Do you understand why that's a misleading statement? Yes or no?

Do you understand why no reasonable conclusion can follow from it? Yes or no? — S

It is always good to prevent suffering so no whether someone exists to know this or not.

That's evading the point. Please don't do that. We can't move on until you address my point properly. Prevention of suffering is having an agenda for another person. You suggested that having an agenda for another person is bad in response to me, yet you yourself have an agenda for another person. — S

No, the other person does not exist yet. No agenda is going to be had by them.

Sure. But the problem is that that doesn't make any sense to me at all. You're categorizing desire as morally problematic regardless of anyone's opinion of it. — Terrapin Station

Correct.

Well, maybe they don't get bored because they're doing whatever, but the point I'm still trying to get at is that we can have someone who doesn't have a negative valuation of phenomenal states such as "I'm hungry." But it seems like you're saying that's irrelevant to it being a moral problem. — Terrapin Station

Yes it's the initial desire, not the assessment of it.

That's just your opinion. — S

My opinion leads to NO suffering for a future person. Yours doesn't. I win. No one is actually alive be deprived. I win.

No, that criticism is invalid. It's invalid because it can't apply to what I'm saying without also applying to what you're saying. You are committing the fallacy of special pleading. You say that the prevention of suffering matters. I say that the prevention of joy matters. You say to me that that's having an agenda for another person. I can then say to you that that's having an agenda for another person.

That's logic for you. — S

Ah no. Prevention of joy is not bad, if there is NO ONE alive to be deprived of it. Prevention of suffering is always, good whether someone for whom this is a benefit or not. That's the asymmetry.

I can understand that Schopenhauer felt that way, but why would you think that it's necessarily universal? You're not familiar with people who never feel bored, for example? — Terrapin Station

Oh yeah, that's why ascetics and meditation and such..things Schopenhauer liked.. but that was to reduce the Will in general.

But to for those note meditating and eating a bowl of rice 24/7, I don't believe it. People don't get bored because they are filling the time with stuff that overcomes the baseline boredom they would feel otherwise- TPF, shopping, reading, working, etc.

Yeah, again, this is not the definition I'm using here. Maybe this other Schopenhauer quote will help in defining negative here:

If life — the craving for which is the very essence of our being — were possessed of any positive intrinsic value, there would be no such thing as boredom at all: mere existence would satisfy us in itself, and we should want for nothing. But as it is, we take no delight in existence except when we are struggling for something; and then distance and difficulties to be overcome make our goal look as though it would satisfy us — an illusion which vanishes when we reach it; or else when we are occupied with some purely intellectual interest — when in reality we have stepped forth from life to look upon it from the outside, much after the manner of spectators at a play. And even sensual pleasure itself means nothing but a struggle and aspiration, ceasing the moment its aim is attained. Whenever we are not occupied in one of these ways, but cast upon existence itself, its vain and worthless nature is brought home to us; and this is what we mean by boredom. The hankering after what is strange and uncommon — an innate and ineradicable tendency of human nature — shows how glad we are at any interruption of that natural course of affairs which is so very tedious.

What I'm getting at is that there's a difference between "I want food," which you seem to be categorically calling a "dissatisfaction," and having a negative experience in conjunction with wanting food.

In other words, someone can just want food without having an attendant value assessment of that experience, where they assign a negative or "bad" value to it. It can just be an experience without a valuation. — Terrapin Station

Then you are not taking into account how I (and Schopenhuaer) are using "negative in nature" here.

The overall value of life is what primarily matters here, over and above any one particular factor taken in isolation. You can't reasonably assess the overall value of life by only taking into consideration a single factor such as suffering. It's easy to come up with examples of this methodology failing in other contexts as well. So your method is doomed to failure from the start. It doesn't even get off the ground.

And when people do take all of the relevant factors into reasonable consideration, funnily enough, they reach a different conclusion to you. Coincidence? I think not. — S

Suffering, at this level, is the most important thing to take into consideration. Anything else is having an agenda for another person. So not only are you not taking proper account of suffering in comparison to other stuff, you are putting the other stuff as something that "needs" to be experienced- forcing others into this game so that they "need" to experience this stuff. Putting an agenda above the interest of suffering. This is essentially the axiom. There is no further here we can go. I've said that before. You can disagree with the premise, but at the end, emotional levels of interest in the premise are going to decide if you follow it.

