I referenced this above reproduced here

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/#FourCaus

"This result is mildly surprising and requires a few words of elaboration. There is no doubt that the art of bronze-casting resides in an individual artisan who is responsible for the production of the statue. According to Aristotle, however, all the artisan does in the production of the statue is the manifestation of specific knowledge. This knowledge, not the artisan who has mastered it, is the salient explanatory factor that one should pick as the most accurate specification of the efficient cause (Phys. II 3, 195 b 21–25).

"By picking the art, not the artisan, Aristotle is not just trying to provide an explanation for the production of the statue which is not dependent upon the desires, beliefs, and intentions of the individual artisan; rather, he is trying to offer an entirely different type of explanation–namely, an explanation that does not make a reference (implicit or explicit) to desires, beliefs, and intentions. More directly, the art of bronze-casting the statue enters in the explanation as the efficient cause because it helps us to understand what it takes to produce a statue; that is to say, what steps are required to produce a statue starting from a piece of bronze." — tim wood

And developed a little further (by me) here:

You appear to think the builder is the efficient cause of the house, and informally I agree. But the person of the builder is not the efficient cause; rather he is an accidental cause. The efficient cause is his skills as a builder, the skills themselves and the skills as he possesses them, so yes, informally, he is. But Aristotelian causes are those expressions that answer the question why or how, and would seem to refer to properties rather than accidents. So the efficient cause of the house is the property, or art or skill, of the builder as a builder. Material cause not the material itself, but the property or capacity - or passion - of the material to be worked in an appropriate way. Formal, not the plans, but the quality of the plans which makes it possible to build from them. Final, the property, or capacity, of the thing built to be used as intended. — tim wood

Now my bias is in most things to try to keep it simple, or as simple as possible while still making sense. When Aristotle lists as one of his nine accidents "passion," as compliment of action, I'm confident that the simple grammatical meaning I attach to it makes sense, is meaningful, is defensible, and is very likely what A. meant. The wind blows the screen over; the screen is blown over.

A. may dig into the significance of this screen's being able to be blown over - as compared with a screen reinforced against the wind that cannot be blown over. And this leads to a double statement: the screen was blown over and the screen could be blown over. And in both cases I think "passion" applies as to the fact that it was acted upon, and that it could be acted upon.

Maybe this.
Let CNC stand for "The cat is not a cat," intended here as a false proposition.
Let MGC stand for, "The moon is made of green cheese," also a false proposition.
Let K stand for the implication, (CNC => MGC).
According to the rules, K is true. Period.

But it is a mistake displaying the greatest ignorance to suppose that K in any way proves either CNC or MGC separately.

More to be said but useless to say it if you do not grasp at least this.

Does being among humanity's strongest thinkers, professional grade mathematician, and a world class physicist indicate that Pietism is no-longer nourishing or rational? — Moliere

Is Pietism rational? From online: "... is a movement within Lutheranism that combines its emphasis on biblical doctrine with an emphasis on individual piety and living a holy Christian life." Depends maybe at first on what you believe, but later on what you grant and presuppose to be true, and how and in what way. Thus the rationality contingent on what the ground is and how it is determined. Nourishing? To whom, in what way, for what purpose?

And if that were so, why would Kant claim that it's important for practical reason, in general, to believe in God or the immortality of the soul, for instance? (the focus on the intent of an actor is also something important here -- something that fleshes out the choosing of maxims in the formal system) — Moliere

You will find that ably answered in Kant's Preface to his Critique of Pure Reason, the beginning of which, here:

"Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.

'It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic."

And soon enough he gets to denying knowledge to make room for faith, because knowledge won't answer, but faith can. And he goes on to make sure his faith is built on, with, and from reason.

This a short answer. Is it enough?

Do you "buy" Mr. Maritain? I don't. It reads to me like straight-out co-opting and arrogation (that is, propaganda and thereby disingenuous and unworthy on its face).

But in fact his accomplishment was dependent on fundamental religious ideas and a religious inspiration he had received in advance. — Jacques Maritain, Christianity and Philosophy - The Ethics of Kant

If you buy it, perhaps you'd like to defend this? It seems to me a variety of Big Lie, the which always starts with a kernel of truth.

