Comments

  • Should Whoopi Goldberg be censored?
    Gosh. That's not how his name is spelled, is it? — Ciceronianus

    From now on I will spell it no other way.
  • Is anything ruled out?
    How about an elephant hanging over a cliff with its tail tied to a daisy? — alan1000

    Easy. The elephant is hanging over the cliff secured by stout and strong cables and also with its tail tied to a daisy. The question is not "How is this possible?" but "Who would do that to an elephant?"

    *****
    On reflection, I think it's impossible to tie an elephant's tail to a daisy. You would always end up tying the daisy to the elephant's tail. What you do with the elephant after that is a matter for your conscience.
  • Is anything ruled out?
    Presumably one can be ruled out — alan1000

    If there is no God then they can both be ruled out. If God is of necessity good then they can both be ruled in. (Compare: are two lines parallel because they never meet or do they never meet because they are parallel?)

    That's enough ruling out and ruling in for one post.
  • Should Whoopi Goldberg be censored?
    Heildegger — Ciceronianus
    :sparkle:
  • Should Whoopi Goldberg be censored?
    So when they went door to door hunting down Jews it wasn't about race? Well, I never knew that. I don't think I know it even now. I cannot see how it can be true.
  • Should hinge propositions be taken as given/factual for a language game to make sense ?
    @Banno @Sam26

    I think the idea is that hinge propositions are not used in deductive logic. They are the background against which deductive logic and any other kind of coherent thought is feasible. On this view, statements such as "I know there is an external world..." or "I believe that some events have happened before other events..." or "I am currently doubting whether I have a body...." are as incoherent as their denials. Knowledge, belief, doubt and certainty do not apply.

    This may be off-beam, but the discussion of an 'animal' (a-rational) aspect reminds me of the distinction between 'saying' and 'showing'. I cannot coherently say that I believe or know that there is an external world. However, I cannot live a human life without my every word and action showing that I 'hold' such a 'belief', the scare quotes meaning that it is not a 'proposition' as we usually understand propositions to be. This line of argument can end up with us saying that hinge 'propositions' lack most of the features of propositions, including truth-value.

    All the above is 'for what it's worth'. I'm not on sure ground.

    Maybe I'm not too off-beam -

    Of course, their being ineffable does not prevent our hinges from showing themselves in what we say, but here too, certainty is animal. My hinge certainty that 'I have a body' is much the same as a lion's instinctive certainty of having a body. — Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, p8
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    ↪Olivier5
    :flower:
  • Is "no reason" ever an acceptable answer?
    I put the quote in just to show that the necessity of causation is not a foregone conclusion. Many philosophers and scientists dispute the need for it. — T Clark

    That is interesting. But we know there are causes. Bridges collapse - engineers investigate - causes are identified and reported. The concept of cause is very troublesome to explain in general terms in the philosophy schoolroom. But jettisoning it seems premature. Without it, we cannot become engineers or understand what engineers have to say about the reason for bridges collapsing. We can banish 'cause' from the schoolroom for being awkward. We still need it in order to live our lives every day. It is a phenomenon that should be preserved in philosophy even when it gives us a headache.
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    If the apple exists as an object in the external world, then every pair of elementary particles in the external world would also exist as an object. — RussellA

    If everything that's true of apples is true of elementary particles, then that is indeed so. If you can pick up apples for sixty pence a pound in Tesco, then you can pick up a pair of elementary particles for the same low price. Every little helps.
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    Where is the information in the external world that the apple as an object exists independently of the table as an object ? — RussellA

    If we eat the apple and the table is still there, then we're done.

