One cannot be against a culture or blame it for blameworthy acts because only individuals can perform blameworthy acts. One has to avoid holistic methods for determining blame or guilt or innocence and use individualistic methods, or else one will always be wrong and therefor unjust. — NOS4A2

But surely culture influences individuals, no? Conservatives love this point. So do liberals, but in their own way (exaggerated "Wokeness" and "religious fundamentalism").

I think it's a human tendency to prefer peaceful solutions over costly violent conflicts, but when there are no peaceful paths available its equally human to resist violently. — Tzeentch

When can you condemn a cultural practice?
Is all violent resistance justified because someone perceives it to be justified? If Pieter was a Netherlander who believed that eminent domain was a made up government fantasy and property was eternally one's own property in perpetuity, and that if that property were to be ceased by the Netherlands government under eminent domain, and Pieter violently attacked Netherlanders, is he justified? Let's say he invoked "international law"? But this digresses.. because it becomes more relevant if it is a philosophical stance versus a cultural stance, to this debate.

Violent resistance against oppression is historically quite common across all regions of the world. — Tzeentch

Yes, but we must extricate the kind of violence (what it's aimed at, who is allowed to be harmed), and also answer the questions at hand.. to distill them from above:

is terrorism, that is to say, purposeful targeting of civilians to strike terror/fear/provoke response, and using one's population for fodder, a cultural trait of some countries, or is that simply situational.. ANY culture would act EXACTLY like this under X circumstance? — schopenhauer1

if let's say a culture simply had built-in (extremely) violent responses to injustices, and then someone was not from that culture but promoted (extremely) violent responses to injustices, but advocated it out of philosophical regard, if we determined the extreme violence was "bad", would the philosophical regard agent be worse than the cultural agent? — schopenhauer1

Just about everything held within a single religion is contested by others within that religion. I struggle to see exactly where the demarcation is between culture and religion, whether it matters and how any distinction can clearly be understood. Who do we blame for what? — Tom Storm

So a question I might ask is why for example, and this is controversial, is terrorism, that is to say, purposeful targeting of civilians to strike terror/fear/provoke response, and using one's population for fodder, a cultural trait of some countries, or is that simply situational.. ANY culture would act EXACTLY like this under X circumstance? Are there cultures that are more insulated from these violent tendences towards perceived oppression? I'm thinking of the Civil Rights Movement in the 50s-60s in the US. This seemed to be largely peaceful, and to a large extent won the day, legislatively (Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act, school integration, etc.).

Edit: One can say, MLK, Jr. and others created the culture for this to take place- even using religious rhetoric in doing so.. which is in stark contrast with other religious rhetoric that might use fire-and-brimstone, JUSTICE (but the violent kind of comeuppance).

Edit 2: To continue the line of thought that , if let's say a culture simply had built-in (extremely) violent responses to injustices, and then someone was not from that culture but promoted (extremely) violent responses to injustices, but advocated it out of philosophical regard, if we determined the extreme violence was "bad", would the philosophical regard agent be worse than the cultural agent?

One reason why these cultural moral teachings are so important, is because they become so deeply ingrained into people and the society they live in, that many will not be able to question these teachings at any point in their life. They become so normalized that the majority of people will be unaware they even exist and affect their lives on a daily basis.

To make a long story short: some moral values are simply worse than others, and by their fruits you will know them. — Tzeentch

Yeah, this is true. It could be subtle things. It's generally when cultures clash that these become prominent. And then what is cultural, and what is just individual, is also a question. One tends to excuse something if it is a cultural tendency, rather than just someone being X, Y, Z (inconsiderate, etc.).

When I was a 3-year-old, in a middle-class English suburb, I played out in the street till late-ish. That culture was more trusting than modern middle--class culture. To my mind the biggest danger to such a child is the growth of car ownership; cars and 3-year-olds don't mix unless the car drivers are super careful. To me this sort of issue is the crux of debates about 'culture'. Increased car use and diminished public transport use are associated with greater individualism and distrust of others, fear of the stranger. But much cultural argument wants to blame / scapegoat 'others': gangs of youths, dangerous individuals. Car-lovers don't want to blame cars. Car-loving gets invisibly embedded in 'culture', so even now, we find it easier to imagine, to deal with the climate crisis, electric cars, instead of *less* cars. — mcdoodle

I see what you're saying, but there is also common sense. Three year olds are still pretty young. Not realizing that if the dominant culture has many fast cars, or not including the risk if their child might get hit is problematic on a cultural level, one might think. Either the old culture doesn't put much emphasis on risk, and also has busy streets, or the old culture didn't have busy streets so never calculated the risk. That habit must start conforming if the security is valued, one might think.

