I wouldn't even say that about those philosophers I really can't stand. This is surely a personal problem for you, rather than a problem generally speaking. — S

That isn't an answer. Can you think of anything at all in the Treatise Book 1 that advanced our philosophical knowledge, being original, true and beneficial? So far, no one else has either.

And isn't it you who are concerned with a proof of the external world? A deductive enterprise which you claim is somehow needed? — joshua

My demonstration of an external world is not deductive.

I think you are missing something important here. It is conceivable that the brick will bounce off the window. Of course we don't expect that to happen, but we can't prove that because bricks usually smash through windows that they will always do so. — joshua

You are correct that bricks will not always break windows. In some cases, the window may be made of bullet proof glass. But that doesn't change the fact that when we see a brick go through a window, we are observing the glass break the window. We are observing causation. A sold object cannot pass through a solid object without breaking it. In the case of the bullet proof glass, the brick doesn't go through the window. It simply bounces off.

But the silent assumption is that nature is uniform, that the past determines the future. I know of no non-circular and therefore genuine proof of this. — joshua

This is a very interesting topic. If you are interested, I will provide you with some book titles.

1. Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science by Burtt
https://www.amazon.com/Metaphysical-Foundations-Modern-Science/dp/0486425517/

2. The Foundations of Scientific Inference by Salmon
https://www.amazon.com/Foundations-Scientific-Inference-50th-Anniversary/dp/0822964562/

3. Natural Laws in Scientific Practice by Lange
https://www.amazon.com/Natural-Laws-Scientific-Practice-Lange/dp/0195131487/

I don't agree with everything the authors have written but there are a great many helpful insights in each book. Of course, if you are not interested, then the suggestions.

Offer the average person a proof that the world exists and they might think you are crazy. — joshua

I agree. The goal of publishing my proof is not to stir the masses to get a job or change their life. My goal is to change the way philosophers think and to change the way philosophers teach philosophy. The greatest philosophers, in my opinion, are not the skeptics. Skepticism is important in both philosophy and in science. Skepticism is the motivation for testing your conclusions and gaining a greater confidence in them when they pass the test. But irrational skepticism, the kind of skepticism that Hume had, is unwarranted and slows progress. The greatest philosophers are those who put the irrational skeptics aside, totally ignore them, and go about their work.

For me the problems are X,Y, and Z, and no grand solution is apparent. I can offer trivialities like eat healthy food, don't waste your money on stupid sh*t, try not to need so much, seek employment that's fulfilling, blah blah blah. I think this is good advice for those who generally want to survive, but I see no master plan that makes that comfortable survival important to strangers. And I see no grand purpose for the species. And the problems I see in the world are (to me) manifestations of the opposed forces in my own 'soul', while for a different type of personality the world's problems are the result of a conspiracy of the bads, who of course are other-than the diagnostician. — joshua

This is not a bad digression at all. Philosophy, at least originally, was about life. It was about gaining wisdom to live a better life, accomplish the right things, and be a good citizen. My philosophical interests are very much in this direction. In addition to being interested in philosophy of life, I'm also interested in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science and philosophy of religion. I believe all of these areas of study can help me build a better philosophy of life.

What I do NOT want, as I am developing my philosophy of life, is for some follower of Hume to pop his head up and say "But you can't even prove an external world exists!" That's what Hume was preemptively doing in Section 119 of his first Enquiry. It's annoying. His only purpose is to distract someone from making philosophical progress. That's why it's essential I publish my paper. Once it is done, we can put that bit of irrational skepticism behind us and move on. I consider that real progress.

Refute what? That induction is unjustified? They all joined him on this! — Caldwell

No, philosophers were unable to refute Hume's claim that the external world cannot be demonstrated. Thomas Reid tried a "common sense" approach. Kant tried. GE Moore tried. A great number of philosophers tried. My paper next year will provide an unassailable proof that an external world exists.

Yet I think you agree that nobody needs an OCD proof of the external world. — joshua

I would say that nobody needed a proof before Hume asked for one. Once people were stumped, the proof became necessary which is why I'm publishing one next year.

I suspect that there are lots of people out there who don't make much noise (what's the point?) and yet take science for a useful best guess and philosophy as a bag of tricks that might be good for this or that situation. And as an amusing zoo of vivid personalities who think they've finally got it right. — joshua

Science is much more than a "useful best guess" because it results in useful products and medicines that improve and lengthen our lives and also gives us new facts about which we can philosophize. Philosophy is important for a vast number of reasons, but so much bad philosophy has been published that is weighing people down and holding them back. Philosophy can be a terrific store of epistemological and logical tools and metaphysical facts. Philosophy can provide a platform from which new researches are conducted and new sciences are developed. Right now, philosophy is in a dark place. I think the best service I can provide philosophy is to remove the hindrances to good philosophy by refuting some of the worst philosophers. I'm starting with Hume.