Okay, but I'm saying that there are people who don't feel anything like pain or feel that it's "positive evil" to have to get off of the couch and open the refrigerator, for example (in order to get food because they're hungry).

Are you disagreeing that there are people who don't see this as pain/evil/something experientially negative? — Terrapin Station

I disagree with your assessment. You are going to a secondary level when I am not. The primary level- there is an initial dissatisfaction. Why is the person getting off the couch?

I'm not sure I understand that response. Are you saying that it's impossible for Joe to feel that it's negative that he has to get off the couch and open the refrigerator, say? — Terrapin Station

Here is a quote from Schopenhauer to help you decipher the meaning:

I have reminded the reader that every state of welfare, every feeling of satisfaction, is negative in its character; that is to say, it consists in freedom from pain, which is the positive element of existence. It follows, therefore, that the happiness of any given life is to be measured, not by its joys and pleasures, but by the extent to which it has been free from suffering — from positive evil. If this is the true standpoint, the lower animals appear to enjoy a happier destiny than man. Let us examine the matter a little more closely.

However varied the forms that human happiness and misery may take, leading a man to seek the one and shun the other, the material basis of it all is bodily pleasure or bodily pain. This basis is very restricted: it is simply health, food, protection from wet and cold, the satisfaction of the sexual instinct; or else the absence of these things. Consequently, as far as real physical pleasure is concerned, the man is not better off than the brute, except in so far as the higher possibilities of his nervous system make him more sensitive to every kind of pleasure, but also, it must be remembered, to every kind of pain. But then compared with the brute, how much stronger are the passions aroused in him! what an immeasurable difference there is in the depth and vehemence of his emotions! — and yet, in the one case, as in the other, all to produce the same result in the end: namely, health, food, clothing, and so on. — Schopenhauer

Right you are psychological there- I see what you're doing. No, dissatisfaction is precisely negative, in that there is a near constant lack.

Joe has a desire for food, so Joe has to get food however he gets it (maybe as a baby it's opening his mouth for a nipple, and then maybe later in his life it's getting off the couch and opening the refrigerator, and so on), and even though Joe doesn't have a problem with any of this, it's something that needs to be avoided on moral grounds.

But maybe I'm misunderstanding it (partially because it's difficult to believe that the above is something you'd be arguing) — Terrapin Station

It is the "dealing with" we discussed earlier. That there is an unfulfillment that needs addressing. Dissatisfaction. The First Noble Truth. That sort of thing. That is the baseline structural suffering that is the background for all the other stuff that takes place, including contingent forms of suffering, which are circumstantial physical/psychological pain. Why create the need for needs in the first place?

You aren't addressing the problem. The problem is that life consists of a lot more than suffering. And given that life consists of a lot more than suffering, you aren't warranted to talk only about the prevention of suffering. Suffering is a part of life just like all of the other emotions are a part of life. You haven't justified talking about the prevention of suffering alone. Do you understand that or not? If so, please produce a valid response in your next reply. — S

Why is anything more important than the new person's suffering? What about the other stuff makes the threshold to procreate that much more? Because people are not killing themselves left and right?

Structural suffering? What is that? — Terrapin Station

This is from a previous post I wrote:

However, what is not usually recognized is the structural suffering inherent in existence- built into the human affair. Structural means that it is not based on contingent circumstances like genetics, place of birth, circumstances in time/place, or fortune. Structural suffering can be seen in things like the inherent "lack" that pervades the animal/human psyche. We are lacking at almost all times. The need for food and shelter, the need for mates, the need for friends, the need for interesting projects, the need for flow states, the need for comfortable environments. These "goods" represents things WE DO NOT HAVE (aka lack). We are constantly STRIVING for what is hoped to be fulfilling, but at the end, only temporarily fills the lack state, and for short duration. Structural suffering can also be seen in the psychological state of boredom. I don't see boredom as just another state, I see it as an almost baseline- state. It is a "proof" of existence's own unfulfilled state. This leads again, striving for what we lack. There is a certain burden of being- the burdens of making do- of getting by, of surviving, of filling the lack, of dealing with existence. That we have to deal in the first place is suspect. That not everyone is committing suicide is not a "pro" for the "post facto, people being born is justified" stance. Rather, suicide and being born in the first place are incommensurable.

