If you think otherwise that's ok too. If studying someone who you think has important things to say is fanboying, then I guess I'm guilty. — Sam26

It's not even so much just fanboying. Look, I "fanboy" on Schopenhauer. Perhaps I'll start a thread on something about him shortly, even. But Schopenhauer made a lot of commitments in his works, that can be criticized and compared one way or the other. Schopenhauer himself put his theories in context to other philosophies, etc. I find much of what he writes as having some element of intangible wisdom to it. You might find the same with Wittgenstein. However, I also disagree and am critical of a lot of foundational stuff in Schopenhauer as well, whilst still being charitable to where he is coming from. I don't see that as much from the Wittgenstein fanboy crowd. So here is @RussellA who clearly has read Wittgenstein and quotes him at length, but dares to challenge him. And it seems that Wittgenstein can never do wrong with many of his defenders. I don't know, that to me goes beyond just being a fan.

It's always "misinterpretation" because "obviously" if one read him "correctly" one would have to agree with him!

Why are trying to make Wittgenstein fit your idea of what should or should not be said. All your doing is inserting your subjective feelings into the conversation, as though you know best what Witt should be saying and not saying. None of us can hold a candle to his ability to think through these linguistic ideas, including many professional philosophers. — Sam26

I don't think you see how you sound from an outsider perspective here. You sound like because he asked a lot of questions and answered his own questions, that he has these god-like qualities.

A lot of what he says is intuitive, but fleshed out (language is a game constructed from its usage). He gives many examples of such. Cool. But it makes not commitments really one way or the other of its own implications other than that his previous theory (and to some extent Augustine and Russell) were wrong. Well, yeah.. Interestingly, I think he did a great job taking himself to task about his own idea of "atomic facts". Why? Because in Tractatus he just started there and had no real context for it. He provided more context for it (and why it is wrong) in the PI than the Tractatus which started from this very important assumption!

But anyways, no he doesn't have to fit my theory of how good philosophy should be written. I just question why he is to be fanboyed to death. He himself, did not do such, yet apparently he is put on a pedestal and is now thoroughly worshipped for it. It certainly gives Philosophy of Language stuff to churn over and over. As long as it is open-ended, it can never be wrong, right? So make few commitments and you can carve your name in history!

He's trying to get people out of the pig pen. He's trying to clarify our philosophical thinking, which is no easy task. I think Wittgenstein went off the rails a bit when it comes to what can be said, i.e., in terms of metaphysics. — Sam26

See it's that attitude bolded that rubs me the wrong way. My first reaction is, "Oh is he!" followed by "Wow Socrates, you're so clever!". What I am talking about is discussing the relevant theories at hand and comparing and contrasting and defending your position in a systemic way. This doesn't mean that you must exclude your exposition (he does that well already), just that it should be nested within a more systemic or analytic approach in order for him to not just be a prophet but a philosopher. Character of Socrates the question asker is cool, but it is Plato that we read for his system and theories, and Aristotle who we read who refute Plato and provide reasons for such, etc.

One of the reasons why Witt doesn't always answer a question is that he's trying to make us think. He's not trying to avoid answering the question. I can't imagine Witt shying away from answering questions. And finally, if you understand that Witt is giving us a method of doing philosophy and not a linguistic theory, this will help steer you in the right direction. Our tendency is to look for a theory and miss the method. It's the method that is most important. This is Wittgenstein's legacy I believe. — Sam26

Fair enough. No doubt he runs a gamut of interesting questions. I’d just rather there be an explicitness to the kinds of things he is countering. A survey of other theories and how his own weighs against that. He’ll mention a Frege or an Augustine or a Socrates every once in a while, but not enough I think.

Perhaps it is just my distaste for the so called “linguistic turn” where language is turned into first philosophy. I grant that his illustration of how language is constructed adds some jumping off points. I just don’t see the need to fanboy it’s a holy script.

Our tendency is to look for a theory and miss the method. It's the method that is most important. This is Wittgenstein's legacy I believe. — Sam26

The method of asking questions and answering them in Socratic fashion? Seems to be a long tradition but he does that only about language use.

The same was and is said of Socrates. The reason in both cases can be found in the preface to PI:

I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. — Fooloso4

Maybe it's this presumption that I have trouble with. It makes one seem "above the fray". Come into the pig pen, my dear Witty!

But at the same token, you are doing precisely here, what Witty himself would refuse to do (pour of other people's words) in such a devout manner.

Part of that semantics is that proper names refer to the very same individual in each possible world in which it exists. A consequence of this is that one might specify a possible world in which the characteristics that supposedly set out the essence of that individual do not apply. — Banno

Part of the problem there is what counts as an “individual”? Russell was caught up with the referent. What happens if it was found the referent was fictitious? Kripke would move to say that it’s the causal dubbing (and it’s development that is traced back I guess) that is “real” in all possible worlds I would think and not the individual itself. But this provides for an oddly causal based realism, where only causality picks out essence (of individuals) and not individuals themselves. Something then seems off there. It’s upgrading causality to a high status.