I agree that science has progressed, but I think you are missing the point. There's a tendency to explain things in terms of basic principles which themselves remain unexplained. Sometimes we find a more general theory or set of concepts that offer an explanation, but now this more general theory is true for no reason (or seems true enough for now for no reason.) — joshua

You are absolutely correct that we sometimes find a more general or deeper theory that fits the data better. One example of this was Einstein's theory of gravitation known as his general theory of relativity. Newton's had noticed what he called the universal law of gravitation, which is mathematically an inverse square law. Newton used g as his symbol gravitation. Einstein continued using the symbol g. He continued to recognize the inverse square law. The difference in the theory was the Newton could not explain what caused gravitation and Einstein's theory says it results from the warping of the spacetime continuum. Why do massive objects cause the spacetime continuum to warp? We don't know and so there is room for a deeper theory than Einstein's. But I think you are missing Hume's attitude in this passage. Because he is a skeptic, he is saying "Guys, we really haven't learned that much. There are still lots of things we don't know and we will never find out." Hume was clearly wrong. His skepticism is irrational, unwarranted. I'm thankful that scientists did not listen to him. If they had, I would not be able to book international airline tickets from my smart phone while riding in the back of an Uber.

I find it implausible that 'Hume's followers' are anti-science. Instead I see Hume as a scientist's philosopher. I read him as anti-religious and anti-dogmatic. Consider the part you left out: — joshua

My scientist friends consider Hume anti-science. I don't see how the portion I left out helps make the case that he would applaud the advance of science. His Treatise Book 1 was a frontal attack on Isaac Newton, observation, Newton's law of cause and effect, mathematics (especially geometry which Newton used in the Principia), etc. I know that for a long time the Hume followers taught that Hume was a follower of Newton, but this demonstrably untrue. Hume praised Newton with faint praise but attacked everything he accomplished. See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-newton/

I agree with you that your Socrates quote is real Socrates and not Plato. But Socrates had reason to be skeptical that Hume did not have. Hume lived after Grosseteste, Galileo, Kepler, Bacon, Boyle, Huygens, Hooke, s'Gravesande and Newton. Hume lived after the great burst of the Scientific Revolution and then attempted to deny and fight against the advances these great men made.

Yet he also sees that science has no deductive justification, which is fascinating. — joshua

Science doesn't need deductive justification. Let that sink in.

Regarding Dallas Willard's description of reality, you write:

I greatly like this statement. But I so far also don’t find anything in Hume that would at all contradict its stance. — javra

Yes, I very much like Dallas Willard. I even had the pleasure of meeting him once. To find where Hume runs into reality, read Hume's Treatise, especially the sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.7. No one can read those passages without seeing the absurdities that Hume has run into and the doubts about his philosophy this causes him. Instead of mending his philosophy, he decides on what he calls "mitigated skepticism" a kind of on-again, off-again skepticism.

Causation is an abstract concept or reasoning and, as such, is not directly observable via the physiological senses. — javra

Not true. We can and do observe causation. We observe the transfer of kinetic energy when one pool ball strikes another. We observe causation when we observe the flame consume the match. We observe causation when we observe a brick shatter a window. There is nearly an endless supply of these simple examples.

Rather than get lost in details, I'll try to focus the issue. I don't think Hume doubted the existence of the external world. — joshua

This is a quote from an earlier comment you made. The Treatise Book 1 explains Hume's doubt of the external and his shock the porter was able to rise to the second floor if the stairs were annihilated by Hume's absence. If your only exposure to Hume is his first Enquiry, then you would not be aware of Hume's extreme and pernicious doubt.

I agree with Hume that no argument can prove that there is an external world. — joshua

A rational person would not request a proof. The request is irrational. I explain this in my forthcoming paper which I hope will be published next year.

You provide a quote from Hume:

It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? — Hume

I will give a few hints about my paper. Hume doesn't like sense data. He says sensations are only impressions in the mind and arise from "unknown causes." He says our senses are founded upon our imagination. And Hume tries to distort the meaning of these sensations. For example, Hume likes to pretend that we cannot see depth and distance. As a result, he makes some odd comments about space. Hume really dislikes the sense of touch because it gives a sense of reality. With sense of touch you can discern hardness and softness, heat and cold, pain and pleasure. Hume's dislike of sense data makes him the very opposite of an empiricist. He is the anti-empiricist.

But here is the real key. Hume seems to know absolutely nothing beyond the five senses commonly discussed during his lifetime. Now we know the human body has many other senses under the category interoceptive senses.

