Humanity is an ideal. The reality is that the world is harsh and brutal. There is no room for idealism. If a person, by whatever means, commits and atrocity... They should therefore have no rights.

Humans are brutal. Get over it. Brutal people deserve brutal consequences. Simple. There are simply too many people in the world. There is no room for these people.

ah didn't see the author posted. But thank you

!!!! Agreed!!! :up: :up: :clap:

So in some cases a person is not responsible for the brutal murder of someone?!

Lol! Right...

key word 'some' aren't deterred by fear. And in this case you are talking about psychopathic individuals. In this case, a mental asylum for the criminally insane is sufficient. Perhaps... Lobotomy!

Maybe they deserve cruel and unusual punishment, for the criminal took away the rights of an individual by murdering them.

Fear is the only real deterrant.

okay, well what if someone raped a child and then murdered them? What if someone murdered another brutally in cold blood?
They should still be treated with dignity?

I think that is unethical in itself. It is a complete mutation of ethics.

A child rapist should have his penis cut off with a dull knife, waterboarded, then thrown into a dark cage for weeks eating nothing but hard raman noodles and drinking dirty water.
Bet you they wouldn't do that ever again!
Bet you after hearing this nobody would dare rape a child.

The man who murdered my partner's aunt, who got away with it, and left her body rotting for weeks deserved to be tortured.

Im not saying the USA should do this... But what if there were shootings of criminals? What if the punishment for a heinous crime like murdering a child, raping someone, brutally killing another, armed robbery, etc was always worse than the crime? That would successfully deter a lot of people say, "Well, if I kill this person and am found guilty, I am going to get my head blown off in public and my body burned to ashes and disposed of, or get hanged in public and then cut into pieces and thrown into a landfill" or, "If I rape someone and get caught, they are going to cut off my penis."

I might actually support this...

It seems unethical... But seriously? Imagine how the victims feel and the families? The only unethical thing was what the criminal did...
I say screw the child murderer or repeat child rapist... They should get what they bargained for... MORE THAN THEY BARGAINED FOR.

I wonder how many people would commit crimes if there was a system like this for serious criminal offenses.
@ChatteringMonkey@mcdoodle@Sapientia@ArguingWAristotleTiff@Maw@VagabondSpectre@Bitter Crank@tim wood@wellwisher@andrewk

I'm sorry...

Aaahahahahahahahahahahaha!!!!

Meaning that is not emotional is a game of signs and simulacra.

Well since you know the truth? What is Truth?
And furthermore? How could you base an unequivocal knowledge of truth? And... If you can see the connection... How do you resolve the idea of all metaphysics presupposes an epistemology and all epistemology presupposes a metaphysics?

It was someone from Stanford I presume. There was no author posted.

Nonsense. Only women can have be pregnant and have babies. That is a result of their physical features and how those physical features give rise to certain behaviors only allowed by those physical features — Harry Hindu

This is an argument from bad faith. What of a woman happens to be physiologically sterile? Therefore she is not a woman? What if a woman has parts of her reproductive organs surgically removed because of a disease. That makes her not a woman?

You can't manipulate nature unless you have opposable thumbs, etc. Your capacity for any behavior is governed by not just the size and shape of your body, but also the processes that go on inside it, like the level of certain hormones and chemicals flooding your brain at any given moment — Harry Hindu

Surely you have some good examples!
...

It is what men with a delusional disorder have to do after having a doctor cut off their penis and makes a hole and calls it a "vagina" - a miscategorization of the Nth degree. — Harry Hindu

You are omitting the opposite, which is a f to m procedure...

But the sex organs are not the focal point. You clearly know no transgender people. They resemble what they identify as, and they recreate these concepts according to their own authenticity and creation and freedom, which you are undermining or obdurately and intransigently rejecting according to an empirical realism that is far from being unequivocal or infallible!

I am saying that it is a metaphor to say that neural activity creates a metaphor.

Be with another person who 'represents' these words. Be around them I mean. Engage in a real conversation about life and desire. Only in a respectful, meaningful exchange will you find the true meaning of what these words like transgenderedism mean, or homosexuality. That is the authenticity I am talking about. The paradigm of authenticity would be the paradigm that is not idle talk. Like, instead of saying that I am gay I say that I am absolutely, completely, unequivocally and unquestionably in love with and sexually attracted to someone who has the same gender and sex as myself.

