It's interesting that such a person can elaborate extremely interesting and insightful epistemological and metaphysical philosophies because of his conclusions about the origin of existence. Yet one can reject his conclusions while accepting his other arguments. But he would not have elaborated this arguments absent his nihilism. It's very strange.

Maybe there are optimistic AN perspectives in that, one can be an optimist about the future while thinking that not being born would have been better. Maybe. — Manuel

Cool insights. One can have two ideas in one's head at the same time. I bet you you can find some happy-go-lucky philosophical pessimists. Not all PPs are necessarily dispositional pessimists too.

It's simply not dire or exigent enough for natalists (or conscientious antinatalists) to advocate wholesale human extinction. — 180 Proof

As you know, I am not advocating for wholesale human extinction other than people choosing not to procreate. We may be closer then.. I would say it's "anatinatalism at the margins". Once you get to the "World-Exploder" things like that, it is not antinatalism proper, if you ask me- it's some form of radical negative utilitarianism or some other broader philosophy. It certainly doesn't take into account the dignity of the individual person as I am trying to defend.

I'll put it here too since you seem to want to espouse it in both threads. — Isaac

Honestly, this is the fuckn shit that makes me not want to answer you. Do not "throw sand in my face" before you make your argument. Just make your argument. How many times do I have to tell you about etiquette. I made a whole thread on insults if you want to use it for reference. This is on here because I saw someone else wanted to open this thread and of course I am interested in the topic. Stop being so aggro bro ;).

Conception is unique - it's not like throwing people into a game you can only escape with self-harm because there are no 'people' whose will we can consider prior to birth (even a few months after birth there's not a sufficiently complex will for such a consideration), so contrary to what you say it is not the inevitable conclusion for people who do not like throwing people into a game you can only escape with self-harm. Such people may well hate throwing people into a game you can only escape with self-harm with a vengeance, but still consider the unique situation of having a child to be morally acceptable. — Isaac

Right, and my point is that its seeming uniqueness, is not different. It is another case, just with a time displacement from conception to birth or whatever other place you want to consider "valid" (consciousness, self-consciousness, etc.). It doesn't change anything because of the displacement.

There are no other circumstances where the person who would experience that which we expect for them does not exist to be asked (or have their will considered) in our lives. Birth is the only one. So we have no intuition on the matter other than the one we use for birth, and that is 99.999999% in agreement that it's morally acceptable. — Isaac

I mean, I can then make a case that because this is so unique, it defies things like, "waking up the lifeguard to save the drowning child" because in this case the person is absolutely being used for X reason and never for its own sake being that it doesn't exist yet. Thus the suffering is completely unnecessary for that person, and there isn't even a greater harm for that person being ameliorated for a lesser harm. Again, completely causing conditions for unnecessary suffering upon that person born.

My only argument against schopenhauer1 is that his argument is not logical though he makes it seem so. He accepts that the whole preservation of dignity thing is and should be violated sometimes. As such, he can't really argue that having children is unilaterally wrong without begging the question (assuming that having children is already one of the instances where dignity violation is not acceptable). He could try to argue for that separately so as no longer to beg the question by taking a misanthropic angle, and trying to show that in most or all cases, having a child is a heavy enough burden, and doesn't alleviate enough to be considered acceptable. But he doesn't do that. So as it stands I think his argument begs the question at worst, or is insufficient at best. — khaled

So after our conversations, I am of the idea that really unnecessary suffering and dignity are inextricably intertwined as some sort of "limits" of morality and that it is not binary but of degree and that if a threshold is reached then it becomes violated. Thus nudging the lifeguard to wake up is not to the degree of violating dignity or unnecessary suffering prevention that forcing the lifeguard into a lifetime of teaching lifeguarding lessons would be doing.

Even if we were to "know" the greatest good would come from this, the dignity threshold has been violated. In the case of procreation, even if you believed the greatest good for society is to be had from the birth, the dignity violation of violating someone's autonomy (forcing a game on them) is met. Certainly, there is a balanced calculus that has to be made regarding how much unnecessary suffering and dignity violation is happening. In most cases, an "aggregate" approach to suffering is almost always violating the dignity violation of an individual.

There are cases when one must cause harm to an individual but that is to ameliorate a greater harm with a lesser harm for that person.. Being person-contexted rather than aggregate contexted, and being that it is "necessary" to prevent further suffering for that individual, it may not be a violation.

