OK, so you define "order" as "having no meaning". That is your starting premise? What's the point? Any meaning you give to it will be logically invalid, as contradictory to that definition. There is nothing to study in a concept which has no meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
Excellent job of misquoting me, attributing to me things I didn't say, and launching yourself into another irrelevant tirade against math, or abstraction, or the ordinal numbers, or whatever it is you're against.
Perhaps you're right that meaning isn't the correct word. If I said we remove a concept from its worldly or physical referent, would that be better? We care about first, second, third, and not first base, second base, third base. So how would you describe that? I'm focusing on ordinality itself and not the things ordered. So you're right, meaning was an imprecise word.
Of course it makes it meaningless, you just said you take away meaning from it. If you take away all the meaning from "first" and "second", you just have symbols without meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
We have order, without reference to the things ordered. We still have meaning, I'll concede that meaning was the wrong word. What would would you use?
If you leave some sort of meaning as a ground, a base, you have a temporal reference, first is before, (prior to) second. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no temporal reference.
You are using "abstract" in a way opposite to convention. We do not "take away meaning" through abstraction, abstraction is how we construct meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
No not at all. One meter, one fish, one planet is meaning. One by itself is a mathematical abstraction. I'm not entirely sure that it means anything now that you mention it. But we can still study it, and then apply what we learn in the abstract setting to any particularities of interest.
There is a process called "abstraction", by which we remove accidental properties to give us essentials, what is necessary to the concept. We do not abstract away the meaning, we abstract what is judged as "necessary" from the concreteness, leaving behind what is unnecessary, "accidental". — Metaphysician Undercover
Ok. I agree that I'm having trouble precisely defining abstraction and I sort of see your point. But ordinal numbers are purely about order, but they're not about any particular things being ordered. How would you describe that? It's not meaningless, yet it refers to nothing in the world at all other than the pure concept of order. Which you don't seem to believe in.
Sure, cardinality is not the only possible way of ordering numbers, but if the point is, as you described, to allow for any possible order, then we have to deny the necessity of all possible orders. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, although we do deny the
primacy of any particular order. That is, in order theory, the usual order 1, 2, 3, ... is no more important or special than one of the funny orders like 1 2, 4, ..., 3. Although the 1, 2, 3, ... order is important enough to give it a name, the "standard order" or "usual order" on the natural numbers. But you are correct that in order theory, the process of abstraction does put us in the position of regarding all possible orders as equally valid. Not unlike lining up the schoolkids by height, by alpha last name, by reverse alpha first name, by date of birth, by test score, etc. Each of those orders is equally valid in some particular context, and none is inherently preferred over any other. Right? Surely you'll grant me that. And then further grant me that mathematically, sometimes the usual order on the natural numbers is useful (like in most ordinary usages of math), and other times alternate orders are (like when studying or using the higher ordinals).
That is to say that there is no specific order which is necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover
Correct correct correct. Although I suspect you're about to object to that! But yes, that is exactly right. One order is as valid as another if we're studying pure order theory; although we DO honor the grade school teachers of the world by giving 1, 2, 3, ... a special name, the standard or usual order.
This removes "order" as a defining feature of numbers, — Metaphysician Undercover
Absolutely correct. I think you're trying to disprove or invalidate the idea, but actually you're understanding the process perfectly.
because no order is necessary, so numbers do not inherently have order. — Metaphysician Undercover
Correct correct correct. One order is as good as another, though the standard order has considerable mindshare among the general public and of course among mathematicians too. I'd be pushing the point too far if I denied that the standard order is special. After all in the standard order, the numbers are arranged by cardinality, which important; and the ordinals are arranged by set membership, whichis also important. So yes there IS in fact a "natural" way of characterizing the standard order is important.
Therefore order is not essential to the concept of numbers — Metaphysician Undercover
Just as being lined up by height is not essential to the concept of school children. Being orderable in one or many ways is an attributed of children and numbers, but it is not essential to the concept.
Then, we need something else to say what makes a number a number, or else we just have symbols without meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
The question of what is the meaning of numbers is an interesting one. I'm not sure mathematicians concern themselves about it, just like biologists don't spend much time talking about the meaning of cells, or physicists (when they are doing physics) talk about the meaning of quarks. When physicists are doing philosophy, they talk about the meaning of quarks. And when mathematicians are doing philosophy, perhaps they talk about the meaning of numbers. But even on that last point, I'm not too sure.
I don't know what numbers "mean." I had dinner earlier and I don't know what my dinner meant. I know it tasted good. Is that a problem, that I don't know the meaning of dinner? What do you even mean by meaning in this context?
