I wanted to pick schopenhauer1's brain on how, given the givens, a minimum amount of suffering is necessary (leprotic/diabetic neuropathy related maladies) for survival or, in more colloquial terms, to stay outta trouble. Transhumanists disagree of course and I feel there's merit in such a position - we could, if we work in earnest, find ways of decoupling danger from pain. It's just that in my humble opinion, nature (evolution) has already experimented with that and it was a disastrous failure - those who didn't feel pain were genetic dead ends and failed to pass down their superpower superweakness to the next generation. In a sense, life rejected happiness or, inversely, life welcomed, with open arms I might add, pain. — Agent Smith

So similar to DA671, this is not about straight up harms/benefits but a move I characterized as "aggressively paternalistic". So for example, if I forced you into a game that had a set of choices that were the parameters of the game, and also had a certain amount of harms, and even ones I didn't mean to happen but happened anyways as you played.. You would say that's wrong.. But not only because it kidnapped you from a previous life.. There is something wrong with me choosing for another person (you) that THIS is what you should endure.. And then telling you to kill yourself if you want out of my game. I see no difference with this intuitively wrong move and procreating someone from scratch. In other words, even if I conjured you from thin air with the snap of my fingers, it would be just as wrong as if you already existed.

It is my argument and there has been no successful demonstration of its falsity. — DA671

Don't be a dick. The OP of this thread set out an argument about something being wrong due to making an aggressive(ly paternalistic) move on someone else's behalf. THAT is the question.. It is a two parter.. It is not just about the person being affected, but rather the person doing the affecting upon the other person.. In fact, it is MORE about that. It is about the move the procreator makes upon the procreated.

Edit: Not THIS thread but what this thread has become about.. (The other thread).

And being born is not making a previously happy person cry by frustrating their desire to not exist. — DA671

Right, the straw man you keep presenting that I am not positing.

Hence, there is no obligation to never procreate. — DA671

Wrong conclusion from a straw man argument.

it can also be a benefit — DA671

Weasily words to get out of the fact one is doing the three things I argued in the OP. It's not just unimitigated benefit (benefits without contingencies attached). Benefits purely, and alone is not what is in question here in terms of the "bestowing". Other things (what set of choices others must endure, harms they must endure, unknown harms) were what was in question as moral. You must admit that I have given you my objections numerous times in regard to giving a gift that isn't just trivial or unimitigated good, but comes with those three things. To ignore this is to be uncharitable to the extreme and wasteful conversations that go on forever because I have to repeat myself, being that these objections have been unprocessed/packaged, overlooked for the same argument that I am questioning, and then repeating the process. To move forward you'd have to at least recognize that goodness isn't unmitigated and that this unmitigated "gift" is the aggressive move, because it is assuming things for others that imposes on them.

I see no difference between choosing for others what they must endure/be harmed/gamble harms for them when already alive and from scratch. That is indeed the question at hand.. Why would procreation not fall under this kind of aggressive paternalism? How is it any different than if someone was already born. See conversations I've had with @Tzeentch about this recently as well.

The act is not a harm unless it negatively impacts an individual. — DA671

You made my point.

You, as an antinatalist, want to prevent suffering but this suffering exists only as a potential for a possible person. It is only fair/consistent that you also concede that a possible person has the potential for happiness, oui? — Agent Smith

While I agree that there can be a potential person who will suffer, and will experience happiness.. Not causing the happiness isn't morally wrong, or an ethical problem or issue, especially in light of the fact that collateral damage of harm is entailed.

Except that rights begin with creation, which is why they are not violated by it. Deciding on behalf of another person is bad for an actual individual, not the air. — DA671

Whence does an individual come into play (when they are born). This is also when bad comes into play. Don't do that thing that causes bad. It doesn't matter one wit about whether the non-existent person gets joy from this move of not getting harmed.

An act is an imposition if it violates someone's freedom, which also seems to imply that non-existent beings are in some free state. But if purposely ignoring that is the best option, then creating positives can also be a gift and constantly mentioning deprivations/hurt is nothing more than suggesting an unjustifiable double standard. — DA671

You are ignoring my question and making your own red herring/straw man so you can try to knock it down. Stop it.

