When else are you called a Nihilist for not accepting something is perfect? If there was a one logic it would still be people using it.There might be one way things are and many ways to understand it without being 'truth adverse' or whatever that system would look like; mostly free association with sprinkles?

Okay, so you think the PNC can be violated without being destroyed? — Leontiskos

I think we don't know that it can't. Things are certainly going to remain contradictory in many cases.

Again, I would suggest focusing on the argument I gave, not some argument you are afraid I will give at some point in the future. — Leontiskos

Not presupposing anything other than you don't get to assume the PNC is a LNC in an argument about whether logical systems can find themselves in opposition and remain true. Does it break a lot of rules about doing philosophy? Yes and no, ironically.

Where do you find that claim, "They aren't logical without total adherence?" — Leontiskos

Implied by stating it's violation is a destruction.

Can you answer the question? Do you agree with the argument? If you disagree then please explain which premise you oppose. — Leontiskos

I haven't encountered all the P logics, so it's inductive. Very persuasive, easy to corroborate, sound, etc.

If two proper logical systems arrive at a contradiction I think we just call it a singularity and move right along. I don't think the argument, no one would normally have to make, has been made. A counter-example of the PNC doesn't destroy it in the sense it hasn't been demonstrated.

I disagree with the first premise. They could have systematic disagree and remain consistent in their conclusions. Somehow, presumably. Or how they couldn't is the argument and this premise is the conclusion. Hence, light begging of the question.

I don't see it. It doesn't say "pluralism implies a contradiction, thus not-pluralism" but rather "if pluralism then not-PNC.*" How does this give priority to PNC? One might affirm pluralism here and just deny PNC. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I was reading this part as making the PNC conclusive. "Destroyed"? Things will remain contradictory even if there exists more than one way to arrive at a conclusion following a self-consistent process. In any other thread I would agree, but if the matter is logic itself then it cost a bit of the contextual adherence to the assumption that the PNC is a boundary that can't be crossed. Granted it's a nuanced question begging, but I'm curious about the follow through.

So we end up with this:
The "true/correct logics" either contradict one another or they don't.
If they do, then the PNC has been destroyed.
If they don't, then we are no longer talking about logical pluralism. — Leontiskos

Pick your poison. Your thesis is that there are true/correct logics with nothing in common, such that we cannot call their similarity logic in a singular sense, and we cannot apply a rational aspect under which they are the same. — Leontiskos

They aren't logical without total adherence seems strong, not incorrect or unintuitive.

I could go along with your suggestion as a way-point, but not as a conclusion. If the argument is sound and the premises true, then if the conclusion is false something is amiss and must eventually be addressed. — Banno

I just go around assuming I'm wrong a lot. It's gotten less efficient with age and education but I'm always the one pleasantly surprised at the end. So, we have systems that allow for the occasional violation of the PNC or has a suitable alternative been found?

Leon seems guilty of making a strong assertion in favor of the PNC being conclusive. There's a bit of tentative weight inherent in the PNC that it could be both sub-dominate and remain legitimately problematic.

To your point though I think the detail is in the nature or a better word for how our reality is both seemingly real in a naive sense and yet participatory. I can acknowledge a logical argument, note the premises are correct and concede the conclusion while believing it's wrong. Logic is contractual discourse.

That'd be logical nihilism. What is being suggested is logical pluralism.

You might try
1. If we have discursive knowledge, then there are true/correct logics
L1. We have discursive knowledge.
L2. Therefore, there are true/correct logics. — Banno

Are we confusing true/correct with simply consistent? All of our ideas agree therefore the symbols we use to represent them must construct actual truth, feels like a reach.

I think the problem there is that are trying to understand micro quantum phenomena using macro concepts. So is a quantum particle anything like a particle of sand, or a quantum wave anything like macro wave phenomena? It seems to be not a true paradox and in part at least a terminological issue. — Janus

It's been reconciled as a particle floating on a wave as well. But, that gets into 3d space. Anyway, seems like I lost the beat. I probably need to read a bit. Banno brought charts to a word fight.

