Why must love be designed in the first place? — Agustino
If love isn't designed then the necessary ends of love (what you suggest are morally necessary to uphold) become the result of evolutionary dice rolls that have resulted in a random human telos.
If someone were born with a physical or mental deformity, then their teleology could define contrary moral positions compared to what we consider to be moral for average humans (i.e, can't reproduce or can't communicate). If such a deformity was an aberration from some essential standard, then we might say that the normal human telos still applies, but if the telos of an individual is defined by the form that they take, and our morality is based upon our telos, then morality for that individual becomes defined by their form.
Another way to think about it: if male humans had hardened knuckles and hardened heads that were designed for us to compete by knocking one another out, then according to our teleology it would be a morally necessary end to use the tools we are given toward their intrinsic purpose (one might argue a society based around
the numbest skulls would be moral) Morality in this case becomes evolutionary happenstance. (side note: my personal moral position accounts for evolutionary happenstance, but because I found my morality on only the
most universally shared values (like the desire to be free from pain and freedom to pursue happiness) they are therefore more common and more applicable (more persuasive to the individual) when considering the outlying dilemmas).
And there is actual evidence, namely our experience of love. — Agustino
People experience love differently, I think that much is clear. People also tend to value it differently given different preexisting psychologies and actual experiences of love. "Love" (the exclusive monogamous and romantic kind) is not actually a universally shared experience or value. Because our feelings toward that specific kind of love differ so much, it becomes very difficult for us to come to agreements about what is morally obligatory when it comes to love (among other things).
No, you cannot back that up with evidence at all. You cannot show that love is just a chemical cocktail, you yourself have just admitted this. Maybe what you want to say is that you can back up with evidence the fact that the experience of love involves the release of certain chemicals within the body, but that is an entirely different story. Correlation does not necessarily entail a causal link. — Agustino
Just to clarify, I'm not making the hard claim that love is nothing more than it's physical description, but I am making the argument that love is causally linked to the physical brain. My strong evidence has to do with case studies involving things like brain damage and brain tumors which can drastically impact the behavior of individuals, and in addition to what we know about the effects of various kinds of lobotomies. Further evidence can be found in the correlation between the use of psycho-active drugs and sometimes drastic impacts on human behavior. Some very compelling evidence comes from degenerative brain diseases which tend to produce drastic and irreversible changes in behavior, up to and including utterly losing the ability to even remember who your spouse is, let alone love them.
I can show that the evolution endowed biological/physical component of love actually exists (to such a strong inductive degree that disagreement is unreasonable). Can you show that any additional metaphysical components of love actually exist? If not, as a devil's Aristotelian, why should I accept any telos which you try to base on unsubstantiated metaphysics?
Okay, I don't think you have the right understanding of what a soul is in Aristotelian terms, but for now we'll work with yours. So you say that a "rational soul" is the form of a living thing with nutritive, perceptual, and mind components. You also say that "the actual form that humans take can be understood by the actions/functions that they manifest". So if the form is understood by the actions/functions they manifest, then clearly the test to determine the existence of the form is to see if they manifest the respective actions/functions that the respective form would entail. But previously you said:
The assumption that humans have a "rational soul" is not proven or scientific. — VagabondSpectre
I believe that it's time to retract this statement, since we have shown that forms are understood by the actions/functions they manifest (just like atoms would be understood by the actions/functions they manifest) and we do know that human beings have nutritive, perceptual and mind components - we know it from direct observation. — Agustino
Here's my beef with this approach: It's difficult enough to try and classify something by "function from form" when they exhibit very many and varied (and often contradictory) behaviors and actions, but to even begin by arbitrarily categorizing human functions along "nutritive" and "animal/mind" lines implies that the parts of us which "seek out nutrition" (which lacks an explanation of
how) are wholly separated from the parts of us which perform other kinds of functions (like intimacy). This separation in the first place could be the result of a misunderstanding of the underlying causal mechanisms.
It's as if you're categorizing elementary attributes of humans but you're not taking into account any real causal structures or fundamental relationships between them; it seems like approximation and guess work from mostly behavioral norms. I won't retract my statement that the "rational soul" is not scientific because I don't see how even the claim that human function can be divided into the aforementioned arbitrary categories is justifiable or scientific from the get go.
All you're really saying with "rational soul" is that humans have the ability to think, and the drive to consume energy to say alive, but you're saying nothing about the why and how of these human attributes, so at best it amounts only to a general observation...
