Not only do we "know" objects though subjectivity, but objects only have significance in subjectivity. Any object is in relation with all others, no matter how distance, and is but one finite state with meaning in subjectivity. It's not only subjective all the way down, but every subjectivity is objective-- states of the world which are unaffected by going unnoticed or disagreed with.

To interact is to be something related to occasions of the experience of objects. Subjectivity is objectivity. It is to exist, whether known by someone or not. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I'm trying to understand the gist of what you are saying. So you think that some things interact and others do not? Those things that do not interact are still in some relation to each other, and this is objectivity?

I mentioned that above. I think an idealist understanding of mind is basic to Peirce's general philosophy, but it's not necessary for bio-semiotics, so it is left out in that context. — Wayfarer

That sounds a bit like Whiteheadian process philosophy. The only way we "know" objects interact is through subjectivity. Objectively interacting doesn't even make sense outside the context of a knowing subject. Whitehead thus makes the speculative move to posit that everything that interacts is through subjectivity- it is subjective all the way down. To interact, is to have occasions of experience for objects.

Happiness is always temporary, but that doesn't make it any less valuable. If anything, its temporary nature makes it more valuable. — Sapientia

That's not much of a consolation when someone is not happy. Good try though.

Permanent happiness is impossible, so the alternative must either be to live an unhappy life or to die, neither of which are preferable, so why are you complaining? — Sapientia

Actually, it was better never to have lived in the first place, but now that we are here, it is not bad to recognize the situation. Those are false alternatives. Rather, we will live and strive as we normally do, sometimes achieving a level of happiness, but with all the caveats I explained. This does make it better to have been, it just makes it that we can cope with reality, meaning we can make do.

Life cannot accurately be summed up as "coping" or "avoiding" or a "distraction" from "angst". — Sapientia

How is it not? Besides, you are reworking my more nuanced argument effectively making it weaker (and basically making it a strawman). By dulling the force of the argument you can weaken it, and thus provide what "appears" to be a stronger reply. Here is what I actually said:

By being taught to sublimate and concentrate on various tasks-at-hand one is socialized to avoid feelings of angst or dread. One cannot have time or inclination to see our nature striving-at-nothing if one has something to concentrate on. All the better if the concentration embodies the socio-economic values of the embodied culture, as at least it will probably give one a good reputation- mine as well pursue that which provides status and good health if one is going to pursue anything (good worker, good family man, good performer, good athlete, healthy eater, healthy habits, etc.). — schopenhauer1

But, importantly, we are not powerless to think or act in a way which is conducive to living a life worth living, despite the downside, which you predictably emphasise and exaggerate because it suits your argument to do so. — Sapientia

There are constraints to our freedom imposed by the world and ourselves. We have some freedom to choose, but the fact of our goal-seeking, dissatisfied nature should give some pause to simply saying "Look, I can choose goals and pursue them- yay!"

I suspect that what you really mean is that, in relation to something else, such as "the grand scheme of things" as you see it, what presently matters to us seems insignificant. You might note, for example, temporality and the finiteness of things, and fallaciously jump to the conclusion that therefore nothing really matters. — Sapientia

Instrumentality is the concept that we are doing to do to do. Happiness is often temporary, is often frustrated, and leads to more suffering. The world imposes constraints of survival and unwanted pains and the self imposes constraints of boredom into goal-seeking and pleasure seeking, which leads us to the idea of instrumentality. As I said in an earlier post about the implicit message of society:

By being born, it's telling us that various projects of life are supposed to be followed through and carried out. Thus, suicide, though an option, is not preferred. What is preferred is finding coping mechanisms within the structural and contingent constraints.

By being socialized to find reproduction as worthwhile, it is telling us that these projects must continue in perpetuity. The reasons to have others and have them pursue projects is tricky as it ranges from "having a little one that one can influence" to hoping for the possibility that future people may discover more scientific and technological understanding (which itself may be a reification of forms of knowledge).

By being taught to sublimate and concentrate on various tasks-at-hand one is socialized to avoid feelings of angst or dread. One cannot have time or inclination to see our nature striving-at-nothing if one has something to concentrate on. All the better if the concentration embodies the socio-economic values of the embodied culture, as at least it will probably give one a good reputation- mine as well pursue that which provides status and good health if one is going to pursue anything (good worker, good family man, good performer, good athlete, healthy eater, healthy habits, etc.).

