of course it matters. Nothing incoherent about my premises. — Bartricks

Yes, there is. Saying that something is a value to no one in particular makes no sense. Value doesn't work that way.

So on your view, if you're stating an argument in terms of a natural language, natural language semantics doesn't matter because ____?

I have told you that the arguments I have made are deductively valid. — Bartricks

Which is irrelevant to whether the argument is semantically coherent. You're stating the argument in natural language. If it's not semantically coherent, that's a problem.

We never really know what the belief is, because we only ever deal with the corresponding language expression. — alcontali

??

Don't you deal with your own beliefs?

It is a language expression that is at best "isomorphic" with the corresponding belief, meaning that operations on the language expressions will still correspond to operations on the belief. For example, if you negate the language expression, it will somehow correspond to the negated belief. — alcontali

I don't think I understand this.

So, let's say that I believe I stopped at the public library to use the restroom. I can write "I stopped at the public library to use the restroom." Now, I negate that, "I didn't stop at the public library to use the restroom," how does that correspond to a negated belief?

(Which is not to mention that what was at dispute isn't whether a linguistic expression can be correlated with a belief, but whether linguistic expressions literally are beliefs.)

I am convinced that some beliefs can be expressed in language — alcontali

How do you think that sound waves or ink on a page or whatever can literally be a belief?

Not all beliefs are subjective, because some beliefs are deemed objectively justified. Furthermore, once a belief is expressed in language it is no longer a state of mind, and does no longer require that a person be involved. Machines can also manipulate language expressions. — alcontali

If we use "subjective" to refer to mental phenomena, then beliefs would be subjective unless we're claiming that beliefs can obtain outside of minds somehow. It wouldn't hinge on justification if we're using "subjective" to simply denote that something is a mental phenomenon. (Not that I'd agree that a justification can be objective anyway.)

Re language, I'd say that you're conflating things like sounds, pixels on computer screens, ink marks on paper--however language is expressed, with beliefs. The sounds, etc. are correlated to beliefs, but they're not literally beliefs.

Does the study capture etiology? Does it attribute the mental issues to any particular range of factors, or factors in combination with each other? — StreetlightX

Good questions.

Also, re this: "They’re going to be in the hands of doctors for the rest of their lives . . . Can you imagine having a life where you need to seek doctors all the time, for everything . . . getting everything checked?" Isn't that what we keep being told we need to do? Go for regular check-ups, prostate exams, breast exams, colonoscopies, etc. etc.?

Although people think of respect differently. The member above seems to think that respect is most importantly about all of the superficial nicey-nicey stuff. A smile here, a thumbs up there. I very much do not think of respect in that way.

You and I have agreed about the importance of being frank with people:

"Definitely some people you know are going to think you're an idiot sometimes. If they don't tell you that, they're not being honest with you".

Those are your words. — S

Yes. Personally I care about honesty a lot more than respect.

No; this is the very same thread, just in a different place.... — Banno

:lol:

What would it mean for there to be a ripple in "the facts of their extensional relations"? — petrichor

As long as we're talking about something observational and not simply something we can do with mathematical constructs, it would mean that you're observing particular dynamic changes in the extensional relations of objects.

I see it as reifying mathematics and other instrumental theoretical constructs, and subsequently doing bad philosophy. A lot of it amounts to the equivalent of positing epicycles to account for planetary motion, to avoid having to change paradigms.

As these beliefs are based on morals that may be upheld by anyone, religious and non-religious alike. — Shamshir

That's true, but if why is it that laws are so in line with Christian morality in the U.S.--and are such a struggle to change from that? I don't think it's just a coincidence.

Yeah, religion has a huge influence on laws . . . and there's no way around that, because we're surrounded with religious folks and they're voting (and lobbying and so on)

I obviously do not agree with you on the coherence issue.

And anyone can find anything offensive, degrading, etc. There are plenty of people who see religion as both.

The comment was MY opinion of some features of both religion and racism, by the way. Hence "I think . . ."

And by the way, surely you're overestimating my opinion of the intellectual value of religious belief. Put it this way: it would be difficult to underestimate it.

But the point was one you're proving in your criticism: folks make subjective judgments about stuff, and based on those subjective judgments, they deem that some things are okay to be insulting, nasty, condescending about.

Well, some people make that judgment about religion.

If one is going to make that judgment about some things, one can't be surprised that others make that judgment about stuff that one thinks should be treated with respect instead.

For the Christian religious folks, this is the "judge not, that ye be not judged" idea. You shouldn't have to be very old or wise before you realize that not everyone is going to feel the same way you do about various things. If you're going to start attacking others for stuff that you don't agree with, don't be surprised when they turn around and do the same for stuff you cherish that they don't feel the same way about.

If you want respect, treat people with respect. And not just the people you agree with.

Have you ever heard of matter-antimatter pair production out of the vacuum of space? — staticphoton

Yes. And what we're talking about--or, what's really going on in that talk, rather--is doing things with mathematical equations.

Why did you start another thread about this? You're the one who started the first thread a few days ago.

So that thing that creates the separation between objects is only a mathematical tool. — staticphoton

There's not a "thing" that creates separation between objects. There's just the facts of their extensional relations.

Just to add - but again, not for dispute - 'objective', as I am using the term, is not synonymous with 'external'. 'Objective', as I am using it, means 'exists outside of minds' or, if one prefers, 'made of something non-mental'.