My own five-cent analysis is that Kant, whom we're told was brought up Pietist, at some point found it no-longer nourishing; yet finding some of it compelling, tried to reason out why it should be compelling. It being helpful to remember that he is among humanity's strongest thinkers, as well as a professional grade mathematician and world class in physics.

There is no coherent meaning for "the passion of being built". — Metaphysician Undercover

Then how or why is it coherently meaningful to me? In school we learned that something/someone can act and that someone/something can be acted on. The first active/action, the second passive/passion - these being two of Aristotle's accidents. But for you, the second has "no coherent meaning." That can only mean that for you, it is meaningless to say that anything is (ever) acted upon.

Suppose a wind blows over a screen. What happened to the screen?

The latter is the case in your example, when Bob's mind is affected by his passion he desires to break the window, and this is an ill-tempered act. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. The window is broken by Bob absent any intention on his part - not that that makes any difference - an accident, Bob need not even be aware the window is broken. The point is that common usage is to say the window was broken. That is a passive construction. Greek also, although done differently. .

The window was just minding its own business, then bang and it was broken. It was a passive participant in its own braking. And the noun for that passivity is passion. Absolfreakinglutely nothing to do with emotion of any sort or kind.

And reading Posterior Analytics - thank you for the reference - 94, I do not see how it is relevant.

Thus so far you are denying the simple fact of English usage and grammar, also the Greek, that is the passive case, and what it means.

In a Pachinko game, a ball is let to roll down an inclined board spiked with nails to impede its progress, each nail the ball hits imposing a binary choice as to whether to go left or right past the nail. And in the fall, the ball follows rules - there's no magic involved - ending up in one of a number of slots at the bottom of the run. The point being that notwithstanding that the inputs seem the same, the results can and do differ across the entire available range.

And the notion from this is that the consideration of the Trolley Problem, while hypothetical, is not an exercise in the abstract. And it is thus not what I should do, but instead what I will do. And as the pachinko balls line up in different slots, so also in the ultimate necessity of choice individuals will make different decisions, and none intrinsically in itself better than the other, just as there is no right place for the pachinko ball to fall.

Of course that leaves the reason for the choice, if it can be determined, and on that basis the choice may be bad, but that not the question of the Trolley Problem.

Given C, a contradiction, the expression C => P is true. That is because C is false, and whenever the antecedent is false, the implication is true - them's the rules. But it is an elementary and serious error to suppose this shows that P is true. For P to be true, C must first be affirmed. That is, C ^ (C => P) => P, C being true, affirms P. And this is exactly - or should be - what Tones said.

But that is not at all what you have said. You have stipulated that both L and ~L are true, and then created the expression (L v X), noting that it is true. And it is, but it says nothing about X.

By the way, Tones is Tones, I am not, I am tim wood.

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/passion, #3.
"The state or capacity of being acted on by external agents or forces." — tim wood

And the same in dictionary listings that are more-or-less complete. That "passion," has this meaning that has nothing to do with feeling, emotion, or affect is not debatable; it's simply a fact.

Of course the word does not occur in Aristotle's writing. From above:

And this point explicitly made in his Categories 1b25, this being one version.
"1b25. ... doing or being-affected. ...; of doing:...;of being-affected:" — tim wood

The "being-affected," along with "passion" being translations of the Greek word. The Greek was perfectly capable of rendering a sentence in the passive voice. "The window was broken," would be perfectly intelligible to him (assuming he had windows); that is, that something happened to the window and the window was a passive receiver of that action. And equally, "the house was being built."

As to cause, αιτία, "cause" seems the simplest translation, but the word also carries a strong sense of culpability, fault, guilt. Thus "did it," or "made or facilitated the happening," while clumsy, seem accurate. If Kevin is our builder of houses - if he is that, or we call him that - it is not in virtue of his simply being Kevin, or of being a guy, or of having a hammer and saw. It is only in virtue of his having the skills and knowing the arts of building that he is called a builder. That is the argument for the efficient cause being the arts and not the man.