Of course with all this is the notion that life is instrumental. We do not want to think goals are chosen out of a desire to not face angst. Rather society, which gave us this language-brain, (which comes with it the ability to feel angst) wants us to then take that feeling and sublimate it with goals that are supposed to be taken as given (guilt is a great tool to ensure this sticks). Do not look passed the socially prescribed goals (of family, work, legally-deemed entertainment, and maintaining one's living environment) as this may then see the angst itself below the surface.

Now, people will mention the awareness of instrumentality, and then go on to discuss how the notion of absurdity and embracing the charade is the mentality one needs to carry on. Sometimes that just does not do the trick.

I mean, these kinds of work-arounds (in my experience) are conjured up, with the goal of finding work-around. Then the thinkers conceive models of things that they (I should say we) claim matter, ultimately desirable end-goals, — David

Any thoughts? — David

Read Schopenhauer or just read about any one of my posts on Schopenhauer, Philosophical Pessimism in general, or antinatalism.. You are starting to get it :).

You might try this question over at the older PF. — darthbarracuda

Good point, I'm sure apokrisis will want to field that one.

Levinas said it well when he proclaimed fatigue as being a fundamental aspect of a human. — darthbarracuda

Yep

Nagel also was correct in that anything, anywhere, can be seen as absurd. — darthbarracuda

and Yep

I'm also interested in Whitehead and his philosophy, but all I've done so far is read a couple of opinions about him and his work, so I can't answer your questions. — anonymous66

Fair enough, it is a very obtuse philosophy. The basics are relatively easy, but I have some questions that cannot be answered without more technical knowledge. For example, what justifies "creativity" to be (what I think to be) an axiom of this theory.

But that was my point. "Society as a whole" (as you use it) identifies a particular society, but not the society you're required to be in. Kim Kardashian lives in a different society from me and an Amish guy another. — Hanover

Post-industrial society is about choosing an identity. It's just window dressing. Your comparison to the Amish is more effective, but disliking one of the window-dressings in post-modern/industrial societies does not mean one flees to the Amish (even if that was a feasible and readily available option). However, since we are already socialized in a post-modern society, by "choosing" to live with the Amish, this too becomes another window dressing.

I think both you and I have a fairly similar understanding as to why it's a charade. It's pointless, scary, harmful, absurd, hilarious, enjoyable in some respects and uncomfortable in many others...an actor on an empty stage facing an empty audience is practicing a charade just as much as any of us are. — darthbarracuda

By being born, it's telling us that various projects of life are supposed to be followed through and carried out. Thus, suicide, though an option, is not preferred. What is preferred is finding coping mechanisms within the structural and contingent constraints.

By being socialized to find reproduction as worthwhile, it is telling us that these projects must continue in perpetuity. The reasons to have others and have them pursue projects is tricky as it ranges from "having a little one that one can influence" to hoping for the possibility that future people may discover more scientific and technological understanding (which itself may be a reification of forms of knowledge).

By being taught to sublimate and concentrate on various tasks-at-hand one is socialized to avoid feelings of angst or dread. One cannot have time or inclination to see our nature striving-at-nothing if one has something to concentrate on. All the better if the concentration embodies the socio-economic values of the embodied culture, as at least it will probably give one a good reputation- mine as well pursue that which provides status and good health if one is going to pursue anything (good worker, good family man, good performer, good athlete, healthy eater, healthy habits, etc.).

Of course with all this is the notion that life is instrumental. We do not want to think goals are chosen out of a desire to not face angst. Rather society, which gave us this language-brain, (which comes with it the ability to feel angst) wants us to then take that feeling and sublimate it with goals that are supposed to be taken as given (guilt is a great tool to ensure this sticks). Do not look passed the socially prescribed goals (of family, work, legally-deemed entertainment, and maintaining one's living environment) as this may then see the angst itself below the surface.

Now, people will mention the awareness of instrumentality, and then go on to discuss how the notion of absurdity and embracing the charade is the mentality one needs to carry on. Sometimes that just does not do the trick.