An example of the old culture being the same, but the values being different (same amount of traffic/different value of risk), is how some countries view trash/litter. Some countries had anti-litter campaigns in the 60s. Litter is now seen culturally by the dominant groups of these countries as frowned upon. One doesn't generally chuck their garbage out the window, as one might have wont to do previously. Other countries don't value this perhaps. You might see beautiful landscapes littered with trash. The emphasis on litter isn't in that culture's framework, perhaps.

Edit: Let me provide the requisite scathing remarks about these "first-world" countries also being the biggest polluters, makers of plastics, and petroleum products, and making of all-around junk. I'm not excusing nor overlooking this. I guess my point is more on micro-scales of communities rather than large geo-political economic policies.

Virtue is a kind of habit of a use of a kind of habit; it is not habit per se. I drew the parallel between culture and habit, not culture and virtue. — Leontiskos

I don't think I was confusing the two. Virtue-building is a part of a culture of a philosophical school of thought.

I've said that a culture is a kind of societal habit. On that view nothing an individual does in themselves has any necessary connection with culture (because the action or habit of an individual is not necessarily the action or habit of a culture). — Leontiskos

Ok so in your view "societal habit" is the key.

One is intentional and the other is not necessarily intentional, no? — Leontiskos

I'd agree yes.

Suppose we have a norm, "Do not treat others as you would not like to be treated." Suppose a culture instantiates this norm. Suppose there are two people in the culture that are baptized into the cultural norm, Bob and Joe. Bob is under the influence of the cultural norm, and it influences his actions. Joe, on the other hand, while being under the influence of the cultural norm, also perceives that it is a moral norm, which he then freely assents to in a rational manner. Bob and Joe are different. Bob holds the norm in a merely cultural manner, whereas Joe also holds it in a moral manner. Joe is therefore rationally and intentionally invested in the norm in a way that Bob is not. We could argue whether Bob is virtuous for following the cultural norm, but it is certainly true that Joe is more virtuous than Bob.

(We could of course consider a third person who intentionally rejects the cultural norm.) — Leontiskos

I'd agree with this mainly.

It's possible. One source of counter message is in forms of Christianity that teach having faith in yourself. They focus on how to avoid the pitfall of pity. Someone may think they're helping you with their pity when it's actually destructive. — frank

I think it would be an ironic if a social justice warrior ended up being a soft bigot in regards for peoples capacity for agency based on subculture, no? In a multicultural society how much is it incumbent to teach the subgroup the dominant customs? What if they’re resistant? When does it matter? Views on Safety? Violence?

It would be cool if everyone could be looked at as individuals. But it's also true that some people have challenges where others have privilege, you know? — frank

Can that contribute to self-fulfilling prophecy? Is that itself treating others as having less agency? Should there be two tiers of morality- one fir cultural subgroups one for dominant?

If you're allowing the children to be out late that's a sign of a high-trust society and the practice reflects that. — BitconnectCarlos

Three year olds in a busy urban street? Trust who? Do you just argue to argue?

I can't think of one. — BitconnectCarlos

I’m sure a lot of religious practices had no discernible origin and later ideas and stories made it have a backstory but none of that matters to my point.

I don't think I believe in this. Can you cite an example? Even very strange religious practices have a logic to them. — BitconnectCarlos

I wasn’t necessarily thinking religious practice though there could be just no reason for it (except post facto). I was thinking more like three year olds playing in the street or letting dogs roam neighborhood without being confined to owners property…that’s how it was done in the old country isn’t really a logic. Just a practice that’s accepted.

The intolerance won't go away, but it will help us understand it. I do find learning the logic behind it interesting -- it helps us understand things like the depth of the wickedness and where its roots lie. And this leads us to ask: Were the roots themselves wicked or were they twisted by the culture? — BitconnectCarlos

Ok so what if there was no logic, it's literally mimetic in that everyone's ancestors did it from way back when?

Edit: That is to say, functionally speaking, it wouldn't make a difference if the practice was just blind tradition or out of a logic that that tradition holds.

Is it? Are they better at taking responsibility for their actions? — frank

It seems to be the case this is what happens in multicultural societies or when dealing cross-culturally. If let's say a subgroup individual does X "bad" action, we say, "Oh he is a product of that culture". If the dominant culture individual does X "bad" action, we say "He made a bad decision" or at the least make it much more atomized (it's his family at the most, or his own personal background or life story, not necessarily cultural).

I agree that cultures can be wicked. But there is a logic behind it that can be explored. — BitconnectCarlos

Right, well you made it seem by knowing the logic, the intolerance will go away. But what if knowing the logic makes no difference or even makes it worse?

Because (and this really is the rub, to me) that culture either doesn't possess the concept, or rejects that account. There's no real argument if that's the case.. — AmadeusD

That's an interesting point. Is it the job to educate, or let them be? This is a classic case of cultural relativism, or better/worse cultural practices? Why is the latter shunned, or is it?