Facticity impeding freedom is what Sartre calls Bad Faith.

The woman of liberty must free herself from two forms of imprisonment: one, the assumption that in order to be independent she must be like men, and two, that socialization through which she becomes feminized. The first alienates her from her sexuality. The second makes her adverse to risking herself for her ideas/ideals. Attentive to this current state of affairs, and to the phenomenology of the body, Simone De Beauvoir sets two prerequisites for liberation. First, women must be socialized to engage the world. Second, they must be allowed to discover the unique ways that their embodiment engages the world. In short, the myth of woman must be dismantled. So long as it prevails, economic and political advances will fall short of the goal of liberation. Speaking in reference to sexual difference, Beauvoir notes that disabling the myth of woman is not a recipe for an androgynous future. Given the realities of embodiment, there will be sexual differences. Unlike today, however, these differences will not be used to justify the difference between a Subject and his inessential Other.

The goal of liberation, according to Beauvoir, is our mutual recognition of each other as free and as other. She finds one situation in which this mutual recognition (sometimes) exists today, the intimate heterosexual erotic encounter. Speaking of this intimacy she writes, “The dimension of the relation of the other still exists; but the fact is that alterity has no longer a hostile implication” (The Second Sex, 448). Why? Because lovers experience themselves and each other ambiguously, that is as both subjects and objects of erotic desire rather than as delineated according to institutionalized positions of man and woman.

From plato.Stanford.edu

So if I was transgender and have changed my name and have started taking hormones and began my transition, you would still have the audacity to call me a woman? What if I say I am not a woman and that I am, consequently, a man?! What if I feel better as a man? What if I am uncomfortable in my own skin looking in the mirror every day seeing something incommensurate with what is on the inside?

There is absolutely no connection between gender and sex. This is a metaphorical correlation and is absolutely non-sequitur. So because someone cannot have children they are thus genderless?!

You are sick.

The only truly meaningful thing about a sexuality, which is defined by the romantic interest in another, is love.

The word creates the limitation, the boundary. And a mind that is not functioning in words, has no limitation; it has no frontiers; it is not bound... Take the word love and see what it awakens in you, watch yourself; the moment I mention that word, you are beginning to smile and you sit up, you feel. So the word love awakens all kinds of ideas, all kinds of divisions such as carnal, spiritual, profane, infinite, and all the rest of it. But find out what love is. Surely, Sir, to find out what love is, the mind must be free of that word and the significance of that word. (Jiddu Krishnamurti)

This is an interesting idea... "I am born this way."

1. Do not immediately take this statement at face value or, in other words, as an assertion that would be true analytically; by virtue of the meaning of the words. Instead, understand this sentence with regard to its context, as you would understand a singular word by both denotation and connotation. The reason this is the case is due to this: often those who say "I am born this way" do not mean that they are determined to be this way and because of this are authentic by virtue of it being 'natural' or something. They often mean something different and metaphorical. They often mean that they themselves ARE this and want to establish this truth meaningfully; they metaphorically posit (metaphor does contain a certain power) their existence, their birth, their whole life and authenticity of being as a pillar of truth atop which their homosexuality is supported.

2. If the statement, "I was born gay," is asserted as if to be analytically true... This is obviously impossible. It is impossible because a person is not born any sexuality. Sexuality regards (and I hope this isn't too metaphorical) the libido, a psychical energy. Freud says that the libido becomes manifest in different ways, and becomes an impetus of expression for the individual. This libido thus does not depend on genitalia and actually has nothing to do with it, for it is more-so an activity of the brain, not any other organ. According to experience, a person changes and their outlets of expression, identification and the manifestations of their desires become conditioned and mirror their experiences, according to what that particular person wants, which cannot ever be described adequately in theory but is at base irreducibly personal. One is not born any sexuality but becomes who they are and wills with their freedom their interactions, relations and intimacy.

3. I am gay. I am gay because I choose to be gay. I choose to be gay because that is what I feel. I feel what is closest and proximal to me. I realize the manifestations of my desires and my impulses and I direct my attention towards that. I have perhaps an inclination to be this way but I also have past experiences that have changed not my conception of what I desire in other people but what I desire for myself and what I want my existence to consist of. I was not born to be determined. I was born free. I have always been free. I choose everything that I am. It is bad faith to live a life of trying to conform with what you are, as if what you are is absolute and separate and you, the innocent bystander, are relative to these inescapable conditions. You are the totality of your experience, regardless of its origins--the origin of something is meaningless with regard to the apprehension of its meaning.

