Philosophy has become in large part insular and self-referential. Written by philosophers for philosophers. — Fooloso4

Has this not always been the case? I suppose philosophers may not have always been writing for philosophers. But they have always been writing for a small target audience. Though occasional writings may break through to a larger audience, even that audience tends to be limited to intellectuals.

How would philosophy look different if philosophy had not "went wrong"?

However, memetics ain't language any more than shapes are clouds or events are time. — 180 Proof

Indeed.

I am what's left when you subtract out the Other, yes. — frank

Indeed!

So a sense of self emerges from the process of becoming the still centre of a world in smooth predictable motion. You and your target are one. Two halves of the psychological equation. The wider world is likewise reduced to a continuous flow. The brain is modelling reality in a cleanly divided fashion which is not a model of the world, but a model of us in the world as the world’s still and purposeful centre, with the world then passing by in a smooth and predictable manner. — apokrisis

Good stuff.

↪Mikie Proudly declaring your ignorance. Not a good look. — Jamal

As opposed to proudly pretending not to be ignorant?

you might get more responses if your post was more than "Go and research Zizek for me so I don't have to." — bert1

:-)

putting things in my own words forces me to think through and articulate what I think is meant by a statement. What may seem clear to me upon reading it may turn out to need further work on my part if I am to understand it. — Fooloso4

excellent point!

I would go so far as to say that if I cannot put it my own words, then I do not understand it.

But those sources didn’t prepare me for the real thing, which was a life-changing experience for me. — Joshs

My experience is very much the same.

Now I continuously read Being and Time in conjunction with other writers. I especially like William Blattner and Taylor Carmen.

From a religious perspective, God is more pleased by a genuine search of the truth instead of a blind assent to authority. That is besides the point though. Philosophically speaking, truth must be searched and questioned absolutely until it is found absolutely and can no longer be questioned absolutely. Recognizably, this is not easy, yet Christ has taught that the Christian life is not easy. However, you are correct that questioning one's beliefs can actually strengthen those beliefs, or if one discovers the truth, destroy that belief. Yet if you discover the truth, then those beliefs were better off gone. Truth is the ideal principle of Christianity, as Christ is in the faith, Truth Himself. At least, this is what Christ intended, but that many Christians do not practice Truth, or even understand the truth of Truth, is reality. — IP060903

Good stuff.

All should question their beliefs on a regular and ongoing basis.

I never said anything about definition or meaning — Mikie

Then why did you spend so much time arguing that the definition given didn't count?

Perhaps I misinterpreted. Either way, we had an excellent discussion and we seem to be in agreement that the ontology thesis presented in Being and Time is worthy of being studied as an ontology thesis regardless of significant moral shortcomings on the part of the author.

I re-read all of your posts on this thread and they are good.

I'm an atheist — plaque flag

when asked if I believe in God, I usually (and honestly) say "sometimes."

It's not that it isn't consistent, it just seems unlikely that this is what Heidegger wants to say about it rather than describing the common (albeit tacit) understanding — Mikie

Again, you are the one who is making this in to something bigger than it is and I can only guess as to why, i.e., you seem to think that definition and meaning are synonymous. They are not. For example, the "definition" of a cross as "a mark, object, or figure formed by two short intersecting lines or pieces" is insignificant compared to its "meaning" for some religions.

Similarly, there is no doubt that the the "definition" of being Heidegger offers is insignificant compared to the "meaning" of being that Heidegger intends to and does articulate.

With all due respect, it is only in your head that the offering of an introductory definition must be considered significant.

I think it is a good definition and gives little away.

I am done now.

I was raised Catholic myself. — plaque flag

me too.

I agree. He is twisting his inheritance. Falling immersion is a state of [ original, necessary ] sin. Felix culpa ! — plaque flag

I have stated on many occasions that Heidegger is not a good person for many reasons with his Nazism being foremost among them.

And this is an example of what is number 2 on the list, intellectual dishonesty. Heidegger would go out of his way to interpret the most fragmented and obscure text in such way as to support his ontology and in such a way as to suggest that the pre-Socratics agreed with him and he was just returning philosophy to its roots. Simply put, his intellectual honesty is suspect.