Procreation is causing (the conditions of) unnecessary suffering for an individual, and aggregating the "use" of the individual for some "greater good" idea violates the dignity of that individual, so fails on both accounts.

So basically procreation can be:
Violating unnecessary suffering prevention: Yes
Violating dignity using people for aggregate: Yes
Violating dignity, forcing a game on them: Yes

By what standard is a state of affairs where someone is not suffering worse than one where there is someone suffering, but at the same time a state of affairs where someone is not having pleasure is just as good as one where someone is having pleasure. — khaled

This is in respect to non-existence and its absence. The absence of pain that could have occurred, is always good. The absence of pleasure for someone who does not exist but could, is neutral.

I do see why you find this harder to claim. His basis are intuitions like, "We don't seem to care over the absence of pleasure on a deserted planet, but we would probably empathize if there were aliens that were in tormenting pain". There is something valuable about not suffering sub species aeternatatis which is not the case for not feeling pleasure sub species aeternatatis.

So some conclusions might be:
A universe devoid of people with pain is just a "good" state of affairs.
A universe devoid of people with pleasure is just a "neutral" state of affairs.

However if it is person-dependent (because they are already born), then:
A person devoid of pain is a "good" state of affairs.
A person devoid of pleasure is a "bad" state of affairs (if the person feels "deprived" of this pleasure).

Sure, but that doesn't make "not doing this" good. I think there is a difference between what is moral and what is good. Sometimes something is moral but not good, as in it is a minimum requirement. "Not killing people" is definitely moral, but not enough to be called good. You're not virtuous simply because you haven't killed anyone. — khaled

Granted, I would make that distinction too I think. But one is the foundation, the other are some implications if one believes the foundation. For example, Benatar himself had several other asymmetries that followed from the initial asymmetry. See here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Benatar

As I say, if someone dies they are deprived of life's pleasure. Is it only different for the unborn because they are not someone? Because that is what Benkei is saying. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Yes it is different.. If someone is not born, there is no "deprivation" of pleasure. If someone is born, they are deprived when it is taken away. This is the crux of the asymmetry. Pleasure denied in respect to "non-existence" is neutral. Suffering prevented, in respect to "non-existence" is good. And as explained to Khaled, this is in respect to a state of affairs of "good" and "bad" and "neutral".

The idea that "not having children" is a good act is absurd. It is at best neutral. If you want it to come out as "good" you run into a lot of problems. For example: "Not shooting people" is now also a good act by the same reasoning. Therefore someone who owns a gun and chooses not to shoot someone can justifiably walk up to you and say "Why observe what a paragon of virtue I am! Can you see how many people I haven't shot!". And the more guns they own and choose not to use, the better they are.

This seems absurd. Choosing to not harm someone is not in itself agood act. It should go: — khaled

@Antinatalist too
It's not about act, it's simply the state of affairs of not being harmed/in pain/suffering/negative, etc. is in some way "good". Benatar has also stated his asymmetry can be used in any normative ethical system, so it could be deontological or utilitarian, for example.

However, I don't see it being a problem as an act either. This is more my spin on it. If you have the gun, the rule would be to not cause the the unnecessary suffering (preventing bad). It's not a strong "do this!" simply a common "don't do this!".

You start by positing harms and here the non-existence of the un-concieved child doesn't matter - they will exist and so one can consider the harms that will befall them. But here, the aggregate argument carries. There will be more harm by not conceiving them than there would by conceiving them (if you have a reasonable expectation that they'll mostly enjoy life). — Isaac

It doesn't matter. This is unacceptable to do for someone else, as what you are doing to them is like the lifeguard situation, unless you agree, the lifeguard should be kidnapped because you think it is good.

And no, I argue BOTH that unnecessary suffering/harms and dignity violated (for other people) are the two rules. They are related but separate reasons and it is a matter of degree/threshold at which it is being violated. I also admitted I had no calculus yet but that in the case of birth there was high amounts of autonomy/dignity violated and unnecessary suffering violated being that all suffering that will occur come from the act, thus the high threshold violation.