I agree with you about the absurdity of "only men/women can do 'that.'"

The reason this is the case is because being a certain gender does not imply any capacity of capability with regard to doing something, and neither does it necessitate any conclusion about capacity or potentiality at all. This is non-sequitur: what necessitates a conclusion about capacity, potentiality or capability is that which would be directly causally related, as opposed to some sort metaphorically based relation. Being a woman has nothing to do with being able to give birth or ejaculate. This refers to anatomy, not gender. There are those who want to draw correlations, but these correlations are at base with regard to some sort of ulterior motive or other ideological framework the impetus of a will to the domination of woman.

@TheWillowOfDarkness@creativesoul@Bitter Crank@Banno

Before The Second Sex, the sexed/gendered body was not an object of phenomenological investigation. Beauvoir changed that. Her argument for sexual equality takes two directions. First, it exposes the ways that masculine ideology exploits the sexual difference to create systems of inequality. Second, it identifies the ways that arguments for equality erase the sexual difference in order to establish the masculine subject as the absolute human type. Here Plato is her target. Plato, beginning with the premise that sex is an accidental quality, concludes that women and men are equally qualified to become members of the guardian class. The price of women’s admission to this privileged class, however, is that they must train and live like men. Thus the discriminatory sexual difference remains in play. Only men or those who emulate them may rule. Beauvoir’s argument for equality does not fall into this trap. She insists that women and men treat each other as equals and that such treatment requires that their sexual differences be validated. Equality is not a synonym for sameness.

The Second Sex argues against the either/or frame of the woman question (either women and men are equal or they are different). It argues for women’s equality, while insisting on the reality of the sexual difference. Beauvoir finds it unjust and immoral to use the sexual difference as an argument for women’s subordination. She finds it un-phenomenological, however, to ignore it. As a phenomenologist she is obliged to examine women’s unique experiences of their bodies and to determine how these experiences are co-determined by what phenomenology calls the everyday attitude (the common-sense assumptions that we unreflectively bring to our experience). As a feminist phenomenologist assessing the meanings of the lived female body, Beauvoir explores the ways that cultural assumptions frame women’s experience of their bodies and alienate them from their body’s possibilities. For example, it is assumed that women are the weaker sex. What, she directs us to ask, is the ground of this assumption? What criteria of strength are used? Upper body power? Average body size? Is there a reason not to consider longevity a sign of strength? Using this criterion, would women still be considered the weaker sex? A bit of reflection exposes the biases of the criteria used to support the supposedly obvious fact of women’s weakness and transforms it from an unassailable reality to an unreliable assumption. Once we begin this questioning, it is not long before other so-called facts fall to the side of “common sense” in the phenomenological sense.

What is perhaps the most famous line of The Second Sex, translated in 1952 as “One is not born but becomes a woman” and in 2010 as “One is not born but becomes woman”, is credited by many as alerting us to the sex-gender distinction. Whether or not Beauvoir understood herself to be inaugurating this distinction, whether or not she followed this distinction to its logical/radical conclusions, or whether or not radical conclusions are justified are currently matters of feminist debate. What is not a matter of dispute is that The Second Sex gave us the vocabulary for analyzing the social constructions of femininity and a method for critiquing these constructions. By not accepting the common sense idea that to be born with female genitalia is to be born a woman this most famous line of The Second Sex pursues the first rule of phenomenology: identify your assumptions, treat them as prejudices and put them aside; do not bring them back into play until and unless they have been validated by experience.
The situation of women is comparable to the condition of the Hegelian Other in that men, like the Hegelian Master, identify themselves as the Subject, the absolute human type, and, measuring women by this standard of the human, identify them as inferior. Women’s so-called inadequacies are then used as justification for seeing them as the Other and for treating them accordingly. Unlike the Hegelian Other, however, women are unable to identify the origin of their otherness. They cannot call on the bond of a shared history to reestablish their lost status as Subjects. Further, dispersed among the world of men, they identify themselves in terms of the differences of their oppressors (e.g., as white or black women, as working-class or middle-class women, as Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Buddhist or Hindu women) rather than with each other. They lack the solidarity and resources of the Hegelian Other for organizing themselves into a “we” that demands recognition. Finally, their conflict with men is ambiguous. According to Beauvoir, women and men exist in a “primordial Mitsein”: there is a unique bond between this Subject and its Other. In contesting their status as inessential, women must discover their “we” and take account of the Mitsein. Beauvoir uses the category of the Inessential Other to designate the unique situation of women as the ambiguous Other of men. Unlike the Other of the master-slave dialectic, women are not positioned to rebel. As Inessential Others, women’s routes to subjectivity and recognition cannot follow the Hegelian script (The Second Sex, xix–xxii).