Are you high right now? — darthbarracuda

It was meant to be an open-ended sophomoric question (as I eat my munchies).

a silly charade and yet an important silly charade. — darthbarracuda

So why is it important? What makes it a charade? Charade from what?

eh, sure - think we lost the plot for tepid niceties but this thread's toast anyway — csalisbury

I didn't! Your claim is that Will cannot "do" things in causal like-fashion. If the world of appearances are an illusion, then the illusion must be accounted for. The appearance of it exists, and therefore something outside of Will exists (but how can this be if everything is "actually" Will!!). One way around this is that both the world of will and appearance are flipsides of each other- one did not "arise" out of the other (or otherwise fall into the fallacy of attributing causality to Will). Schopenhauer1's nuance was that the odd conclusion that comes from appearance being the flipside of Will, would be that an ever-present organism would have to exist in order for the world of appearances to not just "arise" from nowhere but always persist (as it cannot just come on the scene at any point in time "x"). Maybe that will set the gears going again!

I think the truly virtuous understand that the good is pursued for its own sake. To instrumentalize it is to take away all meaning and uniqueness from it. But pursuing the good is not to pursue progress. Progress can be made in the pursuit of it, but progress in and of itself is value-neutral. One can make progress towards anything. including evil. — Thorongil

I was giving a speculative history of virtue. That wasn't the crux of the argument. My argument actually agrees with you. Progress doesn't give a meaning to life though I find it interesting that it exists. Clearly it can be tied with evolution and our general learning capabilities. Learning allows us to accomplish things instinctual programming might do for other organisms. It just so happens an exaptation of this is progressing in non survival related activities. First you must know your goal, then you must know what it takes to achieve it or achieve it more quickly or with more ease.

My main point was that the fact that we progress can make people reify it to some sort of bigger meaning. Even just in our own lives, overall something might seem like it's getting better so people may think we are here in order to achieve some sort of improvement.

sees consciousness as something that occurs in my head as opposed to being out in the world. — Erik

I'd have to understand this more thoroughly to comment on this and compare to Schopenhauer because this could be misinterpreted very easily. Can you explain what you think H meant by this?

The ready-to-hand and present-to-hand modes of being can be understood as the difference between the holistic, context-dependent and absorbed way we use tools and materials in our world to achieve our goals vs. the context-free and atomistic way things show themselves when we remove ourselves from practical involvement and just stare at them (they become Ideas, objects, sense-data etc.). So in a certain sense these two basic modes of revealing would appear to be possibilities which cut across historical distinctions. Practical and Theoretical as two modes of Being most societies would at the very least be able to make sense of, regardless of particular historical circumstances. But there's much in H's analysis that I'm leaving out that does make his appropriation of the dichotomy unique and illuminating.

Gellasenheit is a concept of the 'later' Heidegger, the one much more immersed in the 'history of Being', and has to do with a particular way we comport (or attune) ourselves to the world. It's characterized by neither practical engagement nor theoretical detachment, but some sort of 'active disengagement' for lack of a better term which is equally far from indifference and aggressive instrumentalism. I seem to recall Heidegger talking about an active 'letting-be' of beings. So beings can reveal themselves in a variety of ways to us, which points to the 'ontological difference' between beings and Being. Being is nothing, literally no thing. But this no-thing is what allows for our understanding of anything, which is what makes us human in fact, and so lies at the heart of our existence. A frightening thought perhaps. We try to conceal this groundless ground (Heidegger's term) which allows for anything to come to 'be' in the first place. We seek some sort of eternal foundation - 'Ideas', God, Will, Consciousness etc. - to stave off the terror that strikes us upon genuine insight. — Erik

I've used some Heidegger before to get at themes that Schopenhauer touches upon. My spin on his idea of ready-to-hand is when we concentrate on a task, we have a certain flow where we kind of lose our sense of time and are immersed in the task. Things seem to be going well here. Then the "broken tool" occurs when we see are no longer concentrating. Schopenhauer describes this as the feeling we get when we reached our goal, or have just experienced something pleasurable. It is a kind of feeling of unease, angst, existential boredom, and similar feelings. To Schopenhauer though, this would be seeing things as they are- this striving Will. We might get caught up in the flow, but when broken tool occurs, and we have not distracted, sublimated, isolated, and anchored our thoughts, we see it for the Will-to-nothing that it is.

As for the no-thing that allows for understanding of anything- I don't see how that is dissimilar to Schopenhauer's atemporal Will which is "no thing" in terms of its empirical emptiness but its "felt" inner sense of being. I don't see why Heidegger thinks he is really inventing anything new with the terms. It might appear to him that they are radically different, but I don't see it as being so. Perhaps he did not give Schop's Will too much attention because he wanted to differentiate himself and to do so, you have to deny the significance of previous philosophers?