'External' just means 'out there'. — Bartricks

It's synonymous with "external" in context. In other words, "external to minds," or rather "external to brains functioning mentally."

he view I have defended above is subjectivist, not objectivist. I am defending a divine command theory of value - a divine command theorist about value is a subjectivist (in my sense of the term, given above), — Bartricks

That much is fine, actually. The problem is the argument you present, where you posit moral value "full stop." That is objectivist.

What you'd need to say is something I suggested already:

"If moral values are my valuings then if I value something it is necessarily morally valuable to God"

Although you'd probably want to change that to:

"If moral values are my valuings, then if I value something correctly, it is necessarily morally valuable to God."

(Ignoring the modality problems with the placement of your "necessarily.")

But as I said, "If moral values are my valuings, then if I value something correctly, it is necessarily morally valuable to God," is very controversial. Anyone who would accept it as a premise of a sound argument would already agree with what you're wanting to argue.

And of course your second premise wouldn't work with the addition of "valuable to God."

Having said this though, I think the whole polemic concerning whether morality is objective or subjective is flawed and plagued with category errors, reification and shallow thinking. Subjects are not apart from the world, or apart from the inter-subjective context in which the very idea of morality can become coherent. — Janus

No one is saying that people are apart from the world or that people can't interact with each other and influence each other.

But your finger isn't a hot dog, and even though you can flick someone with it, it's still your finger and not a communal finger.

So we've figured out that your argument works just in case one agrees with it.

And arguments can't be stupid. People can be, however. Really, really stupid in some cases. — Bartricks

People can be aspies, too.

At least you're entertaining as a clown.

Yes it is. — Bartricks

No, it's not. I'm a moral subjectivist. "X is morally bad regardless of S's opinion" is the exact opposite of subjectivism.

Your stupid modus ponens argument rests on trying to insert objectivism "quietly" by not specifying who is valuing. Because, as you pointed out, you believe that it's a "value full stop"--that's objectivism, not subjectivism.

Okay, but what you're arguing isn't subjectivism then.

Steve's act of rape is morally bad regardless of Steve's attitudes towards it. — Bartricks

That's objectivism. It's not subjectivism.

Moral objectivism is incorrect. That's not what the world is like.

Things are only morally good or bad to individuals. Different individuals have different opinions. There are no non-individual moral opinions or valuations to correctly match or to fail to match.

So if Steve rapes Jane and we subsequently find out that Steve valued raping Jane, then we have found out that Steve did nothing wrong. — Bartricks

We have found out that Steve did nothing wrong to Steve. Once again, these things are ALWAYS to someone.

Someone else may have a different opinion.

Good - so you think that if I value raping someone, then necessarily it is morally good for me to rape them. — Bartricks

Morally good to you yes.

That's not false. It's obviously true, rather. That's the whole idea of you valuing something morally. It's morally valuable to you.

MY premises, as written by me, not you - you disagree with. — Bartricks

The first, because it's incoherent as written.

Valuations are always to someone.
Statements about value that don't state or at least clearly imply who is valuing something are incoherent.
Therefore, "If moral values are my valuings, then if I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable," especially in the context of your argument, is incoherent.

Or do you think it won't be? You think, do you, that if I value something then necessarily it is morally valuable? So, if I value raping someone, then necessarily it is good for me to rape someone? — Bartricks

If you value raping someone (and you consider that a moral stance), the necessarily, to you, it is a moral value, or it is morally good, to rape someone.

That's the whole friggin idea behind morality being subjective. So yes, that's correct.

First, there is no 'to me' at the end of my premise, so stop putting it in. — Bartricks

Right. There's no "to you" written by you at the end of your premise, which is a problem, because valuations are ALWAYS to someone. There's no such thing as "morally valuable" full stop. The idea of that is nonsense.

Why is there yet another thread discussing essentially the same thing?

I can fill it in for you:

"If moral values are my valuings, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable to me."

That's definitely true.

That makes this:

"If I value something, then it's not the case that necessarily, it is morally valuable to me."

Clearly false.

(I switched around the modal quantifier because if we don't fix that, the premises still wouldn't be true with the modal quantifier present--after all, it might be the case that you only contingently value something. Moving the modal quantifier makes it pertain to the semantics of the conditional instead.)

Er, no, you're really not understanding this. There's only so much I can do. If - if - moral values are made of my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable. — Bartricks

Er, no, you're not really understanding this. It has to be "necessarily it is morally valuable to ____" How do you want to fill in the blank? It's not an option to not fill it in.

Well as the argument demonstrates, moral valuations are not the values of you or I, but of another subject. — Bartricks

Which would mean that your first premise is

"f moral values are my valuings then if I value something it is necessarily morally valuable to another subject"

or

"If moral values are my valuings then if I value something it is necessarily morally valuable to God"

Neither one of those seems noncontroversial as a premise, do they?

No one. — Bartricks

So that's a problem as I pointed out. Valuations are always to someone. You can't have a valuation to no one.

Re your first premise, "then if I value something it is necessarily morally valuable"--to whom?

. — Artemis

Yeah, it's a common phenomenon in Phil 101 or Intro to Phil-type classes, especially where they're taken as electives by people with other majors who figure that "philosophy will be an easy A," to see people drop out because they're uncomfortable with having their views challenged.

If you're going to try to argue, "This view, this challenge, etc. really does deserve respect. That view, that challenge, etc.really does not. It's okay to be disrespectful, condescending towards it," then since we're supposed to be doing philosophy here, you should probably attempt some support for that--support that can stand up to strong objections.

So, you do think religious belief is equivalent to Nazism. — T Clark

I think that you'd likely be very hypocritical about treating things with respect.