The interoceptive senses are those we use to sense the internal condition of our bodies. We can sense whether we are cold or hot. We can sense whether our heart is beating fast or slow. We can sense if we are hungry or full. We can sense if we are thirsty or well-hydrated. We can sense if we are getting enough oxygen or if the air is thin. We can sense if we are losing our balance or if we experience sudden muscle weakness and in some cases we can even sense if we are about to lose consciousness.

Proprioception is among the interoceptive senses. Our bodies have little sensors, called proprioceptors, under our skin and in very high density in our hands, feet and major joints. These sensors tell our brain where our body parts are in space. For example, if you put your hand behind you, you no longer see your hand but the proprioceptors tell you that your hand is behind you. Proprioceptors can tell you if your hand is low to the ground or high over your head. And they can tell you the orientation, whether your palm is facing forward or facing backward. Try it right now.

That is all the hint I'm going to give you regarding my upcoming paper. Perhaps you can figure out the proof of the external world from this.

You mention Kant being inspired by Hume. Indeed. Assuming that you like Kant, that also evidence of Hume's significance. — joshua

I'm not a fan of Kant. Philosophy would have been much better off if Kant had provided a real refutation of Hume as I am about to do.

You provided another lengthy quote from Hume. I would like to comment on a portion of that quote:

These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer — Hume

This is absurd. The quote certainly hasn't aged well. If Hume was a decent student of natural philosophy, he would know how silly this is. Why is Hume not openly mocked in philosophy texts for saying "these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature?" He was certainly no futurist. He had no clue about the discoveries yet to be made relating to electromagnetic forces, radiation, strong and weak nuclear reactions, fluid dynamics, quantum mechanics, atmospheric science, geology, chemistry and biology. Hume was enamored with the skeptical philosophy, not with the advance of science.

Hume concludes:

Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it. — Hume

Do you see what nonsense this is? There is currently strong tension between the disciplines of science and philosophy at the university. This tension, I believe, is largely the result of Hume's followers being irrationally skeptical and anti-science. Philosophy will never progress out of its current darkness until Hume is seen as entirely refuted.

For the same reason he cannot accept there are stairs, he cannot accept there aren't any. He cannot see the occurrence of either. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, this is the essence of Pyrrhonism - the suspension of judgment. But this suspension of judgment is entirely irrational.

In making this point, Hume isn't trying to pose some kind of universe without external objects or even without external objects which we know, but laying out what is demanded by a certain kind of justification. The true sceptic doesn't deny himself the comforts of knowledge because they understand this scepticism isn't strictly a measure of what is known. It's a measure of whether a claim has been justified to a certain standard. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, this is correct. Hume's irrational scepticism isn't trying to prove the non-existence of an external world; it is trying to establish suspension of judgment. In Book 1, Hume speaks in a very dogmatical way but his goal is not to establish knowledge but to establish suspension of judgment. This even applies to the continued existence of objects when they are not being observed such as the stairs. This leads to all kinds of absurdities and inability to reason properly in Treatise 1.4.7. Hume then goes for, and leads his followers to go for, a totally unprincipled "mitigated scepticism" which is "on-again, off-again." Hume was forced to give up his goal of living a life that was philosophically consistent. Why? Because he was unwilling to give up his irrational scepticism.

Once you read the proof of an external world, the suspension of judgment about an external world goes away. And so do all of the absurdities and inconsistencies. It is possible to live a life that is philosophically consistent. Hume failed to show the way.

If you're not convinced there's nothing of value in one's philosophy that claims our understanding based on our observation cannot be justified, then that's your opinion. But Hume had made a statement that's deceptively simple it freaked the heck out of the entire caboodle of philosophers. — Caldwell

Yes, it did freak out a bunch of philosophers and no one knew how to refute him. But Hume's idea was still completely irrational. He did not add to our philosophical knowledge because he was wrong and I can prove it.

Kinetic energy is implied in the the movement of the pool balls. We grasp its truth, but never the thing "kinetic". It's not separable from the other things in the room, like the balls. Yet you speak of it like you could literally hold it in your hand, with or without the balls. — Caldwell

I think you are trying to draw too fine a distinction here. When you see motion, you are looking at kinetic energy. That's all you really need to think about. When you see an object at rest, then you are looking at inertial energy.

Yes.

Hume isn't laying out a rejection of external objects, knowledge or philosophy. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I did not claim that Hume was rejecting external objects. I'm saying the Treatise Book 1 lays out Hume's argument as to why we do not have a proof of external objects and Hume's argument that it is irrational to believe in the continued existence of objects not seen.

I see that you have not read all of my comments. I can't say I blame you. It's a lot to read. But in my comments above I quote Hume bewildered by the fact the porter was able to reach his room on the second floor as he was under the belief the stairs would be annihilated if he was not looking at them. That seems ridiculous to us, right? But that is where Hume's doctrines lead him. His philosophy is irrational and unlivable. He attempts to make his philosophy livable by changing to a "mitigated scepticism." This mitigated scepticism is just an unprincipled "on-again, off-again" scepticism. He will be sceptical when philosophising but will not be sceptical when he gets hungry! Hume says a "true sceptic" doesn't deny himself these comforts.

