is there a presumption that there is such a thing as a non simulation? I remember way back in the day when one of my professors routinely stated "in theory, every analog process can be digitally replicated." Then one day a stated asked, "if in theory, every analog process can be digitally replicated, then what is the basis for presuming there is any such thing as an analog process?"

However and restricting myself to the confines of your post as posted, if we accept your premises, then not only is the simulation more probable in the future, is it not inevitable? and if you throw an additional premise of infinity, then by definition if it is inevitable, it has already happened and we are on an infinitely recurring loop?

seriously, don't flatter yourself.

I am done. I can be no clearer.

1. I am certain I clearly said I had no issue with whether we are unique. We are, after all, the only species that has ever intentionally killed others over a disagreement regarding the transubstantiation of a piece of bread. I suspect it does not get more unique than that. My point was and still is that uniqueness is not a synonym for superiority;

2. I made no claims inconsistent with known physics. I stated we want to claim that the universe is better because of our presence. Apparently you agree with me that such a claim is absurd.

3. I did not assume that people claimed computers will never be able to beat a Grandmaster at chess. I was there when sceptiks of AI made the claim. You can look it up. However, once Deep Blue did beat a Grandmaster, the claim then became computers will never be able to display emotions. That is not an assumption on my part. I was also there when AI skeptics made that claim. And now the new X is that computers will be unable to display awareness of self. That is not assumption on my part. Every time computers are able to do the X that the skeptics say they will never able to do, the skeptics come up with a new X. If you want to argue that X1 replaced by X2 replaced by X3 is not a pattern, then good luck with that. I have obviously failed in my attempt to persuade you to see the deeper issue regarding self awareness as pregnant with our need to treat uniqueness as a synonym for superiority. That failure is on me. I am done now.

that we are unique is not the issue. I am quite confident that there are many species that are unique in their own way. The deeper issue is to behave as if our "uniqueness" justified a normative superiority vis-à-vis other species. You are obviously aware of the now decades old claim that "unlike humans, computers can't X" where X is continually replaced once the computer is then programmed to do X. They cannot do X (beat a grandmaster at chess), they cannot do X (display emotions), and now they cannot do X (display self-awareness). We somehow want to claim that the universe is a better place for all because humans and only humans can do X while the truth appears more likely to be that the universe is a better place only for humans because humans and only humans can do X. Do you not see the pattern here as well the desperation to perceive an indifferent universe as somehow better off because of our presence? What in the world is that all about?

Self awareness is hard to define. It is easiest to describe it as "what we have and the beasts do not" so yes, by definition, we have self awareness. — TogetherTurtle

It rests upon the unstated presumption that you have something beasts do not. If all H's (Humans) have A's and only A's and all B's (Beasts) have A's and only A's, then the statement that SA = that which H's have but B's do not produces a null set. And even if you could establish some sort of qualitative and/or quantitative difference between the awareness Humans have and the awareness Beasts have, that difference would not necessarily be a difference in a degree of awareness regarding awareness, i.e., self-awareness. Couldn't such a difference simply be a difference in awareness of how or how much? For example, if all Humans were aware to some degree as the result of having visual sense of entities while all Beasts were aware to some degree as the result of having a sonic sense of entities, then under your formula the difference between visually sensing entities would be an awareness the Humans have and that the Beasts do not and would therefore be, under your formulation, self-awareness.

Seriously, I share your interest in the subject matter. But I maintain the deeper issue is why some seem so insistent upon reserving to or creating for human (and only human?) some sort of unique normative ontological priority. This apparent need to preserve, reserve, and/or create a significant normative specialness for human is quite fascinating.

you can never get me that information too soon. I have started Tractatus a couple of times and just could not get into it. Reading it in a structured way with others could make the difference. At least that is my hope.

seriously, are the proposed itemized sessions agreed upon and is there a proposed schedule for their timely completion? Please advise.

if the world is everything, then why does he keep going on and on? Just asking. :smile:

and if they say that my ancestors were just meaner and more war like, then that just means that my ancestors were meaner and more war like. Not every trophy is worthy of being won.

yes, whatever happened to the good old days when our politics were so serene?

I did see a post to the effect that white privilege does not mean your life has not been hard. Instead, it means that the color of your skin is not one of the reasons. And there is some truth to that.

I was browsing the Internet about Dewey, Nietzsche and nihilism and came across this, regarding the author's journey from Nietzsche to Dewey, which you might find interesting :http://www.johndeweysociety.org/dewey-studies/files/2018/02/4_DS_1.2.pdf — Ciceronianus the White

Good read.

:smile:

I do not believe in drugs for non-recreational purposes.

if the goal is to understand the nature of the real, then disagreement is indicative of not sharing the same goal, or is it? — Posty McPostface

I said philosophy was a discussion regarding the nature of the real. I did not define any "goals" to be achieved by such discussion and even if I did, your comment implies that such goals would be or are supposed to be the same for all those involved in the discussion. I already have an understanding of the real and I suspect that may be true of most people engaged in philosophical discussion. One of my primary goals is to articulate my understanding in hopes of gauging its accuracy and/or depths in terms of the responses of others engaged in the conversation. Whether others agree with me is not a significant matter per se. But if they articulate their disagreement in such a manner as to enable me to rethink and/or deepen my understanding, then their disagreements are quite welcome. Neither consensus nor agreement is the equivalent of truth. Coming to consensus could mean that we are all wrong.