A circle is a drawing or something imagined. it doesn't have a "back" since it is a representation of a two dimensional object. So it's not clear what you are proposing. — Janus

Making an argument for impossible things it seems. I maintain that a square circle ought to be perfectly round and have four corners regardless of how it appears. And if one was found then it would meet that criteria. Logically it can't exist by definition, but neither can a single point that's a wave and here we are.

Granted it seems intuitively accurate, but what logic prevents it? You could cut a square out on the back of a circle. And argue which side defines the object.

Frank, how would a square circle look? That is how would you know something was a square circle? — Janus

Perfectly round with four corners.

A thought came to mind about Kant's (still useful) way of breaking up the world. Logic is a way of recognizing rules. This is how information is parsed out. Scientific principles regard distilling correlations to a point of being able to distill rules. The two logics are different- one has to do with language pattern, and one has to do with empirical patterns. However, they are both intertwined, as the rules of logic seem embedded in language, something that comes prior to the empirical correlation-distillation that takes place in the cultural practice of scientific research. — schopenhauer1

The framing in the OP seems to lean towards the idea that "logic" is "formal logic." Thus, we speak of "languages," "systems," and "games" and difficulties within or between formalisms as problems for "logic." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with both statements in acknowledging the difference between logic as a transmission protocol and logic as it happens about the mind. Saying our rules for making statements are imperfect doesn't establish that the world can't make sense.

↪Cheshire Yep - although the rigour is predominantly provided by mathematics rather than syllogism. And I sympathise with the conceit that science is essentially liberal. — Banno

Specifically, it's provided by Statistical mathematics which reaches for an approximation to the truth. Which is probably why it's reliable, unlike syllogism which fails to account for unknown error. Which points to my earlier misadventures of pointing out that knowing A; entails the possibilty of being wrong about A and asserting it is true. The problem isn't in the system of logic but the flux of the evidence.

'What is, is' only works if you're correct about what it is initially.

So Logical Nihilism has me returning to what I had taken as pretty much settled; that scientific progress does not result from a more or less algorithmic method - induction, falsification and so one - but is instead the result of certain sorts of liberal social interaction - of moral and aesthetic choice. — Banno

I think we have to differentiate "doing science" and presenting scientific evidence. Inspirational moments and the willingness to try anything isn't the same thing as establishing support for a conclusion. Popper is pretty clear on this point. He encourages people - sometimes - often times the wrong people to question scientific fact and make bold guesses. And insists they try to prove themselves wrong with tests. So, perhaps the thought process is as it's quoted by you but the rigor might be closer to algorithmic.

Drop in after a couple years to concede your point on knowledge and find you discussing Popper and Russell. Anyways, you're probably right. Whatever that means.

It seems like it would be within civil liberty to start a religion. I wouldn't recommend it, but I wouldn't oppose it.

We defined knowledge as perfectly true and then decided we could rationally doubt anything.

It was a deliberate weapons test. They even avoided bombing the city earlier in the war so they could better measure the outcome. The bombs purpose was to demonstrate military supremacy and complete the most expensive weapons program in history with real data. Dropping nuclear bombs is not a part of negotiating a surrender. The question of morality is simple objectively; it's obviously immoral to target civilians and dropping nuclear weapons on cities targets civilians. At the time the US and Japanese had grown quite comfortable with killing each other so I doubt the sanctity of human life was the issue at hand. There's a big difference in thinking you have a super weapon and everyone one knowing you have a super weapon. The power gained from the confirmation and demonstration was the purpose. The war was the plausible context that facilitated it.

Or not.

My entire argument is the entire argument. Please read it. — Philosophim

I did and then you decided this all only applies to the limited context of "places divided by sex". I was trying to clarify your context. You said in public it doesn't matter at all. Seems Ad-hoc.

We are talking about places that are divided by sex. My claim is that gender does not override sex division, because gender and sex are different. — Philosophim

So, your entire argument is regarding the caveat moments such as dressing rooms and bathrooms?