Then of course, there is the contingent suffering (what is commonly what is thought of as suffering). This is the circumstantial suffering of physical/psychological pains that pervade an individual's life. This may be any form of physical or more emotional pain that befalls a person.

The parents' perspective are that the goods of life, the encultration into society for which these goods are to be had, is something to be experienced and carried forward. Structural suffering is not even seen in the picture. You only go with the information you have at hand, and you deem most important. Structural suffering is not a concept most parents think about, even if it is the main governing principle of animal/human existence. As far as contingent suffering, it has been well-documented the optimism bias that we have in underestimating the harms for past and future events.

Fallacious reasoning can't be reasonable, because it is by definition unreasonable. And you've committed a fallacy by drawing a conclusion based on just a single factor whilst wilfully ignoring all of the other relevant factors. I just explained that to you. — S

Ah I see how you are using that now. You didn't need "I just explained that to you", it's unnecessary (but based on your past posts "reasonable" to expect :)).

Are you abandoning antinatalism as you previously described it or not? Because you previously described it as a position essentially about not having children to prevent a future person from suffering, and my criticism still applies to that description. Again, the description is misleading and it's unreasonable to reach that conclusion from insufficient factors, and suffering alone is insufficient, because obviously life is a lot more than suffering. You would have to change your premise about the prevention of suffering, or add additional premises which actually take into account all of the other factors. Otherwise the argument will never be sound, because it's invalid. — S

No buddy, it's not. What I'm trying to say, is that upfront, that at the procreational decision (ONLY), prevention of suffering is above and beyond all else, because no actual person is alive to be deprived of the all else you described. Only AFTER they are created do they then have something to lose. And certainly valuing the prevention of suffering would have to come into play here as a premise.

Like I just said, a reasonable analysis must take into account all relevant factors. So by asking me only about suffering, you're effectively asking me to be unreasonable. — S

This means nothing to me. Using "reasonable" or "common sensibility" I just won't accept as an argument. Argue something. Don't just use the ambiguousness of the word "reasonable" or the like make it for you. Explain.

It's a fallacy known as a hasty generalisation. And another fallacy you frequently commit is the fallacy of cherry picking. — S

Not if I admit that indeed, not causing all forms of suffering to another person, while not actually depriving that person of any of the emotions (or any other perceived good) is indeed the best decision and outcome.

Things are good because of the overall value taking into account all factors, not bad because you deliberately select just a single factor whilst wilfully ignoring all of the others.

Please, show some intellectual honesty. — S

What makes the emotions you list more important than causing the conditions for suffering for another though?

If you cannot put the logic together, I can't help you.

Um, I did. Pay attention.

Again, the threshold to kill yourself vs. the threshold to procreate another person are different heuristics. Prior to birth the asymmetry (no one actually exists to be deprived, but all suffering prevented). After birth, someone with fears, personality, interests exists and may be worth continuing.

However there are cases of severe neuroses requiring treatment but I endorse the view that, in general, neuroses are simple quirks in personality than anything debilitative. — TheMadFool

But this is exactly the type of dismissive understanding I'm talking about. Neurosis, for the sufferer, is debillitative, it is just not as externally observable. But internally the sufferer is silently keeping themselves together. That's not to say this isn't a spectrum, but as you were saying, it's like an iceberg where people only see maybe a few odd behaviors. A lot of it is silent to others, but very present internally for the sufferer.

I think it is also interesting because I wonder if tribal societies manifest "OCD" as superstitions and sufferers of OCD in this society might be celebrated as "medicine men" in some tribal societies.

If you want to stop describing the position in a misleading way, you can copy and paste the above. — S

So it is good to bring about negative conditions for others because of the host of emotions you list? So the ability to experience these emotions is the main reason to then procreate, despite being exposed to negative experiences? Then, why would these emotions need to be experienced by another person in the first place? Why would that be important? Think hard on that, because appealing to "common sense" or a "common sensibility' or some such shit is not an argument.