It doesn't exist metaphysically. It's just an abstract concept used to describe the movement towards a particular goal. I would not link it to virtue, seeing as there is all around us the steady progress of injustice, ignorance, and evil just as much, if not greatly more so, than there is of justice, knowledge, and goodness. — Thorongil

I am not linking progress to virtue per se. What I'm saying is that perhaps at some point in ancient history, it was perceived that having certain "virtues" meant better survival. These "rules of thumb" became reified into some sort of thing unto itself to try to achieve.

That doesn't mean (pace Sartre) that humans are free to create whatever meaning they choose - H's lifelong meditation was on the relatedness of human existence to Being as it unfolds historically. He situated the understanding of ourselves and our world as manifested through modern philosophy (with its emphasis on subjectivity, objectivity, willing, sense date, etc.) as but one particular instantiation within the history of Being, and not the only or inevitable one. The way we understand ourselves and our world appears to undergo periodic shifts that are not entirely of our own making. — Erik

Can you explain how his ideas of ready-at-hand and present-at-hand are related to his ideas of Being undergoing radical shifts in history? Ready-at-hand and present-at-hand seem to be different modes of being- Ready at hand possibly being more "authentic" of some sort. Also what does this have to do with his idea of gellasenheit and quieting of chatter? His framework seems to be historical-leaning but at the same time his ready-at-hand has some sort of permanence that is not a part of the historical dialectic. In other words, please try to fit the neologisms I have bolded into your interpretation of what Heidegger was trying to say. Tall order... I can go back to his texts, but he is one philosopher that I rather have secondary sources (or quaternary sources of a Heidegger fan on philospohy forums) and being that I am probably not going to be a Heideggarian expert over night, I'll make do with your interpretations as a launching point. I will try to keep up with some basics by reading some secondary and primary sources as well so we can have a somewhat intelligible discussion on him compared with Schopenhauer or just on his own terms.

He may be another case of what I said earlier about other existentialists and how they compare with Schopenhauer: "

He wrote about it more eloquently, clearly, yet more completely than those who came after who seem like fractured remnants trying to reconstruct bit-by-bit what was already wholly stated. — schopenhauer1

That is what I am going to predict I will see once we unpack some Heidegger.

There is a sense of non-definitiveness, of freedom, in considering that everything about “me” is conditioned and in principle changeable (even if, given time and resources, it couldn’t actually change in my lifetime). So this is where an “extreme freedom” view makes sense – but it necessarily includes the aspect of life as conditioned and constrained by the world as it happens to be. — Arik-Alb

Wow you just made me think of how Schopenhauer's view of character being inborn can be related to Sartre's authenticity. Perhaps Sartre's radical freedom, or being authentic, is actually just the playing out of what one's character actually wants. It is finding the motivations which actually suit one's character.

There is a sense of non-definitiveness, of freedom, in considering that everything about “me” is conditioned and in principle changeable (even if, given time and resources, it couldn’t actually change in my lifetime). So this is where an “extreme freedom” view makes sense – but it necessarily includes the aspect of life as conditioned and constrained by the world as it happens to be. — Arik-Alb

It would misrepresent Schopenhauer to view him as strictly deterministic. Motivation is a complicated thing though, and in his views, one of the four justifications of sufficient reason. Anyways, my point in the original post was that Schopenhauer did not stop at reflecting on our ability to define ourselves by our ability to choose. Rather, he probed deeper- into the very fact that we have desires, urges, goals, and unsatisfactory needs in the first place. As stated earlier, we are this pendulum swing of survival and boredom. We can choose to take certain actions based on our personal motivations, but there is always a principle of striving forward in the first place. This striving, according to him, leads to inevitable suffering, and he observed the many ways in which it indeed does (frustrated desires, temporary happiness, the instrumental nature of existence as it moves forward but with no ultimate satiation). We are always in a state of "lack" in which we are trying to remove said feeling, but in vain.

Even more than the existentialists, he knew "angst" though I am pretty sure he did not mention that anywhere in his works. He wrote about it more eloquently, clearly, yet more completely than those who came after who seem like fractured remnants trying to reconstruct bit-by-bit what was already wholly stated.

It can describe humanity as a whole, viewed as a collection of individuals. — Thorongil

What do you think of what do you think of my last post because that more clearly stated what I was trying to get at than the OP.

I'm not sure if you saw, but I made a comment above that might have clarified what I am talking about.