These seem to run up against each other? — AmadeusD

I mean, multicultural in a broad geographic region because of the relative isolation of subgroups from each other/ the dominant group. If there's enough isolation the dominant group can go on condemning X practice amongst its own, whilst the subgroup persists in it, because there is no one there to witness it or not enough at least to really do much about it except shake their heads or tacitly accept this is their way...

I think this precedes the geographical demarcation above. I think it works by initial acceptance, until this (the clash) occurs, and hten over time, either there's violent confrontation, or geographical separation. This, to me, is not multi-culturalism and it seems, to me, that its a bit of a red herring. We want cultural acceptance so we're not invading each other. I can't see much more than this being achievable cross-culturally. — AmadeusD

Not sure what you mean.. Yeah at some point either acceptance or confrontation will happen.

I think you can take any behavior and analyze it out for influences from the most poignantly personal all the way out to the nature of life.

One thing I remember from time to time is the comment from a friend who was listening to me explaining race relations. He said "You know you're just trying to understand yourself.". I was stunned, but I knew it was true. — frank

I like that.. To add to this.. I notice that with minority subgroups people like to use contingent forces that make people act a certain way. For the dominant group, it is more seemingly free willed. To explain X subgroup you need to analyze culture. To explain Y dominant group you need to analyze the individual.

No, that's you reading and interpreting ideas. Culture is very real and it can really impact a person whether they "agree" to it or not. Culture to a large extent is impressed upon an individual not so with philosophy. — BitconnectCarlos

I mean where is the dividing line. In some ways, religions can be seen as a philosophy, no? One can even enter a religious community rather than being born into one.

You can be against certain cultures, but there's certainly a logic to that culture that you need to be aware of. So usually just saying "I'm against X culture" sounds kind of stupid -- it's like the accuser isn't not engaging with the logic behind the cultural practice. — BitconnectCarlos

Sure, okay, a culture that say, perceives its land being stolen believes it has a right to get it back by any means necessary (terrorism).. There is a logic. I understand it. So?

This is the exact issue which is going to, likely, prevent any real multi-culturalism every working. We would need to be blaming hte other culture to support those positions. THe 'home' culture wins, on principle alone. But this doesn't have anything to say morally, if you want a reasoned position, as opposed to 'this makes sense to me culture'. And back we are to the first issue.. It just wont work. — AmadeusD

I'm not quite sure though.. Can we distill that 3 year olds running in the street, just like the roaming dogs example, be considered unsafe for the kids/animals? Why would safety not be considered valuable for the sake of child/animal? Can we perhaps track other factors and say the society that doesn't allow these practices has X outcome and the one's that do have Y outcome, and THUS, we see correlation, or would this just be trying to square something that cannot be reconciled- that cultures do what they do without any real resolution to who is correct?

The way this plays out is generally, if the subgroup has domination over a geographic area, most likely it will continue.. so the dogs and children roaming, would continue as long as there is not sufficient population of the dominant culture in that particular geographic zone. So in a way, the multiculturalism does persist, it is reconciled by geographic separation.. This starts getting muddled when things like "gentrification" happen and the old-subgroups and the new subgroups may clash a bit.. The new ones might respect the old one, even if THEY wouldn't practice it, or they might be called out, or whatnot.. You can see the possibilities. These play out daily across the world I suppose in various countries with multicultural populations.

For Aristotle habit is the basis of both vice and virtue. — Leontiskos

This bypasses my question, and doubles down even. It is assumed "virtue building" such as a program that one might enter into as an Aristotlean or Stoic or whatnot, would seem to be a freely chosen philosophy that one is intending to follow. A culture seems to be something one generally falls into, though one can take it on too. What if one is about virtue-building but isn't following any particular program, just their own.. Is that culture? Is the practitioner of a philosophy and an individual acting under the enculturation of a subgroup's culture the same thing? Is there a substantive difference or is it all culture all the way down?

This is essentially my question :D. [...it] is more of an axiological question

I tend to blame Rawls for this sort of cultural relativism. When you can't figure out how to ground morality objectively, then you just stop at the level of culture, and that's what Rawls did. — Leontiskos

Want to elaborate? Provide a quote or example from Rawls, and what you see as problematic with it?

For example, there is a moral difference between someone who freely engages in a bad act and someone who is addicted to it. — Leontiskos

So is culture akin to addiction in that it is a mechanism whereby free will is limited to an extent? This gets into some interesting stuff though because then can any individual habits not be cultural to some extent? Free will vs. determinism starts entering the debate. I rather not go there, but hopefully you will veer it away from that inevitability with a response as to how culture can be distilled out.. It also seems a bit odd because we like to think OTHER subgroups are determined (by culture), where OURS (usually the dominant culture) is one whereby free will and rational analysis of one's behavior reigns. Is that the case though?

And we must remember to distinguish between morality and custom in order to avoid condemning what is contrary to our own customs but not to morality. — Leontiskos

But can't certain cultural customs be immoral? Why would you make such a sharp distinction?

