Suppose "pi" defines the perfect circle. Do you think that striving to resolve the exact mathematical value of pi would be a case of striving after the ideal? We all think that pi has no end, and to prove that it has no end is a fruitless task, like proving infinite has no end. But what if someone found the end? — Metaphysician Undercover

When writing pi as 3.14159... the dots "..." do not abbreviate the numeric result of an algorithm, rather the dots express that pi is a sequence generating algorithm, as opposed to referring to a particular numeric result of using such an algorithm. Hence "pi has no end" is true in referring to a sequence generating process.

All that said, Wittgenstein wrote remarks on several occasions that indicated his recognition of a theological sense in which mathematicians like Georg Cantor thought of the infinite cardinal numbers as representing platonistic "completed " infinities; namely in Wittgenstein's acknowledgement of the "giddy feelings" that accompany thinking about set-theory from the platonistic perspective, and that have psychologically motivated it's development. Wittgenstein, while clearly recognising this theological motivation and use of mathematics, forewarned that it led to the unnecessary development of confusing and over-complicated formalisms of logic that were misleading when it came to the practical application of logic and mathematics.

Isn't the Hippocratic oath and the entire practice of medicine a political practice? Accusations that the practice of clinical psychology is political therefore require nuance and elaboration. The very ethical notion of "harm" is relative to metaphysical ideas about the self, the state and personal mortality. In a world in which everyone rejected the idea of personal mortality and prioritized the health of the state, a painless suicide wouldn't necessarily be recognized as harm.

If the practice of clinical psychology was politically "neutral", psychologists would able to prescribe financial gifts, holiday cruises and supermodel escorts as remedies for treating depressed patients, as opposed to prescribing them "numbing" medications and talk therapies ....but this runs up against society's need to prioritize it's finite resources. So there cannot be a politically neutral practice of psychology.

The notions of mental illness, diagnosis and treatment, are better understood holistically from a utilitarian perspective. It is never the lone individual who is diagnosed and treated for a mental illness, but the individual as part of a wider cross-section of society whose broader interests are often in conflict with the individual. The particular interests of the psychology profession are but one component of this greater good.

Consider the game Cluedo. Who killed Dr Black?

- The "fact" as to the identity of the murderer refers, by convention, to a single name within the envelope in the middle of the board.

- The fact is constructed to be a hidden element of a finite set of suspects that is also decided by convention and known a priori to all players.

-The fact is decidable within finite time.

-At any time during play, a player's belief-space consists of the finite set of cards he knows of, but has not so far personally witnessed during this game.

So in this game, there is a clear convention for distinguishing epistemology from metaphysics, that is to say, for distinguishing 'belief' from 'fact'. The question the OP raises, as i understand it, concerns the extent to which the Cluedo model of truth applies in the real world.

Consider for example, what if two names were placed inside the envelope? Does this modified game denote epistemological uncertainty, or metaphysical ambiguity as to the culprit? Doesn't the answer to this question depend upon whether a second game will be played as a decider?

the practice of psychiatry isn't politically neutral, either on the side of the patient who requests a diagnosis due to failing to conform to the social values of modern society
— sime
It sounds like your concern about psychiatry relates to its practice in the criminal justice system, where the subject is not the doctor's client. That will always be problematic, just as it is with forensic pathologists and police surgeons.

But we can't avoid having that involvement, can we? What would be your preferred model for dealing with someone that is alleged to have committed a brutal crime and who pleads insanity or is suspected to be suffering from severe mental illness? — andrewk

If we accept that individuals are not self-causing agents, and therefore if we understand the concept of guilt pragmatically, in other words we define a person's guilt in terms of the social benefits of sentencing the individual, then we certainly need much more than mere analysis of the subject's brain, and in many instances the status of the subject's brain is irrelevant.

And exactly the same logic applies when diagnosing the average depression.

If psychiatry is a science which t accepts that individuals are not self-causing agents, then I cannot see how psychiatric evaluation as currently practiced is particularly relevant to establishing guilt.

Those linguistic conventions are presumably shared expressions of our belief. And here I am trying to use your terms.