Ok, so I thought about it more and I realized what I might be getting at. It is the theme of instrumentality and progress. Let me explain:

First, I want to understand what this progress thing is. I would like to know it better as something which exist in the world. Obviously I know it as something that happens, something I experience daily, but I would like to know exactly "what" it is in some sort of epistemological sense (how do we go about knowing it") and and metaphysical sense ("how/why/what it is").

Next, I want to know if people have mixed "progress" with the goals of "progress". Perhaps someone way back in time thought that the only way to get things "done" was by following certain "virtues" (courage, good judgement, etc.). These virtues helped survival or at least they appeared to work (after all, it COULD have went another way where a different set of virtues might have led to some form of survival but this set of virtues or skill-sets worked). Then these virtues became reified through various schools of philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, etc.). They became the "point" of existence rather than habits of mind that were perhaps rules of thumb to survive better. Fast-forward two thousand years and Western society refined science and technology. Now, perhaps virtue + science and technology became the "point" of existence (or maybe drop virtue for just science and technological innovation). On an individual level, we master certain techniques and we think of this as the goal. Perhaps we make it into a reification as "meaning" even.

Anyways, I just wanted to see if progress is just another thing we look at and hold as a "see existence is showing us some meaning" when really things are more instrumental than that. Life itself is instrumental. We do, we do things better, but what of it? We are doing things, but we simply do because we are striving forward. We cannot help but do otherwise.

@Thorongil @darthbarracuda @Bitter Crank

Whether someone thinks Sartre or Schop gets closer to the human condition more or less comes down to whether are more interested in the expression of freedom or the expression of restriction. The former gives freedom as the reason for our horrors (we all chose it... "Hell is other people"), the later supposes the reason for our actions is a restrictive force of inevitability which which we always carry (Will). — TheWillowOfDarkness

That is a good summation of the two sides. Clearly, I tend to take the side of Schopenhauer, who is more nuanced than simply saying Will is a restrictive force. He does leave room for individual expressions of the Will and even some sort of transcendental and empirical "character" expressions that tend behave in certain ways. Actually, I guess you can say even his idea of individual character traits, are restrictive because we cannot even will to be different than our characters here. He definitely seems to describe a more general restriction of the perpetual "pendulum swing" of human existence. I characterized it myself as impositions of the world (unwanted pains, survival in a cultural context) and impositions of the self (boredom transformed into goal-seeking and pleasure-seeking).

In the everyday common sense term, progress just means to move forward. If we obtain a goal, we progress. If we acquire something better, we progress. If something changes, it progresses, thus progress is tied inherently to process (a process can progress through stages). — darthbarracuda

I think we should make a distinction here between progress: forward or onward movement toward a destination. versus progress: advance or develop toward a better, more complete, or more modern state. I'm using the second term.

In the more philosophical, existential sense, progress, in my opinion, is an unsustainable process that can only happen in a "bubble", or in more scientific terms, a system with a consistent source of energy. The environment we call Earth can be harnessed to produce technology that better aids our societies. We can progress out of more archaic moral ideas. All of this progress exists and is entirely dependent upon the "bubble" we call Earth. — darthbarracuda

But if we step back for a minute. What are the implications of the fact that the "value" of progress clearly seems to exist. Individually, we can progress at an activity or in quantity of knowledge. Collectively we can progress at institutions and technology. It is so basic we don't even really question it. But, what does it mean that progress is a part of our epistemological experience as humans? Is there something that is "shown" to us in this understanding that we can "progress"? Sure, much of it is habituation that gets stronger over time, or accumulation that gets more integrated, but it is a function of the human experience to experience this "getting better" "getting more refined" or just progressing. I'm not sure I have this fully fleshed out, but there is something I am trying to get at, and perhaps a dialogue will tease it out. Don't worry, I'm not trying to get all Nietzschean or rosy-eyed optimistic here, but I am just trying to work with this concept of progress in the individual and group sense.

Schop almost understands this in Will. It a much better handling of the infinite expression of finite states than found in some other philosophy, such as that which suggest that humans have power over such expression. He's still doesn't quite grasp it though, for he views it as a consequence of representational experience (a state of space-time) rather than understanding it as a thing-in-itself. He's still thinking of the infinite in terms of space-time. Supposedly, it needs us (or the ever present organism) to be. He's given it a beginning (life) and an ending (death) when it doesn't have one. Not even in us, for we don't be at conception (we are yet to be made) or in death (we have ceased to be). — TheWillowOfDarkness

I sort of see where your going, but you are going to have to lay down a more explicit explanation for your own point of view in contrast to Schopenhauer and in the simplest terms possible.