There's no person who's dignity or will needs to be considered. We're not kidnapping someone against their will, there's no person who exists yet for their will to be considered. It's a unique situation not analogous to any other we face in life. so we have no other intuition on how to handle it that the one most people have about conception (that it's morally fine). — Isaac

Yes it is supremely annoying to ME when we've discussed this. If you think you're frustrated...
Once the person is born, and the decision was made for them, that was the "force". It is a unique situation but the displacement of decision-made and consequent doesn't change the analogy. Is this not a huge decision you are making on behalf of someone else? And even though @khaled doesn't agree with my position anymore, I think he has made dozens of examples that proved this point over and over previously.

If you want to continue the discussion qua discussion, address the arguments, don't just ignore them and move on to fresh meat you hope might not spot the flaws, that just makes you seem like you're recruiting, not discussing. — Isaac

This is silly. Recruiting.. :rofl:. Yep, I find "recruits" left and right here :roll:.

All the stuff about harms has been discussed and resolved - no need to bring it up fresh as if it hadn't. If you take an aggregate harms position there's an argument that not having a child causes more harm than having one for some prospective parents. There's a threshold of autonomy/dignity above which we all cringe at considering aggregate harms (such as your kidnapped lifeguard). So harms are now completely irrelevant to the argument because it has moved on the the threshold of dignity/autonomy and its relation to conception. — Isaac

No that's the point, you can't just look at aggregate harm, as dignity/autonomy IS in the equation too. It hasn't moved, it's that both rules are in play- don't cause unnecessary harm and don't cause dignity to be violated. I used to think one was subsumed in the other, and still not sure honestly if they are just separate limiting factors on actions or one is a subsection of another.. Of course you wouldn't help me parse that out so, I won't even ask because you're not going to have a constructive conversation about something you hate so much... so don't worry about that part of it, cause it doesn't hurt the main position that both shouldn't be violated.

You're view on this is that childbirth is like kidnapping, but you've not provided anything to support that view. Most people think childbirth does not cross the threshold of dignity/autonomy, mainly because the person whose will we'd normally consider doesn't yet exist. — Isaac

Right, and I discussed how displacing the time of decision and the time of the consequence doesn't change anything about this crossing the threshold of dignity/autonomy and being analogous to kidnapping. A state of affairs that takes time to actually unfold, why would that make a difference? A bomb didn't go off now.. but will go off, well technically now, there is no bomb blowing up. Obviously that is bone-headed.

Nothing here is about the 'logic' at all, nothing about the discussion. It's all about that view. You think conception is like enough to kidnapping that your intuition about kidnapping applies to ti. Most others think conception is dissimilar enough to kidnapping that their intuition about kidnapping does not apply to it. Since conception and kidnapping are certainly dissimilar in many ways you can't show anyone to be wrong about that by necessity. There's therefore no 'argument' to be had. — Isaac

Yes, I explained how life is akin to a game.. the "game of life" of "overcoming challenges". If you do not do X, Y, Z then you will die. It's a deadly game. But just because you don't mind playing (at least at the moment we are discussing this), doesn't mean that your preference should be assumed for other people.

And I am not switching arguments but separately, the threshold for unnecessary suffering also is met being that all suffering will occur to that person who is born, and there would have been no downside for any "one" by not having them. If you start railing about the aggregate "good" for the "whole" had by having your kid (which is really presumptuous by the way), then that would indeed be violating the other rule about dignity as you are looking at outcomes other than the person the decision is being made for. That indeed is also like the kidnapping scenario.. The lifeguard would be creating the greatest amounts of good, but you are overlooking the lifeguard himself (dignity violated) for your "cause" of the "greatest good".

I don't see any reason to reject life on the basis that it involves some suffering. How much suffering would it need to involve in order to warrant rejection? If it was nothing but suffering it would warrant rejection. How about 90%? 80%? 70 %? — Janus

Being that all conditions of suffering are created from the conditions of birth itself, I would say it's pretty substantial. It literally foists the game of life on another. I would say anything less than a paradise, honestly. Even if you didn't agree with that standard, this particular world isn't even close.

It seems that anything substantially more than 50% suffering could plausibly be argued to be grounds for rejection of life. But since no percentage can be established even in relation to an individual life, much less all of human life, then it seems there cannot be rational grounds for general rejection of life. — Janus

So again, if the person kidnapped into lifeguarding school actually ended up identifying with his kidnapping and enjoyed it 50% of the time, it was thus justified? No. Forcing an X on someone unnecessarily and suffering unnecessary is never right. It is only just when mitigating a less harm for a greater harm, which can only happen for people that already exist. In other words, using people by forcing the game on them to create better outcomes for humanity would be like kidnapping the lifeguard.