Okay, but @Banno I did admit as such that language as use can be confirmed experimentally with the bridging being a form of intentional learning, as informed by that Tomasello article:
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rstb.2020.0320

So it's not like I am disagreeing per se. I certainly agree with him that the kind of formalism of Russell's enterprise was not going to work and that it was just a synthetic language game that was trying to account for an ordinary language game which is more explained by intention, etc. But I bring your attention to the questions I had for RusselA:

As an aside I don't think Wittgenstein or Tomasello have a great theory for "self-talk". Much of our talk is just our own conversation with our self. If I make statement, "That is a rock" to myself, silently in my mind, and have no intention other than what I am seeing, and it's not done to remember something, but as some sort of habit when I see something, what intention is behind that? What use is that? There doesn't seem to be much intent or use in that kind of statement. So then does it not have meaning? It does though. That indeed is a rock. There is a correspondence there. — schopenhauer1

~~ — Banno

What happened? I liked the emoji :razz: !

shown to be an error. — Banno

What pray tell is the error he has shown? Neither his language games argument nor his "silence" argument (from Tractatus), necessarily precludes providing context, connecting with other ideas, etc.

But most importantly, he admitted so himself!

The thoughts that I publish in what follows are the precipitate of philosophical investigations which have occupied me for the last sixteen years.
They concern many subjects: the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition and sentence, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things. I have written down
all these thoughts as remarks, short paragraphs, sometimes in longer
chains about the same subject, sometimes jumping, in a sudden change,
from one area to another. a Originally it was my intention to bring
all this together in a book whose form I thought of differently at
different times. But it seemed to me essential that in the book the thoughts
should proceed from one subject to another in a natural, smooth
sequence.
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into
such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I
could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my
thoughts soon grew feeble if I tried to force them along a single track
against their natural inclination. —– And this was, of course, connected
with the very nature of the investigation. For it compels us to travel
criss-cross in every direction over a wide field of thought. —– The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of
landscapes which were made in the course of these long and meandering journeys.
The same or almost the same points were always being approached
afresh from different directions, and new sketches made. Very many of
these were badly drawn or lacking in character, marked by all the defects
of a weak draughtsman. And when they were rejected, a number of
half-way decent ones were left, which then had to be arranged and often cut down, in order to give the viewer an idea of the landscape. So this
book is really just an album — PI - Wittgenstein

I was reacting more to his not having a justification. Not sure I’m convinced about the realism implication. More this:

He asks endless questions without trying to draw these together into a comprehensive answer. In fact, he seems proud that he makes no attempt at theorising. Perhaps it is no surprise there is so much misunderstanding surrounding his works — RussellA

Even if I had credentials as a fully academic professor of philosophy…writing on an obtuse style..well I gave my answer. I dont care what ethos you give it (But he’s the great X!).

I rather read a clear wrong philosopher than an obtuse can never be wrong one.

I fully endorse people making their own guns. — NOS4A2

That's not the issue it is trying to illustrate. Rather, the gun didn't exist before, and then it will exist. Not only that, the gun will be used let's say in some nefarious way. Thus a worse state of affairs is likely to take place. But wait! You can prevent this... But you don't, you let it happen because you don't believe in future conditionals? I call bullshit.

Let me know when some other person or group of persons demand you comply with something and I’ll be there in support. Find some logic that is parallel with this and I’ll give it a shot. — NOS4A2

Well, that's fine. You can do whatever you want. Clearly you don't believe in future states, for example. But my point is "de facto" dictates are a thing. Just because you choose not to acknowledge them, doesn't mean they are not a thing.

I was applying a new line of argument (in this case what counts as an injustice) — schopenhauer1

Looking back it was about whether the locus should be at the individual or aggregate level. I was saying it applies in ethics but not as much politics. Then you went on that there is no actual person. or whatnot. I was just making a comment about how I had a similar view but used in a completely different way, that's all.

I’m fully aware that we use modal reasoning, but when I ask the question “what in the world is schopenhauer1 referring to”, I can see you are only reporting on your thoughts. You aren’t referring to actual persons, but to your notions, the movements of your brain, in short, yourself. It just so happens myself and my own thoughts differ. — NOS4A2

Baloney. You didn't address the gun analogy, for example. Should you not give a shit if you see someone making a gun, and they have the intent to use it? For surely, the possibility and high likelihood should not matter here?? Nonsense.

The point is we do not comply with existence because it has no wishes or commands. There is no game of life, and when it comes to survival you only have yourself to answer to. If you’re hungry and must work to feed yourself, it’s you, not existence, telling you to do this. Hunger is your dictate. And you don’t have to comply. You can deny yourself if you choose and can make any efforts towards your own liberation. — NOS4A2

I love it how you arbitrarily just divide the line to make such that only "libertarian" values make sense, but yet nothing else that falls under the logic does... For example in this, it is definitely the case that now someone has to "deal" with things they don't want to deal with, exactly your complaint about compulsory government. It's just all too convenient and cherry picking.

I suspect its not a coincidence you bring up antinatalism, and then blame me for rehashing old arguments. Am I supposed to come up with new arguments while you repeat the same old ones? I dub it the schopenhauer1 effect. — NOS4A2

No I don't mind discussing antinatalism obviously, I just don't like when arguments were not acknowledged for that topic as if this particular line of reasoning had not taken place and I already addressed these issues (even if you disagreed with them). In my case here, I was applying a new line of argument (in this case what counts as an injustice). I did acknowledge though from the start that we are using similar logic but in different realms. I never claimed that you agreed with how I am applying it. So you were the one who made a biggy deal of it it seems.