No it's not satisfactory. Substances per Aristotelian ontology are composed of form & matter - hence the doctrine of hylomorphism. This isn't a very controversial thing, since both matter (potential) and form (actuality) are required to have an actual, real substance.
The form of the living body, as Aristotle writes in De Anima, is known as the soul. The form of the body has nothing to do with the shape of the body. Rather, the soul is the principle by virtue of which the body is a living body, instead of a dead body. The soul is not some ghosty thing which has the shape of the body, and leaves the body upon death to go up to heaven, or whatever you may have imagined when you made the silly statement that there is no scientific evidence for the soul. — Agustino
I meant that it's not an adequately testable or precise regime of interpreting the differences between objects (and how they change), and it doesn't lead to any predictive power...
Now forms give the matter that they govern the powers that it has, and only those powers. Forms are absolutely necessary to explain the behaviour we notice in matter. Take the simplest particle, the quark. Why does it have the behaviour that it does, and not some other behaviour? Clearly to explain this we have to postulate a principle which governs its behaviour. Even if, via the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle that behaviour happens to be somewhat random, we still require a reason why it's random, and not non-random — Agustino
According to deconstructionism yes we
need want a reason for the quark's special qualities, but slapping the label [FORM OF: QUARK] and then saying "quark = what quark forms do" isn't an actual reason or explanation of why quarks do what they do, it's just a sloppy means of categorization. Such categorizations can be quite charming but we mustn't forget that these categories are actually just placeholders for actual physical descriptions we do not yet and may never have (or metaphysical one's we'll probably never have).
Also think about genes. You say that genes are responsible for the features that we have. So why do genes have such powers? This is more besides the point, but you have to understand why Aristotle postulated forms in the first place. — Agustino
He wanted to try and understand the world, the things in it, why they're different, and how they change.
When you say "substance" I understand what Aristotle would have meant: "matter of different types which have different inherent characteristics and
mysterious qualities" (note that the mysterious qualities of actual matter (i.e, why bronze shines) was an impassable end-point for Aristotle), but when I try to square that with my own understanding of the world I can see that variations in substance actually comes from different combinations and compositions of molecular and atomic complexity and environmental conditions that work on relatively few fundamental principles or "rules" and with relatively few building blocks as starting points. Protons, neutrons (standing in for quarks) and electrons can be rearranged to form any kind of matter that exists. Differentiating between the characteristics of certain arrangements in certain conditions can be quite useful, but for a full understanding (including predictive power) over these things we must go beyond simply categorizing their various behaviors (along with presumed teleological final causes) as a behaviorist would. We may be forced to accept the behaviors of certain elementary particles for what they are (being unable to delve further into the physical world) but we need not think of human psychology or h
uman function as an
elementary or fundamental thing by any stretch.
Now - we have discovered that the soul is the form of the living body, and together they constitute the creature in question. If either the soul is gone, or the living body is gone, then we cannot have the creature. Once the creature dies, the soul disappears or dies - and the body stops being ANIMATED (Anima = soul). That's why, for example, Epicurus the atheist and materialist believed in souls - he, unlike Aristotle, thought that the soul dies with the body.
Now a rational soul is distinguished by the powers it gives the respective body. Namely all the powers the vegetative soul has (nutritional, reproduction, etc.), all the powers of the animal soul (locomotion, sensory, etc.), and in addition to those, will and intellect, which are uniquely human powers (as far as we know). There's nothing primitive about Aristotelianism, in recent years in fact it's been coming back very strongly in philosophy of science. — Agustino
I have not the gumption to assent to the position that my existence has purchase in any realm beyond the physical world we share (I do not have the evidence). As far as I understand what animates the body is not "the powers given to it by the rational soul" but rather that the body animates itself (describable by fundamental and elementary particles/forces), along with producing the end behaviors they exhibit such as movement, reproduction, and complex thought.
As far as I understand it, a human thought is the result of networks of neurons firing in sequence: it's bio-chemical/mechanical. It's all body... If we want to think of human conscious as non-physical, sure, but all evidence suggests that it's the body which empowers/produces/animates the consciousness, not the consciousness which empowers or animates the body on a fundamental level. Yes the consciousness is permitted to do some high level steering (not always though
;)), but it's not pulling the strings on the lower levels (which govern the higher)...
Stopping at "will/desire and intellect/creativity" or "love" as fundamental or elementary parts instead of going deeper with science seems primitive to me.