I appreciate your patience in almost all of your answers, and I confess I think you flatter me in supposing I've read enough to have my own opinions - sometimes I have and do! But consider this from here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/#FourCaus

"This result is mildly surprising and requires a few words of elaboration. There is no doubt that the art of bronze-casting resides in an individual artisan who is responsible for the production of the statue. According to Aristotle, however, all the artisan does in the production of the statue is the manifestation of specific knowledge. This knowledge, not the artisan who has mastered it, is the salient explanatory factor that one should pick as the most accurate specification of the efficient cause (Phys. II 3, 195 b 21–25).

"By picking the art, not the artisan, Aristotle is not just trying to provide an explanation for the production of the statue which is not dependent upon the desires, beliefs, and intentions of the individual artisan; rather, he is trying to offer an entirely different type of explanation–namely, an explanation that does not make a reference (implicit or explicit) to desires, beliefs, and intentions. More directly, the art of bronze-casting the statue enters in the explanation as the efficient cause because it helps us to understand what it takes to produce a statue; that is to say, what steps are required to produce a statue starting from a piece of bronze."

In sum, "passion" simply the noun form of passive, no feeling, emotion, affect. And the passion of the building being built simply that the building is not building but is being built. A grammarian's distinction that yields an insight. You can if you like parse meaning clean out of the expression, but that creates other problems, and in any case is not the sense of the usage I find in such Aristotle as I've read.

You disagreed with the above. — PL Olcott

So see how you can use this distinction to explain how what you said
diverges from what Wikipedia said. — PL Olcott

What are you referring to?

You're incoherent, here. And it looks like you do not understand the distinction between valid and true.

Do you understand that in terms of these discussions and your replies to me you're talking crazy - most of your replies being either or both nonsense and non-sequiturs?

You missed the point. You appear to think the builder is the efficient cause of the house, and informally I agree. But the person of the builder is not the efficient cause; rather he is an accidental cause. The efficient cause is his skills as a builder, the skills themselves and the skills as he possesses them, so yes, informally, he is. But Aristotelian causes are those expressions that answer the question why or how, and would seem to refer to properties rather than accidents. So the efficient cause of the house is the property, or art or skill, of the builder as a builder. Material cause not the material itself, but the property or capacity - or passion - of the material to be worked in an appropriate way. Formal, not the plans, but the quality of the plans which makes it possible to build from them. Final, the property, or capacity, of the thing built to be used as intended.

Now, you seem to think my other question stupid. Let's try this: In as much as you say the house is the goal, the final cause, and you imply that before it is, it isn't, what then is the builder building? And there a regression here, because the implication - your implication - is that anything built as a final cause, not existing before it exists, cannot be built.

The builder is affected by that project and has the passion to build. — Metaphysician Undercover

So if (from above) the window was broken by Bob, Bob had been affected by the window and had a passion to break it? It is here completely clear you do not know what the word means in this context, which is also how it is used in a secondary sense in ordinary English grammar. Adjective, passive; noun passion. How can you not know that?!

I asked you a specific and clear question.

Please define this. If it is a constructed set, please show how it is constructed. — tim wood

You ether cannot or will not answer it. You describe what you call a set and make certain claims about it. You have not shown that it exists or can exist, or how it's built, and you certainly have not shown how it can satisfy the claims you make for it.

Let me start you out. You adduce a set of what you call truths; you then iterate some kind of syllogistic reasoning on the and produce new conclusions. And done. How does this meet any of your claims?

the set of expressions of specified semantic meanings — PL Olcott

Please define this. If it is a constructed set, please show how it is constructed.

I already specified that the R I am referring to is the set of semantic meanings specified as expressions of language. This is the key foundation of my whole point and cannot be ignored. This R is the ultimate foundation of the truth of all expressions of language that are {true on the basis of their meaning}.