Because it is not a logical, merely an emotional, reason, given that your premise (feeling) that life is overall more suffering than joy, cannot be substantiated. — Janus

So any premise can't be substantiated then because at the end of the day, it is up to the person who follows the ethical framework. However, if the premises are shown to be quite sound and the logic follows, then it is logical overall. But your claim can be made at any ethical framework. Ironically, it is partly based on that freedom to choose and not be chosen for, that antinatalism is based which strengthens its argument, being the very ethic for choosing an action or ethic is founded on it too.

Why is it sound? Because though it's contrary to current views, it is based off quite ordinary intuitions about not substantially forcing situations on others and creating unnecessary harm. The logic follows from there by the asymmetry of not being obligated to create good for someone else, while still being obligated to prevent harm- in other words, negative ethics (deontological or utilitarian).

The point is that there is no calculus of joy and suffering such that anyone could make a fully informed decision whether or not to have children, so it must come down to personal feeling. — Janus

Must it? Again, if you kidnapped the lifeguard because you feel it brings about a greater good, or even worse, because it makes you feel good, is that justified?

We know what your feeling is, which is fair enough for you, but you are not rationally, or in any other way, justified in attempting to universalize your personal feelings on the matter. — Janus

But you do get the irony, right? If my "feeling on the matter" is followed, no "one" gets hurt. The other one, does cause substantial harm, by definition of causation of the conditions of said suffering in the first place.

Anyways, why am I not "justified" to persuade people on a logical reason to not do X action? Why are you singling out this one as not rational when this is certainly justified for many other political/ethical ideas? Seems like special pleading. Also, am I "forcing" anything on people or just presenting a case? And if you want to say that anything counts as force, then we get all sorts of absurd conclusions.

Nice explanation rebutting Benkei's causation objection.

Antinatalist fundies seem incorrigibly blind to this point; they've somehow lost the ethical plot – maximal reduction of suffering for already born sufferers – which has the distinct advantage of being desired by the vast majority of people (et al). — 180 Proof

But as you point out, much of antinatalism is a sub-section of overall philosophical pessimism. Fundamentally, the problems are incorrigible. If you don't believe in throwing people into a game you can only escape with self-harm, if you don't believe in exposing new people to suffering.. that is the conclusion. Certainly though, giving to charity and helping out people in some capacity is noble to reduce harm, but that doesn't negate the causes that antinatalists focus on.

As @Gregory just stated, you think it narrow-minded that antinatalists have solely focused on their dissatisfaction with the current situation and its incorrigibleness, but the non-antinatalists have not focused on it enough.

Having a child takes faith because you have to have the faith that the world is good — Gregory

Actually that is a very good response to @180 Proof

If existence was nothing but suffering, then your point regarding the undesirability of creating new life would stand. — Janus

But is that true? There is unnecessary suffering caused to another. Why do benefits even play a factor in this? That is all you need to know. If I kidnap you to play a game, then that is wrong. The game of life I see as no different. You have to work to survive, find this or that to occupy time and to get comfortable, and to navigate the world, all the while getting impinged upon from all sorts of contingent harms (e.g. pandemics). So I disagree with this one off the bat.

But existence is not nothing but suffering, therefore your point fails; because there is no adequate calculus with which to accurately measure suffering against happiness. Some lives may contain more suffering than joy and others more joy than suffering, — Janus

Well, that is actually something I was going to bring up. What calculus would sufficiently be considered the threshold as "too much".. I had an argument with another poster on this...

If I needed to wake a sleeping lifeguard to save a drowning child's life, and I nudge the lifeguard to wake him, but I wanted to save the child, I don't believe I have gone beyond the threshold of "overlooking the lifeguard's autonomy/dignity" in saving the child.

What happens if after doing calculus for greatest good outcomes, I realized if I kidnapped the lifeguard and made him teach classes on lifeguard training, that actually created the most good. The outcome here doesn't matter. At this point, I have violated the threshold of autonomy/dignity of the lifeguard. Procreation, I believe, falls in this "violated the threshold" mark on the front of "causing unnecessary suffering to another" and "violating the autonomy to another" so if these things are valued, then it should give pause to just go ahead and procreate simply because there are good things in life.

Some lives may contain more suffering than joy and others more joy than suffering, — Janus

And who are you to be the decider for someone else? If you guess wrong? Doesn't matter?

