:up:

So the anti-natalist is saying, in order to abide by the ethical rule now, we must create the conditions where this ethical rule will no longer exist, since humans are the presence of ethics and no more humans will be present. The anti-natalist is saying we should eliminate the existence of the ethical rule for the sake of following the ethical rule. Just like they are saying we should eliminate the possibility of human procreation (end all future humans) for the sake of abiding by an ethical rule that is only found in existing humans. The anti-natalist gets to be the last ethical man standing, and the last instance of ethical behavior anywhere in the known universe. — Fire Ologist

Why should it matter if the ethical rule disappears though? What needs to preserve the ethical rule? The rule comes into play when more than one human is around, and the potential to procreate is there. If there is no potential to procreate, it no longer applies. Why would it matter that the rule gets rid of the application of itself? I don't see the problem.

Water by itself has no value. But when an animal relies on it, water then obtains some "value" for that creature. If there are no humans, there is no ethics. If there are no humans, there is no thirst either. Thirst exists because humans exist, we don't exist because thirst would cease without humans. That makes no sense.

But then if ethics didn’t exist until I did, how could it have been unethical for me to be born?” — Fire Ologist

I don't get what you are saying. A lot of people believe honor killing is ethical. Does that mean the first person to question this was wrong because it was a novel idea? Also, before you were born, there was the potential for you to be born. You didn't need to be born for the ethics to be relevant, just the potential for "someone" to be born.

The fact that the ethics summarized as anti-natalism arises in the human race means the human race must exist for the rule to not inflict suffering to exist, AND the human race should NOT exist because none of our consent to suffering could be obtained.

(It’s not quite a paradox because it holds “is” together with “ought not”, as opposed to paradoxically joining “is” to “is not” or “ought” to “ought not”, but it is certainly absurd.) — Fire Ologist

But it isn't absurd. You are already finding out that your own objection seems to have no impetus. All this is saying is humans can self-reflect which is different than other animals.

Anti-natalism is either a self-defeating way of saying, because of human suffering, it would have been better if humans never existed. Or it is simply passing judgment on God, saying God, a being whose mere existence entails ethics (like humans) was wrong to create humans and inflict suffering on them without their consent.

Absurd or Satanic. Better to rule without humans or their ethics in hell, than to consent posthumously to suffering in heaven. — Fire Ologist

I have no idea what you're getting at. If humans don't exist, there are simply no people, not some hell. Also, I don't think anyone has called existence "heaven" in any non-ironic way. So, not sure what that's getting at. If you have some unspoken religious biases that you would like to bring up, go ahead.. Your notions start becoming clearer to me if you have some theological reasoning, but it doesn't become more accurate, just explains your frustration perhaps. The "Existence must exist so that we can fulfill whatever X mission" explains some of your implicit confusions and objections and it turns into the old debate of the problem of evil.

Interesting enough, antinatalism SOLVES a Christian problem by bypassing it. Souls cannot be sent to hell if you do not bear them into existence in the first place. If you didn't do this, of course, you would violate the "be fruitful and multiply", but let's say it was carried out to its logical conclusion and no one existed.. Would more people just be created like Adam and Eve so that they go through this game? Why have the game? What is important about the game? Doesn't it seem a bit anthropocentric? If aliens exist, would their religion reflect a god that has them as the main characters in their own Moral Play? Perhaps they have a similar but not quite the same salvation mythology.. One that precludes humans? :chin:

I think the argument avoids the question of whether life or existence is good. — Leontiskos

I am not sure what this is supposed to translate to, ethically speaking. It becomes irrelevant given the considerations of suffering prevention being more ethically an obligation than happiness promotion, all things being equal. In fact, if what you are implying here is correct, it is your notion that has some template that people must adhere to assumed to be there prior to birth "The Good". But I am not sure completely what you are implying, so I'd hold judgement. "Life is good" seems a theological statement of some sort.

There persists the conflation between the ontological and the "moral" (in the modern sense). It is the difference between preventing something and preventing the potential/potency for that something. To prevent the potential for X will also prevent X, but it is not the same thing as simply preventing X. One could prevent their child from getting smallpox by vaccinating them or by having no children, but these two options are not parallel. The obligations with respect to each are somewhat different. — Leontiskos

So as with TClark, this will be a case of how we parse the facts of life. That is to say, I believe it to be the case that it is empirically evident that life has X amount of suffering. Charmed lives don't exist, except in perhaps imagination or thought experiments. And with this particular argument, it is precisely because we are ignorant of what that X entails that we take the route of causing minimum suffering.

I also see the thread about fate and determinism there is discussion of agency. Clearly, the child did not have to experience any suffering. And this is why Is ay that it is never good to turn a preventative into a palliative purposefully. I don't cause (the conditions for) suffering so that you can take X, Y, Z palliative actions from it. And then I don't gaslight the situation and say that "It is what it is", or that "This is just not a growth mindset". We know that at least certain amounts of suffering, often well-known can and do occur.

Is Thanos from The Avengers a good example of an antinatalist? Specifically, a Thanos who snaps his fingers and everyone disappears without pain, not just half of them. No suffering + no potential for suffering = perfection. The theological gnosticism crops up its head again here, for the gist is that it would have been better for nothing at all to exist. I don't think the theological shift is avoidable given that your argument pertains to ontological realities and sheer potencies, rather than only to mere "moral" realities. To weigh suffering against life or existence will go beyond the "moral" insofar as evaluations of life and existence do not fall within the "moral" (in the modern sense).