The question I have is: What is it I will in general? I never "run in general" as I when I run I do so for a reason. I know what running is, true; however, I don't maintain that I run in general "outside of time" and for no reason, without any ground. I don't accept the idea of a kind of Platonic Form of running or "to run." Is the Will something similar? — Ciceronianus the White

It is more than mere Platonic universals in Schopenhauer's conception. Will is like an inner force that strives but with no aim. I think he vascilates between it being apparent in our voluntary wills, and our subjective inner experiences. Is Will akin to the inner "what it's like" aspect of things or is akin to the drive we have to move about to survive and pursue goals in general? Or is he tying the two together such that the inner "what it's like feeling" is like the necessary vehicle for which the Will can move forward in a world of subject/object dichotomy? Maybe @Thorongil has a take on this.

I don't think Schopenhauer's Will, if I understand it correctly, is something that can be inferred from the fact that we have wants, needs, or desires we try to satisfy. — Ciceronianus the White

Actually he does just that as one of his main proofs for Will in his book 2 of the World as Will and Representation.

And in fact, if we focus on the contexts in which we want something or to do something, we find instances when we can regulate our desire or refrain from indulging it. — Ciceronianus the White

It is not just motivations but voluntary movements of the body. Here is Schopenhauer:

As we have said, the will proclaims itself primarily in the voluntary movements of our own body, as the inmost nature of this body, as that which it is besides being object of perception, idea. For these voluntary movements are nothing else than the visible aspect of the individual acts of will, with which they are directly coincident and identical, and only distinguished through the form of knowledge into which they have passed, and in which alone they can be known, the form of idea.

But these acts of will have always a ground or reason outside themselves in motives. Yet these motives never determine more than what I will at this time, in this [pg 138] place, and under these circumstances, not that I will in general, or what I will in general, that is, the maxims which characterise my volition generally. Therefore the inner nature of my volition cannot be explained from these motives; but they merely determine its manifestation at a given point of time: they are merely the occasion of my will showing itself; but the will itself lies outside the province of the law of motivation, which determines nothing but its appearance at each point of time. It is only under the presupposition of my empirical character that the motive is a sufficient ground of explanation of my action. But if I abstract from my character, and then ask, why, in general, I will this and not that, no answer is possible, because it is only the manifestation of the will that is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, and not the will itself, which in this respect is to be called groundless. — Schopenhauer

The will, moreover, only wills one thing as a timeless act of will: life. The knowledge of distinct, individual objects and acts of will is, therefore, ultimately illusory. — Thorongil

This is why I made a separate thread about illusion. The "knowledge" part- the "illusion" has to be accounted for. It "exists" in some way. This illusion has been around since the first organisms according to Schopenhauer. Being that the illusion cannot come about at time "x", it has to have always been there (along with Will or as part of Will). Thus, the odd conclusion is there is an organism that was always there along or as part of Will. I know it is odd, but I am just taking the logic to its full conclusion.

That evidence can be gained only through observation, investigation, experiment, life experience--living and interacting with the rest of the world, trying and failing or succeeding, seeking solutions to problems, answers to questions, and finding out what happens when we do. — Ciceronianus the White

Certainly the Schopenhauer's Will can be found in our own striving nature which is hard to simply deny by fiat. Our own striving is something immediate to us. Try stopping it..

Certainly we can speculate if we wish, but that is all we do in that case, but when our speculation is unable to be judged correct or incorrect, or even probably correct or incorrect, that speculation is idle. — Ciceronianus the White

Of course, "judging correct or incorrect" being the crux. If there are different criteria for this, then even that statement cannot be made. Why is the speculation idle though? The word idle is kind of not doing anything for me right now, so maybe use something else to explain it? Is it because it doesn't allow people to "do" anything with technology or science? You can debate it because one can point out flaws in the argument, etc. Again, you are assuming empiricism, but there are ways to debate non-empirical arguments.

This brings me to a larger point: You assume what is "true" is what is goal-oriented. That in itself could be false. What is useful to "achieve" a a goal, might be good if that is your goal, but then you must argue why being goal-oriented should be the goal, and when you start arguing for the basis of this without any a priori appeal, you will be begging the question and then what happens is you can only use snark and smugness to assert your claim, which would be sad and annoying.

Since we are essentially talking about the same thing, why don't we move this conversation to the "This Old Thing" thread.