Are you suggesting that we cannot have a conversation in which we both talk about the same thing?

Because I know that's wrong. — Banno

How is disagreement possible if we really are talking about the same thing?

By "the same thing" I include any intuition or phenomena that the observer experiences as a result of their mental state. So if we look at the same sky and disagree about tomorrows weather due to having had different past experiences, we aren't looking at the same thing by my definition.

Suppose someone says "Only the sky we share before us is objective, and our private intuitions are subjective and irrelevant". This isn't a deep epistemological statement about the world we experience, this is merely a statement about a linguistic convention that ignores the private facts of each person.

It might have practical significance. What if the equation in question controls a piece of machinery, and getting it wrong means the machinery fails? Rocket fails to launch, bridge collapses, patient dies. That kind of thing. I think I would be correct in saying that it then becomes a matter of objective fact. — Wayfarer

Right. But does this necessitate the concepts of truth and falsity? Don't all statements refer to objective facts, even the so-called "false" or "subjective" ones?

What if we interpret an engineer's words as being necessarily correct whatever he says and whatever happens as a consequence of his words? In other words, we understand an engineer's words in the same way we understand a photograph generated by a camera, that is to say idiosyncratically as a snapshot of the time and place the words were uttered.

To my understanding, the philosophy of trivialism understands falsification in terms of miscalibration; a person's words can be taken-wrongly by a community as a consequence of the person disobeying a linguistic convention. And his words are taken-rightly by community once it identifies the causes of his words.

If someone looked at an equation on a blackboard, and said ‘that’s wrong’, is that a matter that can be explained in terms of stimulus and response? — Wayfarer

If all stimuli impacting upon the individual accounted for, both external to and within the individual, then I am at a loss to know whatever else "that's wrong" could refer to.

It is only by linguistic convention that the shared expressions of our beliefs are said to refer to the same object, and our conventions fools us into thinking that "right" and "wrong" have deep epistemological significance.

It isn't clear a priori what the object of a belief could be, other than the immanent and immediate stimuli that provoked the expression of the belief.

If someone looks at dark clouds in the sky and says "it is about to rain", the object of the belief is on any scientific explication of subject's stimulus-response, nothing more than the presence of dark clouds in combination with the subject's mental state, making the belief a necessarily true statement concerning only the present. A contradiction of a belief by a future course of events is then a contradiction obtained via post-hoc revision of linguistic convention.

"There-is-no-objective-truth" is self-inconsistent if understood to be a universal proposition. The same is true of any negative universal proposition that is self-applicable, since this leads to a liar sentence.

Rather than viewing the liar sentence as a proposition possessing inconsistent static meaning, instead consider it to be a performative speech-act that when repeatedly applied to itself creates a dynamic alternating sequence of unstable outcomes. This way the liar sentence is no longer interpreted as being in conflict with itself, but as merely yielding instability.

The "spirit" of any word isn't it's definition.

Suppression of doubt is critical for a good performance, especially when hecklers are in the audience. And the sense of any proposition is in relation to it's performance.

An image is ideal if it is the image of one's striving.

For example, this imagined polygon doesn't satisfy my striving for symmetry and smoothness. So i imagine a "limiting polygon" that I call a "perfect circle", where "limiting polygon" is my vague imagination of the Sun which is sufficiently vague and unstable that I cannot make sense of counting its sides. The image satisfies my craving, but not the striving.

I can certainly imagine a "perfect circle", an "infinite extension", an "ideal body" and so on.

But "perfect", "ideal" and "infinite" aren't passive and objective descriptions of my observations, rather they are expressions of active speech-acts I commit (including cravings I may have) in relation to my observations. For example, If I am hungry then A Big Mac might seem the "perfect" burger.

Presumably, this is how the later Wittgenstein understood ideality. Any advice he gives is therapeutic advice whose objective is to prevent cravings for cravings sake.

I think therefore I am. You think therefore you are. Hence solipsism is wrong. Simple. — Devans99

To me, your thoughts exist in a different sense to mine. Certainly the word "solipsism" does not possess a shareable public sense (hence the lack of solipsism conventions), but that is of course of no concern to the solipsist.