We could try saying that it is necessary that numbers have an order — Metaphysician Undercover
It isn't. We could consider the set
of natural numbers,
which has no particular order at all, or that implicitly comes along by convention with its standard order. But order is not essential to numbers, it's imposed afterward. At least in the mathematical formalism. I get that you are drawing a distinction between the mathematical formalism, in which order is secondary to the existence of numbers; and philosophy, in which order is an essential aspect of numbers.
But in the Peano formulation, order is inherent via the successor relation. In the past you've rejected the Peano axioms, but now it seems that you should be happy with them. Because in Peano arithmetic we have 0, and we have S0, and then SS0, and then SSS0, and so forth, and there is an inherent order to the process. Happy now?
, but the specific order which they have is not necessary, like we might say a certain type of thing must have a colour, but it could be any colour. — Metaphysician Undercover
A schoolkid must have a height, but it could be any height. But with numbers it's even worse than that. A set of numbers, like a set of anything, has no inherent order. Order is a relation imposed upon a set. The set is logically prior to the order. Yes you are right about that, and I get that you're unhappy about that, but that's how it is. At least in the modern formulation of these matters.
But this will prove to be a logical quagmire — Metaphysician Undercover
You see it that way. I see it as providing beautifully logical clarity. We have the set of natural numbers, and we have the standard order and we have a lot of other orders, and we can even consider the entire collection of all possible orders, which itself turns out to be a very interesting mathematical object. It's quite a lovely intellectual structure. I'm sorry it gives you such distress.
because it's really just a way of smuggling in a contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
A contradiction is a proposition P such that both P and not-P may be proven from the axioms. Perhaps you would CLEALY state some proposition whose assertion and negation are provable from the concept of order as I've presented it. I don't think you can.
I would believe that you have some
philosophical unease. That's not the same as a contradiction. Can you see that?
It is impossible, by way of contradiction, that something must be a specific colour, and at the same time is possibly any colour. — Metaphysician Undercover
But I have not asserted that a set must have any order at all. The set
has no inherent order at all. Just like a classroom full of kids has no inherent order till the teacher tells them to line up by height or by alpha firstname or reverse alpha lastname or age or test score or age. Why can't you see that?
A set has no inherent order. Order is imposed on a set afterward, and only for our own convenience in a given context. Sometimes one order, sometimes another, depending on what we're trying to achieve or express.
It is only possible that it is the colour that it is. — Metaphysician Undercover
Terrible analogy. Physical objects have color, but sets don't have an inherent order. Besides I could play the game of pointing out that while physical objects reflect light of a particular wavelength, their color is a function of the physiology of the visual system of the perceiver. So the color isn't really inherent in the object.
But I won't go there. Rather, I will just note that physical objects do have color (or at least a wavelength that gets reflected when it is hit with white light), and mass, and electric charge, and various other physical parameters. But
sets do not have inherent order and this is absolutely fundamental to the nature of sets. Axiom of extensionality again: A set is completely characterized by its elements. Order has nothing to do with it, and a set by itself has no inherent order at all.
Likewise, it is impossible that numbers must have a specific order, but could possibly be any order, because the order that they currently have, would restrict the possibility of another order. — Metaphysician Undercover
Not at all, and I've shown you the example several times. The order sets
and
are the same underlying set of elements, each with a different order. Neither order is inherent to the underlying set.
The point was, that if remove all order, to say that numbers are not necessarily in any order, then we must define the essence of numbers in something other than order. — Metaphysician Undercover
Absolutely agreed. Yes. The essence of a set of numbers is NOT in their order, since we can easily impose many different orders on the same underlying set. Just as the ordering by height is not essential to the classroom of kids, since we can impose a different order; or by letting them loose in the playground at recess, we can remove all semblance of order!
Surely you must take this point.
If this is cardinality, then cardinality is not an order. — Metaphysician Undercover
Of course cardinality is not an order, I thought that was abundantly clear long ago. But yes we can order a set by cardinality, if the set consists of elements of distinct cardinality. We can do that. We can order the kids by height, if in fact their heights are all distinct. If two kids have the exact same height then we can't linearly order the class by height.
They are concepts, abstractions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Ok. But that's not good enough. I asked how do you call mathematical objects like topological spaces. But justice and property are concepts and abstractions, yet they are not mathematical objects.
If you don't like the phrase, "mathematical object," what do you call them? Sure they're an abstraction, but that's way too general. You see that I'm sure.
I apprehend a difference between concepts and objects, because concepts are universals and objects are particulars. There is an incompatibility between the two, and to confuse them, or conflate them is known as a category mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover
Ok. I call numbers, sets, topological spaces, Abelian groups, etc., by the collective name mathematical objects. What do you call them? You can't say "abstractions," because justice and property are abstractions that are not mathematical objects. Consider yourself challenged to come up with a better name, if you don't like "mathematical object."