But the Christian and Platonist traditions have been saying that being and goodness are convertible for thousands of years, and given that the argument does not recognize this seems to imply that it is weighed down by a specifically modern context. Yet to make an argument against life per se or existence per se is to move beyond that modern context. — Leontiskos

So you are conflating two arguments into one here. It is precisely because people cannot be consented that this Thanos argument is wrong. Also, once people exist, taking their existence away, is not the same question as bringing people into existence, so should probably be thrown out as some sort of counterpoint. There's too many differences.

As to the Christian/Platonist idea of being and goodness, or nothingness and perfection, I do find it intriguing. This is actually touching upon Schopenhauer's notion that we are NOT actually "being" in some rested/Platonic way, but because we are in the world of Maya, we are in the world of "becoming" which by default is always in some way "suffering" as it is a world of dissatisfaction, or lack, or "what we do not have presently and fades away", a world of "vanity", and all such notions. Indeed, there is an argument is precisely this world that we experience that is NOT goodness in any Platonic/completed/perfected sense. And interestingly, mysticism tries to work around this problem by saying that we are trying to "perfect" the world by giving it value and moral meaning (usually by way of enacting various commandments or divine actions upon the world).

However, though I am glad to discuss these notions, it is tangential to the argument itself which doesn't need the world to have any inherent value per se. Rather, as long as there is suffering (in any sense of that word), and the decision is there, that the moral weight is to prevent suffering more than any other one, including promoting (what one believes to be) good experiences for a person. It creates a baseline set of boundaries, as what people can end up doing is any such harm to a person and justify it in the name of X positive value that they think will result. Rather, if people have inherent dignity and worth, that respect for this boundary would seem to be necessary, otherwise people are perpetual pawns that are to be treated as such.

Moore is replying to Kant, as is clear, and presumably the objection is to the argument that we never have access to the thing-in-itself. Moore's reply is to shake the thing in Kant's face.

Wittgenstein had great sympathy for Moore's view. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent; one can say nothing about the thing-in-itself; therefore leave it out of our conversation.

Yet W. was unsatisfied with Moore's response. OC is Wittgenstein working through the issues raised by that dissatisfaction. — Banno

I still think Moore and Wittgenstein did not sufficiently provide an alternative to Kant's project. Moore simply resorts back to what is sensory, but Kant's whole point was to refute Hume, and posit that there was a mechanism whereby the mind must interpret the immediate sensory experience into something intelligible. By doing this, it is always "the hand as it appears to us" and not simply "hand as it is in-itself". Moore didn't refute that with this famous "Here is a hand. Here is another."

Wittgenstein, in turn, seemed to just sideline the question as to social practice rather than how it is that the mind can turn raw sensory information into coherent thoughts. Cognitive science and anthropology already go a step beyond Wittgenstein by reincorporating the learning aspects with cognitive structures in the brain and evolutionary biology. So I am not sure either of these two attempts provide much of a response to Kant. If anything, it highlights that what Kant's project was about was central to understanding how humans gain knowledge of the world. You cannot just bypass the questions Kant poses by fiat by mere showing (Moore) or by turning it into a completely social phenomenon (later Wittgenstein).

Meaning, what is the point of being ethical towards beings that aren’t born yet, if ethics itself is not to be? — Fire Ologist

This doesn't make any sense to me. We are not living for ethics. Ethics is present because humans are around.

Why would we humans uphold any ethics above upholding the procreation of more humans, if upholding that ethics means that humans and ethics both equally should no longer be?

Antinatalism is just as much an anti-ethicalism. — Fire Ologist

Ethics simply is entailed if humans exist. We aren't living to carry out ethics, ethics is carried out because we are living. It is actually precisely CONTRA a notion that we are obligated in some "positive" (must do) sense. That is to say, there is more obligation to prevent suffering (a negative ethic), than to promote happiness or any X "other" beholden reason. That is to say, if there was a case whereby my action results in an unknown amount of suffering, and I can't get consent beforehand, and the effect is not only trivial, but major (though this part is not even necessary to state), that is more relevant than the unknown amount of happiness that might result as well from this action.

**excuse my constant affect/effect errors.

Anti-natalism doesn’t save anyone in particular from suffering. We are not doing anyone any good by not procreating. There has to be a someone to prevent someone from suffering. Life is ontologically prior as Leontiskos said. — Fire Ologist

But I think I answered that objection from @Leontiskos. That is to say, all that matters is that humans exist for this to take place. No humanity, no need for antinatalism or any other normative ethical principle. The principle doesn't come first. IF humanity exists, the morality of being human applies. IF people exist, and the decision is about making another suffer or preventing it, then this applies.

Also as indicated, and I went into more detail here on...

I think this is throwing out a lot of important values we hold in other arenas. For example, if as a consenting adult I force you into a game you don't want to play because I think the game is bigger than any one individual's refusal, that seems mighty suspicious. And I am talking personal ethics here, which procreation (should) fall under. I do believe there is a discontinuity with the State/political ethics, but that is a different argument, which I can bring in if you want to make the category error of using laws like the draft, education compliance, and inoculations.