Okay. So then that seems a bit contradictory to me because on the one hand you do not want to stick to the very well defined philosophical terminology of Aristotelianism, but at the same time you want to avoid the vagueness that exists in other more colloquial terminology. — Agustino
Yes. If you want to use a term in a very specific way, whether it be a term with colloquial meaning or special meaning pertaining to a particular school of thought, then just be careful to give a robust and precise definition of exactly what you mean when you use that specific term.
This way not only will I always know what you mean, but I will have easier access to the underlying premises and justifications which support your conclusions.
How do we go about choosing correct premises? A conclusion is only as good as the premises, but mostly because the premises already contain the conclusion. But clearly we decide on the premises before we decide on the conclusion. Therefore it is at least logically possible to get to the conclusion without any premises, right? Certainly it's not the argument that will decide what the truth is, for the argument always presupposes premises, and premises always presuppose some other source - other than arguments. — Agustino
The answer to choosing robust premises is to apply doubt to them and test them in every conceivable way. Usually premises themselves have supporting arguments, and so attacking the premises of the argument supporting one of your chosen premises can also be an effective way of falsifying premises.
Generally, the harder we try to falsify a premise, and the more we continue to fail, the more confident we become in the truthiness of that premise.
Strictly speaking, the premises of an argument don't "contain" their conclusion, but are rather indicate or point to that conclusion (sometimes via probability, sometimes via necessity). If a single premise contains a conclusion, then it's circular logic, and really what should be considered is the argument for the premise in the first place.
When we get down to fundamental premises though (premises with no traditional logic behind them, such as the premises underlying logic itself) (let's call them brute facts) they're really only as good as they are demonstrably inviolable. A good first premise is a truism that you can rhetorically and through physical demonstration beat someone over the head with until the cognitive capacity of their brain submits to it as true (brute experiential/experimental force). The existence of gravity is a good example of a starting assumption whose underlying argument involves simply observing it bunch of times and becoming confident that the phenomenon of gravity is reliably and consistently existent.
The best fundamental premises are those premises which are very easy to falsify, but despite all attempts remain un-falsified.
Your objection to my premises can always happen - it's not constrained by anything, except your honesty and your experience. — Agustino
It's constrained by my cognitive/logical capability primarily though, so if you show me my objections are unreasonable then any self-deception should be overcome.
Okay I see. So then I think you'll also agree that a good watch is one which tells the time right, a good hairdresser is one which does your hair right, and a good eye is one which allows you to see well, correct? — Agustino
Yes, but it might also be worth noting that anything we call "good" can be also considered "not good" by someone with different standards of quality or even decency. A good doctor from WW1 is a butcher by today's standards who wouldn't be qualified to treat a horse. A "good" performer for example is hard to justify on any objectively measurable quality other than how successfully they entertain people, but the problem there is that different types of people might be highly entertained by a given performance, and a different crowd might be entirely offended by it. We should keep this subjective nuance to the word "good" in mind going forward.
Would you agree that a moral man is a good man? — Agustino
Sure, but what if we disagree about what is "moral" and how might we come to moral agreement?
But would you agree that if anyone, regardless of who they are, understands what we mean by doctor, then they will also understand that a good doctor is one who is good at what we mean by healing? I'm trying to talk about the underlying concepts now, not about whatever words we use to refer to the concepts, so just checking if you're still with me. Because concepts are objectively related to each other in a certain way - such as doctor with healing. — Agustino
The relationship with doctor and healing is a very robust distinction (making it a good basis for a word to refer to a category of healers) but again keep in mind that what people consider to be "good doctor" qualities can differ drastically.
Right, so I think you should retract the statement that there is no evidence for the tradition, since quite clearly you do not wish to prove a negative. So we can cross this one out. — Agustino
Well, technically I said that what you've written contains no actual evidence, and that referencing a tradition is not actual evidence. Demanding that I rebuke a tradition in order to justify my lack of belief instead of providing the evidence yourself wont persuade me
You're telling me to prove that X does not exist (or that there is no evidence for X) in order to justify my exclamation that I see no reason/evidence to believe in X (or for you to provide evidence for X). The idea that love goes beyond the physical in the ways that I've described is a central part of your claim that there is a necessary final cause of love that ought to be upheld above and beyond the varied final ends that evolution can be shown to have developed (presuming we're basing morality on teleological final causes in the first place).