What valid reasoning/logic allows for solipsism to not necessarily be true? — gsky1

Well, can't you fathom the vibe of the extrovert's mindset when he says "the world exists without me"?

Is there really more to it than that? (The issue here being about the sense of an expression rather than truth)

I am under the impression that those who discount presentism do so, because they interpret presentism as a variant of realism about time and causality, where the ontological basis of that temporal realism is the present.

But if so, this is a strawman argument, for there is no indication that presentists are realist about time and causality. I think that a presentist can interpret any statement presently, including any statement asserting temporal realism and eternalism. So in some sense I think the presentist would find debates about presentism pointless. For he would interpret both sides of the debate as a construction of the present.

Presentism is certainly a dramatically different viewpoint upon the meaning of the past. But in a sufficiently simple universe, presentist understanding of the past would be perfectly aligned with physical understanding of the past.

For example, suppose we lived in a very simple universe in which only the earth and the sun existed. Then looking at the appearance of the sun through a telescope, a presentist and a physicist might both say "We call this appearance of the sun "eight minutes ago". "

In reality, the reason why neither the presentist nor the physicist are prepared to say that "eight minutes ago" is the merely a name for the appearance of the sun, is because "eight minutes ago" is a holistic and open-ended collection of inferences in relation to our entire lives and anticipated experiences that we cannot call into mind simultaneously. Hence we are unable to define "eight minutes ago" in terms of our experiences, even though we are readily prepared to judge some of our experiences as referring to "eight minute ago".

Yet in a sufficiently simple and closed universe, "eight minutes a go" would be definable as an adjective referring to immediate experience, like "reddish", "circular", "rough-looking" etc.

Realists are right to point out that the meaning of past-contingent propositions transcend individual acts of verification or constructions out of sense-data. The anti-realist (including the presentist) should concede this, without feeling forced to conclude that the concept of the past transcends the entirety of experience.

Hence like the logical positivist Ayer, the presentist ought to be skeptical of any particular doctrine of verificationism, but not necessarily the spirit of verificationism.

If you look at the difference between past eternity and future eternity, the the first is a completed infinity whilst the 2nd is not. — Devans99

If the present is considered to be the origin of one's spatio-temporal coordinate space, then there is no reason to consider past eternity to be any more complete than future eternity.

For example, a constructivist and anti-realist interpretation of time might consider both the past and future to be ongoing constructions that are semantically reducible to sense-data and memory. This view does not imagine time to be a completed and directed cartesian axis, with the past and future occupying opposite ends.

The same is also true of certain models of cosmology, for example the Hawking-Hartle Model that does not single out any point of space-time as being the unique causal-origin.

What is the point of that question? You could play that game with any profession: what is a lumberjack without their cutting down of trees, what is Chris Froome without his bicycle, or Serena Williams without her racquet? — andrewk

What distinguishes the practice of psychiatry from the above, is that the the reason for the practice of psychiatry isn't politically neutral, either on the side of the patient who requests a diagnosis due to failing to conform to the social values of modern society, nor on the side of the psychiatrist who is diagnosing according to an illness ontology that is based on a narrow conception of an individual that serves capitalist interests in endorsing a particular system of moral judgement.

In the criminal justice system and the welfare state , psychiatrists and psychologists play the role of priests who in effect deliver a moral judgement of an individual in the guise of the presence or absence of a mental illness diagnosis, that is largely subjective with respect to unreliable and incomplete proto-scientific evidence. Of course the psychiatrist will claim to be only giving the best possible objective psychological diagnosis, but he is rarely paid for this reason, for his diagnosis is used by other institutions and juries to reward or punish a 'weakly performing' individual in relation to society's values.

In case anyone hasn't read Quine's Word and Object, I'd recommend reading it simultaneously with PI, especially for the clarity of Quine's behaviourist arguments regarding the indeterminacy of translation. The challenge is then to reconcile the two philosophers. (I think any conflict is mostly a style issue, for Quine's definition of "science" was a very broad and immanent church)

It sounds like you are describing the problem of clustering; for any collection of elements that are pairwise related by some measure of similarity, how many clusters are there, and where are the boundaries?