I also think it is a bit of a red herring to compare it to parental care of children under a certain age (often 18 yo). That is because usually the care is about preventing more harm in the future for that child, where this very specific/unique kind of decision is creating all of the potential harm in the first place. These are two different types of decisions regarding consent. At this point since someone DOES exist, it would be more harmful NOT to take care of them, as now you are not recognizing the rights of the child who does exist already, to be cared for, being that they have not fully developed into fully functioning adults yet, and had no say to be born in the first place. Presumably babies and children have a right not to be abandoned, neglected, or abused, for example, which is a different (positive/must do ethics) consideration rather than the (negative/NOT doing) ethics of simply not causing harm in the first place. One is palliative (as someone already exists and is exposed to great harms), and one is preventative (in the absolutist terms). — schopenhauer1

See about the difference between palliative and preventative ethics. Procreation is in the realm of preventative ethics, not palliative. AND it would be wrong to make a preventative situation turn purposefully into a palliative one.. I can prevent harm, but I cause it, so that you now need to mitigate it.. That isn't right...

I would appeal to a similar "inversion" argument to the one I already gave, but focusing on suffering rather than consent. Just as consent does not constitute an absolute principle, neither does suffering-avoidance. "I'd say life is bigger than suffering or consent."

The key here is that birth/existence is qualitatively different from, and ontologically prior to, consent and/or suffering. More directly: life is more than the avoidance of suffering, and therefore the desire to avoid suffering is not a sufficient reason to nix life.

Regarding the moral maxim of (1), I think it would apply to procreation in a very dire apocalyptic scenario, but I don't think it applies more generally throughout history. I don't know... There are a lot of different ways one could go with this. — Leontiskos

So the case is really best exemplified by David Benatar's asymmetry argument that is now more widely known than when I used to discuss it.

However, I don't want to get caught in the weeds of that particular version of the argument. I think it is best reformulated clearly as this:

Preventing happiness is less a moral obligation than preventing suffering. All things being equal, in the case of non-consent, and ignorance (like this Veil of Ignorance argument is saying), it is always best to prevent suffering, even on the behest of preventing happiness.

The fact is, this is from the perspective of the decision-maker. That SOMEONE exists who can understand what will result is all that matters, not that the subject of the action exists.

Yes, perhaps a statement can be justified, but why stop there, why shouldn't the justification be justified, and then again, why not justify the justification of the justification. — RussellA

I just think this is loading the question to get this answer. Only if a philosopher believes that they can provide absolute certainty, can this be true. He seems stuck on the idea that philosophers are under the spell that they CAN provide a complete knockdown argument for their claim. I don't think most philosophers work that way.

You mentioned the mystical. I see Schopenhauer in a way, as being an analytic mystic. The mysticism is first (Will), and the analytic part, (how Will is constructed) is just the "gist" of how Will operates. He is giving his best go at it, but with the idea that it can never be truly completely understood.

And let's take a philosopher more like Socrates. His questions are generally pretty loosely going in a direction, and thus open for creative destruction and reconstruction. So, not every philosopher is giving "the" most certain view of things NOR are they thinking that they are conveying it in the most absolute certain and accurate way. I don't know anyone who really thought of language as such a perfect system, including other philosophers.

However, this does bring me to a possible exception- the early analytic philosophers such as Russell. And perhaps with his notion of precise logical constructions of language and proofs, and his own demands on philosophy, and especially ideas like "definite descriptions" and demands for meaning to be fixed in such a way, that Wittgenstein is almost always speaking to this (type of) philosopher in particular. If that is the case, it turns a much more grandiose ambition into a squabble amongst a very specific set of philosophers at a particular place and time rather than saying much about what the project of philosophy was actually getting at. Just my two cents right now.

That is, Pietism might well have inculcated in Kant a thing or two, but then, with respect to what was inculcated and is here in question, he took it over and owned it and established it on a whole other footing, one arguably far better. . — tim wood

Yes I would definitely agree here. I don't see the point to over-determine Pietism's affect on Kant's thinking, but I can understand that it possibly gave him some frameworks from which he could draw upon. I doubt it was anything like paying homage to Pietism, or because he thought of it doctrinally. Rather, some of the ways of thinking about things, the language, so-to-speak was was possibly a starting point how to look at certain problems. I think it's generally safe to assume people borrow ideas from the context they grew up in.

As I can assert that "evil is bad" as a self-evident truth, perhaps the Tractatus can also assert that "the world is the totality of facts" as a self-evident truth. Anyone disagreeing that "evil is bad" or "the world is the totality of facts" then has the opportunity to present their argument.

After all, most of our statements are assertions, whether "I walked to the supermarket", "stealing is bad", "I admire Monet's aesthetic", "the world is a complex place" or "the play starts at 9pm". Rarely is it expected that we need to justify what seems to be self-evident. — RussellA

But that is just what makes philosophy different than everyday activity. I want from my philosopher reasoning and justifications for their assertions and claims.

If your claim is "The world is what are the facts", this is either of the following:

1) A truism- something everyone pretty much holds in everyday life.
2) A profound philosophical insight- in which case it must give the context for which it is set against, what notion it is overturning or contradicting

"The cat is on the mat" is true IFF (the cat is on the mat), where "the cat is on the mat" exists in language, and (the cat is on the mat) exists in the world.

The fact that (the cat is on the mat) in the world is dependent upon there being a relation between the cat and the mat. What is the nature of this relation?

Mereological Nihilism, aka compositional nihilism, is the philosophical position that in the world there are no objects with proper parts, in that there are no metaphysical relations that connect parts to a whole. — RussellA

I find it funny that I think you have made a better summary than the original :wink:.

