Right. By definition then if one accepts nominalism. — Noah Te Stroete

Well, it kind of follows from the nonidenticality of discernibles in general. If we can discern two things, they can't be identical.

that doesn’t answer the question of HOW individuality happens. — Noah Te Stroete

By virtue of multiple things existing. If we have two existents, they can't be identical.

And what was nominalism an answer to? You said “where nominalism begins.” What was the question? — Noah Te Stroete

The thread asks "Where on the evolutionary scale does individuality begin? "

Can you remind us what nominalism is in your own words? — Noah Te Stroete

In a nutshell everything is a unique particular--there are no real universals/types (platonic forms, etc.), and there are no real abstracts. ("Real" being extramental or objective here.)

But do you think they are different in the way two things of the same type are different, i.e. two oranges, or are they different in the way things of different kinds are different, i.e. an apple and an orange? — Pantagruel

Probably more like two oranges, although that can be quite different.

It depends on how you define "theory." If you mean a hypothetical structure, then, no, it is not a theory. If you mean a way of organizing experience, then yes, noting that certain things (trees) are equally capable of evoking the concept <tree> does organize our experience. — Dfpolis

"Theoretical"--basically in the sense of reasoning about something, coming up with an account of "what's realy going on" contra the phenomena in question, etc.

The point is that phenomena that are present aren't actually always of one as a conscious being experiencing things. The only way to move away from realism with respect to experience is to introduce theoretical explanations for what's really going on.

maybe what I experience as consciousness and what you experience as consciousness are not the same? — Pantagruel

As a nominalist, a relativist, and what I call a "perspectivalist," it's impossible for them to be the same.

Where nominalism begins. Right at the start.

Governmental structure preferences are just that: preferences.

If you're arguing that some particular governmental structure is going to solve or invite some particular problem that's another issue, but it's also not really decideable, because (a) it's usually purely hypothetical, and (b) even if it weren't, there are way too many variables at play to say that the governmental structure solved or introduced the problem.

Imagine you watch a great movie, you are so in it that you lose your sens of self, you lose your awareness of yourself. Same principle, imagine an AI having some qualitative experiences but doesn't have any mental capacity to be aware of it .. can't have realization, perception, or knowledge. — Basko

Why would you think that awareness has to be of self/has to include a sense of self?

Yes, trees are often just present — Dfpolis

Sure. So going from that to "this is something I'm perceiving" etc. is theoretical, isn't it? That is, it's literally invoking a theory about what's going on.

Faced with the two possibilities of:

(1) the human brain (the understanding) spontaneously constructs perceptual objects

and

(2) the human brain (the understanding) does not spontaneously construct perceptual objects

What are the reasons that we'd believe one over the other?

If one is positing that one has a body and is perceiving things via one's senses, etc., then one is already assuming realism, by the way.

This is one reason the question of whether it's always the case of not just "tree" but "I'm conscious of a tree" (see my post above) is important.

Well, if source A relies on corroboration from source B, which relies on corroboration from source C, etc.,
Unless you are explicitly saying that there is some 'foundational set' of authoritative sources which all mutually validate one another. — Pantagruel

The foundational set you use is the folks doing the observations, experiments, etc.--basically journal articles. Sources secondary to that should be citing the journal articles in a way that's easy to track down.

For me, it's not a hierarchy, just a list of quality criteria for it.

I'm not sure why it would lead to an infinite regress.

Re conspiracy, aside from being someone who doesn't believe in any conspiracies*, it's important to understand that knowledge doesn't imply something that can't be wrong.

(re conspiracies, I'm referring to something where a lot of people are cooperating on something covertly, with a very different official story, where the conspirators are able to keep the conspiracy a secret indefinitely, so that the conspiracy isn't obvious with respect to evidence, so that it becomes the official story instead)

So my first question is: Is an authoritative source sufficient evidence? — Pantagruel

Especially if we're talking about reliable sources corroborating each other, especially under something like peer review, where you have good reason to believe are using epistemic methods that you'd agree with, and the claims do not seem purely speculative, etc. then I don't see why that wouldn't be sufficient.

Well, and you were asking me questions and so on.

At first, I reported my opinion in response to something you'd said, just in an off-the-cuff way, and then you wanted to launch into a big discussion.

You're using "experience" in the sense of "I'm a conscious entity, aware of x."

The first thing I'd wonder is if that's really the way all phenomena are to you. For example, it's never for you just that there's a tree, say. It's always that you have something like "I'm a conscious entity, aware of a tree" present?

For me, there's often just a tree (or whatever).