Come on, admit it. That's dishonest on Hume's part!

The idea that one should bother with a proof of the external world strikes me as absurd. Only a person in the grip of madness doubts the external world, and they might as well doubt the legitimacy of a complicated 'proof' of this world as well. So I think we agree that doubting the external world is just ridiculous. — joshua

If your only exposure to Hume is his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, I can see why you might think that. Hume does not even hint at his doubt of the external world in the early part of the book (but read section 119 closely). However, in his Treatise Book 1, Hume is highly skeptical and he is very upfront about it. He was much influenced by Pyrrhonism.

The goal of Pyrrhonism is the “suspension of judgement” resulting in a lack of knowledge or belief about everything, including what things absolutely and really exist. By suspending judgement, Pyrrhonists believe they will achieve a state of happiness marked by freedom from distress and worry. Pyrrhonism was distilled into the “ten modes of Aenesidemus” or the “five modes of Agrippa.” Hume has developed his own series of doctrines which have the same goal as Aenesidemus and Agrippa, suspension of judgement. Hume describes and attempts to support these doctrines in the first part of the Treatise Book 1.

Kant read Hume and was "awakened" from his "dogmatic slumbers." Kant said it was a scandal that philosophy had never offered a solid proof of an external world and he then described a proof that he claimed was the only possible proof. People found it wanting. Others have tried and their efforts have also been found wanting. You can read Moore's famous proof here. http://joelvelasco.net/teaching/4330/moore-onskepticism.pdf

You are correct that most people, even most philosophers accept the reality of objects external to their minds. But there is a significant minority of Hume followers who do not accept that it is proven, even though they may agree it is probable. Hume followers do not have much faith in probability.

If you want to know more about Hume and his view of the external world, you can read Hume in Treatise Book 1 or you can read the book by HH Price.
https://www.amazon.com/Humes-Theory-External-Habberley-1940-12-06/dp/B01HC14VU4/

Can you explain the difference between them? — Janus

Yes. Potential energy is the energy an object holds relative to other objects. Think of a boulder perched on the side of a cliff above a highway. Someone or something, perhaps gravity, dislodges the boulder so that it begins rolling down the hillside. Once it begins rolling, you are looking at kinetic energy. Before it begins rolling, you are looking at potential energy. Another way to conceive of potential energy is the store of energy necessary to put the boulder back in its original position above the highway. To put the boulder back would require you to expend energy. The energy you expend in that effort is now the potential energy stored in the boulder once it is back in place.

Mass rest energy I explained last time. To repeat, Einstein came up with the equation E=mc^2. This equation explains conversion of energy to matter and matter to energy. Matter to energy is easy to explain by thinking of a fire in the firepit. The wood, coal or natural gas in the firepit is the matter. By burning it, you turn matter into heat energy. That's one example.

Inertial energy is the energy an object has at rest. This may seem confusing because it sounds similar to mass rest energy, because relates to objects at rest. But only the names are similar. Inertial energy doesn't have to do with conversion but to motion. The more massive the object, the greater its inertial energy. The shape of the object also contributes to its inertial energy. One billiard ball can easily move another billiard ball because the second billiard is round, it rolls easily and is the same size as the first billiard ball. But if you put a much bigger, flat boulder on the billiard table, the billiard ball would not be able to move it even when moving quickly. The boulder has a lot more inertial energy than the ball.

Newton described vis inertia in his Principia but this is one of the issues Hume never understood. Motion, power, energy, inertia were all mysteries to him. But lack of facts never stopped Hume from pontificating from his position of suspension of judgment.

But again, by what standards do you demarcate the goodness of ideas? — javra

This is a good and fair question. In general terms, the goodness of ideas is found in their truthfulness and their benefit. Truth is that which is in accord with reality. Reality, in the words of the great philosopher Dallas Willard, is "what you run into when you are wrong." Running into reality can be painful. By knowing more of the truth, then you will experience less pain - which we can all agree is a benefit.

More specifically, in terms of philosophy, I'm wondering what in Hume's Treatise Book 1 has shown itself to be true and beneficial? Hume's claim that we cannot know that external objects exist is irrational (and disproven in the paper I'm preparing). Hume's idea that causation cannot be observed is counter to our everyday experience and completely irrational. Hume's attack on induction is original but vastly overstated.

Perhaps you are wondering if any philosopher has ever lived up to the lofty standards I am expecting of Hume. Yes! For example, Aristotle's physics are terrible. He was wrong about many things. But he is also the author of deductive logic. It is not that Aristotle was the first to use deductive logic, but he was the first to write down the rules. Of course, the rules have been clarified and enlarged over the centuries and new forms of logic have arisen. But Aristotle's work here is both original and good. Aristotle has added to our store of philosophical knowledge. Hume has not.