But was Tractatus really aimed to dispute the position of mereological nihilism? Okay, let's say that charitably he was..

The part that needs explaining so the philosophy doesn't end up (sounding like) a truism and what he has to defend is something against this right here:

IE, if a fact in the world is dependent upon the ontological existence of relations between parts, then if there are no such things as ontological relations in the world, then it follows that there are no facts in the world. — RussellA

How does he actually do that, rather than simply asserting premises that he thinks is true?

https://problemi.si/issues/p2018-2/03problemi_international_2018_2_kobe.pdf

You might find that interesting as it seems to answer the question about the influence of Pietism.
TL:DR: Kant's notion of intent coming from true respect for moral law is likened to the Pietist's intent coming from true faith as the arbiter of if an action is moral, and that due to the ambiguity of knowing if this is case, it may be very difficult to know. This is of course opposed to consequentialists or people who look at practical outcome (or intent that merely LOOKS like it is morally willed). Clearly for this camp, the consequences are easier to discern than one's actual intent or how one is willing their intent, etc.

You didn't respond to my argument. The argument you make here is your usual one and has nothing to do with a veil of ignorance. No reason to take this any further. — T Clark

What isn’t answering your supposed objection of my use of VOI?

You believe that the statement "the unicorn is on the mat" is a false proposition. I believe that the statement could equally be a true proposition. — RussellA

I was trying to give some relevance to the truism that "My understanding of the world are a set of "true" propositions or "independent facts". Otherwise it is a truism. Hence I brought in ideas of subsistence and existence. You are in fact making my point when you say:

Yes, there is no dispute that what is important in language are facts and true propositions, but the dispute arises in deciding what is a fact and what is a true proposition. — RussellA

It is this that has relevance, not the truism that the world is what are true propositions. Rather, what COUNTS as factual is the actual interesting part.

On the one hand the statement "my knowledge is made up of independent facts" is philosophically profound — RussellA

I contend this. I think that the statement "My knowledge is made up of independent facts" is not profound, but amounts to a TRUISM. Truisms are not profound, almost by default. They are uninteresting things most people already hold.

Aren't thoughts 1) and 2) in opposition.

I cannot justify in words my non-empirical thoughts that "evil is bad" and "beauty is good", yet I believe them to be true. I believe them to be truisms.

The only mechanism I can think of to explain such beliefs is that they have been programmed by evolution into the human gene for the benefit of the survival of the group.

As there are only 75 pages in the Tractatus, primarily devoted to Linguistics, I don't think we should also expect a foray into Evolutionary Biology, even if that is what he believed. — RussellA

This is going on a tangent.

My last point I added to the last post is relevant here:

How do we determine that this philosophy is not a true proposition? It only needs to be a true proposition. "Will and Representation" could be token objects that either are or are not the case.

If Wittgenstein isn't explaining why a proposition cannot be true, why should we care if the broader claim, "The world consists of true propositions or independent facts," is correct? Again, it's a truism that means nothing without a mechanism to determine what is actually true or not.


From here you can try to tell me that it has to form a picture that models such as the cat on the mat. But at the same time, Will and Representation can also form a picture or model of a state of affairs of the world if it is true. However, it is a metaphysical truth that is not empirically falsifiable. So now it is not the picture but the verification that his notion of meaningful language hinges on. But then that doesn’t answer the question of why true propositions have to be empirically verified to be meaningful. It’s very much just an assertion and discounts “facts” or states of affairs that one cannot necessarily verify empirically. It’s arbitrarily putting a hierarchy on what counts as meaningful language it seems to me. — schopenhauer1

Also, you didn't answer my question.. "What philosophy DOESN'T think their understanding of the world comprises independent facts"? I have yet to meet a person, who thinks "This is morally bad, or this is good" is the same as "The cat is on the mat." What problem then is he solving?

His philosophy implicitly relies on VERIFICATION for making distinctions yet the case would have to be made why empirically verifiable statements are more meaningful, especially if it can be the case that NON-VERIFIABLE propositions CAN BE true.

Just saw your reply. No doubt Kant respected and used scholastic ideas. I guess I was more thinking of his categorical imperative as an individual agent’s way of determining right/wrong, rather than looking to external sources from a community of set beliefs etc. it’s individualistic and it can be argued the Reformation emphasized, individualistic readings and interpretation of the Bible, individualistic forms of church doctrine, and also puts emphasis on the individual as directly engaging the texts’ meaning along with the individual as living out ethical living in everyday life versus through special liturgical practices or ways of living (monks, mass, works of the church or whatnot). But I found this which seems to be about this subject. @Moliere maybe this will help:
https://problemi.si/issues/p2018-2/03problemi_international_2018_2_kobe.pdf

So basically the CI becomes about individual responsibility as an agent and their will to determine right action rather than a set of fixed doctrine that one can turn to regarding this or that matter.

The article indicates that it is very much the pietistic aspect of protestant ism that influenced Kant. That is to say the aspect that it is ones justification through faith. He makes an interesting point that even the person making the rational decision can’t quite be sure that they made it out of respect for the moral law or self-interest or other intentions. This is similar to the Pietist idea that they can never know if they truly did something out of purely faith and not self interest or other intentions.

No, that's not what I am saying. Your premise is <Consent should precede birth>. Your conclusion follows, <Because consent does not precede birth, therefore we should not procreate>. — Leontiskos

But that's not what I am saying. Rather, if a human exists, then consent towards other humans is on the table.