Regardless of manifest expressions or lack thereof in the post-Husserlian writings leading up to and including (at least) SuZ, the 'structure' (language-speaking) of H's (early?) reflections on 'being', it's reasonable to assume, was markedly influenced – though of course not exclusively determined – by his (early) Jesuit education, studying neo-Thomist theology before switching to neo-Kantian philosophy and writing a habilitation thesis (i.e. PhD dissertation) on the Scholastic theologian-philosopher Dun Scotus. Not long after, H would make a considerable study of 'biblical hermeneutics' (e.g. Dilthey & theologian Schleiermacher) which, reformulated, plays a centrol role in SuZ. — 180 Proof

Indeed!

In this context, I think it’s much more likely that this sentence wasn’t meant as a serious definition. — Mikie

Whether you consider it a "serious" definition is beside the point.

And as I already stated, it is William Blattner (not I) who argues that by "meaning" Heidegger is getting at "structure."

And I do not see why it would be such a big deal to offer an introductory definition of the term whose "meaning" he wishes to articulate. After all, "definition" and "meaning" are not necessarily synonymous.

How serious you choose to take the definition is up to you. But the definition is consistent with all that follows.

Yes, I’m very familiar with that one line. Once context is put back, it’s not necessarily Heidegger’s claim. And it would be very odd indeed if this casual sentence is the final word on it. — Mikie

I disagree.

First, I do not understand what you mean when you say it is not necessarily Heidegger's claim. Whose claim is it?

And second and most important of all, since the project of which Being and Time is a part is laying out the structure of being rather than defining being, Heidegger's definition of being is hardly the final word on the structure of being.

But as for what being is? Heidegger, as far as I’ve seen, never really says. — Mikie

"Being [is] that upon the basis of which entities are already understood." Being and Time, pp. 25-26.

As for the "meaning" of being, William Blattner argues that Heidegger is after the "structure" of being. And Heidegger most definitely has something to say about that.

We do tend to attach cool sounding labels to that which we cannot explain and then proceed as if the label explains all.

But Being and Time is the famous book, so everyone grabs that. To me it's not the best introduction. A little Heidegger Reader might be better. — plaque flag

His lectures were published at his leisure while Being and Time was rushed. Both the History of the Concept of Time and Basic Problems of Phenomenology were first published in the 1970s. Being and Time was a classic by then.

Well, if they don't work very hard to 'conserve' affordable prices on beer, then I will sharpen my pitchfork even more, and persuade the rich people, that we are all coming to drink free beer at their houses — universeness

I like beer.

We are so Cartesian.

I can't comment on the later Heidegger. I will reiterate that his style is direct and clear in the lectures that led up to the writing of Being and Time. — plaque flag

I agree. The same is true of some of the lectures immediately following Being and Time as contained in Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

It was unstated and not argued because that is not my position. — Fooloso4

I did not mean to suggest otherwise. I was speaking about the the thread in general.

The first is what his contribution to ethics might be. I don't see anything in his discussion of care that applies to ethics. — Fooloso4

I agree. I am unaware of any significant contribution to ethics on the part of Heidegger.

My primary interest in Heidegger is Division One of Being and Time. I am far more interested in the nature of being than I am in either prosecuting or defending Heidegger.

Isn't that the problem? Heidegger's 'care' does not answer the question raised: — Fooloso4

No. That is not the problem. I raised the question and the question was not being asked of Heidegger. There seems to be an unstated and essentially unargued claim that philosophical works may be dismissed if their authors fail to meet a heightened standard of morality.

Heidegger was not a good person for many reasons with his Nazism foremost among those reasons. But that does not render invalid everything he has to say about the meaning of being anymore than Nazism renders invalid every significant cinematic idea of Leni Riefenstahl or engineering principle of SS Officer Wernher von Braun.

I suspect that Being and Time was fated to be a major philosophical work regardless of the fortunes of the Nazis.