The will is a logical explanation of the world, not a physical one. If you recognize this distinction, then I think the force of your concern evaporates. — Thorongil

Yeah, but the Fourfold Root only applies to the world of representation- it cannot be applied to Will itself. Also, since we are talking about when "time started", it actually does apply to the category about time and sufficient reason.

The will is just a word abstracted from the feeling of the present moment, which is strictly incommunicable. I can only communicate and have knowledge of my will in time, in terms of distinct acts of will that I perceive after they have occurred, but as for sheer willing itself, this "occurs" in the timeless present, and this timeless feeling of willing or striving Schopenhauer simply calls the affirmation of the will to life, since what is known to be willed after the fact is life or representation. — Thorongil

No, I get it. That was a very good explanation of Schopenhauer's Will and its relationship to representation. Actually, I think I am going to quote you to answer @TheWillowOfDarkness in the "Mind is Illusion" thread as it is a very succinct but thorough summary.

Anyways, the part I am having trouble with is the dichotomy of the atemporality of Will and the presence of time/space in representation. Will is atemporal and representation at least has the appearance of time/space etc. The problem is when Schop talks about Will objectifying itself, as Will does not do "causality-like" things. To quote myself again:

Things arise in this side of things, things don't arise on the Will side of things. You can only maintain this if we lose the idea of "objectifying" because Will- being aspacial and atemporal does not do "causality-like" things. — schopenhauer1

In other words, time/space/the world as representation cannot come AFTER some originary period where all is Will. That makes no sense if Will is temporal and there is no before/after (and thus no causality). Rather, space/time/ the world as representation must "exist" (words do no justice here) right along side Will. It was there all along doing its time/space thing. However, that is a conundrum because time obviously has a beginning- which according to Schop happens with the first representing-making creature (something about "first eye opening" as a metaphor). Since time/space must have always been there (as there is no before/after as stated earlier), and since that occurs with first organism, there must have been an ever-present organism where time/space can always exist.

I know this might be muddled. If you need me to try to do a premise, conclusion thing, let me know.

The problem with using a priori is it takes an empirical state (us, in the world, in each moment) and tries to turn it into the infinite. Will is idle because, in forming that universal idea, it leaves out where the action occurs, in each moment of existence, where every little thing is distinct and change occurs. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I guess @Ciceronianus the White passed the baton to you? Ok..

Then you miss the point that Schopenhauer made which is a furtherance of Kant's point which is the thing-in-itself (non-spatial/non-temporal aspect) and the world as representation (world individuated in space/time). That is not idle, that is simply speculating based on what we know about our own bodies, and the limits of our epistemology.

It is an abstraction of meaning expressed by states of the world. Desire might be everywhere at all times, but no instance of it is the same as another. Will is not what acts. It's merely something expressed in any action. Those actions differ vastly. One soldier is Willed to fight. Another soldier is Willed to flee. Different consequences, different meaning, an understanding of which is not dependent on understanding Will (i.e. that everyone is willed to act), but rather on the states themselves. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Will is not simply every action though, but the underlying striving below the surface. It's context in language-dependent and situation-dependent instances are simply minor variations on the same theme.

The so called "it-in-itself" is a red-herring. With respect to the world, it gives us understanding of nothing, for it only refers to the infinite expression found in any state. It our escape from the world into an abstract realm free of finite difference and change. About the world and its relationships, it says nothing at all. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This just sounds like TheWillowofDarkeness's (not surprisingly) grumpy feelings of the matter, not necessarily the matter itself. I am pretty sure it is saying a lot. It is giving a principle behind which all is connected. It gives a ground of unity in an only apparently individuated world.

And that's why a "reason" cannot be found for Will. It doesn't have one. To pose the question is to ask, "Why is making a post making a post?" Unlike states of the world, where existence defines whether or not something occurs, Will contains no action and cannot be said to be or not be. The infinite nature of Will means it cannot have a reason. It's necessary. No matter what we do, Will is still expressed. — TheWillowOfDarkness

You are eating your own tail here. Schop's (and Kant's) point was you cannot use empiricism to ground empiricism.

Anyways, I have made a great deal of criticisms of Schopenhauer lately, but this "a priori SMASH" approach of just denying the approach all together is too uncharitable for my taste. We may agree more than you think, but typically, because you get all frothy at the mouth the instant you see something you disagree with I cannot have a dialogue only a shouting match.