This precedence is both temporal and ontological. It is that premise that I am targeting. Consent doesn't precede birth. Birth precedes consent. That's how reality works. What you are doing is asking for or wishing for a different reality. The ontological principle of reality is that we receive before we give. Your alternative principle would have us give (consent) before receiving (existence). — Leontiskos

This all follows from a faulty view of my premise.

Antinatalism reminds me of Gnosticism, where nature and the material world were created by an evil god and one is thus supposed to escape this entire order of being. Or in modern terms, something like The Matrix. The true god is represented by Consent, and in the alternative, non-evil universe, Consent reigns. Given our gnostic situation, the best we can do is escape the material order by ceasing all procreation. Historically gnostics really did tend to eschew procreation. — Leontiskos

I kind of like this notion, though I don't hold "Consent" to be independent of humans, simply entailed in humanity. If there is no humanity, consent disappears as well.

Also, this particular argument is a bit different than just consent. Rather, it is saying that since we are IGNORANT as to how any person's life truly will play out in the course of their lifetime, AND we cannot get consent otherwise, we should do the option that is with the intention of the LEAST harm, which is of course, not even procreating that person who will be harmed to X degree.

That they will be harmed is generally not questioned. To what extent, and by what right is what is at stake here.

(Edit: I now see you have authored a thread, "If there is a god, is he more evil than not?" :razz:) — Leontiskos

Ha, well, look at my profile for a better understanding of my overall philosophical position. And Gnosticism is mentioned, but as an analogy to Philosophical Pessimism, not, obviously, as a belief in it as a wholesale mystical/ontological belief system.

I think consent has a place, but not the highest place. It does not trump everything else. — Leontiskos

But this also relies on what "the good" is, and defines it in "negative" terms (what not to do). Suffering is weighted more heavily in this conception such that, causing negative/suffering unnecessarily on someone else's behalf is weighted as a bigger moral consideration than any of the positives that result from causing the suffering. Not causing great distress to someone is a bigger ethical consideration than say, buying them cake.

There's another argument here to be made from this, but I am not making that case right now. Though all of it basically can be tied together to make for a compelling set of arguments from various angles contra procreation.

That's very different from a "Veil of Ignorance." If it only means that the we can't predict the future perfectly accurately, then it's kind of a useless concept. — T Clark

No, it means that from a position of ignorance we should do the LEAST amount of harm. And our disagreement is over how ignorant we truly are over a complex situation like a person's psychological, physical, interpersonal, and emotional well-being over the course of a lifetime.

No, it's not just a single couple. It's reasonable to say that any prospective parent can know their future child's ethnicity, social status, and their idea of how to lead a good life with reasonable accuracy. — T Clark

It is true that many decisions are made based on prevailing social norms, but this does not elevate these norms to the status of ethical imperatives. The is/ought problem remains central here: the fact that something is commonly done does not mean it ought to be done. The ethical implications of bringing a child into the world must be scrutinized independently of societal conventions, and this scrutiny reveals the inadequacy of current norms in addressing the potential for harm and suffering.

To be clear, I'm not arguing against anti-natalism here, although you know I find the idea repugnant. I'm only arguing that your logic is flawed. — T Clark

When it comes to making decisions for another person, procreation is unlike any other decision. It imposes an irreversible existence and all its accompanying burdens onto another being without their consent. This is different from other decisions we might make for someone else’s perceived benefit, as those typically allow for some form of redress or agency by the affected individual. Comparing it to a gift is illustrative: a gift can be accepted, rejected, or discarded with minimal consequence. Procreation, however, imposes life, with all its inherent suffering and challenges, making it a decision of an entirely different kind AND magnitude.

We are not ignorant that suffering will occur- but we are ignorant as to the manner it will take shape.

Hubris is a source of a lot of well-intentioned but misguided ideas.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/909034

@013zen You might be interested in this as well.

:point: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/908945

There is nothing wrong in making an assertion and not justifying it by a mechanism, which, after all, is the basis of scientific modelling. From Britannica Scientific Modelling — RussellA

My point is this: which philosophies argue that the world, at least in terms of human communication, is not composed of facts or true propositions? You might think of post-modernism, but that emerged later. Nietzsche could be considered, but his metaphysics didn't focus much on how we understand the world, especially not through language.

Consider the concept of "subsistence" vs. "existence." For example, the statement "the unicorn is on the mat" is a false proposition because it's an impossibility. So, I'm puzzled as to why a philosophy would assert, "My knowledge is made up of independent facts," as if this were a profound statement. What does this even mean in a way that significantly impacts philosophical thought?

If I say, "the cat is on the mat," and we observe a cat on the mat, we might call this a true proposition. But does this contribute to philosophical discourse any more than saying, "Saving money is beneficial for future needs"? It's a truism. Almost no one disputes it. Well done for stating the obvious.

What intrigues me more, as a fan of philosophical insights, is understanding what constitutes true propositions. Telling a financially illiterate person that saving money is good without explaining how to save effectively is pointless. Similarly, stating truisms in philosophy without delving into the mechanisms behind them adds little value.

My broader point is that non-empirical philosophies can also be considered true propositions:

"The world is Will and Representation because of X, Y, Z."
Here, X, Y, and Z are not empirical evidence.

How do we determine that this philosophy is not a true proposition? It only needs to be a true proposition. "Will and Representation" could be token objects that either are or are not the case.