Personally, given the impending problems humanity faces, I wouldn't want to be responsible for bringing a child into this world — Janus

Makes sense.

So all I am disagreeing with is what I see as your unjustified proselytizing. — Janus

See what I said to Unenlightened here for this canard:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/521502

It's only good to prevent suffering if there's someone existing to benefit from that prevention. — Benkei

Yes I know this is your beef. But as I said:

If you are saying there is no one to prevent suffering for then you are the one abusing language because you refuse to recognize the common linguistic and psychogical practice of counterfactuals. Someone would have suffered but didn't.

Following your argument, it would actually lead to a reductio ad absurdum because we would be left with the stupid conclusion that someone has to be born so that they can be prevented from being born so they don't suffer. Clearly if something can perceive that suffering can be prevented prior to that suffering subjects existence, then the conditions are met to prevent that future suffering from occurring. — schopenhauer1

And again,

the counterfactual case of "not having the goods of life", preventing this (or rather not starting this on behalf of someone else) is not unethical. Preventing unnecessary suffering is however the ethical part. That is the asymmetry. — schopenhauer1

Does it matter if the counterfactual person is "prevented good"? No.
Now do the same with suffering.
Does it matter that a person is "prevented bad"? I believe, definitely yes.

There is an asymmetry of "no good" and "no bad" for something that does not exist, but potentially can.

Note: "No good" would only matter if the person exists. But not the same with "No bad". No bad is good, even if there was no one around to realize this. Otherwise we get the stupid absurdem:

that someone has to be born so that they can be prevented from being born so they don't suffer. Clearly if something can perceive that suffering can be prevented prior to that suffering subjects existence, then the conditions are met to prevent that future suffering from occurring. — schopenhauer1

At the end of the day, no one is obligated to create "good" but there does seem an obligation to prevent bad (which WILL happen if someone is born at some point).

We are currently having a similar debate here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/525114

Would you say that a person killed has been deprived of life's good? If so, the unborn are not deprived of life's good solely due to their non-existence? — Down The Rabbit Hole

Because of the other part of the asymmetry- It is only "bad" to be "deprived" of good, if there is someone who exists to be deprived of good.

Aren't you making the exact same "non-existence argument" as you are dismissing from Benkei? — Down The Rabbit Hole

No, because in the counterfactual case of "not having the goods of life", preventing this (or rather not starting this on behalf of someone else) is not unethical. Preventing unnecessary suffering is however the ethical part. That is the asymmetry.

I can't see your point. Your premise that no one exists prior to birth is wrong, because it ought to state that no one person exists prior to one's own birth. Therefore your conclusion that nothing exists prior to one's birth is also wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not sure the objection. I guess I do mean "a particular person", but how does that change the conclusion. That person that might be born is not "deprived of good" and it does not matter whether "a thing exists that experiences good". Rather what does matter is "a state of affairs did not occur where someone has suffered". This is Benatar's asymmetry- good only matters if one exists already to be deprived of that good. However suffering matters in all circumstances.

The principal result of this reasoning is that "not creating good", (inactivity, which is contrary to living nature), is then actually rendered as bad. Stipulating what is good, which renders what is not stipulated as good, bad, allows us to avoid the loopholes which result from having to stipulate what is bad. The loopholes are in the form of 'if it is not stipulated as bad, then it is not bad'. — Metaphysician Undercover

This has not really answered my question.

Again, if you kidnapped an adult to go to the school of MU, because you thought that was the best course for that person, is that wrong? I would say yes. — schopenhauer1

I think your answer would be no, that person should not be kidnapped, even if the result is a person who has a stronger character. I go back to something deeper going on here- the autonomy of the individual (e.g. contra procreation), and the prevention of unnecessary suffering (e.g. also contra procreation).

In a weird way, this may collapse positive ethics and virtue theory into a hedonic framework where:

IFF negative ethics of autonomy and not causing other people unnecessary suffering is met, then one can be free to choose whatever path one gets a benefit from, which can include character-building programs.

If the reductio is based on the conclusion that nobody exists and your reply is, it's not a reductio when still someone exists, then quite simply you don't understand the argument. I can show you water but I can't make your drink it. — Benkei

Again, you are misunderstanding me. If a potential parent exists, whereby the consequent is a new person who suffers, the rule is in play- prevent said suffering. How is that a reductio?