The last chapters of The Second Sex, “The Independent Woman” and the “Conclusion”, speak of the current (1947) status of women’s situation—what has changed and what remains to be done. Without ignoring the importance of women’s gaining the right to vote and without dismissing the necessity of women attaining economic independence, Beauvoir finds these liberal and Marxist solutions to women’s situation inadequate. They ignore the effects of women’s socialization (the subject of volume two of The Second Sex) and they are inattentive to the ways that the norm of masculinity remains the standard of the human. The liberated woman must free herself from two shackles: first, the idea that to be independent she must be like men, and second, the socialization through which she becomes feminized. The first alienates her from her sexuality. The second makes her adverse to risking herself for her ideas/ideals. Attentive to this current state of affairs, and to the phenomenology of the body, Beauvoir sets two prerequisites for liberation. First, women must be socialized to engage the world. Second, they must be allowed to discover the unique ways that their embodiment engages the world. In short, the myth of woman must be dismantled. So long as it prevails, economic and political advances will fall short of the goal of liberation. Speaking in reference to sexual difference, Beauvoir notes that disabling the myth of woman is not a recipe for an androgynous future. Given the realities of embodiment, there will be sexual differences. Unlike today, however, these differences will not be used to justify the difference between a Subject and his inessential Other.

The goal of liberation, according to Beauvoir, is our mutual recognition of each other as free and as other. She finds one situation in which this mutual recognition (sometimes) exists today, the intimate heterosexual erotic encounter. Speaking of this intimacy she writes, “The dimension of the relation of the other still exists; but the fact is that alterity has no longer a hostile implication” (The Second Sex, 448). Why? Because lovers experience themselves and each other ambiguously, that is as both subjects and objects of erotic desire rather than as delineated according to institutionalized positions of man and woman. In Beauvoir’s words, “The erotic experience is one that most poignantly discloses to human beings the ambiguity of the condition; in it they are aware of themselves as flesh and as spirit, as the other and as the subject” (The Second Sex, 449). The concept of ambiguity, developed abstractly in The Ethics of Ambiguity, is erotically embodied in The Second Sex and is identified as a crucial piece of the prescription for transcending the oppressions of patriarchy. This description of the liberating possibilities of the erotic encounter is also one of those places where Beauvoir reworks Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment. For in drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the ways that we are world-making and world-embedded subject-objects, she reveals the ways that it is as subject-objects “for the world”, “to the world”, and “in the world” that we are passionately drawn to each other

Hmmmm. P3

p3 That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to it — creativesoul

What about being and the world?

Being-in-the-world (Dasein (the human being / consciousness)) is existentially dependent upon the world but does it exist prior to it?

Hmmm. Existence...

Latin:
Ex- (out)
Sistere (take a stand)
Existere (come into being)

So, does being-in-the-world come into being or stand out prior to the world?
Being-in-the-world 'coming into being' would be the predicate.

Kant thought the ontological argument was flawed. Any argument for the existence of God based on the proposition that a God that exists in reality is greater than a God that only in the imagination is based on a confusion.

Predicates
According to Kant the confusion lies in the fact that existence is not a predicate. The predicate is that part of a sentence which is not the subject but which gives information about the subject. A predicate might be a single word like ‘John laughed’ where John is the subject and ‘laughed’ is the predicate. Or a string of words as in the sentence Clare went to school, 'Clare' is the subject and 'went to school' is the predicate. A predicate is a property that a thing can either possess or lack.