One potential criticism of this formulation, is that it assumes the notion of an element as an axiom from which the cluster-membership of elements is inferred, as well as an a priori metric of similarity. It is a logically atomic model that models clustering as a type of induction.

Perhaps this could be circumvented by treating elements as being another type of relation that is itself a relation between similarity relations(!), such that every subset of relations is understood to be a sub-configuration of a semantically inseparable whole structure. I'm thinking of Tensor Algebra here, as is used in Quantum Field Theory to describe entanglement between an undetermined number of particles that are themselves defined in terms of a global field fluctuation.

I think of potential infinity as iterative processes carried out in time and then as actual infinity as the result of carrying on these iterative processes 'forever'.

Or potential infinity is like the limit concept from calculus and actual infinity is like an infinite set.

Potential infinity is unbounded, actual infinity is out of bounds. — Devans99

What does imagining "forever" consist of? For example, I imagine walking for some time along a row of trees that has no end in sight. Then I say to myself "this is forever", and then I abruptly stop imagining walking along the row of trees in order to get on with the rest of my life.

But i could have imagined exactly the same thing when imagining potential infinity. Perhaps the only difference, is that in this case I might include my stoppage of the imagined scene as being part of my meaning of "potential infinity".

This seems to imply that the distinction between potential vs actual infinity is arbitrary.

It is the term 'Potential Infinity' that comes to mind when thinking of computers. I don't have a problem with potential infinity, its 'Actual Infinity' that is the problem. — Devans99

But is it even possible to define a difference between actual vs potential infinity? Supposing you were confronted by a skeptic who doubted the semantic distinction between these concepts. How can you force the skeptic to accept that there is a semantic distinction without appealing to circularity or falling into infinite regress?

have you considered interpreting infinity to mean an under-determined finite number?

For in practice, (as in the software engineering application of infinite loops), infinity is only used to denote the absence of an a priori stopping condition. But an a priori absence of a stopping condition is not the same thing as failing to stop in practice.

This paradox is related to Markov's Principle:

"if it is impossible that an algorithm does not terminate, then it does terminate."

Sounds undeniable right? But then what does "does not terminate" mean exactly? After all, the phrase "does not terminate" has only ever been uttered in the presence of an event that is interpreted and verified according to a linguistic convention - therefore, according to constructive semantics "does not terminate" must refer to something observable (for example, the C syntax while(true) {...} )

Conversely, an event which is literally absent, namely termination, cannot have caused the utterance "does not terminate". Therefore according to constructivism, "does not terminate" can only refer to the absence of an a priori predictable stopping condition, for example as in the piece of syntax as in the example above, which when actually executed is invariably terminated eventually.

So if "does not terminate" is interpreted to mean "termination is not predictable", then we can rephrase Markov's Principle to mean:

"If the non-predictability of an algorithm's termination isn't predictable, then the algorithm terminates"

Which is clearly a deniable assertion, since that the premise is purely epistemic in nature whereas the consequent is actual. Consequently, infinity should, at least according to constructivism, be interpreted as a purely epistemic notion in reference to finite numbers or iterations.

No it doesn't. This is not how assessments work. We take into account all external as well as internal factors that could contribute to a persons dysfunction. I'm seeing a lot of you guys make assumptions here without any real support. When I evaluate my clients I take into account all factors. — Anaxagoras

But how is it possible to take these factors into account? What does this analysis consist of? Could an analysis of a patient's cognition, behavior and social welfare by any honest measure be called objectively scientific? Wouldn't you need to observe the patient in situ?

In my personal experience as a psychiatric patient for ADHD and depression, "taking external factors into account" consists of the psychiatrist diagnosing purely on the basis of self-reports that cannot be crosschecked and that are potentially wildly inaccurate, especially considering the political pressure there is on the patient to obtain a supposedly "objective" medical diagnosis for obtaining sick-notes.

Imagine if a dentist operated on teeth purely on the basis of questionnaires and self-reports...