Female circumcision in Muslim countries - is this an expression of their religion or their culture? Or both? Muslim apologists in the West will frequently argue that this phenomenon is not a part of Islam, but a cultural phenomenon. I wonder how easy it is to separate culture from religion. Is American evangelical Christianity a form of Christianity? Or is it an American cultural phenomenon? Or both - a religion reimagined through a cultural milieu. — Tom Storm

Good points. I guess I should amend this that religion is PART of the culture. In fact, I think that it is indeed part of the definition of what would be cultural:

From Google AI:

Culture is the collection of beliefs, values, and behaviors that a group of people share, such as a nation or religious group. It also includes the language, customs, and ideas about roles and relationships.

For example, if gangs are a result of poverty, and if poverty is not a societal habit, then the poverty that produces gangs is not a cultural cause. — Leontiskos

Ok, so how do you know which is attributed to which? Should it be condemned if it is cultural, or is culture sacrosanct? To what extent?

The trick is that poverty can become cultural even when it is not at first. Probably everything is like this, which is what makes the question difficult. My guess is that an important distinction must be made between high culture and just culture. The Chinese have a tea culture and an opium culture. The first is "high culture" or intentional culture, whereas the second is just culture, or else undesirable culture. — Leontiskos

Let's say that culture was not at all in the picture, and you disapproved of someone's individual habit.. But then you realized that that habit was actually part of their culture. Does the disapproval change? If so, why?

The other approach is to conclude based on the behaviour of some sample. If you can distill a cultural practice from the sample, and that practice provides an explanation for the difference you're seeing, then that's evidence that culture is causing the difference. — Echarmion

True yes, can you cite any specific cases of this being done accurately?

The other is whether you can then clearly trace back the origins of the culture. The latter will often be immensely difficult, but is not necessary required to solve a problem. — Echarmion

True enough. And they intertwine to some extent. But what would be factors you would compare to tell its culture versus say, socio-economic? What can be used a sort of constant?

For such a person—and they are common—I would ask why we must accept the premise that cultural realities cannot be criticized. — Leontiskos

This is essentially my question :D. But it's also, WHEN can we distill that it is cultural vs. other factors? The first is more of an axiological question, the second is more of a technical question akin to a sociological analysis of some sort.

What do you mean by culture? On my view economics and politics are downstream of culture, and so it is difficult to separate such things from culture. — Leontiskos

I mean a classic example here is gang culture in the US. This is tied with so many things- racial oppression, socio-economic oppression, and cultural aspects. One side of the debate regarding gang culture is that it is a cultural problems. A prominent conservative historian, Thomas Sowell, traces it back to Southern white redneck culture, that ultimately gets traced back to England. Nonetheless, he seems to see it as more of a cultural circumstance more than socio-economic. Others would say that it derives from socio-economic circumstances of simply being poor. If you are poor, and discriminated, these are the activities that a subgroup might tend towards..

There are dozens of other examples where things get entangled. Let's say you have a subgroup that allows their kids to essentially run amok in a neighborhood.. They let 3 year olds run in the street, but that is part of their culture.. But let's say in the major culture it would be frowned upon to let a three year old run back and forth on a street. This is just a micro-example.. Or how about how animals should be raised. In some cultures dogs run around the village getting fed by anyone who has food and water. They might get injured or hurt, but this is less a consideration as having a dog kept locked in a certain area for safety reasons would be odd to them. However pet lovers in many countries might be appalled or at least not happy with this free-for-all arrangement. But then others would chime in and say that "Such and such economic reason means this is why the dogs roam free in those societies". But this doesn't answer if it is moral, or it at least tacitly says it is relative.. as when it is brought to another society that has other values regarding dog safety it becomes a problem and a clash of cultures. But recognizing the clash and then making a moral judgement are two different things. Many might be afraid to condemn the latter.

Among the first ways we know God is that we fear him. God is terrifying. Reality is terrifying. So cross your Ts and dot your Is. It's not "gas lighting" and until you understand this point this discussion is futile. If you act in certain ways your suffering may very well be essentially "on you." We must first accept that this world has rules and if you violate these you hurt yourself.

This really goes back to Adam and Eve but we see it over and over again. Certain things are permitted, others are not, and quite frequently doing that which is unpermitted carries consequences. — BitconnectCarlos

That is to say, the deity now looks all too human, like us. A king that has created his subjects and now wants them to see the manifest greatness of his creation, and if they don't recognize this, they will be cursed, damned, obliterated, laid waste... The ancients saw their own kings and projected their propensities onto their deity. This is how kings act, no? Why not the king of the whole universe? Just a bigger version of this.. And just like a king sometimes grants mercy for those who see that he is indeed the just and righteous ruler that he is (narcissistic self-fulfilling prophecy when fear is involved), then the king of the universe all the same grants clemency. — schopenhauer1

But even more perplexing, why would a supreme deity need things like "a game of justice of right and wrong to be carried out by various lower beings who can choose right and wrong whilst sometimes being rewarded and sometimes arbitrarily suffer (Job)"? Besides the inconsistency of the Job ("seemingly unnecessary" suffering), the whole game itself is very much similar to what a human would construct.