I think of Hume as a sensible, serious guy. — joshua

I have read Hume's first Enquiry. Have you read his Treatise?

Hume says that his philosophy is the same in both books, I believe this to be mainly accurate although there are a few changes. In addition, the Treatise is much more specific about why he holds the views he does. The Treatise is also much more honest about the absurdities his philosophy creates. Hume goes into great deal about this in Treatise 1 iv 7. Have you read it?

Sometimes Hume struggles to maintain his idea that external objects do not have a real or continued existence when not being observed:

I am here seated in my chamber with my face to the fire; and all the objects, that strike my senses, are contained in a few yards around me. My memory, indeed, informs me of the existence of many objects; but then this information extends not beyond their past experience, nor do either my senses or memory give any testimony to the continuance of their being. When therefore I am thus seated, and revolve over these thoughts, I hear on a sudden a noise as of a door turning upon its hinges; and a little after see a porter, who advances toward me. This gives occasion to many new reflections in reasonings. First, I never have observed, that this noise could proceed from anything but the motion of a door; and therefore conclude, that the present phenomenon is a contradiction to all past experience, unless the door, which I remember on the other side of the chamber, be still in being. Again I have always found, that a human body was possessed of a quality, which I call gravity, and which hinders it from mounting in the air, as this porter must have done to arrive at my chamber, unless the stairs I remember be not annihilated by my absence. But this is not all. I receive a letter, which upon opening it I perceive by the handwriting and subscription to have come from a friend, who says he is two hundred leagues distant. It is evident I can never account for this phenomenon, conformable to my experience in other instances, without spreading out my mind the whole sea and continent between us, and supposing the effects and continued existence of posts and ferries, according to my memory and observation. To consider these phenomena of the porter and letter in a certain light, they are contradictions to common experience, and may be regarded and may be considered objections to these maxims, which we form concerning the connections of causes and effects. I am accustomed to hear such a sound, and see such an object in motion at the same time. I have not received in this particular instance both these perceptions. These observations are contrary, unless I suppose that the door still remains, and that it was opened without my perceiving it: And this supposition, which was at first entirely arbitrary and hypothetical, acquires a force and evidence by its being the only one, upon which I can reconcile these contradictions…. Here then I am naturally led to regard the world, as something real and durable, and as preserving its existence, even when it is no longer present to my perception. Location 2910, 32%, Treatise 1.4.2

For most people, Hume’s experience would be adequate to persuade then that a world of objects external to their mind really exists. But Hume has embraced this idea that sense data cannot convey the existence of objects external to the mind and so he’s in a quandary. For those among us who are convinced of the external existence of objects, it is easy to believe in their continued existence when not being sensed. Hume’s idea that the stairs should be annihilated by his absence seems absolutely bizarre to us, but follows, if uncomfortably, for those who are not convinced in the existence of external objects.

Hume continues his “reasonings”:
But whatever force we may ascribe to this principle, I am afraid it is too weak to support alone so vast an edifice, as is that of the continued existence of all external bodies; and that we must join the constancy of their appearance to the coherence, in order to give a satisfactory account of that opinion. As the explication of this will lead me into a considerable compass a very profound reasoning; I think it proper, in order to avoid confusion, to give a short sketch or abridgement of my system, and afterwards draw out all its parts in their full compass. This inference from the constancy of our perceptions, like the precedent from their coherence, gives rise to the opinion of the continued existence of body, which is prior to that of its distinct existence, and produces that latter principal. Location 2943, 32% Hume, Treatise, 1.4.2

And so despite the logical need for stairs to exist for the porter to climb, in spite of the logical need for his friend to continue to exist in order to write him a letter, in spite of his friend’s statement of being 200 leagues distant - even so, Hume cannot find a reason to believe in the continued existence of an external world. Hume loves sceptical thoughts too much to let them go.

In his Abstract, which Hume wrote to increase sales of his Treatise, Hume writes about himself and his philosophy in the third person. Paragraph 28 reads:

By all that has been said the reader will easily perceive that the philosophy contained in this book is very sceptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience; and the belief, which attends experience, is explained to be nothing but a peculiar sentiment, or lively conception produced by habit. Nor is this all; when we believe anything of external existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer perceived, this belief is nothing but a sentiment of the same kind. Our author insists upon several other sceptical topics; and upon the whole concludes that we assent to our faculties, and employ our reason, only because we cannot help it. Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it. (Abstract, Para 28)
http://web.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/web%20publishing/hume'sabstract.htm

This is a telling paragraph. While Hume began with doctrines designed to support full Pyrrhonian scepticism, when he arrived at his destination he found it unlivable. Hume reports that “nature is too strong for it.” This is an interesting phrase. If an external world cannot be known, what is this 'nature' Hume refers to?