Truth preserving operations applied to these expressions that fail to derive P or ~P prove that P is not a proposition because it violates the law of excluded middle. — PL Olcott

And I've granted R all day long. But you're not talking just about R, but generalizing your claims beyond R, and as you persist beyond reason, so with reason I call you out and warn against engaging with you. And not to be forgot, you have been asked about R itself and given no answer. That is, R does not exist and I suspect cannot exist, either way, how is R an "ultimate foundation" of anything? By contrast, Godel et al were exactly rigorously clear about what their system(s) are.

And now we see you do not know what a sentence is, else you'd have finished reading it.

Unless P or ~P has been proved in Russell's system P has no truth value and thus cannot be a proposition according to the law of the excluded middle. Sometimes this "proof" requires an infinite sequence of steps. — PL Olcott

Simplest is this: if P is undecidable, then neither P nor ~P are provable in R. I don't know what R is, but let's assume it stands for the kinds of systems that are actually relevant to this discussion, and which include arithmetic as described by Godel. As such, for clarity let R = G, and let us refer to P as unprovable in G.

P can be and is a proposition in G. It says, using Godel's methodology, that P is not provable in G. The law of excluded middle is misapplied here. To say that it has no truth value qua is a misstatement because it is true. In G itself ,it is undecidable, thus not provable in G.

Now, you have been repeatedly evasive and substantively non-responsive to many posts and questions through at least several threads. My own criticism of your claims, which themselves may not go far enough, is that while you can devise whatever limited system you like, your claim is that you can generalize it where it does not apply. And that is wrong, ignorant, and stupid.

Question to you: is it possible to build a house? Yes? No? — tim wood

Since you apparently don't like this question, it occurs to me to ask you just what exactly you think a cause is for Aristotle. While I suppose you must know, it's not clear in your usage. And I think maybe you get it mixed up with a modern understanding of the word. Give it a try; doesn't have to be a treatise; a paragraph or two should be adequate for present purpose.

The question as to whether we did go overboard will be answered by the people in November. That's how democracy works, with the people getting the final say. — Hanover

No, no, no! In a trial the law gets the final say. Or maybe you merely meant that the vote might be susceptible to interpretation as an expression writ large of an opinion. Of course to be more than an opinion, the people have recourse to both courts and legislature....

This hush money conviction is no big deal, and I doubt you'd care much if Trump were an otherwise decent guy. The judge is required to look at this conviction in isolation. He can't pile on just because Trump is otherwise a piece of shit. — Hanover

Not so. It is the case and the facts to be considered in isolation, not the sentencing. And if appropriate, it is his business to "pile on." That is why there are sentencing guidelines, and why a judge in many cases will receive recommendations.

And this is enshrined - not necessarily for the better - in some states with so-called "three-strikes" laws that impose harsh sentences on those who have been convicted for multiple offenses, the punishment not so much, or necessarily, fitting the crime, but instead the man.

and so his practical reason (e.g. deontology) was faith-based, no? — 180 Proof

I'll say no. Deontology - and his categorical imperative(s) - are reason based. Near as I can tell it's all reason-based, in so far as anything can be based/founded. Of course he makes clear there are ideas of irresistible interest that reason can address but cannot resolve. And for these, faith - though operating with the machinery of reason.

One might ask which for Kant came first, God or reason. More than I know, but I suspect reason. Maybe this way: that God might have got us all here, but it is by reason (alone) we know him and figure things out.

Yes, something is being acted on, and that is the raw materials. The form of the materials changes due to the activity called "building". That is how Aristotle described change. The problem with Df's representation is that he portrays the house as that which suffers the passion, by saying "the passion of being built". And this is incoherent because there is no house in existence, — Metaphysician Undercover

And with this you parse meaning out of language. Nothing can be built. And nothing can be worked with and nothing changed. And your idea of "suffers the passion" makes clear that notwithstanding your claims, you simply do not understand "passion" in this usage and context. Or "suffer" for that matter: in A's time it meant "let" as in permit or allow.

Let's set aside translation. Question to you: is it possible to build a house? Yes? No?