The biblical authors do say humans are a reflection of god, but isn't this just more evidence of the human construction of the godhead? And yet, when this parallel comes too close to home (that god is all too human), the apologist moves to make god transcendental and unknowable again.. Thus cherry-picking when it is convenient. God is "sort of" like humans (until tricky questions of morality come into play about suffering and why even implement this game in the first place? So it's for human growth.. but why would a deity care? That also seems too human. Yet, the "why is suffering necessary IN THE FIRST PLACE" is unknown and transcendental somehow. You're selling hollow, tired, arguments. Why not just drop them all? If you say, fear of X, I then will direct you back to questioning a being that wants this kind of love out of fear... And if you say because you want to be close to your god-daddy.. again goes back to the human qualities of want and need. You are in a pickle Dwight.

Within the biblical worldview we all need to have a general trust in God. That doesn't mean that all suffering needs to be deemed as good. It could be punishment. But it all happens under God's purview. Job lays out the proper way to dealing with unexplainable suffering e.g. you can curse the day you were born, but you can't curse God.

Just because suffering happens under God's purview doesn't mean that he delights in it or wants to see it. — BitconnectCarlos

Ok, so I am just going to refer you again to the post I made to Tom Storm here, as all of this was addressed in some way:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/935954

You ignored almost every argument I made in the last two posts.. Go back and read again and come back and do better if you want me to take you seriously and not just falling into the exact problems that I brought up.. This tells me you had a ready-made answer, and did not grapple with what I presented:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/935954

So it's not that "God likes to see suffering" it's that the world has a certain general way of operating that occurs throughout the generations that ancient writers take note of. Now if you want to go and say "God loves that suffering!" or that suffering is "good for God" now you're engaging in your theology. You are going beyond the pattern recognition and engaging in your own theology when you say that this suffering is "good" for God or that God "likes" the suffering. — BitconnectCarlos

See especially what I said about necessity and the gaslighting (it's YOUR fault evil exists). But really, the whole argument must be taken into consideration from that post..Lest you cherry-pick and take out of context as is perhaps your wont.

Of course many who defend such a malevolent deity will argue that humans don't have the capacity to judge god and that he has his own special wisdom or celestial discernment, which humans couldn't possibly understand. It's that kind of thinking, I suspect, which leads to mass murdering children because god says it's ok. — Tom Storm

Yes, which is where the "dilemma" of two views of suffering come from. There is the viewpoint from humans (suffering is bad). There is the view from God (suffering is good). The job of apologists is to make the two views align (suffering SEEMS bad to us, but is REALLY good in the grand scheme of things that we can never understand).

And then there is this underlying/hidden understanding of necessity and its relation to God. Here we have an all powerful/knowing being, but somehow it is NECESSARY that humans play this game of suffering, as if God couldn't have done it any other way. As if the rules of X goal/value are confined for God himself. He has his hands tied, he's just working with what he's got.

And these bring up the problems I said earlier:
1) God doesn't care about our suffering other than as a tool for a broader goal
2) God likes/wants suffering as a tool that he preferred for a tool for his goal
3) God doesn't know that what suffering is for humans

All of these things would indicate problems for an all powerful/good/knowing/perfect godhead. Good is relativized as a sort of "all too human" quality. Good is not reflective of divine good, which obviously is indifferent to or even likes suffering.

Then of course you have the notion that God "wants". Once you put "wants" in the equation, you have something that "lacks" in the first place. Lacking seems imperfect.

But there's more.. Then there is the gaslighting aspect whereby it isn't god that is making you suffer. YOU are making you suffer by not following God's commands. God has a plan, and divine command. You must follow this plan or suffer the consequences. This is just a sophisticated version of the whole "God lacks, therefore he wants this game of free willed people to see how good he is". This is problematic as it goes way back to point 1 here:

1. Right but it's the need to see other people suffer, necessarily or not that seems interesting here. Why would an all good god care to see any suffering? The problem is any answer requires you to explain in a very human perspective. Even the standard theological reasons are rehashed human terms attributed to the deity. It's BitconnectCarlos' interpretation of a religious interpretation of suffering. — schopenhauer1

That is to say, the deity now looks all too human, like us. A king that has created his subjects and now wants them to see the manifest greatness of his creation, and if they don't recognize this, they will be cursed, damned, obliterated, laid waste... The ancients saw their own kings and projected their propensities onto their deity. This is how kings act, no? Why not the king of the whole universe? Just a bigger version of this.. And just like a king sometimes grants mercy for those who see that he is indeed the just and righteous ruler that he is (narcissistic self-fulfilling prophecy when fear is involved), then the king of the universe all the same grants clemency.