Well said.

The basis of Dasien’s being-in-the-world is care. By care, Heidegger does not mean sentimental concern. He means that our connection with other people and things ( the things we experienced are understood by reference to their relevance to our human relationships) is one of pragmatic involvement — Joshs

It is often difficult for some (especially those whose native tongue is English) to get a grasp on Heidegger's concept of care. One could care very much about being a good Nazi.

Tribalism fuels hatred which fuels politics which fuels tribalism. . .

I suppose it is a matter of where one jumps into the circle. . .

education is only helpful in procuring better jobs — Isaac

Emphasis added.

A bit of a stretch.

tribalism is the main issue — Tom Storm

Tribalism fuels hatred which fuels politics which fuels tribalism which fuels hatred . . . ad nauseum, ad infinitum.

"The ability to make choices not constrained by determinism or randomness". — Cidat

What would make the above definition of free will (or any other definition) a "libertarian" definition?

That depends on what you take the practice of philosophy to be about. — Fooloso4

Are you suggesting that there are definitions of philosophy the practice of which would require one to be a good person? And is a focus upon being somehow outside the realm of the "Socratics?" Certainly Plato had his ontology.

Would one have to be just in order to inquire in to "justice?" I suspect many who condemned Socrates to death sincerely considered themselves just and were considered by many fellow Athenians to be so.

I do not consider myself informed enough to be considered a philosopher — Athena

I do not know what that means. Being "informed" about history would not make you an historian, being informed about science would not make you a scientist and so on. I suspect that no amount of information would make one a philosopher.

At bottom, philosophy strikes me as an ongoing discussion over the nature of reality. Either one participates in the discussion in a meaningful way or one does not.

And for people who do, their views are likely to be significantly different near the end of the discussion than they were near the beginning.

I did not bring up his Nazi affiliation. — Fooloso4

Do you have to be a good person to be a good philosopher?

Do you have to be a good person to be a good Doctor, lawyer, teacher, mathematician, writer, president, scientist. . ., etc.

A critical reading of Heidegger is not a rejection of Heidegger. It is not an argument to not read Heidegger. — Fooloso4

Exactly. Even his greatest critics have read him.

A definition is a statement that specifies the correct use of a term. — Jamal

I disagree. I define a term when I want people to understand the manner in which I am using it. Rarely is the manner in which I am using the term the only manner it should be used.

It is good that the case against Heidegger has been made persuasively, but his Nazi sympathies and antisemitism have been known for a long time. It is, however, now more difficult for his apologists to separate the man from his philosophy. — Fooloso4

I agree. Heidegger was not a good person for many reasons with his Nazism foremost among them. It is sad that anyone wastes time trying to apologize for him.

When it comes to Heidegger, I prefer to spend my time understanding the ontological structure articulated in Being and Time. Fascinating stuff.

There are many reasons one should be careful in "assigning" anything by Heidegger with his horrid political views and questionable ethics foremost among them.

That being said, Being and Time should be read by all serious students of philosophy and is worthy of being course subject matter.

It would help to name one if I knew how to recognize one. — Vera Mont

You might have better luck if you looked to political commentators/philosophers rather than politicians. I recommend Thomas Hobbes.

that "being in the world" in the sense of a subject confronted with objects, or a mind and body in objective space, was a derivative or secondary mode of thinking about ourselves — Kevin

Well said. Of all the words you choose, I suspect "derivative" is the most accurate. However, it is important to keep in mind that Heidegger never gives any sort of independent standing "in" the world to beings not having the characteristics of Dasein.

Essentially, only Dasein is "in" the world while all beings not having the characteristics of Dasein are "within" the world that Dasein is in. This puts a significantly different perspective on the Cartesian notions of internal/external and/or subject/object.

This also puts a significantly different perspective on the notion of "transcendence". Instead of transcendence being the process encompassing the interaction of subject with object, it is the process encompassing the interaction of Dasein with the world.

Only Dasein is "in" the world. All other beings are "within" the world that Dasein is "in."