However, if there is a right to not suffer, there definitely should be one to be happy (and the truth is that both of them are intimately connected). — DA671

There is no "right" to the unborn for either harm or happy. There are considerations for what can befall someone in the future who will have rights that are violated. So in these considerations, we can say, "Is it appropriate for one person to make such significant decisions on behalf or another person relating to the kind of choices they will encounter, and the harms they will endure, and the gambling of unknown harms that we did not even know would occur to a child?". That is the question at hand.. not the red herring questions about benefitting non-existent people.

It's quite apparent to me that attempting to dimish the potency of the good by employing arbitrary double standards when it comes to the value of creating happiness is a lot more problematic. — DA671

Just asserting "double standards" doesn't make the argument a double standard. You are placing one and haven't seen how your point doesn't actually make sense.

However, a possible person does have rights even if not to the same degree/level as actual persons. At the very least, if a good life can be assured, possible persons should be allowed to become actual ones. — Agent Smith

I think you are mixing up semantic metaphysical points as well. Possible people don't have "rights". However, possible people have considerations as to what can befall them. There are such things as future conditionals. A future can happen. The lava pit baby. The baby is born into a lava pit by a crazy mother. You talk the mother out of it. You prevented a horrible incident in the future of someone who was not even born yet (but could have been.. into a lava pit). I think this conversation moves forward with progress if you try not to do summersaults about this.. You are giving full rights to non-existent people and @DA671 is denying that considerations are possible. It's like the two extremes that are kind of weaselly in an attempt to avoid the issues.

I never said that you are saying that. It's my argument that there is no obligation to create someone/not create someone because neither of those two actions cause a person to gain/lose something. — DA671

You're playing a semantic game with what I underlined, throwing out red herrings...by trying to make an odd metaphysical point.. but I'm not letting you do that.

Nonexistence has the potential for existence if you concede the notion of possible persons and with the potential for life, a possible person has, in my humble opinion, some basic rights - the right not to suffer (antinatalism) and the right to be happy (natalism).

What sayest thou? — Agent Smith

There is no right for the unborn to be happy. But there seems to be a prohibition to creating harms/choices for others "just because you want to".

Neither is one obliged to preserve a void. The gift would positively affect an actual person. — DA671

With collateral of the other (harm and imposed choices).

Absolute bliss. The pit is indeed bad for one who does exist. However, it's absence is not desired and does not benefit the non-existent. — DA671

No one claimed it did. Straw man that you even bring it up (constantly and annoyingly).

When the lack of action does not result in an actual better/worse state of affairs for a person, there is no obligation to do/not do something (unless it impacts existing people). — DA671

This is either common sense or ridiculous depending how you mean it. The lava pit refutes whatever point you were trying to make, and "prevented" good hurts no ONE. Again and again and again.> You can keep making these category errors your gospel and I will keep refuting thus.

But if creating someone in a lava pit is bad, then creating someone in a palace of joy is also good — DA671

Creating good WITH the bad though, buddy.. Yes not UNMITIGATED good. You are creating burdens/impositions/harms/choices for others, THAT is the relevant ethical claim. Creating good WHEN IT COMES WITH BAD. You say it's fine. I say it isn't good to do procreation or otherwise (except as always with the mitigating greater with lesser harms which procreation doesn't fall under except to expiate someone else's sadness for not getting to enact their will, as if every desire that isn't acted upon is automatically wrong).

It isn't for some people to decide whether or not the value of giving a gift i — DA671

No one is obliged to give a gift, especially for an empty set.

1. It can matter to existing people — DA671

Already addressed.

2. If the absence of happiness is not bad because it does not matter to those who do not exist, then the absence of suffering is also not good because it does not matter for the inexistent. — DA671

Lava pit. It only matters if the person will be born to be harmed. That is the morally questionable thing. I’m not at this point questioning unmediated good (which this is not a case of).

In the absence of a prior state of well-being and pre-existing interests, creation is not a benefit/harm/imposition/positive. If one still insists on saying that it can be a harm and imposition, then it can also be a positive that comes from an act of beneficence — DA671

For millionth time, it does t matter UNTIL the person comes into existence. Lava pit

Fortuitously, there is no rule against creating positives. — DA671

You keep overlooking the negatives that come with it! And you can’t use a gift excuse unless the gift was also an inescapable set of burdens that others couldn’t ask for. That certainly would be questionable gift.