If you are saying there is no one to prevent suffering for then you are the one abusing language because you refuse to recognize the common linguistic and psychogical practice of counterfactuals. Someone would have suffered but didn't.

Following your argument, it would actually lead to a reductio ad absurdum because we would be left with the stupid conclusion that someone has to be born so that they can be prevented from being born so they don't suffer. Clearly if something can perceive that suffering can be prevented prior to that suffering subjects existence, then the conditions are met to prevent that future suffering from occurring.

Some people don't care about their children, so it's bad for them to procreate? But others do, so it's good for them to procreate? — Metaphysician Undercover

No that wasn't the conclusion I was going with. Rather, no one exists prior to birth to even balance a lesser harm with a greater harm. Thus it is purely creating the conditions for harm for someone else (and the good created doesn't matter here as not creating good is not a "bad" when "nothing" exists in the first place).

It's not like that. You can physically force a person with love and affection. So I'm totally dismissing the degree thing as relevant to good or bad. What I am saying is that one can use force in a good way or force in a bad way, no matter what degree of force is being used. Force on its own is neutral, whether it's a huge force or a small force, and it's how the force is used which is good or bad. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, if you kidnapped an adult to go to the school of MU, because you thought that was the best course for that person, is that wrong? I would say yes.

I don't think you're quite grasping my use of "force". Force is anything external to the will of the free agent, so it includes all the natural forces described by physics, gravity, energy, etc.. When we act, as free willing agents we use these forces toward our ends. So even speaking to another, giving gifts to another, and other forms of persuasion like this, are instances of using force.

This is why it doesn't make sense to use the blanket assumption that using force to persuade another, is wrong. Then we'd have to discern all the instances of using force in a good way, and somehow describe these as something other than using force. In reality, saying "if you do that I'll kill you", and "if you love me don't do that" are equal in the sense of "using force", because each is a simple statement. However, it is the meaning of what is said which makes one of these a threat, and therefore much worse than the other.

So there is nothing inherently wrong with using force in our interactions with others, and nothing wrong with a "forced game" if this is how you wish to describe procreation, because a forced game might just as well be good as bad. That force might be the force of love. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, so this then would be degrees and threshold.. see analogy I used with preventing suffering. Persuading someone with words vs. physically forcing an intractable game, let's say is a huge degree of difference.

I don't believe that there is ever such a thing. If you willfully pushed someone down the stairs, then you decided to do that, so you have a reason for having done it. If you have no reason, then it was not willful, and it was an accident. So when you say "procreation is more like the first", the first has been eliminated as not a real possibility. Therefore your characterization of procreation, as like the first, is not acceptable, because the first is not real, and procreation if it is compared with pushing someone down the stairs, is not carried out without a reason unless it is accidental. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, so let's split then reasons vs. causes. Person A caused Person B to fall down the stairs by Person A pushing Person B. Person A's reason was not to help Person B but some reason that was not to save from a greater harm. The reason Person C pushed Person A down the stairs is because there was a bullet, presumably a greater harm.

It says hard work is a virtue and laziness is bad and no one gets something for nothing and many other permutations of this sentiment. — Tom Storm

Right, so instead of God thinks you're a sack of shit, it's just people that think you are a sack of shit. Not sure what was hard to get.

However, if it's a cultural norm, then what's the justification? It used to be God's grace. Not in secular PWE. Aristotle used eudaimonia for his virtue theory (signaling) to end the viscous circle. Perhaps we can copy that here.

Not wishing to be in God's favor is the same thing as being a sack of shit. — Tom Storm

But taking the Protestant out of the PWE, all it says is, "You're a sack of shit because I say so. Well, okay, then. Goodbye.

The distinction between doing and not doing is curious to me. It sounds very Protestant work ethic - 'Don't just sit in your room, get out there and do something!" "Idle hands are the devil's workshop" — Tom Storm

But there was a part of being a part of God's favor and grace attached to it. Other than "You're a sack of shit if you don't do X, Y, Z, and X, Y, Z is what I deem as good" I don't see the compulsion.

Perhaps a bunch of hypothetical imperatives should be used:

"If you want the pleasure of accomplishment, then do X".