If Wittgenstein isn't explaining why a proposition cannot be true, why should we care if the broader claim, "The world consists of true propositions or independent facts," is correct? Again, it's a truism that means nothing without a mechanism to determine what is actually true or not.


From here you can try to tell me that it has to form a picture that models such as the cat on the mat. But at the same time, Will and Representation can also form a picture or model of a state of affairs of the world if it is true. However, it is a metaphysical truth that is not empirically falsifiable. So now it is not the picture but the verification that his notion of meaningful language hinges on. But then that doesn’t answer the question of why true propositions have to be empirically verified to be meaningful. It’s very much just an assertion and discounts “facts” or states of affairs that one cannot necessarily verify empirically. It’s arbitrarily putting a hierarchy on what counts as meaningful language it seems to me.

I know. And 'homeland' was misapplied in this situation. One people's homeland was given to another people, who then systematically persecuted the natives. And are still doing so. — Vera Mont

No one was given anything. The UN partitioned two states, Arab armies rejected, lost war, and lost more land as a result. That was a consequence of not accepting. Clearly, you not only don’t believe in two states, you wish Israel was never formed. Tough shit news for you, it was. Same with Canada, same with almost any country. As I said, I’m done with the endlessly fruitless value signaling on this thread. Have your circle jerk arguments with others who can be your echo chamber.

Then why not have kids. Life is good too. — Fire Ologist

Because causing suffering is more important than not promoting good.

If it is good to have no children because life is suffering, than life isn’t all bad since we get to make this good decision to have no children. Aren’t we brave and honest and considerate. Such wonderful compassion for the suffering of future generations - we should build ourselves some statues for thinking so compassionately and reasonably so that all future generations will remember our sacrifices. Oh wait. — Fire Ologist

I see your attempt at irony. Nice, I like irony. But since it really doesn't have an impact on the argument, I don't have much more to say to it. If no one was around to gain the benefits of non-existence, shall we create sufferers so that they can see how they would have benefited from non-existence? That would also be ironically wrong.

We all have to be born and have to live before we can stumble upon the idea of anti-natalism. Seems self-defeating to think much of it. Trying to subvert the nature that brought us to this idea. — Fire Ologist

I believe I just answered this objection:

I never understand these kind of criticisms. It reminds me of "If a tree falls in the woods.." arguments. One can say this about ANY moral claim. For example, if no humans were around, there would be no need for morality regarding murder. THUS, how can murder be wrong (whether through consent, rights, dignity of the human, or other normative ethic) if the norms behind "Murder is wrong" do not exist prior to the existence of humans?

Obviously this is fallacious thinking. Rather, we can simply say that "Once humans DO exist, then 'Murder is wrong' comes into play". The same with procreation. Once humans DO exist, then "Procreation is wrong" comes into play. I don't see it being more complicated than that. ALL moral claims presuppose "life" (people) exist(!) in the first place. — schopenhauer1

If life is ever good enough to allow one to ponder whether to have a child, life must be good enough for the child just the same. — Fire Ologist

How does that logic follow? What happens if life was really bad but one still pondered whether to have a child.. Someone in a terrible circumstance let's say. It is simply false that all circumstances thinking of procreation entails one is in a good place. Also, even if one was in a good place whilst thinking about procreation, why would that effect the morality of the decision of creating suffering for another person?

But should no one be allowed to have a child? Death is still coming for all so what does it matter if you do or do not have a child? No one, not even your children (if you have any) are going to be there long enough to justify any judgment of it. — Fire Ologist

That makes no sense. For example, if someone is suffering in agony, that person isn't going have such a carefree outlook. However, one doesn't even need to go to the worst outcomes, just the fact that you are making a decision for someone else who will live out the burdens, is enough to give pause.

I’m not here for endless debate. My point was about the homeland. Do what you wish.

Colonialism was what it was, it did the harm it did. We have to deal with the consequences. Point here being, both Palestine and Israel have the exact same claim, according to imperialist Britain, but only one of them has the backing of imperial powers. — Vera Mont

If you only apply that bolded statement to what I was saying here:

My point with nation states and North American countries precisely highlights why strictly using property lost in a war or other means in a war might be just perpetuating a badly held notion of justice that just festers as perpetual revenge fantasies and vengeance rather than settling the perceived injustice. — schopenhauer1

I've heard of it only in the quote and link you provided. As described there, as I noted, it does not apply to antinatalism, since when I choose to have a child I do know the kind of life it is likely to live. My wife and I wouldn't have had children if we didn't think we could give them a good life. — T Clark

As I said earlier, it is just factually the case you can never know the kind of life your child will have accurately. That is epitome of hubristic thinking. Any number of factors including health issues, accidents, societal/environmental changes can effect a person negatively and was not accounted for in the prediction. It has been well-documented how when we are in our "happiest states" (which is often the case of young couples who start developing a long-term relationship, or simply sexual relations leading to accidental pregnancy), we are often at our worst state of predicting all the negative things that can occur (Pollyannaism).

Also, personal decision-making process of a single couple is presented here as a rebuttal to a broader philosophical position. This is a case of confirmation bias and overconfidence in predictive ability of a complex situation (every single experience of a lifetime's worth of experiences of a person).

With the difference that they actually built the houses and worked the farms. — Vera Mont

The question is should there be a Jewish state. My answer was yes. I didn’t say anything about taking over farms. The original UN map was not agreed ti by Arab states and thus, here we are in a 75 year old battle of two peoples.