    Suppose someone (it might be G E Moore) chanced upon me writing this post. What explanation can I give? "Well, look, it's like this. We don't know if an apple and a table exist independently. We don't know how we might, outside of our own imaginations, pick up some clue as to whether they do or don't exist independently. We are pretty stuck on the topic. I'm suggesting we eat the apple and check if the table is still there." G E Moore might reply - "Yes, all right so far, but I would put it as a modus tollens for rhetorical effect. If the world offers no information regarding the independent existence of apples and tables, then I cannot discover whether I just ate an apple or a table." I can see Wittgenstein getting agitated at this apparently sensible reply from G E Moore but I'm not going to hang about to find out what he thinks.
  • Is "no reason" ever an acceptable answer?
    Causal laws, he claimed, "tend to be replaced by quite different laws as soon as a science is successful." — T Clark

    I wonder what successful science he had in mind, in which causal laws have been replaced? "What caused X?" seems to be a common form of research question in all the sciences. I'm struggling to think of an exception.
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    How does the relation "X is west of Y" exist in a universe with no minds? What's the ontological status of that relation — RogueAI

    It's like this:

    (1) Some X was west of some Y at time t
    (2) At time t there were no minds

    (1) is not logically inconsistent with (2). You can have both without self-contradiction.

    I'm not sure exactly what you mean about 'ontological status' - unless you mean whether (1) and (2) are consistent. I think they are. As far as I can see, they are.
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    ↪Olivier5
    :flower:
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    Can X be West of Y in a universe with no minds? — RogueAI

    If some X had not been west of some Y on an earth with no minds, then there would not have been a suitable environment for terrestrial mammals with minds to evolve.
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    OK, let's suppose the position to be defended is that 'being west of' is a relation and it exists and it is not to be found in any city. That's not a problem. Ryle's example of how it's not a problem was about a university. You show a person round all the colleges, campuses and administrative buildings, then they turn to you and say: "Very interesting - but you have not yet shown me the university." They have misunderstood the concept of 'university'. If you treat a relation as a kind of object or thing then you will get dizzyingly confused - because it isn't.

    I think there might be a thought in this thread that 'If the relation "being west of" isn't in the cities then it must be in our minds'. I don't think that's true, either. I cannot explain compass points by referring to minds. I would need to refer to cities, for example, but not (as explained) to a particular object in a city called 'being west of'. What kind of thing is a relation? Is it a physical object like a building? No. Then is it a mental construct like a perfect circle? No. But it must be one or the other. Why? It may be in a category of its own, separate from physical objects and also separate from mental constructs. The category in question may be 'relation' and it works in a way different from either.

    So if you're in a philosophy forum, and someone asks that question, I don't think 'yeah so what?' is much of a response. — Wayfarer

    True. If someone had written that then I think they would just not have been joining in properly. Thankfully the person who might have said that has not pitched up in the thread yet.
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    Still, I am not quite sure why Glasgow should be aware of its geographic position respective to Liverpool. — Olivier5

    It isn't. Ask any city what it's aware of - if you can work out how to ask things of cities - and you will draw a blank. Perhaps I did need to go on about category mistakes. But here's someone who went on about it at greater length and in more detail than I can manage: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/category-mistakes/
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    Doesn't it require a mind to determine whether something is West of something else? — RogueAI

    I did not mention minds. Perhaps I should have. I think if anyone tries to determine something in the sense of 'decide whether something is or is not the case' and that person does not have a mind then they have a bigger task ahead of them than the previous one I tackled. Determining entails thinking and thinking without a mind is perhaps not possible for any person. But such a supposed person's difficulties - struggling, mindless, to position cities in Scotland - will not affect the geography of Scotland. How could it?
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    the non-eliminativist must also argue for the ontological existence of relations - not an easy task — RussellA

    Indeed, but let's have a go. First, let's distinguish ontological existence from other merely everyday kinds of existence. Now 'ontological' means, roughly, 'pertaining to existence'. So we are looking for a category of existence that is related to existence. Well, perhaps that's not too hard, after all. I guess every category of existence will qualify. If it is a category of existence then it pertains to existence. In the same way, if we go looking for canine dogs, feline cats and primate humans we will not be disappointed. We can tuck them into our metaphorical hunting sack along with the ontological existence.

    Next problem. We have to show that relations exist. We already know (from above) that, if relations exist, then they have the special ontological kind of existence required - because everything that exists has that special kind of existence. But we don't yet know whether relations exist.