Maybe you set the bar so high that practically no one will be able to accomplish this so-called optimal life. I guess a difference between being realistic and being idealistic. — TheMadFool

Let me get you in a mindset then of the neurotic person...
The "average" person may close a door. They may check the handle and turn it to make sure it is locked. They go their merry way.

The "neurotic" person (this case OCD) may have something where they lock the door 4 times. If they lock it 3 or 5 times, they feel X sensation (in the moment) or they believe Y belief will happen (in the future. This present sensation or this belief about the future causes extreme anxiety and other sub-optimal experiences (not thinking clearly, extreme fear, hypochondria, etc.). The trigger of 3 or 5 (not the "right" number) has nothing to even do with the door itself being locked.. it's just that those numbers have "magical" or "superstitious" value for the neurotic person.. They cannot shake off the anxiety of not repeating the act without thinking that something bad is happening or will happen to that person. If they lock the door 3 or 5 times and then leave, they are wrought with anxiety, fear, delusions, irrational beliefs, etc. However, if they go back and repeat the sequence four times, the feeling immediately goes away. This is not something the person wants to feel or have to repeat, but they feel it and repeat it nonetheless. That is what I mean by not optimal.

Everything said about psychosis and neurosis is said against the background of normality. It has to be the criterion to determine what counts as psychotic and neurotic - as well as other so-called "psychopathological conditions". To me one of the biggest problems is to know what is "normal". One of the most basic aspects of this concept must be: according to / in line with the "norm". But, there are so many norms: and, they are really so "circumstantial". It seems to me to lead inevitably to the road of "many normals". But can that be the case? If not, then what will be the nature of the "one normal"? Taken as a concept, what will be its definition, denotation / connotation, its sense / reference etc? And, after having done an in depth conceptual analysis of the concept, will it be clear to anyone what "normal" really is, or will we end up knowing even less and only be able to point out how problematic the concept actually is? — Daniel C

I don't think it has much to do with normality, per se. Rather, someone with a neurotic disorder is believing or doing something they rather not do. It interrupts their thought process and ways of being that might otherwise take place without the disorder. In other words, a neurosis is not simply a different way of doing something that can be seen externally by others, but they themselves experience and can usually report the negative impact of the neurosis and would like it to not negatively impact them anymore.

These are all irrational behaviors that if not carried out give people anxiety. The different is that they are 'understood' and 'expected' by the various cultures or subcultures. One can see the neuroticness in big cities, say on the subway, where a bunch of different subcultures intermingle. There you will see people conforming to a wide variety of norms that look entirely differently, inlcude different ways of speaking, dressing, coiffing, standing, moving...and most of those people would feel extreme anxiety if they did not do all these things 'right'.

I would conclude that we have cultural neuroses and not only do these cause people stress, they are further used to ostracise people and create random hierarchies, and then they cost a lot of money, especially with clothes, the 'right car', trophy houses......... — Coben

Although I agree with you, in spirit, how enculturation and mass media can shape cultural expectations and cause widespread anxieties, I do not think this shaping of culture or these anxieties are the same a person with an actual neurotic disorder. First off, in order for something to be a disorder, it has to be a major disruption to their life. It has to affect how one functions at things like work or social interactions. It has to be pervasive. It has to be something that one cannot simply walk away from and turn on and off. An example would be let's say that for someone who was simply "anal" about how their desk was organized, they might prefer it to be neat and tidy. Someone with an actual neurosis like OCD would have something like exact spots where things need to be. If they do not put something in that pattern or place, they think about it the whole day, they preseverate, they can't think clearly. In other words, they obsess. They feel a compulsion to go back and put it in the "right" place or pattern. That is an actual neurosis. To generalize it to how culture shapes anxieties would be to muddy the definition and significance of an actual neurosis with cultural practices.

However, it could be that neurosis isn't really a problem. People manage to take it in their stride and it doesn't cause personal or social disruptions to the degree warranting treatment or intervention. — TheMadFool

I doubt that for the person experiencing it. But yes, someone can be "riddled" with neurotic behaviors and thoughts and live a daily life. But clearly that life is not optimal for the person experiencing it. My point was that it may even be more so as they are living in a double world of having the irrational belief/behavior but also knowing that they have it.

And it's also kind of weird that people say anti-natalism is a projection onto a future child while also claiming that all non-pregnant women are potential mothers without having been fertilized in the first place..?