Predicates and the Existence of God
When people assert that God exists they are not saying that there is a God and he possesses the property of existence. If that were the case, then when people assert that God does not exist they would be saying that there is a God and he lacks the property of existence, i.e. they would be both affirming and denying God’s existence at the same time. Kant suggests that to say that something exists is to say that the concept of that thing is exemplified in the world. For Kant, existence is not a matter of a thing possessing a property i.e. existence. Existence is a concept corresponding to something in the world.
Kant's objection to the ontological argument is that existence is not a property that can be attributed to beings like we can attribute other properties such as being blue, hard, or round. When we talk about entities existing, Kant contends that we do not mean to add existence as a property to their beings. In other words, the objection seems to be that one cannot go around adding existence as a property to God (or anything else for that matter) in order to define God (or anything else) into existence. Unfortunately, defining my bank account as such a place that contains millions of pounds would not mean that a careful understanding of that definition of ‘my bank account’ would really make it so. In order to see if that definition were true, we would have to go to an ATM and check the balance of my account and see if it is accurate. Similarly, a definition of God must be checked with reality to see if it is correct.

Kant’s Objection to Descartes’ Ontological Argument
Descartes had argued that God had existence in the same way as a triangle has three sides. Kant would agree, if you had a triangle then you did indeed have an object with three sides. But if you do not have the triangle, you have neither its three angles or its three sides. If you accept that there is a God, it is logical to accept also that His existence is necessary. But you don’t have to accept that there is a God.

"Existence is a concept corresponding to something IN THE WORLD."

Ergo existence or Dasein being-in-the-world is "existentially dependent" on the world, but neither is the world prior to existence or is existence prior to the world--if this line of thinking is correct...
But, in that Dasein is "thrown into the world;" that is, its being consists of its possibilities--it is its possibilities of being-in-the-world. So in a certain sense the being of consciousness is prior to the world yet existentially dependent on the world.

However, speaking of it like this seems strangely based, for the being of the world is different than being-in-the-world.
Does the world have a being of its own? Is the being of consciousness absolutely incommensurable in relation to the being of the world?
I think not! It is precisely being along side the world, connected in unison.

I agree with you.

I just read something about this, about Simone De Beauvoir's philosophy.

"Beauvoir rejects the familiar charge against secularism made famous by Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor: “If God is dead everything is permitted”. As she sees it, without God to pardon us for our “sins” we are totally and inexcusably responsible for our actions. Dostoevsky was mistaken. The problem of secularism is not that of license, it is the problem of the “we”. Can separate existing individuals be bound to each other? Can they forge laws binding for all? The Ethics of Ambiguity insists that they can. It does this by arguing that evil resides in the denial of freedom (mine and others), that we are responsible for ensuring the existence of the conditions of freedom (the material conditions of a minimal standard of living and the political conditions of uncensored discourse and association), and that I can neither affirm nor live my freedom without also affirming the freedom of others."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beauvoir/#RecBea

There is a facticity of human existence. Existence does not mean anthropomorphic existence. It is the existence of being, which is clearly not limited to what is human or 'consciousness.' The essence of consciousness is existence and it is in a sense capable of being anything it is (of). We cannot do any possible thing because of our facticity. But existence, that is, the existence of everything can do any possible thing, but only if it can. For is it not true that what can happen will happen? — Blue Lux

But is being limited to human consciousness? How can we know that there is a being of anything other than consciousness, for is that not the 'method' by which anything supposedly 'other' materializes at all? Has this principle of Intentionality really provided a solution to the differences between idealism and realism? Is it true that there is any being outside of consciousness? Have the words merely changed? Is the dualism of the finite and infinite just a mutation? Intellectual subterfuge?

I don't think so. I think it is true that consciousness is consciousness only (of) something it is not and furthermore that human being is not being in relation to the world but being-IN-the-world. And this is Heidegger.

This is something I struggle with philosophically; the primacy of knowledge in terms of existence and consciousness. Sartre basically wrote a huge book about this called Being and Nothingness. But anyway... I still have my own questions and I am not the type to just regurgitate or resort to dogma.

What existentialism has delimited so far for an understanding of human existence is that consciousness is a type of being, but is separate from just any type of being, like that of the phone I am typing on. There is a difference between the being that has being as a question and the being that being would question. It seems the two are tied together intrinsically, but this connection or entanglement is not transparent.