Ok why are we still talking then? — khaled

Because you keep responding to me. ;-)

It is per decision that you based your policy on actions that will impact a living being capable of giving consent in the future based on statistical abnormality though right? — khaled

Yes, of course. No ethical stance can be other than that. Ethical stances always come down to ways that people feel, dispositions they have. (So maybe "decision" isn't quite right--as it's not a conscious process...it's a way that you can't help but feel.)

Cool and you define "abnormal" in a culturally evolved sense? As in whatever society decides is abnormal? — khaled

Not per a decision. Per contingent statistical norms.

This was already answered long ago. Because it would create an abnormal situation for the child that would create a lot of problems.

Is genetically modifying sperm and eggs in such a way that the final result of that modification is that a child will be born with 8 broken limbs on birth morally problematic? — khaled

Yes, I think it is, but not because we're doing anything to a child.

And it's problematic in just the same way that it's problematic for siblings to have offspring, in the same way that it's problematic to carry through a pregnancy when we know that there are particular medical problems with the baby, etc.

Okay, but if we're going to be doing philosophy about this and formulating stances based on ontological points about it, we should probably say things that are literally correct, no?

That is what "genetically modifying a child" means yes. — khaled

Is that literally correct, though?

Okay, so when we genetically modify sperm or an egg, are we genetically modifying a child?

I take it it IS morally permissable to genetically modify a child — khaled

It's important that you are able to learn this:

If what you're genetically modifying is a sperm or egg cell at time T1, then you're not genetically modifying a child at time T1.

Do you agree with that?

t could also mean "I don't have a problem with it" as in it is ethically permissable but it IS a moral issue. — khaled

??? What in the world would that even mean?

I am asking which fertilization counts as: Moral issue but it has been determined that the act is permissalble or not moral issue at all — khaled

How, in your view, does it make sense to say "This is a moral issue but it's morally permissible"?

You can't simultaneously complain that I misread what you say and also that I ask for clarification. — khaled

I didn't complain that you misread what I said. I'm commenting on further evidence of your apparent mental and socialization issues--maybe evidence that you're an Aspie or something, in that you apparently are unfamiliar with and/or you're incapable of understanding, contextually, the very common phrase "I don't have a problem with it," so that now we'd have to hash that out.

So if it so happens that the WAY you genetically engineer a child to have 8 broken limbs on birth doesn't involve interacting with the embryo post fertilization in any way is it morally permissable to genetically modify a child to have 8 broken limbs on birth? — khaled

It's morally permissible to modify the sperm and/or egg. You're not doing anything to a child at that point, because no child exists. Children only exist once an egg is fertilized. In order to do something to x, it's required that x exists. You say you understand this, but it couldn't be more obvious that you do not, because you keep going back to the idea.

I didn't ask if you had a problem with it I asked do you even consider it, morally speaking. — khaled

Now you're not very familiar with how English normally works? "I don't have a problem with it"--in other words, a moral problem. That's the topic.

Now how does genetic engineering fall under that category? Because you also said it does previously — khaled

I have no idea what the actual process is for genetic engineering. That's not my field. If it's only doing something to sperm and/or eggs that aren't fertilized then I don't have a problem with it. That's why I just typed that.

So, now given that fertilization doesn't count as "actions performed on an entity that is currently not capable or granting or withholding consent, but that will likely survive as a consent-capable being?" because the baby doesn't exist as it is occuring, on what ground did you say abnormal genetic engineering is wrong? They are both modifications to sperm or eggs so why is one wrong and the other ok? — khaled

If it's only doing something to sperm and/or eggs that are not fertilized, I don't have a problem with it.

Someone like Terrapin Station is simply going to say something like, "I don't believe harm should be the only consideration or any consideration for moral decision making". — schopenhauer1

By the way, re his comment that "However, through their decision to conceive and raise me, the very possibility of 'my harm' came into being," I definitely agree with that.

One thing I'm disagreeing with khaled about is calling that possibility, that precondition a "cause." If he'd just said "they cause the possibility of harm" or something like that, there would be nothing to disagree with.

At any rate, it's not just that I don't use "harm" as a moral hinge. Even if I did, I certainly wouldn't use "creating the possibility of harm" as a moral hinge. In general, I'm very much against legislating against and having moral proscriptions against possibilities/potentials. I'm not against negligence laws, but they have to be about something specific that actually happened, where the negligent party had a causal role in the occurrence, per the way I define cause.

Anything other than harm at the procreational decision-making level would be forcing a projected agenda on someone else that would be using them for that agenda. — schopenhauer1

That's not something that I'm either legally or morally against. I'm not categorically against manipulation, exploitation, etc. In fact, I think that both can be quite positive instead.