I, on the other hand, have always defined philosophy as an ongoing discussion over the nature of the real. As such, I do not subscribe to philosophy as hermetically sealed off from the real. — Arne
So, then what's all the disagreement and misunderstanding about in philosophy if we're talking about the same thing, the real? — Posty McPostface

First and for what it is worth, I said I define philosophy as a discussion regarding the the nature of the real. In that sense, it is only the subject matter that is arguably the same thing. At no point did I say or reasonably imply that we would have the same understanding of any agreed upon subject. Even if someone understood my understanding, they would not be required to agree with it. And finally and most important of all, I never insisted my definition of philosophy is correct. I only insisted that it is mine. How do you define philosophy? :smile:

I meant that it has no meaning. Not to a tree, and not to a human. As I said, the age of a tree can be determined by examining its rings. But this is not their meaning. They have no meaning. They are a physical attribute of a tree, but you assign meaning to them. Why, and on what basis? — Pattern-chaser

I would agree that we have no concept of meaning that would attribute to the tree any meaning regarding the number of rings a tree has. But from that it does not follow that there are no beings for whom the rings have no meaning. In addition, I would also suggest the possibility that beings for whom the rings might have meaning may be deriving meaning from the rings rather than assigning meaning to the rings.

only for those who sleep. I am less conscious when I sleep. And seriously, how do you think anesthesiology is all about? I once had a client who was a nurse anesthetist and he assured me that not only does it admit of degrees, but that it is circularly spectral through and through.

definitions at least should be provided when asked for — Tomseltje

it is anti-philosophical to not respond to a request for definitions.

Meaning is the same thing as information. — Harry Hindu

I disagree. Data is the same as information. Meaning is essentially derived from the context of the available data/information.

indeed. if we were live, so to speak, you could simply ask for them. But given the nature of this particular medium, having them in advance would be best.

It would seem that appeals to emotion are pertinent. If we feel nothing then how could we make a decision? — Moliere

I like that. To some degree (perhaps a significant degree) emotions do tell us what matters to us. And of course what matters to us contributes to deciding which issues get our attention.

Heidegger posits the notion that each of us has an "ultimate for the sake of which." Some of us grow up into them, some seem to choose, and some do not even know they have them. Either way, if one grants that a person may have a choice regarding their ultimate for the sake of which, having one is still going to be somewhat teleological, is it not?

the need to avoid teleology — StreetlightX

is the relationship between teleology and determinism as strong as you suggest?

Must teleology be bound to pre-destination? — Moliere

what is the difference between destiny and pre-destiny? There is no post destiny.

Are you suggesting that all must agree upon certain definitions of terms before the discussion can even begin? Who would decide what terms needed to be agreed upon? And who would decide the definitions of those agreed upon terms, if any there be? I find that the important thing in discussing philosophy is that you (as in this case me) have a definition for the terms I use that I can clearly articulate to those who ask. In addition, it is equally important to know when someone is using a term that is inconsistent with your definition and that you press them to define their term. In my own experience, the most interesting of philosophical discussions are among people who do not agree about which terms are most important and do not agree how those terms are to be defined. And beer helps.

Tractatus is prior to Heidegger's Being and Time while the Investigations is post Being and Time. I suspect this is no coincidence.

Dude, your reduction of mind to brain and soul to body is the essence of materialism.

I, on the other hand, have always defined philosophy as an ongoing discussion over the nature of the real. As such, I do not subscribe to philosophy as hermetically sealed off from the real.

I am always interested in the notion of what philosophy is and who or what is a philosopher. To some extent, I subscribe to the notion that a philosopher is one who has more things to say than time to say it. I believe I may have gotten that notion from Derrida.

And in distinguishing human from computer we grab onto things that are not uniquely human. For example, while it is true that I am flesh and blood and a computer is metal and plastic, the same can be said regarding my dog and a computer. Similarly, we also grasp on to and use terms referring to entities/ideas/processes as if the terms represented a complete understanding of that to which they refer. For example, sub-conscious is a term that refers to a process that we do not understand and may never understand. Yet how often do we think we have answered a question by reference to the "sub-conscious?" The same could be said of the Marxist term "false consciousness" when referring to behavior significantly inconsistent with the interest of one's economic class. There is simply no reason to believe that the term describes adequately, yet alone correctly, every incident of behavior to which it is applied. Claims to the contrary are a matter of faith. And are we not doing the same with the term "self aware." Because I am aware that I am aware of the redness of a car does not establish that such second order awareness is anything significant, unique to humans, understood in any meaningful way, or even useful. And most important of all within this context, most people treat the notion of self awareness as beyond the computer programming ability of beings who are in fact aware that they are aware. And if and when they do succeed in programming awareness of awareness, will we then distinguish the human from computer by talking about being aware of being aware that we are aware? If second order awareness such as self awareness is being aware of awareness, then wouldn't third order awareness simply be awareness of self awareness?

The deeper issue is why we continually seek some criterion for establishing a qualitative and normative ontological priority of human being.

In philosophy, see as a sense has always been given a priority. We never ask "hear" how that looks? Yet it is not unusual to hear someone ask "see how that sounds?" or "see how that feels?." It is even built in to our philosophical language. For example, "see how that sounds, see how that is scented" [M.Heidegger (1962). Being and Time, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK. (Tanslated by J.Macquarrie and E.Robinson). 590 p., at p. 215]. Heidegger then goes on to claim that the use of seeing as a substitute for other senses and ideas (see what I am saying?) can be traced back to the Greeks. Ibid at 215-216.