At least in the UK, my experience with the NHS tells me that the cognition and behavior of mental-health patients is not evaluated by clinical psychologists - not even a stroop test - and that psychiatrists only provide superficial consultation services with respect to googleable psychopharmacology.

If the question as to whether or not one's personal identity has changed over time is answered according to experience, then doesn't this demonstrate the philosophical uselessness of the idea of personal identity?

Isn't the Bayesian position that there is no qualitative distinction between assumptions and knowledge? It's all just probabilities with different values. — Echarmion

Even frequentist probability doesn't require a qualitative distinction between assumptions and knowledge, for assumptions can be represented as "pseudo frequencies" to augment actually obtained frequencies and applied to a given likelihood function. No frequentist statistician would reject to this, provided one can provide a real-world justification for those pseudo-frequencies.

The reason Bayesian probability has been so controversial is in it's non-frequentist interpretations and usage of "prior" distributions, for when "prior" distributions are non-controversially applied they ironically represent objective posterior knowledge. And it makes no sense whatsoever to interpret flat priors as representing the state of ignorance of an experimenter, unless that prior is redundant in playing no role whatsoever in subsequent inferences.

If an assertion of ignorance was to influence the calculation of an expectation, then by definition the assertion isn't of ignorance but of knowledge or assumption.

The are two distinct ways of understanding timelessness and immortality. One is to identify timelessness as infinitely extended duration, which many point out is unthinkable or a contradiction. The other is to identity timelessness with tenselessness, designating propositions for which the assignment of a temporal index or duration is nonsensical.

For example, every perceivable event (or even every conceivable event) might be regarded as necessarily having finite duration in being otherwise unperceivable or unthinkable; yet at the same time it might be conceded that the abstract types associated with such events are nevertheless tenseless.

For example, it make sense, at least to my mind, to insist that the actual Elvis Presley, in the sense of a particular rock-star who grew fat bingeing on burgers while living in Graceland, was mortal. Yet the concept of Elvis Presley must be tenseless, for otherwise how can I currently make sense of the claim that "Elvis no longer exists"?

An informal way of expressing this is to say that the King can never die... Perhaps a better way of expressing this is to say that one's private imagination only acquires tense indirectly through it's practical application in the world, via calibrating it's imagery to the world's public convention of temporal semantics.

Firstly, in my opinion, Bayesian probability should be interpreted as being reducible to frequentist statistics. For ultimately the empirical distribution in front of us is all there is. A so-called 'prior' is what happens when an observed empirical distribution, say f(x,y), is mathematically represented as a product g(x)h(x,y). From this product it is clear that the so-called 'prior' g(x) is nothing more than a factor of the observed distribution f, and that g does not possess meaning that is independent of the "likelihood" h (and vice versa).

Yet in scientific practice Bayes' rule is usually used for prescriptive induction; it is often the case that g is derived from a different data-set from that used to derive h, such that the product of g and h constructs an unseen joint-distribution that is used to make novel inferences. As with all induction, no statistical justification for this can be given and Bayesian statisticians should remain silent.

Of course, g and h are rarely known explicitly and are more naturally represented in terms of computer programs representing our physical knowledge and assumptions from which we can simulate a distribution of pseudo-data for comparison against new real-world data.

But none of that should detract from the fact that g together with h are synonymous with empirical knowledge + empirical assumptions ; for whatever we are ignorant about can play no role in our predictions or calculations.

Returning to your question, it is under-determined without reference to a distribution correlating independent witness reports to the identity of lottery winners. Of course, we might say that we know this intuitively and are prepared to make an induction, but this further serves to illustrate why Bayesian statistics is pretty useless as a formalism for directly expressing prescriptive induction.

But even an anti-realist must have an opinion on whether sensory input data from the past/future actually exists in the same sense as 'nows' sensory input data? — Devans99

From a meaning-as-use perspective, the difference between a past-referring image - such as a photograph of a deceased historical figure, versus a presently-referring image - such as a live-streamed web-cam image, is how those images are used, which is to say that the images activate very different inferences in the mind or behaviour of an observer.