So if I say that the function of the heart and the cardiovascular system is to pump blood that is my personal definition, and no more true than saying that the function of the heart and cardiovascular system is to stare at the moon? — Agustino
We understand what hearts are and what hearts do with much more fully than we understand what humans are and how/why they do what they do. The reason we should refrain from defining "the final causes" of humans is because we understand ourselves so poorly and the reality of our complexity is quite beyond us.
If we were to write out that hypothetical long list of what humans are, and the variations of what they can do and why, why is it that you pick out certain bits and bobs like "intimacy" and "reproduction" over other random bits and bobs "conflict" and "destruction"?
Well it's quite peculiar that you complain that my morality is based on experience, on what is yours based? — Agustino
Shared experience...
I might have trouble persuading you than something is not harmful (promiscuity and sex) due to some extra beliefs that you hold, but I reckon I would have no trouble persuading you that something IS harmful per my own moral beliefs. In my moral reasoning I try to only use the most universally shared positions as starting points (the most brute-fact realities of the human condition), and from there if I use good reasoning then I wind up with very persuasive and agreeable moral arguments and positions. The fact that both you and I want to be free from the oppression of others is simple but powerful, and as a starting moral value stands on it's own like a brute fact that cannot be disagreed with. With this idea alone we could tear down a tyrannical monarchy and contrive a system of governance, by us and for us, in pursuit of a system which promotes freedom of the individual while also seeking to protect them harm done to them by others (including the new government itself).
Your body cannot actualise a form, rather a form actualises your body, and together they make the substance you consider to be "you" — Agustino
Since I believe that the form is caused by the body (see: my substantiation of the causal link between love and neural-chemistry), I cannot assent to the idea that an extra "form" is required for the body (made from matter/substance) to behave as if it behaves.
Essentially I believe we're all automatons, mechanical beings whose will and behavior comes from (bio)mechanical goings on of our bodies and brains. It's all bottom up physical action, all substance/matter in particular arrangements where those arrangements give rise to end functions.
I want to highlight my distinction that
the body does what the body does (which I believe includes the mind/consciousness) and that the "rational soul" or final cause/function/form of humans is just our attempt to categorize what it is that the body does, and that the rational soul doesn't "actualize" anything beyond an arbitrary and invented category used to differentiate humans from other beings and objects.
Okay, so let's see, why do you think evolution is opposed to Aristotelian teleology? I think that quite the contrary, evolution requires Aristotelian teleology to make sense. If you think about it, a certain combination of genes produces a certain effect. Clearly it seems that specific genes are directed towards producing a certain range of effects, which is exactly what modern molecular biology is discovering. If specific genes weren't directed towards a specific range of effects, then evolution wouldn't even get off the ground, because everything would be chaotic. One day gene X caused blonde hair, and the next day the same gene would cause purple hair! So natural selection would have nothing to select from if there wasn't this underlying teleology. — Agustino
It's actually incorrect to think that individual genes do anything specific and necessary (in fact, "genetic markers" are vast swaths of individual base pairs in DNA which more or less work together - somehow - to achieve more complex results down-the causal line). The best we can currently do is to look at the prevalence (recurrence) of specific genetic markers in the overall code of an individual and make correlation based assumptions about what those genes might actually have some influence over (we're beginning to get at the first steps of "how" but we're no where close to bringing it full circle to "here's it's range of possible behaviors"). The trouble is that these genetic markers in all likelihood influence many things and in many different ways (through spurious and hidden factors we don't yet understand), and layers of complexity we cannot consciously grasp, and this lack of understanding renders us only able to make approximate guesses about what final/necessary effects a higher and lower prevalence of specific genetic markers actually have. It's actually a good analogy that demonstrates the pitfalls of assuming discrete categories and functions of things without understanding the full scope of how they actually interact and behave.
The biggest problem that I see though is not how frighteningly incomplete our categories actually are, it's that evolutionary teleological ends to me seem like a more rational basis for a resulting moral argument (if we're going to appeal to teleological function/form/rational soul in the first place) than presumed metaphysical realities of poorly understood phenomena such as "love".
I eagerly await your argument that demonstrates the moral importance/necessity of adhering to
teleological final causes in the first place...
Regarding my musical selection for this evening, this time it's got some actual class. Pyotor Ilych Tchaikovsky was a homosexual man who went through a failed marriage and as far as I know produced no children. And yet, he managed to create music of such lasting beauty that it rivals love and intimacy itself. Among that hypothetical long list of human functions, enjoying life and it's beauty is among the final causes that I choose for myself...