I know what passive means, it's Df's usage which makes no sense. If you think it does make sense, then explain how Df's expression "the passion of being built" makes any sense to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

I leave your discussion with Df to you. The question is whether the expression. "the passion of being built," makes sense (to me). I'll note that I jumped in only because it appeared you did not understand "passion" in this context and that seemed odd. Now twice you have said you do understand it - yet if you do, I don't see why there is still a question.

Let's start with two sentences, 1). "Bob hit the ball." 2) "The ball was hit by Bob." 2 is simply a passive construction and I'm very surprised if it presents a problem for you. And while it would be peculiar usage now, still one could reasonably talk about the action of hitting the ball and the passion of the ball being hit. The passive voice useful in news articles because often the doer is not the main story, but rather the thing that was done. Is it perhaps the use of the word "passion" itself in this way that is the problem? Anyway, so much for the grammar.

In my opinion - and in this case not even my opinions are entirely my own - what Aristotle has to work with is what he sees, his own logic, common language, and common sense. That is, he doesn't have a science. He's pretty much constrained to description, and whatever sense he can make of things. He sees his friend Kevin and asks him what he's doing. The answer is he's building a house. And Aristotle makes explicit an observation that most folks wouldn't bother with: if someone is building, then something is being built. If someone or something is acting, something is being acted on. And he calls that πάσχειν, translated as passion, or being-affected.

And this point explicitly made in his Categories 1b25, this being one version.
"1b25. Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or
qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or havingor doing or being affected. To give a rough idea, examples of substance are man, horse; of quantity: four-foot, five-foot; of qualification: white, grammatical; of a relative: double, half, larger; of where: in the
Lyceum, in the market-place; of when: yesterday, last-year; of being-in-a-position: is-lying, is sitting; of having: has-shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning;of being-affected:
being-cut, being-burned," bold-italics added.

It is just that simple, so yes, it makes sense to me, and I believe that was all the point that Aristotle was making.

The passion is in the builder, — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you now deliberately fail to understand a word?

The words in question are ποιεῖν poiein and πάσχειν paskein. Boiled down, the first means to make or to do - active/action, and the second, "to be affected by anything whether good or bad, opposite to acting of oneself," (A Lexicon, Liddell and Scott, 1977, p. 536) - passive/passion.

2300+ years on this and you don't get it?

And this, Metaphysics, 1066a:
"That motion is in the movable is evident; for it is the complete realization of the movable by that which is capable of causing motion, and the actualization of that which is capable of causing motion is identical with that of the movable. For it must be a complete realization of them both; since a thing is capable of moving because it has the potentiality, but it moves only when it is active; but it is upon the movable that it is capable of acting. Thus the actuality of both alike is one; just as there is the same interval from one to two as from two to one, and the hill up and the hill down are one, although their being is not one; the case of the mover and the thing moved is similar." italics added.

You would do well to consider exactly (what you think) freedom is and is not. Is it? What is it? What kind of a thing is it? What are its special features? Is there a genus-species of it? Do Aristotle's four causes, material, efficient, final, formal have anything to do with freedom?

Elsewhere it's been argued, following Kant, that freedom is the ability, unconstrained, to do what reason tells you you ought to do. Before you reply, try to think it through.

You can browse here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9910/freedom-and-duty/p1

If you can make sense of what Df is saying, — Metaphysician Undercover

Df is far better able to speak for himself than I am for him.

Imo, an error you're making is thinking that Aristotle is a scientist doing science. That is, trying to understand via test - I do not know if he had the concept of a scientific experiment. Thus, while he might have liked to have thought and written in terms of apodictic proof and certainty, and I think he knew how, in terms of his accounts of the world, his approach seems essentially descriptive, and when he can he offers an account of the description, his reasoning mainly rhetorical. Moreover, in many places in many ways he assures us his conclusions while more likely than not, are equivocal.

And to be sure his language mostly is straightforward. When he says the builder is building a house, there can be no doubt as to what he means. And he calls the activity of the builder an action. And continuing, corresponding to the action of the builder building, is the passion of the thing being built. And all of this makes perfect sense. If you saw a builder building, you might ask what he is doing and on being told he's building, you might ask what it is that he is building. And you're told, "A house." You might then ask, well, where is the house? And the answer must be that it is being built. And just this the passive voice, which the Greek knows very well.

