The one under pressure slaving away every day suffers and is diagnosed as mentally sick, as if to say why do you suffer? A good slave doesn't suffer. So let's give you some chemicals so you can be a good slave again. While the one putting the pressure enjoys the rewards and the good life, and protects his position in part thanks to psychiatry which justifies the status quo. If you're a slave and you suffer, it's not because you're a slave, it's because there is something wrong with you. — leo
not individually but being in a society (product of birth) greatly increases your survival chances as opposed to being out in the wild. It’s like how everyone needs food to survive but not everyone necessarily needs to produce food. We need a next generation to survive but not everyone needs to have kids — khaled
How are those two things equivalent? You don’t need to give birth to survive.If I have to harm someone to survive whether that be by giving birth or cannibalizing someone I'd do it — khaled
1- Both of them are necessary for survival — khaled
2- Both of them have the potential of causing involuntary suffering on another being (it is involuntary in the case of eating because many who work in food production and distribution are there because they can't find another job and dangerous because of the risks associated with the job. Way more people get disfigured in the food and clothing industries than there are disfigured children) — khaled
But as a consequence of not having a child there simply is no person that is either harmed or saved -- and that's my point. — Moliere
So what would be appropriate would be to tend to the needs of children that are actual -- but if there aren't any children, then what's all the fuss about anyway? You're thinking of what is not actual as if it were actual. — Moliere
In your scenario 1, though, there simply is no person to reason about. What's so different about a child you decided not to have and a fictional character? — Moliere
But something else we do not reason morally about are either things or beings which do not exist. So Harry Potter, for instance, is not the sort of thing which we should reason morally about. So far I don't think this is controversial. — Moliere
For myself I have a hard time accepting that I'm inflicting anything on someone who does not exist. Birth will result in a life that will include suffering in it. But without birth there isn't anyone at all -- and hence nothing to consider within a moral light. It is only after birth that someone becomes a morally significant being worth consideration. Else, it's just an imaginary character. — Moliere
But I feel it is probably best to confront how life is actually is as accurately as possible in order to improve it. (That is not to say that we might be wrong in some of our negative appraisals.) — Andrew4Handel
It's not my job to address connections that you're making and not explicating. 'In the realm of information'; 'hint at a kind of theory of information' - this is imprecise blather, and it's nothing but thick irony to accuse me of 'avoiding the central issue' when you're literally making things up and projecting connotations whose significance to the OP you can only hint at with half-baked allusions to semantic connotations. Don't mistake your own analytic inadequacy for that of the OP. — StreetlightX
I spoke of neither emergence nor information - I didn't even use the former word, and the latter only appeared once in the OP in a not very central way. So I have very little time for your two-bit projections. — StreetlightX
I'm not the one who expects tautology to be taken seriously as a point of discourse. — StreetlightX
This is just warmed over mysterian trash. Not worth engaging. — StreetlightX
To understand matter as medium though, also requires a rethinking of the nature of mediality itself. Although 'mediums' are often understood as a kind of epiphenomenon, a kind of cloth by which the 'real thing' is wrapped up in (the TV as a medium for its content), media studies since McLuhan have long recognized that 'the medium is the message': media has its own substantiality and being, in a way that doesn't just transparently 'facilitate' the passage of things, but in a deep and important way, shapes and defines the very nature of what it is that is being communicated. In a word then, the materialist insists that the world is medial through and through: everything that is, has a density recalcitrant to all ideal(ized) first principles (arche) and immedial fantasies (God being among them).
To pervert Aristotle: the accidental is the essential (and the essential is the accidental). — StreetlightX
This would be very silly though. — StreetlightX
I doubt Cat would make the naive and boorish mistake of identifying abstraction with idealism - especially since he seems to reject the latter term as being of significance - but I'll let him speak for himself. — StreetlightX
While I'd like to think that yes, materialism does entail more mature, more elaborate theorizing than the various idealisms which it arrays itself against, I think you're vastly understating the influence and pervasiveness of the latter. If one accepts materialism in the sense outlined here, people like Richard Dawkins and Steven Weinberg become nothing other than arch-Idealists; searches for reductive 'theories of everything', where all the universe follows from a small handful of first principles, turn out to be idealist desiderata par excellence. To say that these debates have no purchase in the sciences is just to leave implicit and untheorized attitudes which pervade them through and through. It's naivety, and a willful and damaging one at that. — StreetlightX
However, I think that the contrast you are drawing is rather between more and less abstract levels of explanation. Abstraction removes detail, and detail is where your "materiality" is. The more abstract an explanation, the more immaterial it seems, as it were, its ontology consisting of made-up concepts like "genes" and "networks," instead of familiar, immediately perceptible "stuff." — SophistiCat
But, still, sometimes we are satisfied for longer periods of time or non-temporally. Such as reading a good poem and remembering it due to its significance. Or owning a place one can call "home". — Posty McPostface
The inherent lack in life is (momentarily) satisfied by certain actions. Then we go back to needing things or boredom. — Posty McPostface
No, does that deny my logic? — Posty McPostface
But, doesn't the joy of owning a home or apartment override such negativism's? To have a place you can call "home" is a magical experience. — Posty McPostface
Rather than these fleshier theories being a case of us getting wise to the materiality of the world, they are simply the result of more mature, more elaborate theorizing, which, while still being abstract (as all theories are, by definition), can afford to incorporate more detail.
As for the question of whether these abstract forms are immanent or transcendent, whether matter possesses its own powers or is animated from without, I am not even convinced that this is something worth asking. In any case, this rarefied metaphysical debate gains no purchase in empirical sciences. — SophistiCat
Well, sure -- but then, nothing is inherently better or worse than anything. Things are better or worse in relation to a judgment we make, not because goodness inheres in a state of mind or object or action. — Moliere
If someone wants to be miserable and elated, there's nothing you can do to persuade them to think or feel differently. Such changes only happen because a person changes. But the distinction should still be recognizable, all the same -- there's a meaningful difference. — Moliere
I'd say misery is the opposite of this kind of happiness -- where we are unable to accept our current conditions of life. But this differs from elation in that we can be miserable yet elated -- we can set unrealistic goals for ourselves, fulfill them, yet be attached to a new, harder, or higher goal. And hence be dissatsified and miserable with life as opposed to happy.
And we can be happy thought we are not elated -- we didn't get everything we wanted, but we can accept the situation we happen to have now. — Moliere
Now, we have a lot of questions about God, life, and such. But, aren't these questions epistemically inchoate? — Posty McPostface
So you have worked up an example that presents an obviously unhappy balance. — apokrisis
The peacock's tail. Is it frivolous or is it promoting the survival of the species? — apokrisis
Could a medical process on an individual past reproductive age be considered moral in the sense you want to apply it? — apokrisis
Most folk would say it is stuff that we might do that makes no essential difference to the fulfilling of that major goal. And our moral stance in regard to that would be a collective shrug of the shoulders. That becomes the morally meaningful thing to do. — apokrisis