But let's not go too far here. In the post-Enlightenment, God has become simply the backdrop for holidays and rituals, not the main character. So really it's window dressing with a wink and a smirk, not fire and brimstone.

Either way, if we go way back to what I was saying on how the Bible was constructed, it was meant for a time and place. It was only under historical contingency that a small nation's deity became THE deity of the Western world. Even so, THE deity taken by the "Western" (Roman Empire) world, was one that wasn't even the same as the one from the Hebrew Scriptures (Ezra's Vision fully implemented by at least the Hasmonean dynasty in Judea vs. the Pauline mutation of a god-man that dies for your sins, more amenable to the mystery cults already flourishing in gentile non-Jewish communities around the Mediterranean).

In the biblical worldview they are one and the same. A free will is a will aligned with God. If we become something else, say hedonists, then our "good" can differ from God's good. Thus the hatred of idolatry. — BitconnectCarlos

And what's your worldview, or do you dare not to have an original thought? Just punt to dogma?

Anyways, this is now tripling down on point 1:

Even the standard theological reasons are rehashed human terms attributed to the deity. It's BitconnectCarlos' interpretation of a religious interpretation of suffering. — schopenhauer1

You still have not managed to bypass it. You have literally "Dwight Schruted" your answer (pedantic, petty, dogmatic... You are playing a caricature of your own profile pic.. at least true to form to your own hero).

If we are to go down this "biblical worldview", we are to go down a road whereby suffering for humans is warranted. This is deemed as good, but then this does not bypass the dilemma of two views of suffering.. The subjects of suffering (humans), and the one who wants to see the suffering.

Many times the abused identifies with the abuser- they deserve it. It's their fault. They should have done better.

Many times the abused excuses the abuser- it's their nature. Who are we to disagree.

The point of the dilemma is thus: Suffering might not be good for US, but rather, for the one who imposed the suffering.. How do you square this difference? You really haven't. Only tripled down on point 1. Betterment for humans seems awfully unnecessary. This seems like someone else is getting satisfaction from the suffering.. Are we but divine tools then? To be used for this game? Is that not questionable? And again, the mentality of the victim- are we to identify with this? Is this in our interest? And most importantly, out of all possibilities, why would suffering be the tool for growth?

I agreed with points 2 and 3. I would go back to Job on this one: As humans our perspective is incredibly limited. Some suffering is understandable and can be attributed to bad deeds, other suffering isn't. Ultimately, suffering is just another state of being. One among many. One can even experience bliss within suffering - see near death experiences. — BitconnectCarlos

Good is relative then. That is to say, can good for humans be at odds for good for God? The answer is harder than offhand references to medievalist Concordia and apology.

God “needs/wants” suffering. Humans rather not.

Why are we here? What is our goal? Possibly for self-development. Or improve the world. But I agree with Wittgenstein -- probably not to have the most blissful experience possible. So if the goal is self-development then suffering can be a tool towards that end. — BitconnectCarlos

You fail to get beyond comment 1, doubling down on it even, quoting other humans even.

The mooted primacy of assertion over other locutions? I don't see any reason to think of assertions as more central or foundational than commands or questions. The do very different things. Assertions only "convey some sort of corresponding relationship to a state of affairs in the world" when felicitous - Austin's term of art - but then questions and commands can also be infelicitous, commanding someone to do the impossible, or asking a ridiculous question. — Banno

And with this I can only think of a few answers.. All probably detached from Kimhi...
1) That's Kimhi's point.. Assertion shouldn't be distinct from the other types..
2) That's Kimhi's point.. Assertion is more than just an illocutionary force, it is a deeply metaphysical thing.

Folk hereabouts seem to want a third "force", such that it is not a full illocutionary assertion yet more than a denotation. What I've been pressing is for them to set out explicitly what that might be. In my view no clear account has been given. — Banno

I don't think I would know either..

If "assertoric force" is proposed to be understood as not an illocutionary force ranging over the subsequent expression, then it is up to the proposer to set out what it is that the force does that is different to the illocutionary force of asserting.

I'm not seeing that here. — Banno

The only thing I can think of is that "assertoric force" although a type of "illocutionary force" (the intention of the proposer is to assert something about the world), it is somehow conferred as something more important because unlike other illocutionary examples (like commands, questions, etc.), this one has to convey some sort of corresponding relationship to a state of affairs in the world. This kind of significance is not necessary for other kinds of illocutions. That's just one take. All other illocutions can be "true" in some sense, that is not about a state of affairs (though they can have that aspect too). This one by necessity MUST have a truth about a state of affairs.