    Let's borrow an example from the opposing camp. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh - so we are told. We are further led to believe that 'being west of' is a 'relation'. Now, what would it mean for such a relation to exist? It could mean that if we turn over the whole universe item by item we will find at least one thing that is to the west of another thing. On the other hand, if we get to the end of all the items in the universe and have not encountered a single thing that is to the west of any other thing then we can say that such a relation does not exist. If 'a relation exists' does not mean that, then I will need to confess I do not know what it does mean. OK so far. That leaves us with the small problem of turning over every item in the universe. But hold on! We just picked an example of the very thing we are looking for. There is a case - at least one case - of something being to the west of something else. From which it follows that there is at least one case of something being in relation to something else. From which if finally follows that relations exist. Putting this conclusion together with our earlier one, we can see that relations have ontological existence.

    "But which of the two cities does the relation 'being west of' exist in?" Well, relations do have ontological existence. But they are not objects that we can lug around with us. We can turn over every object in Glasgow and Edinburgh and we will not find any such thing. That's not because it's very small or particularly elusive. It's because it's not a kind of thing. It's because - oh, gosh, see Ryle and anyone who has written about category mistakes for the last 70 years....

    Need I go on? (No, Cuthbert. Not only need you not go on. You need not even have started.)
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    The real underlying question is basically if anything we typically think of as existing actually does, including ourselves. — Ignoredreddituser

    Oh, ok. Well, let's suppose that the answer to the underlying question is - "No, nothing that we typically think of as existing does actually exist." So I don't actually exist and neither do you. At least that saves us the bother of worrying about metaphysics......

    Perhaps T Clark's question did not go far enough. Not only does the question not matter - it doesn't even make sense. (I'm thinking partly of logical positivism's criticism of metaphysics.)
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    The Lego example is pretty contentious because you can recover an individual Lego from a block as opposed to say an atom which cannot, in principle, recovered from a molecule. — Ignoredreddituser

    This objection shows that lego will help me learn the difference between single objects and stuck-together objects but that molecules and atoms will not help me. So one example is helpful for the purpose of learning a distinction. A different example is not helpful. That is what I would expect from examples and learning in general.

    Also, what is electrolysis? Now that is worth learning.
  • Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
    Why does any of this matter? — T Clark

    C'mon TC. This is a philosophy forum, and it's a perfectly valid philosophical question. — Wayfarer

    I think T Clark's question is also a valid philosophical question, if we read it as a question rather than a rhetorical dismissal of the OP's question. Why does it matter? What is the discussion about? If we want to know about tables, their history and uses, then the discussion will give us nothing new. If we are seeking information about quarks and atoms, then the debate will yield no information beyond what we already know or think we know. If we are uncertain what is a single object as distinct from, for example, a pile of objects stuck together, then we need only play with lego to get the idea. If we want to know whether one thing is 'nothing but' another then we can try substituting the concepts in various contexts and see how we get on. It looks to me as if we cannot even pin down what question we are trying to answer before leaping to the safety of an answer. We cannot say why it matters. We cannot even say clearly what we are talking about.
  • Tegmark's type I multiverse. Can there be exact copies of you or me? I think so!
    Tegmark on his website does not directly address the question of the opening post. But he does address this curious query:

    Will I run over a squirrel?

    To spare unnecessary anxiety - or perhaps to spoil the surprise - Tegmark's answer is clear and unambiguous:

    From Mike Sanders, , Apr 6 2004 at 14:37
    Q: Within the context of the multiverse, doesn't every conceivable physical possibility occur? If I'm driving my car and stop abruptly to keep from hitting a squirrel, don't I purposely run over that same squirrel in an alternate universe. And if so, isn't the number of universes that follow each outcome approximately the same?
    A: No - and that's the crux. The laws of physics and your behavior evolved through natural selection create much regularity across the multiverse, so you'll try to spare that squirrel in the vast majority of all parallel universes where "you" are pretty similar to the copy reading this email (just as regards the above-mentioned gas station robbery). The fractions only split close to 50-50 for decisions that you perceive as a very close call.
  • Is Mr. Reid's "brave officer" objection to Mr. Locke’s account of personal identity valid?
    But don't put yourself down, @Stoycho, we are all struggling and as soon as a person strays outside the safe zone of 'Name That Fallacy' style of Critical Thinking it can be a deliciously wild but confusing world in philosophy. Thanks for the debate.
  • Thumbs Up!
    When it comes to texting and hitchhiking, I'm all thumbs.
  • Is Mr. Reid's "brave officer" objection to Mr. Locke’s account of personal identity valid?
    I think you are looking at a useful distinction between simple 'identity' (sameness of things) and 'personal identity' (sameness of us and people like us). If you don't know the Ship of Theseus argument, I would recommend it. It shows how the puzzles about the sameness of things can be tricky enough without even starting to think about first-person vs third-person perspectives.