:brow: I'm not even much into this subject, because I find it a sticky one for me personally, but I don't think the natalist arguments are pretty shitty. — Swan

That's an odd way to phrase that. Anyways, I don't know who said "all non-pregnant women are potential mothers".. but that is not quite true. Antinatalism is essentially about not having children to prevent a future person from either contingent or structural suffering. That is it. Whatever other odd choice of phrasing you want to add for a straw man or red herring, doesn't really matter to this argument. If someone doesn't have children, they are preventing a future person, who will inevitably suffer. That is it.

I never quite get why this is a problem for people. The person that would be born if someone were to get pregnant and bring it to term. It is applying a future state to something that does not exist in the present. However, the conditions to bring about the future state can be in the present or near present. So why is this so hard to fathom?

Your inconsistency, you mean. If life were that bad, then there would be nothing at stake. — S

Again, the point khaled was making earlier was that at the time of procreation, when there is an asymmetry, when all harm can be prevented, and no actual person is deprived, THAT is different than when someone is ALREADY born and there IS someone who is deprived, there is a personality now that is existent, there is someone with interests. This matters now because as a fully alive human we have emotions like fear and feelings like pain. This is a DIFFERENT circumstance than prior to birth. Being afraid of death, and having interests do not mean that this life was worth starting. It means that once born, life is worth continuing for this person being that it is now someone with emotions, interests, etc. The threshold for starting a life is different for continuing a life. But they are different standards because one uniquely prevents all harm while not depriving, while one is depriving and death will harm someone (the act itself and the lead up). So they are very different situations.

How can you say that that's not his argument, and then go on to mention consent in your description of his argument? That's a contradiction. Clearly if it's in his argument, then he thinks that it's of relevance. I'm saying that it's not, because obtaining consent isn't even a possibility.

And his assertion about putting someone in a riskier situation not only lacks justification, but has been refuted by counterexample. — S

No, read it correctly, I am saying it is his argument. It is the main point of his argument. And the very fact that it is impossible to obtain consent, he seems to be saying, is why you should pick the least riskiest option (not born at all).

If no one existed in sec 1, how would they do anything in sec 1? — Mww

I rewrote the post to be a bit more clear.

End of story. — Mww

Great, so Kantian philosophy would think that if person A did not exist in second 1, but what person B did in second 1 would affect negatively person A in second 2 when person A did exist, then it would be ok, because in second 1 person A did not exist yet? I don't think so.

And how can a thing with no will be a member of the kingdom of ends? How would you know what the benefit is to a merely possible person? And who would formulate an imperative based on a universal law that obliterates the species? — Mww

No one is obligated to the species, only individuals. If the outcome is no species, that would simply be the consequence. No one is beholden to a species though. As far as kingdom of ends, it would be about a future person who WOULD be the recipient of harm. All that matters is, that someone would be harmed when it could have been prevented. The kingdom of ends is not bypassed because at point X that person does not exist yet. Putting someone in a condition of harm, when it could have been prevented would be indeed a violation of the categorical imperative.

But I was trying to show the contrary.

It can be worse than the alternative for some, not that that's always clear at the time, which is kind of the point. — S

I would imagine that is the caveat that makes this still valid.

No it's not, though! Because consent is irrelevant. How many times... — S

Even if it is, that is not khaled's argument. His argument is that one should not put someone in a riskier situation if they cannot consent. That is why I bring up guardianship in this case and the asymmetry of no one being born and someone being born and having their life at stake.

Another example would be undergoing chemotherapy. There might be a slim chance that it would be relatively successful, but it would be a hellish experience, and it might not pay off, whereas no chemotherapy would most likely mean a reduced life expectancy. Even if the legal guardian ends up opting with the "riskier" option, it's right that that's their decision to make. Khaled's analysis is overly simplistic, not thought through properly, and it is definitely not necessarily true of all cases. It is also not an impartial analysis, which is important in terms of method, and explains why it's hardly a surprise to find that there are problems with it. — S

Again, I will let khaled answer this because it is his argument. However, again, the riskier option as presented to the parents is obviously letting the disease slowly eat away at the child. However, this is really a debate about consent. The child is already born. This changes things, as I see it. Prior to birth, it was impossible to get consent and no one is alive to be harmed. Now that the child is born, there is actually a person's life at stake. It is too late. Unfortunately, we cannot go into the future and ask an adult version of the person, thus guardianship is given to the parents. Thus in this situation, the guardians now have to make a decision of the least risky outcome. Usually this means weighing the statistical options outlined by the doctor.