Yes, I'm generally not a fan of the 'can do anything' version of omnipotence that just leads to paradoxes. — bert1

Then I will lead you to this:

3 Even the term "necessary" in front of suffering is problematic, as that implies that God is limited by some sort of super-force (necessity) that he can't help but WANT to see played out (by his human subjects??). — schopenhauer1

4 And then human subjects- why does he NEED an audience/players to play his game? This goes back to necessity.. An all powerful/knowing/perfect god and NEED doesn't seem to fit unless we go back to my Point number 1.. — schopenhauer1

I think we can all agree that suffering can teach us things. It's the idea of "unnecessary" suffering that the philosopher objects to as if he can finely discern different sorts of suffering into "necessary" and "unnecessary." Who knows what is necessary for the soul. — BitconnectCarlos

1. Right but it's the need to see other people suffer, necessarily or not that seems interesting here. Why would an all good god care to see any suffering? The problem is any answer requires you to explain in a very human perspective. Even the standard theological reasons are rehashed human terms attributed to the deity. It's BitconnectCarlos' interpretation of a religious interpretation of suffering.

2, This goes back to another thread that discussed how god having needs (like seeing the game of "necessary suffering" carried out) is problematic.

3 Even the term "necessary" in front of suffering is problematic, as that implies that God is limited by some sort of super-force (necessity) that he can't help but WANT to see played out (by his human subjects??).

4 And then human subjects- why does he NEED an audience/players to play his game? This goes back to necessity.. An all powerful/knowing/perfect god and NEED doesn't seem to fit unless we go back to my Point number 1..

I don't know, but maybe because in doing so it would cease to be God. If God isn't made of parts (as dogma has it) it has to do things wholly. So maybe God can take on the perspective of a human, but in doings so becomes human. I don't know. Theology is a bit guessy. — bert1

Then the omnipotent problem..

I'm not sure God is in a position to like or dislike anything, because it is omnipotent. God can love, or annihilate. Perhaps only finite powers can like and dislike, We can only like and dislike things that come to us from outside that are not under our control, or that we have only partial control over. Not sure though. — bert1

Yes, I'm aware of the dilemma. But human suffering is only evil for humans, not God. No skin off his nose. — bert1

But why wouldn't an all powerful/knowing god not be able to take on the perspective of a (or any given) human and see suffering from that perspective? In fact all suffering at all moments should be accessible to such a god and known.

Rather, this indicates that either god has values that include allowing countless suffering (not all good in the human sense), or god is not in the picture at all.. or that god wants suffering.

Now if god wants suffering, that is an interesting notion we must explore..

But there is another possibility, that suffering is not a concept/thing that god understands. Then the all knowing element is out of the picture. It's a god that doesn't really take into account what a human may feel. This is akin to a sort of Cthulu Mythos.. gods that are indifferent to humans one way or the other.

Certainly, the god of the Abrahamic religion has a god that cares about the outcome (messianic age, following X, Y, Z edicts, etc.). THAT god knows SOMETHING about humans..

Tarski?

But not for the purpose of explaining thunder and lightning because they didn't know science.
I don't actually care what each believer believes or pretends to; only about how they treat other people. I don't actually care whether they think their god created evil, condones evil or is evil; I only care whether they do evil. Because I don't think evil has anything to do with gods or faiths: it's a human concept, a human attribute. — Vera Mont

Me and thee, and most believers. A good god fits the lifestyle of the believer. What your god is most concerned about is likely what any given believer is most concerned about. What's your thing? Refugees? Then god is the rescuer, comforter, and principle advocate for refugees. Balanced budgets? Then god is prudent, looks to the future, wastes not/wants not. Gay liberation? Then god blesses whatever one and one's local gay brethren get up to. Peace? Then god is against war, against the bombing (whatever bombing wherever), against unprovoked aggression, etc. Justice? God's always up for justice! Let justice roll down like the water! But whose justice for whom? — BC

@Wayfarer

I think this is why Schopenhauer is one of the best synthesizers of a non-theistic understanding of a Ground of Being (I won't go as far to say "God" here). The world has something going on here. There is a will in each of us that propels us forward. There is some dissatisfaction as marked by our own needs of survival and entertainment. There are external factors of harm that befall us. There are frustrations.

Questioning this situation, its necessity, is the most paramount of philosophical pursuits.