I tried to note that what I've read of Schopenhauer's Will may be incorrect in some way. If what I've read is correct, though, I think it would be idle in that it would be a mere assertion along the lines of the claim that God is the impulse that makes everything happen. It tells us nothing, explains nothing. — Ciceronianus the White

So any a priori philosophy is illegitimate, and since empirical science does not answer the question either, we should move on. How is it that it tells us nothing and explains nothing? He ties our own wills and subject/object relationship with the rest of nature, and extrapolates an underlying Will. He uses Kant's transcendental idealism as a launching point for speculation on the thing-in-itself. I'm not saying his theory is absolutely correct, but your uncharitable interpretation does not even let you look at his arguments.

I don't know what other methodologies you refer to. — Ciceronianus the White

By that I mean, anything that is not Peirce.

I'm inclined to think that the application of the pragmatic maxim would indicate the concept is idle, as it would seem to be the case that the Will either is everything or some unverifiable, perhaps unknowable, impulse that makes everything happen which Schopenhauer chooses to call "Will." — Ciceronianus the White

So how is it idle? You just explained the theory and framed it in a negative way.

So, we think, we feel, we dream, etc. It would seem unnecessary at best to say that our minds do such things. That doesn't mean "the mind" is an illusion, though. It just means that there is no basis on which to distinguish our minds from ourselves. — Ciceronianus the White

That's fine, I guess you agree in a roundabout way that saying "mind is an illusion" still has to account for the illusion.

The hope is that in applying the pragmatic maxim, one might achieve some sort of clarity regarding concepts. But it has a negative function as well, as a tool of criticism. — Ciceronianus the White

Right, because no one else wants clarity or has clarity using any other methodology. We are all just flies in the bottle, and you are releasing the fly. I'm glad you came along to single-handedly save the day show us all the error. Ok, I'm done trying to out snark you.

it's inappropriate to speak of "the mind" or "the self" or "consciousness" or "the Will" in the abstract, without context; in other words, without consideration of what is meant by them when applied to actual situations arising in life, If I'm right, its application would thus indicate that we should stop speaking of them in that manner, and so get on with life. — Ciceronianus the White

The question was "is it legitimate to say that mind is an illusion, if the illusion itself has to be accounted for". Again, how does the pragmatic principle apply to this? I'm not saying it doesn't, but I want your interpretation and application specifically to this case, since you brought it up. I'm not looking for a rough outline of the pragmatic maxim itself. If you want an explication of Will, I can do that.. It is discussed at length as to how it "applies" in everyday life in Schopenahuer's book. I'm not saying it is "truth" but you certainly are not charitable with it based on your short statements here.

When it comes to such as "mind" and "self" and "consciousness" I think we're best off applying Peirce's pragmatic maxim, and then getting on with life. But I'm no philosopher. — Ciceronianus the White

Why do you think we are "best off" applying Peirce's maxim to mind, self, and consciousness? And why even comment on it if we should just "get on with life"? Why even comment on a philosophy forum about it in the first place? It sounds like you aren't following your own maxim. Of course, you might just like being troll-y.

Yeah, I tried to read Dennett's Consciousness Explained (recon to know the enemy better, I guess) but, even though I expected to disagree, I was legitimately disappointed by how shallow the argumentation was. It's exactly as you say - he just attacked the 'cartesian theater', again and again, as if the only two positions were eliminative materialism and Homunculism.

Maybe the book gets better, but I gave up after a couple hundred pages. — csalisbury

Sounds about right for Dennett.

Truth be told, everytime Schopenhauer starts talking about the indivisible unity of the will, outside the principium individuationis, I get the sense he's not really sure himself what he's talking about. It's basically a somber and confused oscillation between negative theology and ontotheology. The diversity of the world, its conditioned multiplicity, must, its felt, rest on some unified unconditioned (Why? this is the ontotheological impulse accepted unquestioningly). But how's the unity of something inherently eristic supposed to work? What does that even mean? Well...(& then we get the negative theology) — csalisbury

Yeah, there are some assumptions where it might not be explained very completely, especially about unity of Will. As you stated, he uses a negative theology of sorts to get at the notion that if things are not individuated in space/time then they must be this unified whole I guess and apparently it strives and objectifies, but in some metaphysical sense that is not in space or time, so it is kind of like a sublime striving and objectifying.. which seems like a square circle or something.

So how would you tweak Schopenhauer? Is will individuated all the way through? Is there even will? How does evolution, entropy, the Big Bang, subjective experience, and all of science fall into this? Real easy stuff.