Misunderstanding Heidegger It's my guess (I'm not sure) that Heidegger puts us aside of animals in that our Dasein has a Dasein about itself — Raymond
We can know how we are and we can recognize a description of how we are. Heidegger also maintains that we are the being who questions being and we have no basis whatsoever for claiming that any other types of beings question being.
In addition, each Dasein has an "ultimate for the sake of which" and that different Daseins can have a different "ultimate for the sake of which." And we have no basis to conclude that other types of beings of any "ultimate for the sake of which."
Certainly other animals appear to have an understanding, be in a mood, and act with purpose. But we have no basis for presuming animals have their own individualized "ultimate for the sake of which" or that they are beings that question being.
Heidegger makes no claim that Dasein is unique to human beings and his views do not depend upon any such uniqueness. If it turned out that every Dolphin had their own "ultimate for the sake of which" or that Dolphins spent a lot of time questioning being, Heidegger wouldn't care.
Heidegger never considered consciousness or consciousness of consciousness to be particularly interesting topics. Ultimately, the only recollection I have of any fundamental Heideggerian position on consciousness is that it is derivative of being-in-the-world. If anything, I suspect Heidegger would be a bit perplexed by the all the attention it receives in contemporary philosophy.