Do you run around tearing wigs off of bald people? Do you refuse to acknowledge that they appear to have hair? Same difference. It's rude to point out that someone's wearing a wig; there's nothing to be gained by "proving" bald people wrong about their false hair. They would like to be accepted as having hair, because they feel more comfortable that way. It's the way they instinctively, naturally, or whatever word for inherent effect you like; find they want to interact with society.

It turns out to be effortless to allow someone to exist.

I'll make a concession that trying to enforce social decency(treating people the way they present themselves) has been poorly handled. Insisting someone is literally a different sex when it's intuitively a contradiction to a lot of the public has just made things worse. I more or less adopted the opinion of a surgeon that performs the procedures. In his words, the result is a feminized man or the inverse. The alteration seems to help but no one thinks they have become a different sex. They feel they moved closer to the sex they identify with and the remaining difference is something they continue to reconcile. So, let them be, I wouldn't wish that burden on anyone. In closing, let women's sports regulate women's sports. They were managing just fine without the public's input.

Oddly enough the last two times I had to comply was to avoid the homeowners association community management company for towing it away from my own home. The administrator elected to interpret the by-laws of the community as stating any vehicle without a current state inspection to be effectively abandoned. So, in my case I was/am paying someone to threaten my possession of my legally owned vehicle with their arbitrary interpretation of what constitutes abandonment. Rules are funny things.

It seems like people will go out of there way to be legally compliant. I have to get the vehicle I drive inspected knowing there's nothing wrong with it once a year. I have decided to ignore it and found the alternative more of a hassle.

Or not.

Do people value truth? In the sense of ideals, certainly. In application it's contextual.

If they are trying to dismantle a bomb then the truth of which wire to cut is very valuable. But, no one wants to sit through a movie listening to someone constantly remark about how it never happened and pointing out these are all just actors. So, evidently we are selective when it comes to whether the truth of things interests us. We like being right, I think. Which means confirmatory truths are pleasing. But I'd hesitate to say that's the same as valuing idealistic truth.

Or not.

The Mona Lisa is just a painting of a girl.

Odds are when I wrote this last year; I had accepted the premise that philosophy needed some sorting out(missing the point). She's making the same point Popper does more or less. Which is to return to a useful state where the proper application of some rational skepticism will take some one a lot further intellectually than all the poetic squabbling.

In other news I did finally get an important looking piece of paper from a degree granting institution, so thanks for the assist.

I never had to reference a Sanskrit dictionary before, so kudos. You run into a bit of a problem with a declaration of we can't distinguish real vs unreal because it's making a statement about a "real" state of affairs if you believe it. I think holding the world as tentatively real acknowledges the corroborating evidence we find.

The arguments I've heard are along the lines of probability that more lives could be simulated than could exist; but that argument still requires at least one real world. There's nothing that requires any simulations to exist. So, in any case (such as this one) the expected value for a real world is 1 and the number of simulations is between 0 and unknown. The reasonable bet is on a known outcome, until we know there exists simulations of real worlds where people exist and can't tell the difference.

It would have to be a pretty lousy simulation if the people in it were constantly pointing out they were in a simulation. Really, at that point it ceases to be a simulation and just is the context. So, any answer is that we simply live in our version of the real world. Which is where we were when we asked in the first place. Why's my cat acting funny? Probably the hurricane.

But what I am trying to get at is this though, is the argument the guy posted right or was I correct in my questioning of it. Philosophy is my weak point but even I could see the rest of his post isn't consistent with solipsism. — TerraHalcyon

He's bending solipsism a bit toward participatory realism. It's right in the sense it's his particular view on the matter. You are correct in saying that he's putting forward solipsism in a novel way. There's a form of solipsism that's fun to think about and a good framework for learning to develop arguments for things. What's more attractive than a seemingly obvious truth that you are surrounded by a world with things and at the same time if some one doubted it you might be pressed to prove it.