The substance, then, is the house. The accident applied to it in this case is passion. Not that the house is doing anything, but rather something is being done to the house: it is being built.

And any claim that is impossible because the house, being not yet completed, is not a house, defies common usage, denies Aristotle's own example, defies the kind of sense Aristotle usually tries to make, and would make the building of anything a Zeno-esque impossibility. .

Passion is emotion, feeling. — Metaphysician Undercover

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/passion, #3.
"The state or capacity of being acted on by external agents or forces."
Also, here
https://www.google.com/search?q=aristotle%27s+accidents&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS976US976&oq=aristotle%27s+accidents&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIICAEQABgWGB4yCAgCEAAYFhgeMg0IAxAAGIYDGIAEGIoFMg0IBBAAGIYDGIAEGIoFMg0IBRAAGIYDGIAEGIoFMgoIBhAAGIAEGKIE0gEINDI2OGowajeoAgiwAgE&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
"The nine kinds of accidents according to Aristotle are quantity, quality, relation, habitus, time, location, situation (or position), action, and passion ("being acted on").

Simply unaccountable you don't know that meaning of passion.

If there were a solid, really existing self hidden in or behind the aggregates, its unchangeableness would prevent any experience from occurring; its static nature would make the constant arising and subsiding of experience come to a screeching halt.

This seems an extreme and untenable claim.

But a closer look: it may be that my self is a continually emerging product, its history and durability an illusion made up on the fly each and every moment. But the presence and actions of others both animate and inanimate make that an impossible position to hold. There is manifestly a persistence and consistency characterizing events and the self in time. Thus not an either-or of self, but instead a neither-nor. The self, then, existing, but continually evolving and changing, usually unnoticeably from day-to-day, some parts more susceptible of change, and some resistant. And some trans-generational.

The awareness of the no self within the self... illustrates how the progress of a science can come around to affirming what the spiritual disciplines knew. — Joshs

I understand "no self" - perhaps more accurately no-self - as the self "under bare poles." That is, not any sort of negation of self, but instead the self itself. This implies elemental, fundamental, primordial, original, even maybe primitive.

But I suspect what is meant is a refined and elevated self able to deny its self, which on the basis of relevant considerations does deny its self. And thereby being aspirational for some people. I suppose the science to be one that investigates first exactly what self is in order to know what no-self is, and then whether it's possible or desirable - these all seeming more in the way of a psychology than science. If a science, it would be good to know what science, by what criteria.

The suggestion that no-self is self-denial is strong and seductive. But we cannot all be Sydney Carton. There must also be a Charles and Lucy, else no-self an obscene exercise in absurdity. It would seem, then, that no-self must yield to self. Or to complete the sailing metaphor, that the ship be fully rigged and flagged - purposed - fully enselfed, ensouled. But these not negations but affirmations.

That's right, blah-blah-blah, deflect, avoid, misdirect, resort to jargon, straw man, non-sequitur, whatever it takes to avoid answering the question - or any question - substantively, and that seems to make you look smart. I hold you self-convicted of ignorance and nonsense in your inability to be responsive and what appears to be much that is simply wrong.

Warning to all, PL Olcott is a retailer of self-promotion without substance.

And any time you want to prove me wrong your keyboard is within easy reach.

Yes, you create a formal system that does what you program it to do - no problems, no complaints. But then you make a lot of other claims about truth and falsity, about decidability, about the Liar and about Godelian self-reference - not the same thing. The point, I suppose, is that while your claims are defensible bespoke to your program, you re-present them as universal, and that is the case you don't make.

For example, let your database, described above, be represented by, "The cat sleeps on the couch." You now test "finite" strings against your database, and those that pass are "true," those that don't, "false." And you can do that. But what has that to do with true and false, or knowledge of any kind, or anything undecidable? How does that show that Godel was mistaken or incoherent? Or that Tarski was confused?