    But I'm not sure the distinction helps you show that Reid's objection to Locke is invalid.

    In your terms explained above, self-sameness is not a transitive relation - meaning, roughly, that I can forget stuff and still be the same person. Granted. But according to Locke's theory (as quoted) the relation is transitive. Note: "the sameness of a rational being, consists in consciousness alone, and, as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person. So that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom they belong." That is, if I've forgotten stuff, then I've become a different person. And if you can spot stuff I've forgotten about then you can judge me to be a different person. First or third person perspective - it's all the same. But I have not become a different person. So Locke's theory (as quoted) is wrong.

    I suspect you might be making Reid's point for him, whilst thinking that you are contradicting him. But heck, don't take my word for it.

    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/ - dense article, see the bit about Ship of Theseus
  • About a tyrant called "=".
    It's an interesting question. Here's a sum for our early years arithmetic class:

    3 + 5 = ?

    The expected answer is '8'. But suppose we write:

    3 + 5 = 5 + 3

    No point, red cross, wrong answer. But why? 3 + 5 = 8 is true, and 3 + 5 = 5 + 3 is also true. 3 + 5 = 5 + 3 tells us something that 3 + 5 = 8 does not, namely, that addition is commutative. So it carries new information, just as 3 + 5 = 8 carries new information. We could also write "3 + 5 = x + 3 + 5 - x, for any number x", showing that there is an infinity of solutions to the problem. This will either get us sent home early or promoted to the fast-lane maths class, depending upon our teacher's mood.

    Perhaps the tyranny is not the "=" sign itself but the baggage of expectations we carry around with regard to its application.
  • Is Mr. Reid's "brave officer" objection to Mr. Locke’s account of personal identity valid?
    Stipulated means it's a given in Reid's scenario. Here's a more everyday scenario:

    Just after breakfast, I remember what I ate for breakfast. At lunchtime, I still remember what I ate for breakfast. At evening meal I can remember what I ate for lunch, but I've forgotten what I ate for breakfast.

    Consider this theory of personal identity: "the sameness of [my] rational being consists in consciousness alone, and, as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches [my] identity."

    Now let's apply that theory to my day. (a) At lunchtime, my consciousness extends backwards to breakfast and so I'm the same person eating lunch who ate breakfast. (b) At the evening meal, my consciousness extends backwards to lunch, so I'm the same person eating the evening meal who ate lunch. (c) But at the evening meal my consciousness does not extend backwards to breakfast. So my identity does not reach back that far. So I am a different person eating the evening meal from the one who ate breakfast.

    Putting this together. From (a): Me-at-breakfast equals me-at-lunch. From (b): Me-at-lunch equals me-at-evening. From (c): Me-at-evening does not equal me-at-breakfast. That is a contradiction. If X = Y and Y = Z then necessarily X = Z. As Reid would put it: the person eating the evening meal both is, and at the same time is not, the person who ate breakfast.

    ####

    I can see two ways to answer the objection to the theory.

    First, we could brave it out and preserve the theory. Perhaps, after all, I am a different person in the evening from the one who ate breakfast. That's the answer that I call 'crazy'. The whole scenario is built on our knowledge that I am the very person who at all three meals.