Okay, but isn't it true that government puts people in compulsory situations whereas nature does not? The key here is that the government is a responsible agent, capable of injustice, whereas nature is not. Nature "gives rise" to compulsory situations, but it does not "put" people into them, because it does not will this or that. — Leontiskos

I am not referring to government but the people procreating the person... I was saying to NOS that we had the same heuristic but applied to completely different realms (I am against forcing life onto someone, he is against forcing government onto someone). However, now he has decided to rope me into a full-fledged antinatalism debate (which I have had with him I am sure many times circling the same things.. hence my new term the "TPF Effect".

:grin:

I hope TPF Effect can be used and reused such that there is a causal connection back to its dubbing and can thus refer always to this effect.

(Granted, the notion of the injustice of nature does seem to arise at times via theism, but I am leaving this to the side.) — Leontiskos

In the context that we are speaking, the claim is that it is unjust to put someone in the compulsory situation in the first place.

In Kripkean fashion, I hereby dub the word TPF Effect for this phenomena:

a term for when someone willfully pretends like an argument was never made and you start over and over and over again from scratch — schopenhauer1

But that's the inherent problem with these forums, there is a sort of "forgetfulness" whereby one cannot continue a previous thread. Often times a lesser version of the thread is rehashed but it would have been better to return to the previous version and point to what was already debated.

In order for good faith argumentation, there at least has to be the possibility for progression in the argument, even if not agreement or agree to disagree and more importantly, an acknowledgement of the arguments that have already been made from both sides.

This is just an attempt to repackage your same old argument. In your attempt to defend your desire to benefit from society without taking any responsibility you introduce a "metaphysics" which is nothing more than an abuse of terminology that is already problematic enough. — Fooloso4

:up:

Thus, your life is always in a way a serf. Your very procreation means that you must comply (with the game of life) or die.
— schopenhauer1

I think the difference is that nature is not a feudal lord. Nature has no will and therefore does not coerce. Neither is it capable of injustice. — Leontiskos

Well, this goes back to word games and sense and reference. I was playing with words here a bit. We are a "serf" to the burdens and overcoming of harms that life offers. There is no getting around this taskmaster (metaphor obviously). This is why I have always maintained that life provides "de facto" dictates that we must follow. Procreation puts a person in the unjust situation of complying with those dictates or killing themselves. An indignant proposal indeed.

I don’t think that’s true at all and we fundamentally disagree. There is no similarity. There is no person to seek consent from. There is no prior realm of freedom from which we are plucked and placed in a prison-like condition, against our wishes. Existence is all there is. — NOS4A2

That is because you are conveniently overlooking how we use language, and what language confers. Modalities of possibilities exist. Some things can never exist (hobbits for example). They may "subsist" or "absist" in some way, but not actually exist (I shouldn't have to say that I hope). Yet, some possibilities do exist, and some are high likelihoods based on causes. Thus, we can certainly talk about a future person who will exist, and whose dignity will be violated, or consent will be violated, or who will have been caused to be in conditions for inevitable suffering for that individual. So it's just misunderstanding of how modality works. But of course, this "misunderstanding" is conveniently only had for this particular topic which just makes it seem to be bad faith argumentation. I am sure you use conditionals for all sorts of things. A gun doesn't exist unless someone makes it first. The possibility exists. That someone has a intent and a 3D printer, now all of a sudden that possibility is more likely, and so on.

No compliance is necessary, only being. — NOS4A2

Compliance is necessary for survival. Even hermits were socialized to some extent, and even their existence presupposes a culture which allowed for them to be individuals who can (try and probably fail) to subsist by themselves). But usually we must live in some sort of.. wait for it... society!

More often than not parents relieve their children from burden, feeding them, carrying them, housing them, protecting them from all manner of danger. — NOS4A2

It's a burden they are obligated to relieve (in early stages), but more importantly, that they created (which usually knowingly that they can relieve the burden). One shouldn't cause burdens, unnecessarily (meaning when there was no need in the first place for there to be a burden created) so that they can be overcome on someone else's behalf, but there we are.

If you wish you were never born it is because you regret your life, yourself, maybe your family, not because you were better off before you were conceived. — NOS4A2

That's a straw man of the argument. No person exists to suffer is one state of affairs and a person exists to suffer in another. That second state of affairs is the problematic one. No one said "better off", just that one state of affairs is problematic, so don't cause that state of affairs.

I get @Fooloso4's frustration. Fooloso4, is there a term for when someone willfully pretends like an argument was never made and you start over and over and over again from scratch? I believe it's just called ThePhilosophyForum effect :smile:. If we have to keep arguing the same point, as if we never did previously, I believe that is tangential to the definition of insanity.

Oh @Leontiskos might be interested in this.

As such my relation with the government is as a serf to his landlord, or as a slave to his master. — NOS4A2

It's funny how we agree but in completely different realms. I would apply this to cases like starting a life for someone. Creating the conditions for others to be burdened has no justification. The problem is beyond government, it's existence itself. You had no say in being here, you had no say in whether you wanted to be in a position to make a decision to not be here (suicide). Thus, your life is always in a way a serf. Your very procreation means that you must comply (with the game of life) or die.

I just think that once there is a game one has to comply with, it has various interrelations that happen when more than a few people work together. Some of those are vesting power in institutions which then feedback to the community of members.

