What is will, free will?
But my question is simpler. Apparently will is in tension with reason; i.e., not reason. I take free will for granted and can adduce my own arguments in favor of its existence. (Along the lines of, do I wear white socks or black socks today.) But the Greeks, not so much. And Luther, not on your nelly! — tim wood
'A tension with reason' ?
'will' and 'reason' do not appear 'tensioned' but they are it seams points at which some thing undergoes a transition from: cosmic to natural to human. No more than the child has a tension with his/her adolescent or mature form. The 'will' is temporally antecedent to or perhaps contemporaneous with the 'thought', and subsequent reasoning or the 'thinking', which precedes the doing, and appears to come after the 'arrival' of the will. The relationship between 'will' and 'reason' appears entirely temporal and natural, it seems to have a temporal flow, that is applied by consciousness.
Nietzsche writes : "A thought comes when it will, not when I will"
If we consider this assertion carefully I think it points to the historicity of thought itself. In more modern parlance one might assert that instinctual imperative precedes thought and determines the general form of thought, a functional 'reasoning' is subsequently applied to this deeper imperative, and thought seems to be the consequence. The quality of the thought is dependent upon that of the reasoning, but neither 'need' to get the interpretation of the initiating instinct or 'will' correct in toto. Nature seems to revel in misinterpretation in order to produce variance. The correct interpretation of 'will' by the individual may well be the purest form of intelligence as it more correctly correlates with the source of subsequent thought?
The functional reasoning is purely subjective-logic towards the end of satisfying the initial instinctual imperative. In this sense a more modern interpretation of 'will' might be 'instinctual imperative'. These are and may well be continually misunderstood by reason. (Human intelligence or reason may well be in its infancy in this regard)
This definition of 'will' might then be confined to a 'natural function' in the sense that instinctual imperatives are derivations out of of the natural order, and they simply direct the animal towards the satisfaction of Natural as opposed to personal objectives (there is no 'point' to sex for example).
What is important then is to as what is the 'objective(s)' that nature is compelling us towards vis the experience of will? An ultimate form of the evolving Universe?
Anaxagoras may have come close to a notion of 'will' in his concept of 'nous'
Schopenhauer has effectively excluded the notion that you 'might choose your socks' from the concept of a 'freedom' of the will. One cannot effectively assume a freedom of will simply because one thinks about the choice of socks prior to the deed of putting one on, or leaving it in the drawer.
M