My point with nation states and North American countries precisely highlights why strictly using property lost in a war or other means in a war might be just perpetuating a badly held notion of justice that just festers as perpetual revenge fantasies and vengeance rather than settling the perceived injustice.

The dilemma wasn't over who had a valid reason to live there; it was over which promise to keep and which to break. — Vera Mont

This new discussion was based on @Benkei notions of Jewish homeland so again, that was my context.

Which very conveniently happens to coincide with Christian notions of the Holy Land. It doesn't seem to signify that, according to the same book, the Hebrews originally occupied that land by means of a sneak attack on people who had done them no harm. — Vera Mont

Look, there should be no Canada, Netherlands, Ireland, or France according to this notion. I’m ok if you’re equal across the board with historical violence and territories.

There is no real analogy to Native Americans, who were here before the Europeans arrived and pushed them out or exterminated them. The question of which Natives lived exactly where is a red herring. Nor is there a real likeness to Africans who were captured and kidnapped and forfeited their right to claim any part of Africa because they don't each know where their ancestors were from. — Vera Mont

Did you not read my post? I just stated roughly the same thing. Maybe you didn’t see it as I added it a bit after my initial post.

It is my inexpert interpretation of one of Wittgenstein's ideas. — Janus

Fair enough :up:

There are no "false states of affairs", there are only states of affairs. — Janus

Oh FFS, use whatever pedantic terms you want.. true propositions, states of affairs, what have you...

I think Wittgenstein's statement shows a kind of relational 'process' view of the nature of the world rather than a 'substance' or essentialist view. — Janus

Go on.. I am wondering if this is just Janustein or Wittgenstein though..

In this case, not 'homeland' but 'ancestral homeland'. The difference being: Most of us have been living in many other places, but our long-ago ancestors used to live here, so the people who have been living here better get the hell out.

If you go by history, culture and genetics, why are the Palestinians' claim less valid than the European Jews'? — Vera Mont

They aren't less valid. They too have a historical ancestral claim. Hence the dilemma.

I think we often misconstrue various understandings of nation-states as well. I think European type nation states are different than North American and many (former) colonial areas which were simply wholesale takeovers. That being the case of course, Native Americans then would have a right to form a state. Also, interestingly, Liberia.

Presumably it would be harder for both precisely for reasons why the Jewish state makes sense.. The Jews had a very specific geographic location they can point to. Unfortunately, descendents of enslaved Africans cannot point to which exact regions their ancestors came from so would be developing a state that is roughly in the region. Also, the cultural ties to the specific tribes people came from were disconnected (which is not at all the problem with Jewish cultural ties to their homeland).

In the case of Native Americans, the tribes are very spread out, and the numbers are generally pretty low, so it would be hard to compose a cohesive state, which is why it basically ends up being what we have now which is a semi-autonomous region of "reservations", where the tribal nation has control of all internal affairs and laws, but is not in charge of state apparatuses like armies, foreign diplomats, or territorial independence from the larger countries (US/Canada/Latin American/Caribbean countries) etc.

This doesn't make sense. How could I have a child without knowing the social conditions into which it would be born? If I were the King of Philosophy, I would outlaw thought experiments. — T Clark

Just curious, do you know of Rawls' Veil of Ignorance regarding justice and rights? If so, can you see how there can be a direct analogy between the use in the equality sense for a moderate social democracy to understanding that a person's life could be of any condition?

Also, just factually speaking, no person's life can be predicted through simply contemplating it, or taking one's own circumstance as the template for how other people will live.

Imagine if I were to predict all sorts of things based on my understanding of what I think you would like.. But I forced it on you forever lest you kill yourself. Such an odd position to defend. But you will say the same for mine, simply because it is not widely considered or understood, not because it isn't sound.

Facts are not debatable, whether or not something is a fact may be debatable. — Janus

Let me ask you, are there many philosophies that would advocate that the world is composed of false states of affairs?

I know there were debates about "existence" vs. "subsistence" and such, but most people had a notion that there is a difference between things that actually are the case, things that have potential to be the case, and things that can never be the case. But I am not sure how this actually adds to this. No one generally believes the world is made up of false facts.

Not to mention that this seems like really weakened Kantian or PSR notions that there is a ground (facts) to our knowledge. It's like a non-explanatory linguistic-based Kantian notion of how we can filter reality.

Fine. But I don't see it as a contribution to excusing war crimes. — Vera Mont

None of this was about excusing war crimes, but it was about the basis for which the idea of "homeland" was established in a particular region for a particular people thus associated through history, culture, and genetics to that region.

Well, he did say that the world is the totality of facts not of things. — Janus

That doesn't even mean anything. There are many levels of "facts".. There are historical facts, scientific facts, geographical facts, social facts (political, sociological, economic, etc.), psychological facts, evolutionary facts, it's endless. They all have different domains, many of which are debatable. He is saying nothing in not so many a words.

I'm trying to configure where specifically, "Protestant" comes into view here.. And I was trying to get at it from an "individualistic" way. However, that particular way of "Protestant Work Ethic" where one gains favor for oneself through one's labor is actually specifically Calvinist, not just "Protestant", so didn't work, but I still think some "individualistic" angle, can be used as opposed to Catholic/Eastern Orthodox, which might rely more on institutional knowledge.