However there is also the result of combining 2 things most people poorly understand like the Copenhagen interpretation of QM and the moment of consciousness experience often adding some agreeable assumptions and trying to derive something coherent to say about it. I don't like signing into Quora so I can't comment beyond the initial statement.

It's an interesting question you raise; what is the "right" way to consider the most subjective thing.

To settle the other matter; odds are our technology has outpaced our evolution to the point we are receiving "good" information that surpasses our minds experience of the world. Ergo, it doesn't make sense.

I'm not a theist, but I don't reject free will. — T Clark

I should clarify the point. The belief that free will is historically an affirmative indication of a theist world. Not simply that one implies the other. Suggesting the existence of a historical bias, rather than a logical implication. Si?

I guess we have no choice but to ask what decision should we make in a world where we can not make decisions. — T Clark

If we're content in treating the matter as a deliberately unresolvable philosophical soccer ball, then perhaps. Best I can tell is that free will is rejected solely because at some point it was understood to be a product of a creator God. Post enlightenment rejection of religion seems to be more appealing than dismissing the hollow argument that free will implies random action, so the game goes on.

If there is no free will then we are holding people accountable as a product of determinism(or insert variant x). Really, it's an attempt at reductio ad absurdum of determinism that fails, because of the assumption we could choose to not hold people accountable. When someone does something we are compelled by x to hold them accountable. Or put another way; what sense does it make to ask what decision should we make in a world where we can not make decisions.

So what is one to make of the moral character of folk who hold someone who tortures folk unjustly in the highest esteem? — Banno

They assume God's got a really good reason they can't understand. Probably don't want to get tortured. It's kind of a hostage situation.

Probably mobility. The inability to leave the places suffering the effects of everything mentioned.

If you want to find some ulterior motives for me making this thread, you will be disappointed, since pretty much my only motive for this thread was described in my original text: I don't like how taboo the subject of inequality is in the modern world and how it's being discussed. — Qmeri

I'm trying to find a primary motive. You have some imagined debate between pro and anti "equality". You haven't presented an argument or thesis yet. It's just this oscillation between evasion and vague reference. Would you like to argue that some people are more intrinsically valuable than others based on their genetic composition? Or rather argue that you can't argue the above because people assume it's racist? Once again, if you can decide what you are talking about perhaps someone else will discuss it, because this is a bit tedious.

I’ve read every comment in this thread and I have no idea what the OP actually wants us to discuss. — laura ann

It's an attempt to justify inequality with genetic basis. Instead of saying a minority group is disadvantaged from centuries of oppression OP would prefer to suggest that the present is truly representative of an individual's merit and nothing else. They test drive these racist "dog whistle" arguments periodically. Its quaint.

Well, let's say I want to reproduce with someone, but it turns out that 80% of that persons family has a very serious genetic disorder. That would most certainly be a factor in my value judgment of whether I want to reproduce with that person. — Qmeri

Wouldn't the concern be a function of the genes you carry and your counterparts family history regarding genetic disorders?

And in terms of political value judgments... For example knowing whether or not and how much the differences in school test scores is affected by genetics makes a huge difference on what is the best way to deal with such differences. — Qmeri

This is rather specific. Is this what you have in mind primarily, but are avoiding discussing outright?

Qualia is useful for thinking outside the box while in the box.

Name two different human genetic populations.
— Cheshire

Finns and the swedes, texans and new yorkers, ancient people in britain and ancient people in china, your family and the family next door... Any two different populations are two different genetic populations... And depending on what you study... For example trying to find possible genetic causes for a disease, or using ancient dna to figure out peoples movements and such about history... It is often very useful to compare the genetics of different populations. — Qmeri

And you want to determine their sameness? Or just place arbitrary value judgements on differences that you find appealing? Somewhere in-between perhaps?

You are not talking about the methodologies of discourse on equality — Qmeri

The title says the modern equality movement. A movement is not a methodology of discourse. I'm not sure what a methodology for discourse would be outside of legislative order and process. If you can figure out what your talking about; perhaps we can discuss it.