From the article, "But if we ignore these technicalities we can still appreciate the general principle, that each small part contains the information about the whole." Hmm. And maybe if we're not excessively worried about what "information" is, exactly.

We might rephrase using the time-honored locution, "get theah from heah." The idea being - the question being - whether given any here and there, you can or cannot, "get theah from heah."

And this is a question in elementary education. It is generally held that below a certain age the student simply cannot "grok" a lot of math. Against this is the also general belief that subject matter can be taught and learned incrementally, that the boundaries on what can be learned can be extended and expanded. I favor the incrementalists because 1) it's already demonstrated many times over, 2) teaching itself is very far from perfect, and 3) I think that brains are not limited according to what educators believe.

That leaves the question if there is any body of knowledge (and let's rule out here any involved discussion or debate as to what knowledge is) so isolated that we "can't get theah from heah." A key to this answer is the notion of specialized knowledge. I have fingers and can hum: in principal, then, I can learn to play the piano, as can everyone else with fingers who can hum. But with some qualification on what it means to be able to play the piano, most will acknowledge that most folks cannot learn to play the piano. Or that bouncing a ball makes a basketball player, and so forth.

But this would seem to concern learned skills and most folks can learn to do most things at least badly.

Perhaps the best approach to an answer is to consider the learners as a whole: is there any knowledge they - we - cannot aspire to? This groups all knowledge as that which can be known, with the common element being the knower writ large. And since of this whole everything is a part, it would seem that from any part we can get to any other part, eventually.

Let's note, though, that while the holograph contains immediately information about the whole in every part, the progress of knowledge is instead mediate and sequential. Or, "You can get theah from heah, you just ain't theah yet."

That does not make True(L, φ) inconsistent. When True(L, φ) is false and True(L, ~φ) is false then φ is rejected are inherently incorrect. No sense moving beyond this point until after you totally get it. — PL Olcott

It makes it undecidable - it appears you do not know what the words you use mean - and certainly not "inherently incorrect."

My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth preserving operations that derive x from a set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have the semantic value of Boolean true. — PL Olcott

As described here, this is just a sorting program for testing inputs against a data base and dividing them into those that "agree" and those that don't, which you then call true and false. Which, as you present it and have answered questions about it, has zero interest or substance and too much nonsense.

In plain English:
"φ is not true."
What is φ not true about?
φ is not true about being not true.
What is φ not true about being not true about?
φ is not true about being not true about being not true...
Ok so φ NEVER gets to the actual point. — PL Olcott

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What does, 'being about" mean? That is, what prevents me from playing, "what is X about" with any X, thus proving that "X never gets to the actual point"?

From reading your citation, it appears you're looking for a truth-maker for φ and not finding one. And from the reading, it is not clear that it needs one; i.e., φ is a truth-bearer. The problem, of course, is that if φ is true, then it is not true, and if it is not true, then it is true. Apparently this implies that any system that can define truth is inconsistent, "Tarski showed that the liar paradox is formalisable in any formal theory containing his schema T, and thus any such theory must be inconsistent. This result is often referred to as Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth" (Sec. 2.1 your citation, here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar).

But Godel showed us his proposition g, which says g is not provable - and Godel shows us explicitly and exactly how to create g. And self-reference is not the trick.

My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every
finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth preserving operations that derive x from — PL Olcott

Now, your predicate, lets call it P. is defined to return T or F for every string input. And that, apparently, based on finding a truth-maker of some kind for the particular string. But this either constitutes a definition of truth, or is purely an arbitrary distinction made by your program, in which case the P could stand for Procrustean predicate. Or in short, your T and F are exactly not T and F, but some approximation of them.

And even as approximations, in as much as your claim applies to all input strings, it remains for you to make explicitly clear how your predicate makes the distinctions that it does.

I conceded a long time ago that you're entitled to make private claims about your private system, but the claims you are making are public, in he sense that you can be called to account for them. And among them are these, in no special order,
1) Godel was incoherent.
2) Your system distinguishes T from F
3) You have a listing of all "true, actual facts."

I challenge all three and have been challenging all three, to date none resolved.