And nobody benefits from the absence of the harms, which is why the unavoidable fact is that the lack of creation has no value/disvalue for the non-existent. There is no room for untenable double standards here. — DA671

And for millionth time, it doesn’t matter to literally no one. It’s only the other way, creating harms and limitations of choices for another along with the intended goods that matters as now someone indeed exists that this affects.

negativity that could be experienced by countless innocent individuals. — DA671

As populum fallacy.. a million nazis is a million nazis. Less extreme- a million misguided people are a million misguided people. Multiple as much as you want.

What would be crazy if we stopped doing any good in the world just because someone was unable to ask for it— — DA671

Yet no one is deprived and you’re right back at square 1. It always goes one way.

Thankfully, we do not live in a world wherein the only things that matter are impositions and harms. — DA671

And that is exactly the attitude of impositions at question. That you should make those decisions for another.

No ONE that this decision is affecting is in fact affected. Period.

And if you’re going to talk about already existing people sad they didn’t create a child, just think of the slippery slope implications of that. Imagine if people were allowed to impose anything they wanted to others because they’d be sad otherwise. That’s nuts. A mad scientist wanting to use people for his experiment doesn’t get to just use people when he’d like because he’d be sad otherwise. Think of any other situation whereby one person would be sad so they do X cause they want to see it play out and they’d be sad if it doesn’t. Crazy.

My point is simply this: either way (natalism/antinatalism) we're imposing (on a possible person). Damned if you do, damned if you don't! We gotta choose the lesser of the two evils. Can you give it a shot? I'm all ears. — Agent Smith

Yes, only that one presumption creates harms and presumes set of choices that’s supposed to be good for another with its other intention. This matters. Not creating goods creates no negative situation for no one. I can do this all day.

If it turns out that pleasure exceeds pain by the right amount, antinatalism wouldn't make as much sense, oui? — Agent Smith

Choices and harms are presumed for another. That’s all that matters ethically. You’re imposing on others.

it would come with too many problems. It would imply a duty to meddle in other people's affairs, — Tzeentch

Yes, that slippery slope argument. I called it a brand of "repugnant conclusion". All your efforts would have to be towards other people's affairs. If you can work 18 hours a day helping people, you would be doing your best to "help" (interfere?) whenever you can at all possible times. Also then you run into probability unknowns.. You can almost never know how much you are helping in this way versus that way. The opportunity costs then have to rely on just "what you think" which may be way off. Or you are relying on social scientists' or philosophers pet calculation. Where is the demarcation? It is always conveniently selected to make it seem like a neat fit. I also think that ideas of supererogatory can be relevant here.

It's a very relevant topic that can be applied in life (whether to procreate or not). I would say a pretty central one.

What do you have to say to people who exult "Thank god I was born!" To be frank, I've never heard anyone make that remark. It just doesn't seem to make sense, oui monsieur? — Agent Smith

That's the child, not the person making the decision for them. And I have had this debate before, but just because someone says that at one moment in time, doesn't mean a minute later, when they are stuck in traffic they don't go "Oh fuck I hate this shit". Is in the moment dislike their attitude or that general statement? But I think all of it is irrelevant because you are looking at the effect only, when this is about the principle of deciding impositions that are appropriate for others. Even the person who says they were grateful or whatnot, that doesn't prevent the fact that there were harms they may not want to encounter and limitations that they would not have wanted in the choices. In other words, I don't think that statement really reveals much about the nature of how people encounter harms and choices in life.

Yes. All other action is irrational/maladaptive. — baker

Well, you can say that about any philosophical debate, right? That's a whole value sentiment that can be discussed in another thread. Should philosophical debates about life be discussed? I think it is super relevant because we are humans living the human condition and we can analyze what this condition entails. And as far as it having a purpose, it is the definition of something of an ethics that can be applied, so your assessment is wrong.

Antinatalists (at least the variety one usually encounters in secular Western settings) don't go far enough in their criticism of procreation. It is existence itself they should be criticial of, not merely procreation. — baker

Are you sure I haven't done that in the past? Look at some of my past posts focusing on Schopenhauerian philosophy. However, though it CAN be relevant to THIS debate, this particular argument can work on its own, though I think can be quite elucidated from it. I have discussed at length the difference between what I have called "necessary suffering" and "contingent suffering". But again, doesn't have to be discussed in this debate.