Wittgenstein asks questions, but avoids trying to answer them
There are two parts to my understanding of language: i) words have a use in the language game and ii) the language game has a use in the world. Wittgenstein deals with the first part, but ignores the second. Wittgenstein is like a mountaineer who buys all the ropes, crampons, thermal weatherproof clothes and tents but then never goes to the mountain, justifying himself by saying that the actual climbing of the mountain is a meaningless pursuit. He asks endless questions without trying to draw these together into a comprehensive answer. In fact, he seems proud that he makes no attempt at theorising. Perhaps it is no surprise there is so much misunderstanding surrounding his works — RussellA

Yes! I agree! This is what I'm trying to say too. He starts at the midground and then thinks that is enough to justify his statements without background. He does it in BOTH Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. I think this is a form of disrespect for the philosophical audience who is trying to read in good faith, and its an odd form of trolling to the reader in general. He is not above and beyond reproach because he doesn't justify his ideas to a comprehensive conclusion. It just means he is incomplete. Some people take this as some sort of advantage, it seems. Odd that if any modern academic just "uttered stuff" they would get away without justification to a larger picture, the historical arguments, background considerations, etc.

Wittgenstein tackles the first part
As Mark Olssen describes in Wittgenstein and Foucault: The Limits and possibilities of constructivism, Wittgenstein does have a position of Relativism, an Anti-Realism, and even a Linguistic Idealism, where language is the ultimate reality. He explains events not in terms of the individual, but rather in the social constructivist terms of social, historical and cultural "forms of life". — RussellA

:up:

Wittgenstein hints at the second part
Kristof Nyiri points out in Wittgenstein as a common sense Realist that Wittgenstein cannot, at the end of the day, rely on language as a justification for his actions, but rather, does what he does because of the reality of the world in which he exists. When obeying rules, as Wittgenstein writes, sometimes there can be no rational justification expressible in language, it is just what is done in the world. Such is a position of philosophical realism, where people learn about, handle and refer to physical objects within a physical world.
PI 217 If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."

Single words have no use, only sentences
A single word such as "slab" has no use, in that If I walked into a room and said "slab" people would look at me with bemusement. Only sentences can have a use, such as "Bring me a slab" or "slab!". Sentences have a meaning when they have a use, and they have a use when they result in an action, such as someone bringing me a slab or people moving out of the way of a falling slab.

Language only has a use when it changes facts in the world
Language only has a use when it changes facts in the world, such as someone bringing me a slab. When it has a use, it means something. If I say "bring me a slab", for language to have any use at all, this means that I want a slab rather than an apple. Therefore, the word "slab" must be able to differentiate between a slab in the world and an apple in the world, meaning that the word "slab" must be able to refer to a slab rather than an apple. The meaning of of the word "slab" must be able to correlate with one particular object in the world. In other words, the word "slab" must name the object slab in the world, a position of Realism. This is Realism regardless of whether the realism of that of the Direct Realist, who perceives the slab in the world, or the Indirect Realist, who perceives a picture of the slab in the world — RussellA

Sure, but what is considered "real" here? Objects only or abstracted entities (like "justice" or "compassion")? These don't exist "in the world" except as notion in people's internal cognitive understanding.

The meaning of a text and the intentionality of the author
Derrida proposes that a sentence such as "bring me a slab" can still have meaning even if disjoined from the original intentionality of its author, the author's intention when originating the sentence. But this raises the question, does the text of a ChatGPT have meaning if the ChatGPT zombie machine had no conscious intentionality when preparing the text. One could argue that that part of the text which has been directly copied from other authors, who did have a conscious intentionality, does have meaning. However, the act of combining these parts together using rule-based algorithms cannot of itself give meaning to the whole.

As it seems that readers do find meaning in ChatGPT texts, one can only conclude that it is possible for texts disjoined from the original author to have meaning, as Derrida proposed. The meaning has come not from the writer of the text but from the reader.

Interesting idea, but ChatGPT is a simulation of someone with real intent. It's algorithms are such that to model itself as if it had intent, perhaps. It seems to have the intent to provide helpful information, for example.

We make requests as if it had the intentions for this, and it produces those results as if it did. In this case, the intent is fixed (always help you out or answer your requests in a helpful way). Remember though, we just need it to be the case, for it to be operationally "ready" to look at the intent of the statements and expressions being made. And conversely, we may be evolutionarily primed to see intent behind the answers in ChatGPT.

One can also make the case that ChatGPT is an extension of one's own intent. That is to say, it's intention is based on what you are looking for. It's modeling your own intention, that is. It is a blank slate, waiting for the intention to be defined.

That words have a use in the language game is necessary but not sufficient
Wittgenstein's meaning is use suffers from the problem of circularity. From the SEP article Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of a word is based on how the word is understood within the language game, ie, the use theory of meaning, in that words are not defined by reference to the objects they designate.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

He proposes that the meaning of a word does not come from the thing that it is naming, in that the meaning of the word "slab" does not come from a slab in the world. He suggests that we don't need a prior definition of a word in order to be able to successfully use it within the language game of the society within which we are living, but rather, the word is defined through use from "forms of life".

It seems that in the expression "meaning is use", the word "use" refers to use in the language game and not use in the world. It is here that the problem problem of circularity arises. If the meaning of a particular word is determined by its relationship with the other words within a holistic whole, yet the same is true of every other word, in that their meaning has also been determined by their relationship with the other words within a holistic whole. Within a language, if every part is relative to every other part, nothing is fixed, everything is arbitrary, and it becomes impossible to establish any meaning at all.