Later Hume will attempt that to make his philosophy livable one must adopt an unprincipled "on-again, off-again" scepticism. This is what you call "sensible scepticism." His attempt doesn’t really work, because it is inconsistent and Hume retains the doctrines that lead to full scepticism.

Changes in Hume’s philosophy between his A Treatise of Human Nature (THN) and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (EHU) have been noted by others. One change was that Hume was unhappy with his reasonings on personal identity in THN and so he does not address the subject in EHU. The present point is that the beginning of EHU contains little hint that Hume doubts the existence of an external world. However in Section 119 of EHU, Hume shows that he still holds this view:

119. By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.

It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.

Clearly, Hume denies the possibility of knowing if objects external to the mind actually exist or not. Interestingly, Hume does not discuss in EHU the difficulties such a view visits on daily life, as he did on THN.

Hume's "sensible scepticism" is really just an admission that his philosophy is irrational and unlivable.

An object moving does not look like kinetic energy, because if it did you would be able to gauge from the mere appearance the degree of kinetic energy present. — Janus

But you can! Kinetic energy is motion. To measure or estimate the kinetic energy, you multiply mass times velocity. At the same speed, the larger the object the greater the kinetic energy. Also, at the same mass, the faster it's moving the greater the kinetic energy.

Let's take for example, a thrown baseball. You can see that a 45 mph pitch is not moving as fast as a 95 mph pitch. And you intuitively know that the 95 mph pitch has more kinetic energy and would hurt far more than a 45 mph pitch.

In the same way, if a car bumps into you at 0.5 mph, it won't hurt much. But if a car hits you at 35 mph it will probably kill you. You can literally see the kinetic energy is much greater and much more dangerous at 35 mph.

Now let's look at the kinetic energy in hurricane force winds. The air molecules (nitrogen, oxygen, argon, carbon dioxide, etc.) being blown about are so small you cannot see them. Because there are so many small molecules you calculate the kinetic energy differently and it's much more complicated. See https://planetcalc.com/4773/

We have to use instruments for some of the inputs for that calculation. However, you can see trees blowing about as an effect of the wind and you can estimate the speed of the wind from its effects. To your point, we can also feel the power of the wind. To my point, we can observe its effects and estimate its speed and we can use instruments to study the kinetic energy of wind more precisely.

I am already aware enough of the different categories of energy, so no need to school me on that. If we can see kinetic energy then we ought to be able to see "potential energy, rest energy and inertial energy" (which are really all just potential energy as far as I remember) but we can't. When we see an object at rest we cannot see its potential energy which depends on its mass, which we cannot see. A moving object's kinetic energy also depends on its mass and we can't see that there either. — Janus

No, potential energy, mass rest energy and inertial energy are not the same. And yes, we can see them all if we know what we are looking at. I won't bore with a full report, but let's look at rest mass energy for a moment. We learned from Einstein that matter is convertible into energy and energy into matter. That's what his famous equation E=mc^2 was all about. You can easily compare the rest mass energy of one small object to the rest mass energy of another small object. Rest mass energy also contains the kinetic energy, so if one of them is moving - that complicates things.

Hume admitted in the Treatise that he did not understand motion. When he discusses motion, he talks about "unknown causes." The causes are not unknown to the natural philosophers of his day, only to Hume because he didn't complete his degree.

what does kinetic energy look like to you? — Janus

Kinetic energy looks like an object moving, such as an object falling or a ball rolling down an incline plane. If you had read of Galileo's experiments or Huygens work on pendulums or the experiments by s'Gravesande, this would be obvious. But even without those experiments, don't you instinctively feel that a falling boulder is dangerous? If you saw a boulder rolling quickly down a hill, wouldn't you want to get out of the way? Of course you would! Ask yourself why! You know the boulder moving quickly has force and energy and would do you great damage.

This is, at least in part, why Galileo studied motion, Huygens studied pendulums and s'Gravesande studied kinetic energy. s'Gravesande would use objects of different weights and drop onto soft clay from different heights. Then he would measure the depth of the impression the object made in the clay as a way to measure the object's kinetic energy. Of course, he wasn't calling it that. The term "kinetic energy" wasn't coined until the 1800s, but that is what he was measuring.

Objects have different types of energy as well. There is potential energy, rest energy and inertial energy. When an object is moving, you are looking at kinetic energy. It is plainly visible and can be mathematically modeled. Kinetic energy can be of any size, any shape and any speed. Kinetic energy doesn't have color because color is a secondary quality.

We don't literally see kinetic energy, — Janus

When you see an object moving, why do you think that you are not seeing kinetic energy?