Philosophical thought up until now, I think, takes for granted the conclusions made by Descartes about the subject, and furthermore about objectivity. There is this contention that consciousness is a subject and the world is outside of consciousness as object. This seems obvious. It seems that when I say something, for instance, "I am," 'I' am the subject that is predicated, determined by an existence, as if existence is a predicate. Kant has shown this is illusory. Being is not a predicate: being is the foundation of such a statement and is not a quality that one can have or lack. Existence is the base upon which we found knowledge of anything. Knowledge itself is not prior, and knowledge cannot speak in terms of being as a quality or predicate.

Consciousness is a sort of being, but it is not phenomenal. It is transphenomenal (Sartre). This is to say that consciousness is what it is not and is not what it is. Consciousness is what it is conscious of; however, it always escapes itself. It is not exhausted in the contemplation of an object so to be absorbed into that object to become a thing in itself. Consciousness is not a thing. The objects of consciousness, furthermore, are 'things,' but what makes a thing a thing? How is there something finite and singular that one can be aware of instead of simply everything? "Nothing is finite without an infinite reference point." This infinite reference point is consciousness.

Consciousness is 'founded' upon nothingness, and only upon this foundation can anything be. This is why we ask the question of why anything exists when it doesn't seem to have to exist, because consciousness, this transphenomenal being of 'the subject', is not unless it is (of) something it is not.

This is why Husserl's Intentionality is so significant. Because this prior problem of Descartes, this irreconcilable dualism of subject and object is at base an illusion. The two are one. However, another problem materializes--another dualism... That of the finite and the infinite.

Knowledge of something is inevitably infinite. One can not absolutely know an object so to be that object. This is why the primacy of knowledge is an illusion. All that we know is nothing (Socrates). This is not to say that we do not know anything, but that we know the Nothingness that is the foundation of our being so to have a conception of what we are not. This is the interpretation.

So what are we if there is no absolute subject? Are we nothing? Then what of the personality? What of this reference of knowledge in that 'I know something' or "Know thyself?"

Is, aside, the result of this a faith in monism? I do not believe so, because there is again the dualism of the finite and the infinite. In knowing thyself or knowing anything it seems that an ascertaining of infinity is essential. But this infinity is not the noumena. The essence of something is ascertained. The appearance of something does not hide the reality of that thing. It shows the series of its appearances: it is in itself an infinite series of appearances, contained finitely within an appearance. One can ascertain something, and thus apprehend its essence, which is its existence. The essence of existence is existence.

We are indeed 'something,' but this something is not a subject that is active or passive. It is beyond this activity or passivity, for the active and the passive is fundamentally athropomorphic. Our being is not something active or passive, the result of something or its own cause. It is uncreated, to be established in our own experience and with our own experience, aside from some sort of ideal of what we are that could possibly be proven with a statement... Which is precisely what Descartes wished to do... Found being upon the primacy of knowledge. The opposite is the case.

There is a facticity of human existence. Existence does not mean anthropomorphic existence. It is the existence of being, which is clearly not limited to what is human or 'consciousness.' The essence of consciousness is existence and it is in a sense capable of being anything it is (of). We cannot do any possible thing because of our facticity. But existence, that is, the existence of everything can do any possible thing, but only if it can. For is it not true that what can happen will happen?

LOL!

am sorry but you are merely playing with words there. Let's say we are talking from our perception of a door. Does that mean a door is not really a door but its a concept we impose on the object? — Terran Imperium

Well, this is not a question easily answered. It involves an epistemological theory. What you are speaking from is known as realism. Furthermore, this is an empirical realism you are speaking from. The epistemology of trans philosophy is different fundamentally.

This is the root of the differences.

Gender depends on sex but sex doesn't depend on gender. Sex is a biological reality.

Feminist literature as it apparently exists doesn't get to change the meaning of words when they feel like it. — Terran Imperium

According to your epistemology, which is not very accurately based.

What about linguistic gender? Why is tree masculine and plant feminine in German? What are these demarcations of knowledge?
They are arbitrary.