    Secondly, we could complain that the theory is being misunderstood or uncharitably interpreted or that it is just somehow not Locke's theory. That is probably a more fruitful direction. Consciousness and memory certainly have something to do with personal identity. People who lose all or most of their memories and forget their acquaintance with others from their past do seem like different people. I'm thinking of dementia, for example, people who do not recognise their spouses and children.
  • Is Mr. Reid's "brave officer" objection to Mr. Locke’s account of personal identity valid?
    But if (1) is not an established fact...... — Stoycho

    It is stipulated in the thought experiment that boy/soldier/general are the same person. No establishing of fact is needed.

    You might object that no such stipulation is valid. That is, we can never, even in principle, identify a younger with an older self in the event of lapses of memory. The problem is that it just does not preserve the phenomena. As soon as we step outside the weird dust cloud we have stirred up inside the philosophy laboratory we can see immediately that it makes no sense.
  • Classical theism or Theistic personalism?
    I suppose that if there is no God then the problem doesn't arise. Maybe the problem doesn't arise even if there is a God.

    For what it's worth, I think the general problem can have a humanist interpretation as well. One kind of parent will be perfect, all-knowing, all-controlling, endlessly patient - but somehow not quite approachable. Another kind will be engaged and engaging, frazzled and caring, but perhaps lacking in consistency. For anyone who thinks that 'God' may be some kind of psychological projection of our human needs (at best) then this might give an idea of the feeling of the problem (if it is a problem).

    I suspect that the OP was by someone writing an essay in theology and a one-line essay 'There is no God' might not yield the A or B they were hoping for on the particular set topic....
  • Is Mr. Reid's "brave officer" objection to Mr. Locke’s account of personal identity valid?
    So, I think, that such contradiction as "the general is, and at the same time is not, the same person with him who was flogged at school" cannot be made. — Stoycho

    I think you accept Reid's argument that they are not the same person according to Locke's theory. We know that they are the same person, because the whole scenario is proposed on the basis that they are the same. Reid's form of argument is this:

    (1) Person A is the same as person B.
    (2) If Locke's theory is right, person A is not the same as person B.

    By modus tollens: Locke's theory is not right.
  • What do we call a premise which omits certain information?
    We know that we act directly/unconditionally (our actions are know to us in an unconditional way) — jancanc

    What part of your action don't you know? Gimme one example — god must be atheist

    I knew I stuck a finger up at a bad driver on the way to my new job. I didn't know I'd just insulted my new boss. — Cuthbert

    The getting insulted was the action by your boss. Your action was to insult a driver. It was not your action tha that the driver and your boss was one and the same person. — god must be atheist

    The example was about the intension (with an 's') of an act, roughly, how we would describe and think of the act given our current state of knowledge. But we can do things without knowing that we are doing them. So our actions are not (always) known to us 'in an unconditional way'. I ate a chicken sandwich. I ate a dose of salmonella. Same action - but part of my action was unknown to me.

    Could have been Donalda Trump, could have been Pope Francis, — god must be atheist

    True, could have been. And if it had been, I would have unknowingly insulted them. That would have been part of my action that I didn't know.

    You rightly pointed out that the effects of an action are not part of the action. They may be unknown to us but they do not made a counter-example to the claim attributed to Schopenhauer in the OP.
  • What do we call a premise which omits certain information?
    What part of your action don't you know? Gimme one example. — god must be atheist

    I knew I stuck a finger up at a bad driver on the way to my new job. I didn't know I'd just insulted my new boss.
  • Is Mr. Reid's "brave officer" objection to Mr. Locke’s account of personal identity valid?
    .....it follows that he who took the standard is NOT the same person who was made a general. — Stoycho

    I think you say this because the one who took the standard remembers the flogging and the one who was made a general does not remember it. So the standard-taker and the bemedalled-general have different items in their consciousness. So they are (by Locke's theory) different people. Is that how you are arguing?

    If so, then I think you get to Reid's conclusion by a slightly different route. We know that flogged-boy, standard-taker and bemedalled-general are all the same person. If Locke's theory must conclude that they are different people, then it's a mistaken theory.