Conclusion
If meaning as use means use in language, then this is unworkable because of the circularity problem. If meaning as use means use in the world, then this is workable, as the only use of language is to change facts in the world. Language gets its meaning from being able to change facts in the world.

I see the circularity too. I think that the article I posited from Tomasello et al, can elucidate more on how "intentionality" and its evolution into a communal "intentionality" can help solve this. I'd have to follow up with a much more in depth response from the article though. In the meantime, if you can, can you take al look at it? It provides some ideas of how intentionality can be the source of meaning in language. He actually sets the theory of "culture" but I think it works in language too.

As an aside I don't think Wittgenstein or Tomasello have a great theory for "self-talk". Much of our talk is just our own conversation with our self. If I make statement, "That is a rock" to myself, silently in my mind, and have no intention other than what I am seeing, and it's not done to remember something, but as some sort of habit when I see something, what intention is behind that? What use is that? There doesn't seem to be much intent or use in that kind of statement. So then does it not have meaning? It does though. That indeed is a rock. There is a correspondence there. Not sure if @Banno has an answer for that.

I think that’s a great point. The larger the aggregate, the more difficult it is to discern the extent to which its members relate. A prerequisite of a “real relation” might be that people know each other or interact with each other. — NOS4A2

A family interacts with the world around them. Presumably their house is on a land in a jurisdiction with water, gas, electricity, and amenities often provided by the government. They have to interact with roads by driving on them which are often contracted out by government transportation agencies. People go to businesses which are legally defined entities, using money, which is government produced. All this is to say that the interactions are "real" in the sense that people use them.

Do you believe that an entity such as government exists? You are under the jurisdiction of a government that creates laws and enforces those laws. Being in that jurisdiction, generally, the "legitimacy" of the ruling power is that it follows various principles taken to invest it with its power. These would be things like "rights", "consent of the governed" through "fair and transparent" elections, etc.

If a government has legitimacy and is ruling over a jurisdiction, then everyone in that jurisdiction has a "real relation" with the rules, procedures, and enactments of the decisions made by that duly elected body. That is to say, if you drive your car, there is probably a law about which side of the street you can drive on, how to follow traffic norms, and the violations of not following those norms. And it goes on and on. You can't just start a restaurant in a residential zone, for example, unless the law stipulates you can. These are all examples where you are daily interacting with the rules and laws of the governing body politic. So you do have concrete relations with these. You need not know your representative, or even your local city councilman. However, they affect you nonetheless.

There is a dynamic interaction between people, government, laws, norms, etc. that means something like a "society" has "real relations" and it doesn't mean it has to be people you "know". The relations are implicit and explicit.

That being said, I sympathize with your idea about individuals being the locus. However, where I differ is that I think in ethical relations, ethics obtains at the individual. For example, I don't believe people should be born because "it helps humanity", that is using the individual for an abstracted cause. That is to say, our ethical obligations are to individuals, and not abstractions. However, once born, the parent has obligations towards the child. The parent lives in a community that has various obligations towards each other in terms of at least not violating another's rights, these can only be dealt with at the level of institutions whereby parties agree to mediate these kind of interactions. Otherwise, anything can go, including vandettas and mob rule.

Laws ought to apply to each and every particular individual, not a set of individuals. — NOS4A2

But what I mean is, the law was not tailored for you specifically. Was it not made for more than one person? In fact, what happened if it pertained to all the people in its jurisdiction? Can I label the set rather than every individual and call that set society?

Once you answer that.

"Who" is making these laws? When a law is passed by a government, is the individual congressman or parliamentarians or is it an entity collectively called "government"? If that is not the case, then how would the two children living with parents not just be individuals sharing the same space rather than being termed "a family"?

I would consider them a family. — NOS4A2

Ok, and do you believe that laws are meant for a particular individual or set of individuals? If a set, can we label this set, society? If not why?

Do you believe that two parents and adopted children living in a household and subject to the parent's authority are considered a "family", or are they just autonomous beings that happen to share space?

Well, if you want to continue discussing Searle, I suggest starting a new thread. — Banno

Well he still might be relevant here.. This seems more like the discussion we are having about intention. That is to say, our brains are primed for the implicit intention of a statement:

In his debate with Jacques Derrida, Searle argued against Derrida's purported view that a statement can be disjoined from the original intentionality of its author, for example when no longer connected to the original author, while still being able to produce meaning. Searle maintained that even if one was to see a written statement with no knowledge of authorship it would still be impossible to escape the question of intentionality, because "a meaningful sentence is just a standing possibility of the (intentional) speech act". For Searle, ascribing intentionality to a statement was a basic requirement for attributing it any meaning at all. — Wiki on John Searle

That seems to accord with Witty, of "use" (how it is used). Although intention is more internal (what is the mind of the other person), and Witty seems to keep things at context with other words within a community. So perhaps it is just different levels of the same phenomena of shared-ness? But if so, this brings in more about internal states versus communal context which @RussellA may be interested in.

