definitions at least should be provided when asked for — Tomseltje

it is anti-philosophical to not respond to a request for definitions.

Meaning is the same thing as information. — Harry Hindu

I disagree. Data is the same as information. Meaning is essentially derived from the context of the available data/information.

indeed. if we were live, so to speak, you could simply ask for them. But given the nature of this particular medium, having them in advance would be best.

It would seem that appeals to emotion are pertinent. If we feel nothing then how could we make a decision? — Moliere

I like that. To some degree (perhaps a significant degree) emotions do tell us what matters to us. And of course what matters to us contributes to deciding which issues get our attention.

Heidegger posits the notion that each of us has an "ultimate for the sake of which." Some of us grow up into them, some seem to choose, and some do not even know they have them. Either way, if one grants that a person may have a choice regarding their ultimate for the sake of which, having one is still going to be somewhat teleological, is it not?

the need to avoid teleology — StreetlightX

is the relationship between teleology and determinism as strong as you suggest?

Must teleology be bound to pre-destination? — Moliere

what is the difference between destiny and pre-destiny? There is no post destiny.

Are you suggesting that all must agree upon certain definitions of terms before the discussion can even begin? Who would decide what terms needed to be agreed upon? And who would decide the definitions of those agreed upon terms, if any there be? I find that the important thing in discussing philosophy is that you (as in this case me) have a definition for the terms I use that I can clearly articulate to those who ask. In addition, it is equally important to know when someone is using a term that is inconsistent with your definition and that you press them to define their term. In my own experience, the most interesting of philosophical discussions are among people who do not agree about which terms are most important and do not agree how those terms are to be defined. And beer helps.

Tractatus is prior to Heidegger's Being and Time while the Investigations is post Being and Time. I suspect this is no coincidence.

Dude, your reduction of mind to brain and soul to body is the essence of materialism.

I, on the other hand, have always defined philosophy as an ongoing discussion over the nature of the real. As such, I do not subscribe to philosophy as hermetically sealed off from the real.

I am always interested in the notion of what philosophy is and who or what is a philosopher. To some extent, I subscribe to the notion that a philosopher is one who has more things to say than time to say it. I believe I may have gotten that notion from Derrida.

And in distinguishing human from computer we grab onto things that are not uniquely human. For example, while it is true that I am flesh and blood and a computer is metal and plastic, the same can be said regarding my dog and a computer. Similarly, we also grasp on to and use terms referring to entities/ideas/processes as if the terms represented a complete understanding of that to which they refer. For example, sub-conscious is a term that refers to a process that we do not understand and may never understand. Yet how often do we think we have answered a question by reference to the "sub-conscious?" The same could be said of the Marxist term "false consciousness" when referring to behavior significantly inconsistent with the interest of one's economic class. There is simply no reason to believe that the term describes adequately, yet alone correctly, every incident of behavior to which it is applied. Claims to the contrary are a matter of faith. And are we not doing the same with the term "self aware." Because I am aware that I am aware of the redness of a car does not establish that such second order awareness is anything significant, unique to humans, understood in any meaningful way, or even useful. And most important of all within this context, most people treat the notion of self awareness as beyond the computer programming ability of beings who are in fact aware that they are aware. And if and when they do succeed in programming awareness of awareness, will we then distinguish the human from computer by talking about being aware of being aware that we are aware? If second order awareness such as self awareness is being aware of awareness, then wouldn't third order awareness simply be awareness of self awareness?

The deeper issue is why we continually seek some criterion for establishing a qualitative and normative ontological priority of human being.

In philosophy, see as a sense has always been given a priority. We never ask "hear" how that looks? Yet it is not unusual to hear someone ask "see how that sounds?" or "see how that feels?." It is even built in to our philosophical language. For example, "see how that sounds, see how that is scented" [M.Heidegger (1962). Being and Time, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK. (Tanslated by J.Macquarrie and E.Robinson). 590 p., at p. 215]. Heidegger then goes on to claim that the use of seeing as a substitute for other senses and ideas (see what I am saying?) can be traced back to the Greeks. Ibid at 215-216.