That you don't understand a reductio ad absurdum. :roll: — Benkei

We can play this game all day :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll: :roll:

Or you can make a case other than, "You just don't understand". Cop out because you probably don't have much of a case. Oh well. Maybe one of your friends will drop in to help you and provide some more insulting but unenlightening posts, which seems to happen in this forum a lot:

"For fuck's sake, if you weren't so thick-skulled.. idiotic.. ignorant..." blah blah

Lmao. If you don't pursue the conclusion to its extremes then indeed, by definition, you don't have a reductio ad absurdum. Your reply to my reductio is "let's imagine it isn't". — Benkei

No.

Are humans alive to know the rule? Yes.

Then the rule applies to those humans. Cool.

Are there no humans around to know the rule? Yes

Then there is no need for the rule. Cool.

What's the problem?

educate yourself — Benkei

No dude.. I know what it is. You haven't proven that's what I am doing. You are asserting.

You: claim reductio...
I said where? If you are alive and you know the event leads to X, then there is no reductio
You: reductio

Not very fruitful there.

I get to pepper that with snarky comments precisely because your position is idiotic. — Benkei

Yet, you haven't answered my rebuttal. Waiting...

It's called a reductio ad absurdum, which demonstrates the idiocy of the position. But I see logic and language are lost arts to you. — Benkei

Oh please. "Idiocy" blah blah. Your arguments are all insult with a smidgen of not-thought-out objections.
It's a tired approach and one used too much on this forum.

You haven't shown any of what you said. It's not a reductio because the thing that can be prevented is known. That is my response. You have not found a rebuttal yet, but I'll wait for one other than the claim its a reductio without explanation.

If there wouldn't be any cars, it would be weird to talk about how the absence of those cars prevented car accidents. No such thing could exist because the existence of a car precedes the possibility of car accidents. — Benkei

Yet as long as there are people around who know the consequence of the harm, this objection doesn't matter.

Or how happy we should be that the zombie virus of the Walking Dead doesn't exist so that zombies are prevented. — Benkei

Is it a situation that we know exists and can be prevented? No, because it's a fake thing? Okay, no worries then.

If you can reference the article, that might help. But I think there was some relation in terms of sets of relations. I would imagine an ideal for Buddhist society would be living monk lifestyles, which is a sort of communism.

But yeah, I think Marxist-Communism is much more invested in technology as a solution which I think Buddhism has nothing much to say about. The conditions of life seem to be more concerned with the ideas of economics and Marx.. We have to work-to-survive. What does this mean? Of course, I think we shouldn't put people into this situation in the first place (pace antinatalism). Others think it is okay to throw another worker in the world whose needs uses others for labor and vice versa. It is an intractable situation.

I wonder though if people had a more self-awareness in just how it is that work itself and relations related to work is harmful and can be reduced. I think people think that as long as they are not being "man's wolf to man" on a macro level, they get a pass on a micro level, and working social relations are certainly a place where at a micro level, man enacts its "wolf" to man. Homo homini lupus. Because, if we don't all work to keep ourselves alive, then society breaks down, and others can't survive.. So get to fuckn' work! Stuff like that.. Man's wolf to man. Intractable though.. the problem is these habits are seen as necessary.. Yet if it is, we don't stop to pause and think if this situation is good for others to into in the first place.

Bah, no. Eh. Buddhism is elitist. — baker

Can you explain?? Sounds like an old man drunk on his recliner.

So it is true that procreation is a use of force to bring about the existence of others, but we cannot judge this action as good or bad, just on the merits of "using force", because force is used for both moral and immoral actions. All human acts involve the use of force and we must accept the fact that human beings, as living beings, are inclined to act, and this is not bad. You wouldn't argue that human beings ought not act at all would you? Likewise you ought not assume that the use of force is immoral, because all human acts involve use of force. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think we get a slippery slope here anytime forcing a situation is used, even for the good. If I was to kidnap someone to go to the awesome school of "Metaphysician Uncover" to learn Plato, that would still be wrong, in my opinion as someone's autonomy was limited. In procreation, this is always happening, because though the game of life is the only "game in town" so-to-say, it is still a forced game.