He doesn't actually show that and if he didn't hide his work we could see that he doesn't really show that. He doesn't even claim that, yet what he does claim is a little incoherent. G is true in PA yet not provable in PA. The way that we know G is true is that G is provable in meta-math. — PL Olcott

Actually, he does show that - we're skipping over some details - and he proves it. Now, you make clear where he "is a little incoherent." And now I shall insist you use plain English.

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We can see that when we formalize the Liar Paradox correctly
LP := ~True(L, LP)

and not the clumsy way that Tarski formalized it :
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x — PL Olcott

From your Stanford reference we have, "Let φ be the sentence, "φ is not true." That is, we have φ, simple enough and we need nothing else.
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Now, in plain English, using φ, describe how your "system" works.

What you claim is that it knows what is true and what is not. I'm very skeptical, because of many arguments against this, and also not least because you have been singularly non-responsive through at least two threads and many posts.

That's some sentence! Kindly allow or disallow this paraphrase; viz, That transcendent naturalism (TN) is a way of being primordially that is nothing supernatural, that is pre-personal, and that comports without unnatural boundary with the world as it worlds. Or more briefly, TN is the natural and common state of most cats.

From your Stanford page: It won't copy and paste, so I paraphrase:

Assume x <-> T(x) for all x. T(x) simply expressing that x is true. That is, for all x, x holds iff T(x) holds. The assumption being that T itself is well-defined.

Let φ be the sentence, "φ is not true."

Thus φ <-> ~T(φ). However, that with φ <-> T(φ) is a contradiction. Leading to the conclusion that T is not well-defined.

Now, from your other citation
"we shall suppose the metalanguage to be so constructed that the language we are
studying forms a fragment of it ; every expression of the language
is at the same time an expression of the metalanguage, but not
vice versa.
"TIIEOREM I. (a) In whatever way the symbol 'Tr', denoting a
class of expressions, is defined in the metatheory, it will be possible
to derive from it the negation of one of the sentences which were
described in the condition (a) of the convention T;
(b) assuming that the class of all provable sentences of the metatheory is consistent, it is impossible to construct an adequate definition of truth in the sense of convention T on the basis of the
metatheory."

That is, that the metalanguage is not the language, and truth is not in this context definable. Godel observed that Truth was not recursively definable, so he backed off to provability, which he showed was. Were truth so definable, then there would be an expression that was both true and untrue - a contradiction. Godel, on the other hand, created an expression that was true but unprovable (in a certain relevant sense), not a contradiction. This a sketch.

But let's once and for all put all this aside, because it has nothing to do with your claims, which you seem to be unable to directly address or answer any questions about.
--------------------
Here is your claim from above:
" My True(L,x) predicate is defined to return true or false for every finite string x on the basis of the existence of a sequence of truth preserving operations that derive x from A set of finite string semantic meanings that form an accurate verbal model of the general knowledge of the actual world that form a finite set of finite strings that are stipulated to have the semantic value of Boolean true."

Let's stipulate that your "verbal model..," which is practically impossible and I suspect theoretically impossible, exists. I assume you mean that finite stings will be input, and that in every case the output will be, correctly, a T or an F. How will it work?

I quote this from your citation:
"We shall show that the sentence x is actually undecidable
and at the same time true. For this purpose we shall pass to a
metatheory of higher order;... the sentence x given in the metatheory can automatically be
carried over into the theory itself: the sentence x which is
undecidable in the original theory becomes a decidable sentence
in the enriched theory," italics added.

Does it escape your notice that the theory, to be efficacious in the desired manner, has been enriched and has to be enriched? Or that the enriched thing - or any enriched thing - is not the same as the thing not enriched?

So your claim of a "correction" is still empty - and makes no sense. Nor is there any suggestion in your citation that Tarski is confused.

And none of this addresses any of my specific questions to you.

Here ,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UmRU_1fGGg0&t=2569s
is a lecture by Allen Guelzo, whom I've never heard of. The lecture is pretty good, but at 44:20 he starts a question and answer, and that is worth the price of listening!