Yep. What's salient here is the communal nature of certain intentions. — Banno

:up:

I won't go into Searle here, too much of a digression, except to say that he is a hard realist. — Banno

Yes, if I remember, he denies being a property dualist but it being somewhat unconvincing. And here is the proof:

Here is where the inadequacy of the traditional terminology comes out most obviously.
The property dualist wants to say that consciousness is a mental and therefore not physical
feature of the brain. I want to say consciousness is a mental and therefore biological and
therefore physical feature of the brain. But because the traditional vocabulary was designed to
contrast the mental and the physical, I cannot say what I want to say in the traditional
vocabulary without sounding like I am saying something inconsistent. Similarly when the
identity theorists said that consciousness is nothing but a neurobiological process, they meant
that consciousness as qualitative, subjective, irreducibly phenomenological (airy fairy, touchy
feely, etc.) does not even exist, that only third person neurobiological processes exist. I want
also to say that consciousness is nothing but a neurobiological process, and by that I mean
that precisely because consciousness is qualitative, subjective, irreducibly phenomenological
(airy fairy, touchy feely, etc.) it has to be a neurobiological process; because, so far, we have
not found any system that can cause and realize conscious states except brain systems. Maybe
someday we will be able to create conscious artifacts, in which case subjective states of
consciousness will be “physical” features of those artifacts.
(4) Because irreducible consciousness is not something over and above its neural base,
the problems about epiphenomenalism and the causal closure of the physical simply do not
arise for me. Of course, the universe is causally closed, and we can call it “physical” if we like;
but that cannot mean “physical” as opposed to “mental;” because, equally obviously, the
mental is part of the causal structure of the universe in the same way that the solidity of pistons
is part of the causal structure of the universe; even though the solidity is entirely accounted for
5
by molecular behavior, and consciousness is entirely accounted for by neuronal behavior. The
problems about epiphenomenalism and the causal closure of the physical can only arise if one
uses the traditional terminology and take its implications seriously. I am trying to get us to
abandon that terminology.
But if consciousness has no causal powers in addition to its neurobiological base, then
does that not imply epiphenomenalism ? No. Compare: the solidity of the piston has no causal
powers in addition to its molecular base, but this does not show that solidity is epiphenomenal
(Try making a piston out of butter or water). The question rather is: Why would anyone
suppose that causal reducibility implies epiphenomenalism, since the real world is full of
causally efficacious higher level features entirely caused by lower level micro phenomena? In
this case the answer is: because they think that consciousness is something distinct from,
something “over and above” its neuronal base. The typical property dualist thinks that the
brain "gives rise to" consciousness, and this gives us a picture of consciousness as given off
from the brain as a pot of boiling water gives off steam. In the epiphenomenalist version of
property dualism, the consciousness given off has no causal powers of its own , though it is
caused by the brain. In the full blooded version consciousness has a kind of life of its own,
capable of interfering with the material world. — Why I Am Not a Property Dualist By John R. Searle

Renaming the process as physical doesn't solve anything, except make a semantic definitional change. But it's a change that makes no difference to the substance of the argument. The point is what is it that makes physical things also mental things? The question isn't whether it's biological or not. That gets us nowhere really.

I would agree with him that consciousness can be considered physical or neurobiological exclusively, but it's just begging the question and making some semantic rearrangement that doesn't say much about the issue.

Yes cool stuff. I didn't read all of it, but it seems like he is only focusing on institutional facts as distinct from other facts. Does he think that facts about computers having keyboards or this chess piece made of wood work differently, or does he have an all-encompassing theory of language meaning?

The problem I see is that then you have various theories competing that may not be empirical but "just so" stories.. "Well institutional facts work this way" but claims about states of affairs about the world are that way.. and so on.

There is a way of understanding a word that is not found in setting out synonyms, but which is seen in it's being used. — Banno

https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rstb.2020.0320

I think that article has interesting insights into shared meaning. As a species, language it seems, originated from shared intentionality. Language only works if the speaker and audience agree, and thus they have to both be keyed in on the intention of the person. Intention to what though? This is where it ties into Witty perhaps. The intention is how the word is used. Definitional accounts would be too far removed, as far as I see it, from how symbols get their reference. Use, however, is relevant right "at hand" (literally for early symbols which were probably gestural).

If Terrence Deacon is correct, words/gestures are at first icons whereby the symbol has an aspect of what it represents directly (a hammer motion for hammer or hammering, let's say). To me, that seems to indicate "use" origins of word meanings comes first. Humans are cued for human action and intention.

I would like to emphasize that if it was found that this theory was truly off, then Wittgenstein would be less likely to be correct. I think it depends on best theories based on various techniques used by anthropologists and psychologists to make inferential claims.

It could be the case that it is found that a better theory fits based on evidence gained from studying human and great ape similarities and differences, historical artifacts, and developmental psychology.

But to the topic of this thread, what sort of place do you see here for essence? — Banno

Great question but it just opens up the door for writing a thesis on metaphysics and epistemology. And as you just said here:

I'm not intent on writing a thesis here. — Banno

Essence brings up ideas of realism versus idealism, empiricism versus social constructivism, necessity and contingency, and all the rest. It basically forces more than an easy answer that requires putting a lot of puzzle pieces together.

That being said, I'd have to think on it.