Demopheles. How often must I repeat that religion is anything but a pack of lies? It is truth itself, only in a mythical, allegorical vesture. But when you spoke of your plan of everyone being his own founder of religion, I wanted to say that a particularism like this is totally opposed to human nature, and would consequently destroy all social order. Man is a metaphysical animal,—that is to say, he has paramount metaphysical necessities; accordingly, he conceives life above all in its metaphysical signification, and wishes to bring everything into line with that. Consequently, however strange it may sound in view of the uncertainty of all dogmas, agreement in the fundamentals of metaphysics is the chief thing, because a genuine and lasting bond of union is only possible among those who are of one opinion on these points. As a result of this, the main point of likeness and of contrast between nations is rather religion than government, or even language; and so the fabric of society, the State, will stand firm only when founded on a system of metaphysics which is acknowledged by all. This, of course, can only be a popular system,—that is, a religion: it becomes part and parcel of the constitution of the State, of all the public manifestations of the national life, and also of all solemn acts of individuals. This was the case in ancient India, among the Persians, Egyptians, Jews, Greeks and Romans; it is still the case in the Brahman, Buddhist and Mohammedan nations. In China there are three faiths, it is true, of which the most prevalent—Buddhism—is precisely the one which is not protected by the State; still, there is a saying in China, universally acknowledged, and of daily application, that "the three faiths are only one,"—that is to say, they agree in essentials. The Emperor confesses all three together at the same time. And Europe is the union of Christian States: Christianity is the basis of every one of the members, and the common bond of all. Hence Turkey, though geographically in Europe, is not properly to be reckoned as belonging to it. In the same way, the European princes hold their place "by the grace of God:" and the Pope is the vicegerent of God. Accordingly, as his throne was the highest, he used to wish all thrones to be regarded as held in fee from him. In the same way, too, Archbishops and Bishops, as such, possessed temporal power; and in England they still have seats and votes in the Upper House. Protestant princes, as such, are heads of their churches: in England, a few years ago, this was a girl eighteen years old. By the revolt from the Pope, the Reformation shattered the European fabric, and in a special degree dissolved the true unity of Germany by destroying its common religious faith. This union, which had practically come to an end, had, accordingly, to be restored later on by artificial and purely political means. You see, then, how closely connected a common faith is with the social order and the constitution of every State. Faith is everywhere the support of the laws and the constitution, the foundation, therefore, of the social fabric, which could hardly hold together at all if religion did not lend weight to the authority of government and the dignity of the ruler.

Philalethes. Oh, yes, princes use God as a kind of bogey to frighten grown-up children to bed with, if nothing else avails: that's why they attach so much importance to the Deity. Very well. Let me, in passing, recommend our rulers to give their serious attention, regularly twice every year, to the fifteenth chapter of the First Book of Samuel, that they may be constantly reminded of what it means to prop the throne on the altar. Besides, since the stake, that ultima ration theologorum, has gone out of fashion, this method of government has lost its efficacy. For, as you know, religions are like glow-worms; they shine only when it is dark. A certain amount of general ignorance is the condition of all religions, the element in which alone they can exist. And as soon as astronomy, natural science, geology, history, the knowledge of countries and peoples have spread their light broadcast, and philosophy finally is permitted to say a word, every faith founded on miracles and revelation must disappear; and philosophy takes its place. In Europe the day of knowledge and science dawned towards the end of the fifteenth century with the appearance of the Renaissance Platonists: its sun rose higher in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries so rich in results, and scattered the mists of the Middle Age. Church and Faith were compelled to disappear in the same proportion; and so in the eighteenth century English and French philosophers were able to take up an attitude of direct hostility; until, finally, under Frederick the Great, Kant appeared, and took away from religious belief the support it had previously enjoyed from philosophy: he emancipated the handmaid of theology, and in attacking the question with German thoroughness and patience, gave it an earnest instead of a frivolous tone. The consequence of this is that we see Christianity undermined in the nineteenth century, a serious faith in it almost completely gone; we see it fighting even for bare existence, whilst anxious princes try to set it up a little by artificial means, as a doctor uses a drug on a dying patient. In this connection there is a passage in Condorcet's "Des Progrès de l'esprit humain" which looks as if written as a warning to our age: "the religious zeal shown by philosophers and great men was only a political devotion; and every religion which allows itself to be defended as a belief that may usefully be left to the people, can only hope for an agony more or less prolonged." In the whole course of the events which I have indicated, you may always observe that faith and knowledge are related as the two scales of a balance; when the one goes up, the other goes down. So sensitive is the balance that it indicates momentary influences. When, for instance, at the beginning of this century, those inroads of French robbers under the leadership of Bonaparte, and the enormous efforts necessary for driving them out and punishing them, had brought about a temporary neglect of science and consequently a certain decline in the general increase of knowledge, the Church immediately began to raise her head again and Faith began to show fresh signs of life; which, to be sure, in keeping with the times, was partly poetical in its nature. On the other hand, in the more than thirty years of peace which followed, leisure and prosperity furthered the building up of science and the spread of knowledge in an extraordinary degree: the consequence of which is what I have indicated, the dissolution and threatened fall of religion. Perhaps the time is approaching which has so often been prophesied, when religion will take her departure from European humanity, like a nurse which the child has outgrown: the child will now be given over to the instructions of a tutor. For there is no doubt that religious doctrines which are founded merely on authority, miracles and revelations, are only suited to the childhood of humanity. Everyone will admit that a race, the past duration of which on the earth all accounts, physical and historical, agree in placing at not more than some hundred times the life of a man of sixty, is as yet only in its first childhood. — Arthur Schopenhauer- Religion: A Dialogue