of the historian's being towards the preservation (or, the bolstering up) of something cherished. People write histories because (a) they thing the subject is meaningful, (b), they want other people to know about it, and (c) they think that, by telling other people about it, they are participating in the life of the subject. The historian creates and enters the history he writes. — Mariner
It is really up to the administrators here. The PF Facebook page, which I was removed editor of with the sale, — ArguingWAristotleTiff
The Rand analysis is nonsense. — Hanover
Of course, I didn't say anything about Syrian refugees not wanting to settle down. Here, you might find these more helpful. Refugee, Migrant — Πετροκότσυφας
Syrians (and not just them) are fleeing from war and persecution. They didn’t wake up and said let’s hike to Turkey, swim in the Aegean, sleep rough, be bullied by armed forces, probably die along the road, so that we can be laborers in Europe — Πετροκότσυφας
That's all fine and dandy, Hanover. I won't comment on the Enlightened Dutch and all that. I'll just say that your post is irrelevant. Syrians are refugees, not immigrants. — Πετροκότσυφας
The medical analogy [and more than analogy] seems to embody a number of philosophers, as the academic [Lyceum] model does as well. My sympathies lie closer to the medical model, though that would only be natural as one who isn't in academia -- I'd imagine the reverse to be true for someone who is. — Moliere
So long as he behaves himself. — Yahadreas