If your point is that Russell's descriptive account is problematic, then we agree. — Banno

:up:

The converse of the issue you describe is presumably that folk such as Kant and Schopenhauer are perhaps too quick to develop a "full-fledged construction of metaphysical theory" without due attention consistency. — Banno

Well, you bring up here as to "what" we really agree on as to what is problematic. I didn't say that either. Rather, both can be true. Kant and Schopenhauer left questions to be answered, but they did not lack the condition of having a constructed metaphysical theory that provided a reason for analytic judgements in various statements about the world (for Kant his Critique and Schop his Fourfold Root of PSR, and to a broader scope the WWR).

Thus if I was to ever go back and ask as to the reasons behind their claims, I can clearly see where they were coming from. I cannot do that so much with Russell and Witty. They start from midground and don't give the background.

Analytic thinking is not monolithic. The detail here is considerable, and the gloss you give above is far from accurate. — Banno

Fair enough, replace the category "analytics" with "Russell" in particular. (Though early Witty follows him down the rabbit hole).

To a large extent it was to sort out ambiguities of scope. If anything, the situation is more complex than Russell supposed, but we've benefited from his drawing attention to it. — Banno

Indeed. Well, this to me speaks to a confused ontology. It is a cleaving to an empiricism that doesn't seem to be warranted. If everything that is true has to exist, it is weirdly valuing "existence" as something that can input some sort of truth to it. But we all know Bilbo is a Hobbit, and it's true!

And this brings the bigger problems perhaps with analytics (early ones at least). By not participating in full-fledged construction of metaphysical theory (like a Kant or a Schopenhauer let's say), and only trying to restrict the level of inquiry to statements, which perhaps are filled in by de jour commitments when necessary, or by assuming a commitment (empiricism) with no other basis for it, the project becomes hollow.

It's as if you developed a computer program that does various things (but it couldn't handle certain calculations) and told me this program describes metaphysics. That's not how that works. And having a "cleaned" up version of the computer program (C vs. C++ by analogy let's say), it doesn't mean "thus metaphysics explained" either.

It would be replied that color requires experience of an object, so it's not synthetic a-priori. But that's misleading, objects do not give us color, we add colors to objects via the innate apparatus we have, namely the eyes and the brain. The objects merely "open" or "awaken" our capacities.

Likewise, with spacetime, if we had no sense-data at all, how can we say these would still be synthetic-a-priori? We would need a world to apply this framework to, otherwise it's kind of useless. — Manuel

I think Schopenhauer does not agree with Kant, especially this kind of thing:

In order to prevent the emptiness of "thoughts without contents,"[25] it is "necessary to make our concepts sensible, i.e., to add an object of intuition to them."[25] In order to test whether a concept is sensible, we sometimes " … go back to perception only tentatively and for the moment, by calling up in imagination a perception corresponding to the concept that occupies us at the moment, a perception that can never be quite adequate to the (general) concept, but is a mere representative of it for the time being. … Kant calls a fleeting phantasm of this kind a schema." — Wiki - Schema (Kant)

You can see where it starts to get precarious and ripe for ridicule. I mean, he is making a valiant attempt at bridging his a priori categories with contents to make an abstraction. And that begs the question really, "what" is abstraction? It seems like a mid-ground, for Kant, between the pure categories and sensible content that is kind of "imagination".

To be fair, this could be all considered "representation". That is to say, perceptions, conceptions, and imaginations (abstractions) are all architecture. The things-in-themselves are only known through the "furniture" of this representational stage. The furniture needs the interaction though. One can never have pure abstraction without the things-in-themselves running through the stage and its furniture transforming the sense-data into representation.

And this is the aspect that is emphasized by Schopenhauer and how he differs perhaps. He emphasizes that you can never have an object without a subject and vice versa, lest you get caught in the "furniture" and not the objects that interact with it.

For Schopenhauer, it seems to be that representation is always going to have subject for object all the way down such that you can’t have purely abstract concepts unless this condition exists that a subject exists for an object and an object for a subject.

It's a bit hard to defend him exactly as he wrote his system over 200 years ago, we have updated science he did not have, which would've forced him to modify his form of sensible intuition, for instance. — Manuel

I mean, let's just skip the idea of pure conception then. I don't think his system completely falls without it. Categories allow for judgements once input from sensible data / intuitions of time and space interact. We don't need the addition of "pure notions and empirical notions" as some mediator or distinction between empirical judgements and faculties of the mind, it would seem.

Causality (the category of), interacts with sense data as seen through our intuitions of time/space can thus allow us to make judgements of a priori synthetic statements.

Sure. But what I had in mind is something like Schopenhauer's version or maybe even Mainlander, though I have to read him more closely to see if he does simplify Kant. — Manuel

Schopenhauer simplifies Kant in that he thought the categories were baroque and overcomplicating things. He thought that all we needed to consider for transcendental conditions were space, time and causality. With that basis everything else follows according to his "Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason". Everything can be grounded in statements of becoming, knowing, being, and willing.