It's an idea, and ideas are not objects. — Metaphysician Undercover
Ok. this is a difference between us. I say 5 is a mathematical object, a very familiar one. Relatively few people know what a topological space is, but every child knows what 5 is. You say it's an idea and not an object. I think you're wrong about that. But we've been arguing this point for a long time.
I have an idea to post this comment, and this idea exists as a goal. Goals are "objects", or objectives, in a completely different sense of the word. So if you want to say that numbers, as ideas are "objects", we'd have to look at this sense of the word, goals. — Metaphysician Undercover
An object is not a goal. An (American) football is an object, and the goal is to get it across the goal line. You would not say the football is a goal. I think you're way off the mark with your claim that an object is a goal or objective. 5 has no object or purpose. It's just the number 5. A mathematical object. An abstract object, as all mathematical objects are.
But it doesn't make too much sense to say that they are objects in this sense, nor does it make any sense at all, to say that numbers, as ideas, are objects in the sense of particulars, because they are universals. — Metaphysician Undercover
We disagree, since I say 5 is a mathematical object. And I don't think you have a good theory to the contrary. And 5 is a PARTICULAR mathematical object. A universal is a "... class of mind-independent entities ..." (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy). 5 is not a class of entities, it's a single entity. A mathematical object.
Space and time are themselves abstractions, and these concepts very clearly enter into, and are fundamental to mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover
They don't exist anywhere in mathematics. Of course "space" is a technical term very commonly used in math, as in a topological space or Euclidean space or a Banach space etc. But space as conceived in physics, as well as time, do not exist in math. If you would carefully study the axioms of set theory, you will see no references to time or space. Of this I am quite certain.
Are a circle and a square not a spatial concept, which are mathematical? — Metaphysician Undercover
They're idealized geometric mathematical objects. There are no circles or squares in the world, only approximations to the mathematical ideal.
Is the order of first, second, third, fourth, not a temporal order whish is mathematical? — Metaphysician Undercover
No, not in the least. How can you say that? That's not even the meaning of the words in everyday speech in the real world. The winner takes first place and the runner up takes second place sometimes (as in a foot race) but not always (as in a weight lifting contest) by being temporally first. You must know this, why are you using such a weak argument? First place in golf goes to the player with the lowest score, not to the player who finishes the course first. This is a TERRIBLE argument you're making here.
If you seriously think that you can separate mathematical concepts from spatial and temporal concepts, then yes, this is something you really need to explain, — Metaphysician Undercover
No, the onus is on you, as space and time play no role in the axioms and principle of mathematics.
because I've been trying to do it for many years and cannot figure out how it's possible. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you stop confusing math and physics you will be enlightened.
So please oblige me, and explain. — Metaphysician Undercover
Space and time have nothing to do with mathematics. Show me where it says they do. Look up the axioms of set theory (
here for instance) and show me time and space. They're not there.
Nor are they even philosophically a part of math. A physicist has 5 meters or 5 seconds. Math just has the number 5. I hope you weren't fooled by grade school when they tell you that Sally had 5 apples and Fred had 3 apples, how many apples do they have together? Once you get past that level, they just ask you to add 5 plus 3. The apples are part of physics or biology or grocery store management. Applications of math, not math.
The problem is that "5" means nothing without a spatial or temporal reference. — Metaphysician Undercover
If I ask you if 5 is prime, can you answer? How did you do that? Did you really have to mentally imagine 5 apples?
If you think that the mathematician believes that "5" refers simply to the number 5, without any further reference to give the concept which you call the number 5 meaning, then you must believe that mathematicians think that the number 5 is a concept of nothing. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, it's the mathematical object 5. It's the third prime number. It's the order of the group of integers mod 5, and the number of sides of a pentagon. It's the largest positive integer such that all groups of order less than or equal to it are Abelian. That property uniquely characterizes the number 5. Martian mathematicians must necessarily have the same theorem. Likewise the Martians must know that there is no algebraic formula to solve a polynomial equation of degree 5 having integer coefficients. Any sentient race anywhere in the universe must necessarily discover this sooner or later.
Mathematicians have many concrete, if you'll permit that use of the word, ideas and concepts about the abstract mathematical object 5. They can represent it within set theory as a natural number, an integer, a rational, a real, a complex number, or a quaternion. Each such representation is a distinct set. We can identify them all via standard conventions. These representations might NOT be used by Martian mathematicians. The representations are contingent, but the facts about the number 5 are not. Mathematicians could write a dissertation on 5. Wikipedia has a
relatively long article on the number 5. And that ain't nothing!