And talking about it accomplishes what? — baker

Why does one do anything? Does there have to be an achievable goal? Don't psychologize it please, unless you are leading somewhere?..

So what are you going to do about that? — baker

Talk about it.

Correct me if I'm wrong but your main point seems to be the unethical nature of thinking for others (the child who's born). True, if possible I would have liked to be consulted on the matter.

However, isn't antinatalism the exact same thing, thinking for someone else? — Agent Smith

It's not about thinking for others on its own. It's about specifically creating impositions for them or deciding what impositions are appropriate for others.

I'm still trying to articulate this more clearly, but I'd like to ask you, can you define what it is that makes not imposing harms from scratch (for someone else) more ethically relevant than not causing benefits from scratch (for someone else)?

I've explained it thus that for a potential person to exist (the procreative question whereby the effect is another life), not creating a life that has benefits for that person is not experienced by that person. However, creating a person that will be harmed/limited to a set of choices that they might not like, is going to be experienced. It is this that is relevant, despite the good that might come about.

Why is it that if someone already existed and I forced them to play my game of limitations and harms with some good, THAT would be roundly rejected, but if I created someone from scratch (let's say snapped my fingers) THAT is considered fine and dandy? What makes that difference? I think people are misconstruing the idea that a person GETS to experience in the FIRST PLACE as some sort of untold condition of goodness.. But I don't see that as relevant. Thoughts?

I then said that I do not see a good reason for claiming that one should completely disregard the value of doing good and just focus on not harming someone. — DA671

So that's the very point in question. Is it ever okay to aggressively assume harms/choices for another person? I understand your position that it is okay to assume goods for a person. I can even get on board with it IF it didn't have the contingency that I was going to be assuming choices/harms for another. But of course, it doesn't and you are stuck with the reality.

If the absence of the choice is simply neutral (as opposed to being good), then choosing happiness still seems like the better option. I was referring to the value/disvalue inherent in those choices. My point was that there are no negative/positive effects (and no impositions/gifts) for the individual that stem from the act of creation or the lack thereof. Later on, I assumed the proposed framework to be true but suggested that it should be expanded because the creation of the positives is also ethically good. — DA671

But it’s not about effects. It’s about the rule. And so contra your post here, you are misconstruing the argument. We will continue to disagree because not providing positives from scratch has no moral relevance. Assuming someone else’s choices (limitations of sets of choices) and harms is where ethics comes into play. Creating positives always comes with this baggage. Why you want to rehash this debate specifically between us, I don’t understand. We’ve done it before.

The absence of that negative at the cost of their existence simply has no value for the person who does not exist, in my vie — DA671

You gotta stop harping at a point I didn’t make. It’s about the parent making a choice that could affrect someone. It’s about whether to impose or not.

But if it's bad to create someone in a situation where they would be experience suffering, it can also be good to create someone who would experience ineffaceable happiness. Love and beauty are good even if one is not capable of asking for them. — DA671

I’m just gonna repeat what I said previously about creating limitations and harms.

There is no "magic" involved in pointing out that the inexistent is not dancing in joy due to their lack of being, — DA671

Are you purposely twisting the argument or just not understand? It’s about whether it’s ok to make these decisions that limit and harm for another. The state of not existing but could exist doesn’t exonerate that this is a decision that if chosen one way, will affect a person. And that’s the issue at hand. This is beyond common sense.

Nevertheless, I simply do not see how it can be ethical to never lead to the genesis of a good. — DA671

You don’t? You don’t see how assuming that others should like and experience these sets of choices and endure these harms, because there is good, can be an ethical problem? Really?

My apologies for callously jumping into the thread. — DA671

Noted

If there were more people who cared about doing that instead of just discussing things such as politics and celebrities, it is quite likely that the need to even have this discussion would not be strong. Nonetheless, I am glad that you are here advocating for giving people the good (and I consider the lack of harms to be a good thing) that they deserve. Have a nice day! — DA671

Cool

If non-existent beings had some prior interest in avoiding existence that was being disregarded by their creation, then perhaps it would indeed be wrong to procreate. — DA671

Indeed we disagree. I don’t think a person needs to exist prior to life to know it will be affected, and thus at some point negatively. Child born in lava pit will be born in a lava pit. If you can convince the woman not to, you will prevent this negative for the future person. Clearly future states matter.