Since gender regards identity, and human identity is of consciousness, of personality and furthermore of thought; and since thought is the determinant of gender, with regard to the gender variations of language that structure reality, the gender of a personality, in terms of its psychological constitution in the strict sense of the word (logos + Psyche), regards not the material world (which your realism regards) and facticity but consciousness carte blanche.
@yatagarasu@Banno@TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, this is what Descartes has provided. However. Existence is not a subject. It doesn't seem to me that it is.

The only subject of Descartes would be consciousness. But consciousness is not existence. Existence is being and being preceeds essence. Consciousness is always consciousness of something it is not. Consciousness of consciousness is simply consciousness. There need not be an idea ideae of this. This is due to the illusion of the primacy of knowledge

I have many textual parallels between them. I thought this was obvious.
But I don't know how to publish. I have many things I would like to publish but I don't know where to start. I am naive in this regard.

Well that is why I stay out of the idle talk and average everydayness of Das Man, to use some terms of Heidegger.

In other words, this talk by 'them' about the abstraction of 'transgenderedism' is fundamentally inauthentic, as it does not relate to any specification of personality or existence, but of an objective generalization of what it might be for someone who fits under that category.

There must be, to remain within a sphere or paridigm of authenticity, a separation between what is real, like my trans friend Ryan and me the homosexual, and this talk of trans people and homosexuals.

But what does all of that really mean? It seems to me that all of that which you are speaking about only has meaning in terms of curiosity or fascination or infatuation.

The most important thing about transgenderedism, in my opinion, is that it is empowering of people expressing humanity carte blanche.

Well, I think people use the public discourse on transgenderedism as an outlet and a medium by which they can identify how they feel about themselves. For instance, I am gay. If there was not a public discourse on acceptance and the 'ratifying' of homosexuality as authentic then I would have probably not felt as comfortable in my own skin and probably would not have been able to feel as comfortable with my 'partner' in public. In other words, I probably would not be as open about our relationship to people. And I would feel more alienated by others. So it is important to have an atmosphere of understanding about transgenderedism so people can feel more encouraged.

"The disintegration of Protestantism into over 400 different denominations is a sure sign that the restlessness continues." Carl Jung

Christianity is at base a rejection of human life. It is at base an abject, wretched revolt against humanity. It is slave morality. The idea that humanity has to be saved through a slaughtering of God is absolutely grotesque. Furthermore, blood ritual and cannibalism?

The Garden of Love
BY WILLIAM BLAKE

I went to the Garden of Love,
And saw what I never had seen:
A Chapel was built in the midst,
Where I used to play on the green.

And the gates of this Chapel were shut,
And Thou shalt not. writ over the door;
So I turn'd to the Garden of Love,
That so many sweet flowers bore.

And I saw it was filled with graves,
And tomb-stones where flowers should be:
And Priests in black gowns, were walking their rounds,
And binding with briars, my joys & desires.

Love is the root of truth and communicability. Love is the superlative exchange.

It originates with conventional gender non-conformists... It has been taken up by media and other whatevers, but this is mostly because it is a revolutionary way of thinking.

Jung did not reject Freud. Freud rejected Jung. But Jung was always a Freudian! Freud taught him so much. The difference between them was that Freud was way more strict, not very interested in the things Jung was interested in, namely the collective unconscious, synchronicity, religious beliefs and mystical experience. Jung's idea was all about individuation. As well, Jung came up with an Electra complex, akin to Freud's Oedipus complex... Freud rejected this as well. But in the end Jung was still a proponent of Freud's, for instance, 3 essays on the theory of sexuality or his dream interpretation. Jung thought there was an aspect of the Psyche that was not contingent on experience, and that perhaps contained "a biological order from DNA" of beliefs, fantasies and configurations of thought and feeling. He called these the archetypes, and there are many. He substantiated this idea with different forms of evidence that Freud would have never used, because Freud only wanted to establish what could be strictly falsifiable. He wanted an explanation more than an exploration.

Nietzsche's idea of accepting someone's own darkness and becoming "beyond good and evil" is a cornerstone of Freud and Jung. Freud did not adhere to the common conceptions of how things were. He went beyond in order to establish a psychology, which is precisely what Nietzsche says in Beyond Good and Evil.

Creation ex nihilo means a creation out of nothing or from nothing. This is absurd.

Existence making something, namely that which is beyond itself (objectivity) is absolutely impossible for such a subjectivity could not even have the representation of an objectivity, much less be affected with the will to create it.