The foundation proper of Kantian deontology has to do primarily with the transcendental freedom of the will necessarily, the conditional lawful moral action itself as secondary to it.

1.) law can have no exception whatsoever, otherwise it be merely a rule;
1A.) every human is endowed with a will, therefore every human is a moral agent;

2.) if procreation were deemed an immoral act, the imperative corresponding to it for any moral agent must be as if it were in accordance with a universal law for all moral agents;
3.) the universal law must be that no moral agent shall make the immoral procreatic act;
4.) that no moral agent, re: no human, shall make the procreatic act leads necessarily to the extinction of the human species;
5.) it is contradictory that the extinction of the human species shall follow from a universal law;
6.) it cannot be in accordance with a contradiction that cessation of the act of procreation be a moral imperative;
7.) the procreatic act, in and of itself, cannot be deemed immoral. — Mww

I disagree with 5 - 7. Actually, I don't even know what that means.. a better formulation:

Kant's First Formulation: Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.

If everyone coerced others into a game/challenge that they thought was best for the other person then everyone would assume they know what is best for everyone else. The very ability to coerce others would be coerced by yet another person who knows better than yourself. Coercion itself would be nullified and contradict itself.

There are other applications too, but that is one I thought of right now.

Kant's Second Formulation: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.

Assumption- One is looking out for the ends of a potential person (who has no interests or personality yet) when one is concerned about a potential future person that does not exist yet. Thus, in the procreational situation, prevention of harming a future person is the highest priority as there is no actual person who has interests yet. Thus, having a child for ANY reason is putting the parent's/society's agenda above and beyond the interest of the future child (which is to not be harmed).

Better application...

If you can prevent all harm with no cost to any actual person (no one exists to be deprived of not experiencing good, let's say), and you have the ability to do this, this would be the best choice in terms of looking out for any future person. If you do anything outside of choosing this optimal scenario (preventing all harm to future person with no cost of depriving an actual person), you are putting your own agenda above the ends of someone else.

@Bartricks @Sunnyside @TheMadFool you may want to comment.

Because under consequentialism that's irrelevant. — S

Perhaps it is not consequential, but even if it is.. I'll look at the rest of the argument here..

There are lots of things that children can't consent to, and which carry risks, some of which are severe, like with almost any medication or surgery. It can be open to argument which course of action is the bigger risk in these situations, but anyway, the legal guardian should make that call, and that's not simply right or wrong just because of the risk involved or because they can't obtain consent. There are important considerations entirely missing from that analysis. — S

I am not sure khaled's view on this so I'll let him answer if this counts for what he was talking about. I would say there has to be a distinction between the notion of "risky", like a "risky surgery" versus "more risky situation". Clearly, if the parent wants to do what's best for their child, they are actually not doing the riskier option. The riskier option, it would seem in this case, would be to not do the surgery. It may be a risky surgery, but the alternative would be even more catastrophic. Of course, an antinatalist aside to all of this, is any of this harmful situation could have been prevented..but of course that is off tangent from this exact argument.

Even if I decide not to even contemplate possible exceptions, his premise would remain unwarranted. — S

Well, he is claiming this is a hard and fast rule it seems. Don't put people in riskier situations if there is an alternative when you have no consent. That seems reasonable. If you think not, then explain why. If not, then you can't think of anything at the moment. However, your admonition that he is being unreasonable by allowing you to retort with a counterargument or an exception or what have you, is to me, unfounded. It seems perfectly reasonable in any debate for the other person to say something like, "Do you disagree? If so, let me know how." That is what I see going on here. Nothing more.

The way I read it, he is saying there is absolutely no case he can find where someone should put another in a situation where they are more at risk than a less risky alternative when there is no consent to be had (I would have said maybe "impossible" to have). You don't have to answer the question, but that is his claim. I guess the challenge is more like, "Hey, I'll entertain your exception if you have one, but this is the case".