If anyone knows any Hume followers, please invite them to this thread. If anyone can show me something both good and original in Hume's Treatise Book 1, I will appreciate it!

I think it is not a master of being able to see energy but of being able to feel it bodily. — Janus

I disagree. We absolutely can see kinetic energy. Anytime you see a falling object, you are looking at kinetic energy. You may not think of that term, but you instinctively know that you do not want to be under a falling boulder because that boulder will hurt you by its kinetic energy.

Also, whenever we look at flame we can see its destructive power. It quickly consumes whatever it is using as fuel. There's no reasonable doubt the flame is causing the fuel to be consumed. You can literally watch it happen.

How would you prove that they are wrong, that it's the first ball and not God which causes the second ball to move? — Dusty of Sky

Because I don't believe God would deceive us. We can plainly see that one ball has kinetic energy. Kinetic energy is a well-understood, well-described force. For God to be the cause of the second ball moving, God would have to interrupt the action of the moving ball as cause and then insert his own more immediate cause in its place. To do so would be ludicrous, deceptive and unnecessary. Ockham's Razor would say that such an explanation is unnecessary speculation.

But you'd observe the same thing if you were watching an animation of pool balls. We can only observe phenomena, but not the reasons behind phenomena. Reasons are not available to our senses, only to our intellects. — Dusty of Sky

But we are not watching an animation. As long as you accept that the external world is real, there is no difficulty in understanding that a moving billiard ball has kinetic energy.

"Reasons are not available to our senses, only to our intellects." Our senses and our brains work alongside each other constantly. It is not possible to separate the actions of the two. The light flashing on our retinas sends signals to our brains which our brains must interpret. We easily interpret a moving billiard ball as having kinetic energy. This is so easy to do that a child will do it on the child's first exposure to colliding pool balls. Take a three year old to a pool table and ask them what happened when one ball causes another to move and they will tell you plainly that one ball caused the other to move.

Humans intuitively understand events in the world as being causal. But the fact that we intuitively understand the world to be this way doesn't mean that our understanding is correct. We can observe the pool balls striking each other and then moving as a succession of events. But we can't observe the reason why this happens. — Dusty of Sky

"Humans intuitively understand events to be causal." This is at least partly true. Events are understood to be causal. This may be because of intuition and it may be due to the principle of sufficient reason which I take as a reliable axiom of philosophy.

"But we can't observe the reason why this happens." Yes, we can. When we see a billiard ball moving, we can understand that a moving billiard ball has kinetic energy. When the first ball strikes the second ball, the first ball has less kinetic energy (it may slow or stop) and the second ball begins to roll. The second ball now has the kinetic energy. You can watch the transfer of kinetic energy as it happens. There is no question about this. And it can be confirmed by mathematics.

Did you consider the burning match example?

Hume was a one-trick pony. — lambda

I am not a fan of Hume. I just started a thread on Hume and I'm hoping that both fans and anti-fans would come join the conversation.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6682/what-advance-in-epistemological-or-metaphysical-knowledge-did-david-hume-bring-us

Why is Hume seen so highly by Academics, and yet it doesn't trickle down to us amateurs? — Agustino

I'm not a fan of David Hume. I started a thread about Hume and would love for you to join the conversation.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6682/what-advance-in-epistemological-or-metaphysical-knowledge-did-david-hume-bring-us

Hume is one of my favorites — Terrapin Station

Hume is one of my least favorites. I've started a thread and I'm hoping fans of Hume will come answer a question for me and join the discussion.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6682/what-advance-in-epistemological-or-metaphysical-knowledge-did-david-hume-bring-us

I no longer have that ambition to try to justify induction. — Purple Pond

I can't help but wonder if you have read The Science of Scientific Inference by Wesley Salmon. It is quite good.

Also, I am not a fan of David Hume. I started a thread here asking "What advance in epistemological or metaphysical knowledge did David Hume bring us?" I invite you to come check it out.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6682/what-advance-in-epistemological-or-metaphysical-knowledge-did-david-hume-bring-us

So it seems obvious, but at the same time eludes strict proof. It seems to me like Hume's scepticism is thereby validated. — Echarmion

Yes, the external world seems obvious to me and is also demonstrable. It is also clear that a great many philosophers have seen the external world as obvious but their "proofs" have failed to be persuasive. I don't see how it could be my fault that they did not present better proofs. Nor do I see their failure to do so as a validation of Hume's skepticism which was irrational from the start.