    ##

    Having said all that, it all looks very uncharitable to Locke. Did he really believe that whenever he happens to forget or remember something about his past experiences (as frequently happens to all of us) then he becomes a different person? That sounds just crazy. Now, Locke may have been wrong about personal identity. But I don't think he was crazy.
  • Equal Under The Laws?
    That's very interesting and I did not know. But in the Netherlands isn't the country's Parliament sovereign? I mean, the law-makers can decide that it's legal in Netherlands to apply e.g. Turkish civil law in those circumstances. Turkey cannot make that decision for the Netherlands. But if the two jurisdictions were operating in the same State, I don't understand where sovereignty would lie. Perhaps that's why it's a modern problem and a democratic problem. If a monarch can say 'OK, Church, you can do whatever you want in these aspects of law', then so be it. But where law-makers are democratically accountable then it looks more complicated.
  • Equal Under The Laws?
    I wish to ask why a state cannot operate two sets of laws in order to cater for significant minorities — usefulidiot

    Here are a few reasons:

    No appeal to highest authority. Legal disputes can be taken to higher courts. In the case of dual systems, there would be two authorities. each the highest court in its own system. There would be no way of settling disputes between these two authories - unless there is some authority higher than both. Which then re-creates a single system.

    There are multiple (non-state) codes already. People can agree any way they like of settling disputes. They can call them 'laws' if they like, e.g. the laws of cricket. If they don't agree with the process or the results, then they can opt out of the so-called laws and appeal to the law of the land, that is, of the State.

    .....after reaching the age of majority to prevent individuals from switching codes for personal benefit or just to game the system there could be a two or three year delay from application to registration. — usefulidiot

    OK, that sounds sensible on the face of it - and that would be the law, right? But suppose one of the systems changes that law and the other disagrees with the change. Who will settle that dispute?

    Natural justice. Suppose 'personal benefit' includes getting justice, for example, a woman being able to escape a violent marriage through divorce. Now she submits to daily beatings because she should not be a selfish person only thinking of her personal benefit and gaming the system.
  • Classical theism or Theistic personalism?
    I have a hard time understanding what theistic personalism is.... — Dermot Griffin

    It's easy to get lost in intricate philosophical theology and miss the feel of the problem.

    On the one hand:
    If God is all powerful, all knowing, all good, unchanging and timeless, then how can we have a relationship with Him or He with us?

    On the other hand:
    If God is a person as we understand persons to be and if God is able to give and take in relationship with us, then how can He be also a supreme and eternal being?
  • What's the fallacy?
    ......what is that fallacy? — Jon Sendama

    I would say it is not a fallacy. It is a challenge to show that the options presented are exhaustive. To do that, you need to show that denying both entails a contradiction. Exhaustive options are not usually available outside maths or formal logic.

    Do you agree with what I just wrote or not? I don't want to hear 'Partly' or 'Yes, but...' or 'No, if...' But of course those are appropriate responses. You might agree with some of it and not with all of it.
  • Aristotle and his influence on society.
    Plato and Aristotle both probably can be blamed or credited with almost everything that's happened since they were alive. — John McMannis

    And another thing. Why didn't Euclid invent calculus?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    It's frustrating if you see so clearly what time is and no one understands what you mean. — Raymond

    Everyone knows what time is. — Raymond

    So everyone knows what time is but nobody understands your account of it.

    Is there any mystery left, when we analyze time? Isn't it perfectly clear? — Raymond

    It was clear, if (as you say) everyone knows what time is. But it is no longer clear, because nobody understands it, when it is explained.

    So one mystery is: why does explaining something seem to make it less rather than more clear? This is an ancient problem in philosophy. "What is justice?" asked Socrates. Of course we know what justice is and we recognise injustice from our earliest years. But when we try to explain it we can get in a dreadful muddle. Time is similar. Stephen Hawking wrote a whole book about the nature of time. He was not writing it for people who cannot tell the time or who do not know whether they had a shower before or after breakfast.
  • Should Money Be Stripped from the Ideal Evaluation of Arts?
    What do you mean by non-fungible? — D2OTSSUMMERBUG

    I wouldn't spend all that money on a token that I can't even funge.
Home » Cuthbert