Whatever I experience I experience as an idea in my mind — philosophy

Even if we took this for granted, it does not mean that idealism must be true- perhaps some form of dualism is true.

it is impossible to perceive an unperceived object by definition. — philosophy

Even we took this for granted, it only reveals an epistemic limitation of what we know.

belief in the external world, i.e. a world independent of my experience of it, cannot be based on reason but on faith. — philosophy

I am certain that some philosopher might agree with you, but not from the two points you made.

Do you think such a view can be refuted? — philosophy

The better question is what good reason is there to believe in X?
Think about the claims made by people who say they were abducted by aliens; they are typically unfalsifiable, but there is no good reason to believe them.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJdlO6esWr8

This is a debate that people should watch.

If eternalism is true, then the argument from motion won't work, but perhaps the theist will try to use the argument from contingency and argue that the universe is still contingent, nonetheless.

A paradox is indicative that you have an underlying logic error. — Devans99

Where are you getting your information from?

A paradox is not a contradiction.

There is a logical problem with something you can add to and not change. — Devans99

This is the problem, you are thinking about infinity in the same way that a toddler might count her fingers.

Here is a wonderful summary of why that is wrong which invokes set theory:

"Lane Craig uses an argument ... to ‘establish’ that time cannot be infinite in the past and still proceed into the future, on the ground that an actual infinite cannot exist because, among other reasons, if it did it would be impossible to add to it. But this claim is vitiated by the facts that (i) in contemporary set theory it is easy to show that there exists a sequence of infinite discrete ordered sets each with a greatest but no smallest member, each set extending its predecessor by an additional largest element; and (ii) the things in the domain of any consistent theory, as set theory is thought to be, are possible existents. " -Philosopher Colin Howson

it just says an infinite set exists without actually proving anything. — Devans99

They want to show that there is no logical problem with an actual infinity

Potential infinity (as in calculus's limit concept) is a great tool. Actual infinity (as in set theory's transfinite nonsense) is not a usual tool; it just leads to paradoxes. Cantor's paradox, Galileo's paradox, Hilbert's hotel etc... — Devans99

https://www.skepticink.com/reasonablyfaithless/2013/03/25/infinity-minus-infinity/

What do you think of this mathematician's defense of actual infinities?

What reason do we have to think that an actual infinite is impossible?

It can't be logically impossible since the statement "every natural number has a successor" entails an infinite series of natural numbers.

I think the only useful way to think about mind (or strictly speaking the rational intellect) is in terms of 'that which interprets meaning'.

So what is the metaphysical nature of the mind? Is it physical or not?

What Dennett argues, is that what we interpret as subjective experience, is really the result of the unconscious competence of billions of cellular automata that give rise to the illusion of the subject. — Wayfarer

So he sounds like a nominalist.

Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences

If dennett is a nominalist, then he will not deny that there are experiences, but he will instead argue that there is no self behind those experiences.

I don't think the mind is a thing.

I see.

It's the result of brain activity in addition to the context of an animal or human in their environment

So what theory of the mind do you subscribe to?

Does an immaterial mind make the hard problem of consciousness any easier?

It seems like it has its own difficulties. Consider that when you walk from place to place, and that there is an immaterial mind and a material world, you experience a change in location, but an immaterial mind is immaterial and should not be able to change from location to location so it seems that an immaterial mind can't explain our commonplace experiences of moving from place to place. Assuming that the mind is immaterial, if you asked, "where is my mind" then you should be guilty of making a category error, but clearly we experience the feeling of moving from one location to another.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson

It looks like Prof. Strawson is a panpsychist.

Suppose that the experience of color was the result of an evolutionary adaption and that color was not a feature of the universe, the person who is dissatisfied with physicalism would suggest that any kind of subjective experience is incompatible with physicalism- that physicalism can't explain these experiences- and that the origins of color are not really the point.

The "hard problem" of consciousness really revolves around what the nature of consciousness is and if physicalism is undermined by it.

is dennett a nominalist in regards to the self?

I think that however one views the self- as a real thing or not- will determine how they explain the experiences of color or whatever else.

If the universe is a "thing" then we conclude that it has a beginning in time

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sl3uoCi9VjI

@15:02 Prof. Feser argues otherwise.

What is meant by #3 is that the existence of things are contingent, and that they are temporal, meaning that they have a beginning and ending in time.

I don't think that is correct. Feser has stated that his argument is unaffected by whether the universe has always existed or not. If the universe is eternal or has existed for all time, then it had no beginning, but Feser believes that his argument still is sound.

#3 seems to treat existence as a property that something may have as either potentially or actually, similar to the potential for hotness. And that just as something that is actually hot "activates" the potential for hotness in another object, so to something that exists activates the potential for existence in another. — Mitchell

Yes, you are correct in your suspicion.

Aquinas, who Prof. Feser has been influenced by, also thought that essence and existence were two different things and that while everything not-God was a composite of these two things, God was non-composite and that his essence was identical to his existence. Thus, the argument is stating that there is pure existence (God) and that this pure existence bequeathed to the material world its existence.

I think that, since the time of Kant and Frege, we have good reason to doubt that existence is a property.

1.) Change occurs (and this cannot be coherently denied - the denial of change is itself a form of change, for example)

Premise one can be coherently denied though; eternalism is such a philosophical view of time that denies the existence of change.

2.) Material objects that change can only do so because they have potentials that have been actualized
3.) A potential cannot be actualized except by something already actual.

It seems like what premise 2 and 3 are saying is that change exists only if "actuality" and "potentiality" exist, but this does not seem obvious at all; consider this alternative: change is the inherent nature of the universe and that for every event there is a temporally precedent event that is its cause.

In this alternative explanation of change, change needs no explanation outside of itself since the existence of change is due to it being the inherent nature of the universe.

Can someone please define what potentiality and actuality are?