I also think his realization that certain basic concepts, like causality, can not be gleaned by observation is important. — Echarmion

Yes, you are correct that Hume does make the claim that we cannot observe causation. Again, this is clearly false and I will write a future paper on this. Let me explain briefly. Hume was not a student of natural philosophy. While a student at University of Edinburgh, Hume never completed his degree. The fourth year of study required him to complete a course in natural philosophy, but Hume never did. There is no evidence, for example, that Hume ever read the works of Galileo on motion or Johannes Kepler on mathematical physics or Christiaan Huygens on pendulums. If Hume had read Galileo, Kepler and Huygens, he would have had a better foundation to understand Newton. There is evidence that Hume read Newton but he clearly did not understand him. Hume attacked Newton badly in the Treatise. If Hume had studied natural philosophy, he would never have made the claims he made regarding causation.

Hume's illustration of the billiard ball was particularly ill-advised as Hume knew that Locke had discussed this. Although Locke was not a natural philosopher, Locke understood from Newton that one billiard ball can transfer its force by "impulse." When you see one billiard ball roll up and strike another, you are observing a transfer of kinetic energy. There is no question about this. Hume's argument that we jump to this conclusion because of habit or constant conjunction is clearly false. Take a small child to see his first pool table and the child instantly understands that one pool ball has caused the second ball to move. The child understands it the very first time he sees it. Every pool shark with $20 riding on a game has said "Eight ball in the corner pocket." He knows causation is involved. Without causation such predictions would not be profitable. For better philosophy, Hume should have spent more time playing billiards and less time playing backgammon.

The only ground from which one could question causation in this context is if the person held it was not possible to know that an external world exists. To anyone operating on the view the external world is real, then observation of causation is perfectly straightforward in these simple examples. This is also true of Hume's illustration of the burning match. You can watch the flame consume the match. There is no reasonable doubt one is watching causation here.

Again, is there anyone who can think of anything Hume wrote in Treatise Book 1 that is both original and valuable?

I think it is obvious that an external world exists. I don't think that Kant's proof or Moore's proof or any other proof has been persuasive so far and so I'm preparing a paper for a philosophy journal on a new proof of the external world.

Hume was not the first to bring up the problem of induction. Due to his view that the external world is not provable, Hume greatly overstates the problem of induction. Can you think of anything Hume wrote that is both original and valuable?

Anyway the reason I said what I said about an N dimensional space bending in an (N+1) dimensional space is for a reason that appeals to my and hopefully other's intuitions. If a particular N dimensional space is to "bend" then it requires the next higher dimension to do it in. Now that I think of it might just be the right interpretation because take a flat sheet of paper (2 D space) and "bend" it. What do you notice? It acquires a 3 D form. — TheMadFool

Not at all. Imagine a string lying in a straight line on a sheet of paper. Now bend the same string and it continues to lie flat on the piece of paper. It does not acquire a 3 D form.

Cosmologists say the form of the universe could be open, closed or flat. For decades, they mostly assumed it was closed. More recent measurements, which always come with error bars, indicate the universe is very close to flat. In fact, the universe is so big we will never be able to prove the universe is not flat. But the universe could have been closed, which means space would be curved on itself so that if you went in one direction you would end up back where you started. The 4 D spacetime continuum warps and bends due to massive objects. This does not require a fifth dimension.

God is indeed dead if he is construed to be separate from anything. Which is how [Western] Christians, by and large, construed God in the 19th century (and some centuries before -- not all, though). Nietzsche's critique is dead on :D when it is aimed at the right target. — Mariner

In what sense is God dead?

Thank you for the link to the paper. I've only glanced at the paper so far, but it looks like interesting reading. I'm behind on my reading but I WILL read this.

Right now I'm trying to concentrate on Newton and Hume's attack on Newton's law of cause and effect.

Why should growth and education give meaning and purpose? The idea seems silly to me. Did Dewey attempt to defend such a proposition in any of his works?

John Dewey thought it possible to make moral judgments on what I think would be called an "objective" basis without bringing God into play. I find it hard to believe that any "crisis" exists, myself, though I don't doubt some do. — Ciceronianus the White

Does Dewey discuss Nietzsche or nihilism much? Does Dewey claim that life can have meaning and purpose?

No worries. I often make similar typing mistakes.

No, most people find nihilism repugnant and unlivable. The crisis is to find a way to embrace both atheism and purpose in life. James Sire, in his book The Universe Next Door, wrote that existentialism, post-modernism and new age are all attempts to embrace atheism while transcending nihilism in some way. But it doesn't seem that any of these attempts have been successful.

So an argument could be made that Spinoza argues for a objective morality based on an immanent God, which survives Nietzsche's critique. — Nop

That's an interesting thought. Can you think of any followers of Spinoza that have published that idea?

Gene mutation is random, natural selection is non-random. — Nop

Can you think of a more descriptive term for natural selection than "non-random?" If it isn't random, what is it?

Well-stated for a nihilist perspective, but the vast majority of philosophers are not nihilists and never will be.

My sources tell me that Erik Wielenberg is one atheist philosopher who has tried to embrace moral realism and purpose in life. But his is only one name. I'm looking for more.