Until natalists can answer why starting negative situations on other's behalf is permissible — schopenhauer1

So the situation that parents start is life. If the kid in question sees life as a "negative situation," then we should get them some help--psychological help, basically. (Which can be obtained in a variety of ways, including other things to focus on--like philosophy in some cases, religion in some cases, etc.; it doesn't necessarily require a psychologist or psychiatrist, though it might.)

I don't think the matter is as simple or flippant as you are making this out, — schopenhauer1

It's not flippant at all. It's an ontological fact. Good/bad and similar evaluations are simply ways that people feel about something (and/or its upshots per their understanding), dispositions they have towards it.

This decision affects another person, — schopenhauer1

I don't know if it would be plausible to say all, but probably the vast majority of decisions affect another person in at least some indirect way. There's nothing morally problematic about this in general.

Creating negative situations for other people, — schopenhauer1

"Negative situations" is way too vague, though. And any situation can only be negative to an individual, in that individual's opinion, which we can't know until we ask them their opinion. Anyone could consider anything negative. I don't think that a lot of what people consider negative is a moral problem. I often think that the problem lies with people considering things negative instead. For example, when people are offended by speech.

That's not what's written there.... I didn't ask this. — khaled

Here's what you do when someone brings up a point like this: You acknowledge that you misread it and then address it again. See how easy honesty is?

So, addressing that again: no, it's not something done to an entity that will later be capable of consenting. The entity in question doesn't exist until conception.

But I'd say the emphasis on observe-hypothesize-test-revise misses out what's going on in theoretical discussions. The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies doesn't have observations and tests and so forth. It is largely an argument from the basis of what difficulties are resolved -- towards a more coherent theory.

Surely you'd include this in your notion of science. — Moliere

Actually, I'd say that insofar as something isn't based on observations, hypotheses, testing hypotheses, etc., it's philosophy at best. Which of course doesn't mean that it's not valuable as such--philosophy is more "where I'm coming from" than science, after all.

Keep in mind that Einstein had a "Library of Living Philosophers" volume: Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist

What is it that makes these activities not-scientific, in your view? — Moliere

A lack of making observations, formulating and testing hypotheses, and then revising beliefs and hypotheses in response to evidence.

If Jill applying any sort of force on Jack that is going to leave a long lasting effect is bad just cuz then it doesn't matter if that force or something else is the cause of Jack's suffering. A and B have nothing to do with causality but if you pick A then what caused Jack's suffering doesn't matter morally. That's what I mean when I say it doesn't matter to debate who's the cause of Jack's suffering. But had you picked B then determining if that force is the cause of Jack's suffering is significant. You picked A so it doesn't matter if Jack suffers or not or what makes him suffer, Jill is still at fault.

I started this whole situation assuming you would have picked B and was trying to understand how you can causally peg a force to someone's suffering directly. You don't have to do that if you picked A though.

So now I guess we're back at where we were like 3 days ago. You consider actions done on living creatures that are currently not capable of giving consent but will become capable of doing so in the future at some point morally considerable. Ergo you didn't think genetically modifying children to suffer is morally permissable. However you set the bar of what counts as "abnormal" alterations at "whatever society dictates is normal or abnormal" which by definition will never make birth abnormal. So if your argument justifying why fertilization (an action done on a living creature that is currently not capable of giving consent but will become capable of doing so in the future at some point) is morally permissable is because society dictates it. And if that is all it takes for something to be morally permissable then there is no chance you'll ever consider birth as morally problematic

I just want to get this point straight. Does fertilization fall under: an action done on a living creature that is currently not capable of giving consent but will become capable of doing so in the future at some point?

And if so is your reason for saying it is moral that society has decided it doesn't count as "abnormal"

And if not how is it that fertilization is different from genetic engineering. They are both modifications done on living creatures (sperm and egg) currently incapable of giving consent that will become capable of giving consent later. But you classify one as a modification and the other not — khaled

What a mess of not really paying attention to or understanding what I'm saying. There's too much stuff to address there. I'll stick with your "point you want to get straight," because we keep going over and over this, where you apparently are incapable of learning: fertilization/conception is NOT doing something to an entity that is normally capable or granting or withholding consent. Why that's so difficult to learn I don't know, but for some reason you have a mental block when it comes to learning this.

How unconcious chance produces extremes of fortune thereby creating mutually exclusive worlds of experience, its random nature meaning the most vulnerable may be dealt the worst hands, etc - — Robert Lockhart

That makes sense to me. I just don't get what it's supposed to have to do with nihilism. Or "logical reality."

For example, your second paragraph begins with "Such nihilism," but I don't see how anything in the previous paragraph amounted to nihilism.

:chin:

:grin:

Are we being invaded by badly-programmed AI?

Huh?