Our knowing consciousness...is divisible solely into subject and object. To be object for the subject and to be our representation or mental picture are one and the same. All our representations are objects for the subject, and all objects of the subject are our representations. These stand to one another in a regulated connection which in form is determinable a priori, and by virtue of this connection nothing existing by itself and independent, nothing single and detached, can become an object for us. ...The first aspect of this principle is that of becoming, where it appears as the law of causality and is applicable only to changes. Thus if the cause is given, the effect must of necessity follow. The second aspect deals with concepts or abstract representations, which are themselves drawn from representations of intuitive perception, and here the principle of sufficient reason states that, if certain premises are given, the conclusion must follow. The third aspect of the principle is concerned with being in space and time, and shows that the existence of one relation inevitably implies the other, thus that the equality of the angles of a triangle necessarily implies the equality of its sides and vice versa. Finally, the fourth aspect deals with actions, and the principle appears as the law of motivation, which states that a definite course of action inevitably ensues on a given character and motive. — E. F. J. Payne concisely summarized the Fourfold Root

Also I think this speaks to the criticism of Kant's notion of "pure notions" which you were discussing. Pure notions is kind of an oxymoron as they need to have the empirical information to construct it, and is an iterative process:

This is a great quote:

Having sought to find an a priori cognitive faculty corresponding to every empirical [a posteriori] one, Kant remarked that, in order to make sure that we are not leaving the solid ground of perception, we often refer back from the empirical [a posteriori] abstract idea [concept] to the latter [the perception]. The temporary representative of the idea [concept] thus called forth, and which is never fully adequate to it, he calls a 'schema,' in contradistinction to the complete image. He now maintains that, as such a schema stands between the empirical [a posteriori] idea [concept] and the clear sensual perception, so also similar ones stand between the a priori perceptive faculty of the sensibility and the a priori thinking faculty of the pure understanding. To each category, accordingly, corresponds a special schema. But Kant overlooks the fact that, in the case of the empirically [a posteriori] acquired ideas [concepts], we refer back to the perception from which they have obtained their content, whereas the a priori ideas [concepts], which have as yet no content, come to the perception from within [cognition] in order to receive something from it. They have, therefore, nothing to which they can refer back, and the analogy [of the a priori schema] with the empirical [a posteriori] schema falls to the ground. — Kant's philosophy as rectified by Schopenhauer by Michael Kelly "

Category (Causality), can not be applied as a concept (Causation) without the content to begin with! There is nothing "pure" about the use of "cause" in and of itself without its content in empirical content!

Sure, the class of present kings of France is empty, but it can't both exist and not exist. Indeed, attributing existence to a class is itself problematic - what could it mean, except that the class is either empty or not? — Banno

Eh, I don’t get why Russell structured his logic such that a non existent referent makes the statement false and not vacuously true. But maybe this is a problem with predicate logic and existential quantifiers as they are defined. “Bilbo Baggins has hairy feet” is vacuously true, and not false perhaps. It’s the same as the present King of France.

Perhaps you can make a distinction of possibly true and never true. In modal logic terms, Bilbo is necessarily false and the King of France is contingently false. The reference for the King of France is possibly true. The reference of Bilbo is never possibly true. This is akin to Kripke, but deals with existence rather than identity or causality.

Existence doesn’t answer questions if essence though. But it might point the way in terms of origination. Hobbits still have an essence. They are human-like folk, different from big folk and all their noise after all.

This could have been written as a summary of the difference between the Tractatus and the Investigations. — Banno

:up:

Logic is a useful tool for showing up confusions, as above. — Banno

But creates its own problems. Logic is derived to solve problems but is just a tool then to clarify and not a description of truth per se. As Aristotle, Boole, Peano, Frege, Russell, and Lewis and Kripke and Tarski show just by their differences, you can break up and build up the world in any symbolic way you want!

I gave a simplified answer here
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/834880

:up: :smile:

I'd like to propose that both logicism and language-based approaches to resolving epistemic and ontological issues may not be the most productive avenues for exploration. It seems that early analytic philosophers, including Russell, Frege, and Meinong, encountered difficulties because they attempted to confine themselves to what could be expressed through symbolic logic, inadvertently missing the broader philosophical context. They began making assumptions that would have been better suited for discussion within established philosophical frameworks, such as Kantianism or centuries-old traditions. Instead, they constrained themselves within the limits of symbolic logic, which led to Russell, for instance, having to make metaphysical commitments, like his Platonic realism regarding universals and categories. These commitments might have been more aptly addressed in a more meta-philosophical context. In essence, the project of logicism became a self-imposed straitjacket.

It is intriguing how Russell, despite his comprehensive knowledge of the historical approach to philosophy (as evidenced by his work on the history of Western philosophy), opted for this somewhat restrictive approach driven by an unwavering enthusiasm for symbolic logic.

Whitehead, on the other hand, appears to have broken free from this constraint, offering highly speculative metaphysical ideas that transcended the limitations of logicism and linguistic constraints. Logicism, with its fixation on symbolic logic and language, seems to have reached a dead end.

The preference for later Wittgenstein can be interpreted as an acknowledgment that the logicism/logic realism project had effectively concluded. However, the mid to late Wittgenstein, as seen in works like "On Certainty" and "Philosophical Investigations," may introduce its own constraints, resembling the style of Nietzschean aphorisms. This writing style often reads like prophetic proclamations, as if, after arduous analysis on the part of the reader, understanding the information equates to agreeing with it.

If Wittgenstein indeed illuminated an exit from the logicism/logic realism quest for truth, it might be worthwhile to explore alternative approaches beyond Wittgenstein's. When studying language, one could heed Wittgenstein's suggestion to delve into the anthropological route. Consider thinkers like Terrence Deacon or anthropologists like Michael Tomasello, who may offer more comprehensive insights. The questions surrounding denotation often pertain to the holistic development of the body, brain, and mind over evolutionary timescales ("Great Outdoors"), rather than remaining confined within the self-referential systems of language and logic.