The part I'm questioning at the moment is whether or not it's correct to call it protestant, after all. The connection and similarity to Pietism is surely there, so it's fair to say there's a Lutheran influence but it might generalize enough -- to say Buddhism, which I'm much less familiar with -- to not just be protestant, and obviously there are inward-facing Catholics too it might be unfair to get that specific -- perhaps I'm relying too much on Kant's particular religion to classify the ethics, even when it's filled out. — Moliere

As far as focusing more on the individual's own ability to reason, rather than relying on a hierarchical decision, this might be something to consider. The 'Protestant Work Ethic" for example is an example of individuals showing how much they were in God's favor by the fruits of their labor. However, this also is contradicted by the fact that this "favor" was always meant as that they were "The Elect" and thus predetermined, which would be Calvinist, and against the notion that anyone had free will in regards to where one would end up. One simply is following "divine providence" in the Calvinist conception. This is a hard determinism, and not a compatibilist one which Kant might argue.

An inversion is occurring where consent becomes more fundamental than life. A similar inversion occurs where the justification of society displaces Rawls' question of how best to order society. The problem is that life is the precondition for consent, and is therefore prior to consent. Making consent the summum bonum is therefore misguided from the start. — Leontiskos

I never understand these kind of criticisms. It reminds me of "If a tree falls in the woods.." arguments. One can say this about ANY moral claim. For example, if no humans were around, there would be no need for morality regarding murder. THUS, how can murder be wrong (whether through consent, rights, dignity of the human, or other normative ethic) if the norms behind "Murder is wrong" do not exist prior to the existence of humans?

Obviously this is fallacious thinking. Rather, we can simply say that "Once humans DO exist, then 'Murder is wrong' comes into play". The same with procreation. Once humans DO exist, then "Procreation is wrong" comes into play. I don't see it being more complicated than that. ALL moral claims presuppose "life" (people) exist(!) in the first place.

These sorts of arguments look to be a critique of reality, and are incompatible with an acceptance of reality. I suppose one could argue that consent should precede life, but at the end of the day the simple fact of the matter is that it doesn't. — Leontiskos

Same critique so I am moving on.

The variant on Rawls' argument is somewhat interesting: negative utilitarianism in the service of antinatalism. "I should not have a child if they will suffer much." Meh. I don't think life is ultimately about the avoidance of suffering any more than I think life is ultimately about consent, and I have found that those who are excessively focused on such things tend to lead impoverished lives. I'd say life is bigger than suffering or consent. — Leontiskos

I think this is throwing out a lot of important values we hold in other arenas. For example, if as a consenting adult I force you into a game you don't want to play because I think the game is bigger than any one individual's refusal, that seems mighty suspicious. And I am talking personal ethics here, which procreation (should) fall under. I do believe there is a discontinuity with the State/political ethics, but that is a different argument, which I can bring in if you want to make the category error of using laws like the draft, education compliance, and inoculations.

I also think it is a bit of a red herring to compare it to parental care of children under a certain age (often 18 yo). That is because usually the care is about preventing more harm in the future for that child, where this very specific/unique kind of decision is creating all of the potential harm in the first place. These are two different types of decisions regarding consent. At this point since someone DOES exist, it would be more harmful NOT to take care of them, as now you are not recognizing the rights of the child who does exist already, to be cared for, being that they have not fully developed into fully functioning adults yet, and had no say to be born in the first place. Presumably babies and children have a right not to be abandoned, neglected, or abused, for example, which is a different (positive/must do ethics) consideration rather than the (negative/NOT doing) ethics of simply not causing harm in the first place. One is palliative (as someone already exists and is exposed to great harms), and one is preventative (in the absolutist terms).

As to the genetic makeup of modern peoples - especially those that have been dispersed from a relatively small original stock - why even bother to trace them? There are Americans the colour of ginger ale who consider themselves Black. People don't identify with their DNA; they identify with their community, religion, culture and shared past. And their story - no matter what percent of it is factual. — Vera Mont

I'm curious because @Benkei was making claims to the contrary. But even if we did "trace the DNA", my point was it works both ways. Afterall, even in Native Americans, DNA can be relevant, but is certainly not the sole understanding of a member of a nation. One can even take upon the tribal identity through marriage or initiation ceremony, like ethno-religions do. So yes, there is definitely some "backbone" of DNA but that's not the full story (and never was). Certainly a Navajo or Ojibwe person with 48% native DNA but is fully invested in tribe and has roots going way back to that tribe is not excluded as member of that tribe by most standards.

And again, even if we look at the genetic history solely, we see there was a strong linkage to that land by a vast majority of even Ashkenazi. This was obvious to all before the state of Israel. Obviously, when this "difference" (of Jews and the surrounding ethnicity of the nation they were in) becomes a way to take away their rights, and throw them in concentration and death camps, this becomes insanely genocidal. However, as purely an understanding of an ethno-history and how it relates to identity, it is perfectly fine to make the distinction. No one is being "racist" by saying Jews have a specific ethnic history, and understanding that, any more than how the Dutch people are different than (or similar to!) French, Belgian, or (other) German peoples.

Of course it isn't. There's Ethiopian Jews, Ashkenazi, Sephardic, Mizrahi Jews, which are distinct ethnicities. Plenty of discrimination between those groups as well by the way although at least on paper they are equal. — Benkei

Just curious did you read some historical background here?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/908700

I say that because it contradicts what you said here:

It's not their ancestral homeland. That's an idiotic religious claim that anybody that isn't a Jew doesn't recognise. — Benkei