It's not realistic to attempt to distinguish necessary suffering from unnecessary suffering. Let's assume for the sake of argument, that all suffering is brought about by force, it is not willed by the individual, but imposed by external force. Whether that force is imposed by another (artificially directed at another), or is natural, might be a distinction we could make. We can say that the individual will attempt to avoid natural forces which would bring about suffering, and such suffering brought about by natural forces would be due to a deficiency in the individual's capacities. Now we can direct our attention at the artificial use of force by ourselves, and other human beings, in carrying out actions. Would you agree on two categories of inflicting suffering on others, intentionally acting in a way known to inflict suffering, and accidentally inflicting suffering? Neither of these can be properly classified as "unnecessary", because the accidental would have been avoided if avoidance would have been foreseen as possible, and the intentional is seen as necessary for the sake of some end. So it doesn't make sense to propose a category of "unnecessary suffering" because this would just be defined by arbitrary criteria. — Metaphysician Undercover

I struggle with this one too. If I was to take a page from Plato, Not Causing Suffering, would be some sort of ideal. However, in the world of materiality (the world of Shadows on the Wall), there are degrees of not suffering, not simply the ideal itself. Thus if I push someone down a flight of stairs for no reason, that would be worse than if I was to push someone down a flight of stairs because a gun was going to be fired, and the person would be shot. It was suffering, but prevented a greater harm. Procreation is more like the first. It just causes conditions of suffering, for no reason as there was no person beforehand to have to X, Y, Z, rather, you are creating those conditions in the first place. It's like creating a problem for someone else, to watch them climb out of it. So in the world of the shadows, there are degrees and thresholds for which the ideals take place.

Yes this seems to make sense to me for reasons why people do it. People's personalities, rhetorical tactic for an audience, throw someone off their game, straight up just aggressiveness, trying to feel superior, all these are good candidates.

If you start from a place of "I'm right because it's obvious", then you give yourself the appearance of being right from the start. Often one way to do this is to say, "Are you fucking kidding me?" in not so many words.. seething condescension, and other styles to wrap what you are trying to say. I just think it all poisons the well. Does disagreeing with someone automatically call for poisoning the well? I mean there are certain lines of thought I can see it being appropriate to respond with immediate disdain and all the rest, but most debates probably don't fall under this. I can see clearly racist ideas and calls for massive violence for example falling under this.

Perhaps antinatalism seems to be this way for people, but it's not. There is no forcing of anything (actually quite the opposite). I liken it to veganism. If I want to eat a hamburger, I don't treat vegans with disdain for their strong views.

I think sometimes it's perfectly acceptable to call a spade a spade. If someone's being stupid then they ought to be told they're being stupid, and sometimes an effective way to get that point across is by shaming them and making them feel bad. It may not always be the nicest thing, and sometimes it could be considered bullying, but I think there are legitimate cases in which it is 100% deserved and what should be done. "That was stupid, and you should feel bad" works when they realize it really was stupid. — darthbarracuda

I think in a regular conversation this make sense, but if we are all trying to be "philosophical" to some extent, then it is rhetorical flourish to simply state this. I think it just poisons the well. Explain it with an argument.

You describe "obligatory" as following one's own intuition. But then you do not understand "good" in the sense of what one wants. Aren't they essentially the same thing? When you follow your own intuition you are doing what you want to do. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah correct. I just think intuition as it relates to negative ethics are obligatory than ones related to positive ethics because without the negative, you don't have room for everyone's different positives. More likely your positives aren't mine, but our negatives are closely aligned so we can have our versions of positives intact.

If what you are saying is that the coming into being of a person is not something chosen by that person, therefore the person is forced into being, then I have no problem with this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Cool.

There are many things about this existence which are beyond our capacity to choose, and are forced upon us. That's just reality, and like birth, death is forced on us as well. But there are very many things which are forced on us in between, because our powers of freedom to choose are very limited. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, but all of these "de facto" forces you mention only come about from the original force in the first place. This essentially makes my point that the original force is making people "play the game" of all these other de facto forces.

I have a real problem with this sort of negative ethics, (don't do this, and don't do that), because it requires all sorts of definitions and criteria. How can you even speak of these matters in terms of "unnecessarily", and "unnecessary suffering"? We are talking about acts of free choice here, so everything chosen is unnecessary. But then we can't avoid "messing with other people" because we exist in relationships, and we can't avoid suffering because of that great magnitude of force which is beyond one's very limited capacity of free choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unnecessary suffering I define here (in terms of the person who will experience this suffering) because unless is trying to lessen a greater harm with a lesser one, there is no need to cause suffering in the first place.

arrogance — unenlightened

Why so much of that one though? Is that a philosophy thing, an internet thing, a forum thing, a cultural thing, an individual thing? I'm not sure why people can't disagree without being disagreeable.