Well then you've confused necessary and sufficient causes. — Isaac
I'm not
confusing anything. I'm telling you how I'm using the word "cause."
Nowhere did I say anything at all resembling "a cause has to be a single thing."
But a cause has to involve force. If causes are multiple things, then it's multiple things forcing something to happen. That can happen two ways, plus a combo way: (1) as a temporal causal chain: A forces B which forces C which forces D. (2) Multiple things, A, B and C,
simultaneously force D, or (3) there's a combo of a temporal chain (1) with multiple causes (2) at at least some steps of the chain.
No matter what we're talking about, causality still involves FORCE. A necessary cause of D means that D can't happen unless some particular antecedent, B, for example happens. B is a necessary cause of D in that case. That has to involve force of course. A sufficient cause of D means that B alone, for example, can make D happen, though other causes can be involved, too--those other causes need not be necessary, but if B is necessary, D can't happen if B doesn't happen, otherwise B isn't a necessary cause. Sufficient causes can never exclude necessary causes (as otherwise the cause in question wouldn't be necessary; it would be possible for D to obtain with it).
Sufficient causes that aren't necessary can be the case if, say, either A or B can cause D just as well. Then A or B would be sufficient, but not necessary, for D. (So that if A causes D, B wasn't necessary, and if B caused D, A wasn't necessary.)
Regardless, all causes have to involve FORCE, or we're not talking about causes, per how I'm using the term. Also, A isn't a cause of D unless A was part of at least some chain of events that resulted in D forcibly happening, where each step of the chain with A in the antecedent grouping involved forcible occurrences.
Sticking dogmatically to arbitrary ideologies regardless of the harm they may cause — Isaac
When A doesn't force B, where B is what we have a problem with, where B is the harm we're concerned with, then A didn't cause B. That's just the point. In that case it's ontologically incorrect to say that A caused B. So it's flawed to talk about A causing some harm, B, in that case.