If, howbeit, it is an act of aggressive paternalism to "impose" something one did not ask for, then, by the same token, it is also an act of unimaginable beneficence to provide a benefit that an individual cannot (which is different from "did not") demand before existing. If no good was sacrificed and there was a clear predilection for non-existence, I would not have had a problem with universal antinatalism. But, as things stand, it simply cannot be ethically justifiable to prevent all happiness (even if the impact is only on those who do exist). — DA671

Yes, we’ve had this debate. I’m just going to repeat the point that the ethical part is about whether to foist harms and limitations, not goods. It’s goods that come with significant impositions. That’s the very question at hand. The person not existing beforehand isn’t some magic excuse that somehow makes this situation different. I’ll just repeat, I have a game I’d love to foist on you, certainly will be fun in some parts. Yes, you won’t be able to escape the set of choices and yes at parts you will be harmed. Even if I conjured you from thin air to play my game, and not taken you from your existing life, there are serious ethical considerations you would be overlooking to say, “oh no that’s fine”.

The ethical part is not about the good then. I have no problem if every choice would have been wanted and no harms befell people.

cannot be solicited — DA671

You said it bro.

You’re simply going to be unreasonable to make your same argument.

If I went around assuming for others significant limitations on their choices and foisting harms because it sometimes brings good to them as well, the good is not the ethical issue. If that’s the case I have a game you cannot escape from you’re really going to like..let me foist that onto you.

There’s a lot of things off here.
1. Being rich does not equal heaven obviously. Though being rich can help make some things easier.
2. It’s not about non existent. It’s about whether it’s ok to make significant impositions on others behalf when it’s not ameliorating greater with lesser harm but simply creating impositions from scratch. Is it ok to choose for others what their set of choices (that life represents) is, the harms they will endure are, and the unknown harms. I claimed no because it takes an attitude of aggressive paternalism that one can assume that these large significant conditions are necessary or proper to decide for others what to endure.

However, I wouldn't mind if I were born into a rich (and powerful :snicker: ) family. Therein lies the rub, oui monsieur? — Agent Smith

It's not about that.

To ask this question for this topic is misplaced. Antinatalism is an ethics argument. As such, argumentation in the form of statements and reasoning will suffice. I think you mean to say that we need to provide mathematical proof to win this argument. No. If anything, that's a charlatan's way of weasling itself into making a point, but really it's just hiding behind numbers because they couldn't articulate their argument properly. — L'éléphant

A great point. The antinatalism on the thread about impositions is about when or if it is ever right to create impositions for others if it is not ameliorating a greater harm with a lesser harm. In other words, you are simply creating impositions from scratch. And I defined impositions as a) Forcing one's will onto another and b) creating burdens for others. Procreation falls under both those definitions.

@Agent Smith, so it would be like saying, "Kant thought we should not use people as a means to an ends".. Or perhaps, you should not impose onto others that CAN'T consent, or that CAN'T have a choice. Mainly it was about the idea of "aggressive paternalism".. Is the attitude that one can make decisions for others on significant matters regarding the conditions and limitations that life offers (how to survive, the amount of harms we know about, the amount of unknown harms) for another person ever appropriate? All of these questions are based on some kind of principle and violation of things that we may find morally relevant such as justice, autonomy, dignity, etc. In other words, you can't say, "52% of people might benefit from being used" against a Kantian deontological principle that using people is always violating some kind of categorical imperative or whatnot.

If the potential for suffering matters (lava pit birth), the potential for happiness does it (heavenly birth). It is only fair that this is so. — Agent Smith

The asymmetry between harm and benefits. In this existence, it isn't a heaven, it comes with harms. Harms = Impositions (point B specifically.. the burdening of someone and A, foisting one's idea of what those burdens should be onto someone). A heaven, if it is so, would not have at the least B. So there is a category error between comparing heaven to this existence, which obviously isn't so..

What you end up doing is trying to make this statistics. It's not about probabilities but the rule of avoiding imposing unnecessary impositions on others. Or maybe more categorically-speaking, questioning the right to impose, or assume the harms, set of choices, etc. that others must encounter.

Red herring observation. Why should the conclusion be this imposition? You haven’t connected that. It’s just moral fiat. Do it cause you think so.