Presumably a realist concerning the past will insist that the difference between these sets of inferences are of a different underlying type in being representative of an underlying commonsensical ontological distinction between past , present and future that transcends an observer's use of the images.

The anti-realist concerning the past will refrain from drawing this ontological distinction, for example because he might understand all inferences as being ultimately present or future referring. For instance, the anti-realist might argue that the very concept of an evidence-based account of history refers to the future possibility of making certain empirically verifiable discoveries by historians and scientists.

At the very least, if commonsense realism concerning temporal semantics is rejected, past present and future in the psychological sense becomes a mixed up place.

Presentism (believe that only now exists) is the opposite view of eternalism (belief that past, present and future are real). — Devans99

Not necessarily. Consider the anti-realist's interpretation of time:

Definition: "Now" is a tenseless designator that refers only to actually occurring sensory input (including thoughts and memories).

Premise: The meaning of "physical time" is reducible to sensory input translated according to the linguistic conventions of physics.

Conclusion: Physical time is tenseless.

But why would the conclusion need to explicit something that already has been said in the premise? I mean, in "P⊃Q", for instance, if you analyze only the consequent, you'll see that "Q" permits "¬P", which is denied by the antecedent. I'm not quite sure what kind of analysis are you doing but I think that analyzing only the conclusion without considering what was stated in the premise isn't the right way. — Nicholas Ferreira

P⊃Q doesn't permit Q⊃¬P in a consistent logic. That case is different to the set-theoretic case, where Fx ∨ Gx permits Fx ∧ Gx and is therefore a weaker statement than the latter.

Of course, in a sense your antecedent might be said to contain your "conclusion" as a weaker premise, but i think it is a mistake to think of your right-hand side as a conclusion because it must forever remain tied to the antecedent if it isn't to be misinterpreted as allowing F and G to be overlapping sets containing multiple members... assuming of course, that you want to represent the number 2 as a union of pairwise disjoint singleton sets.

sime
This is said in the antecedent, not in the conclusion — Nicholas Ferreira

Correct, hence your conclusion permits a possibility denied by your premise.

Why does the conclusion permits "(x or y) or (x & y) to be F & G" if it is said that nothing is simultaneously F and G? — Nicholas Ferreira

Your stated conclusion

(∃x)(∃y)(((Fx∨Gx)∧(Fy∨Gy))∧(x≠y)∧¬(∃z)((z≠x∧z≠y)∧(Fz∨Gz)))

does not say that X or Y cannot simultaneously be F and G.

Therefore your conclusion is weaker than your premise.

The conclusion "exactly two beings are F-or-G" does not follow from

"exactly one being is F and exactly one being is G and nothing is F-and-G"

Because the conclusion permits (x or y) or (x & y) to be F & G.

From a presentist perspective, one's notion of an 'after life' or lack of, refers to one's present state. This is also true from a behaviourist's perspective, since the behavioural semantics of any thought or uttered sentence consists of one's response to one's immediate environment.

Ordinary thinking considers death to be a state of the individual very much like sleeping or being happy. This leads to the commonly accepted but inconsistent assertion that the individual continues to exist in some sense after his death, albeit in a terminal dead state.

A typical atheist might deny asserting this, but this assertion is implicit in sentences like "Elvis is dead", which would not have sense unless Elvis was in some sense still referable after his death.

One way to salvage the meaning of the sentence whilst denying the existence of individual souls, might be to interpret "Elvis is dead" as saying "The name Elvis no longer refers to a public object". The problem is, the sentence now has sense but at the cost of only referring to the name "Elvis".

The mathematical field of Homology (and by extension Cosmology) runs into a similar problem, namely the problem of how to define a hole in a surface purely in terms of the substance of the surface. It gets around this problem by formulating a constructive definition of holes in terms of the cycles that characterise the surface. That way a hole can be described without resorting to a transcendental ontology containing a 'nothing substance'.

Nevertheless we see that Donuts contain 'nothing' in the middle. Which is equivalent to remarking that a sphere cannot be made into Donut unless we tear the middle.

Observing young children can be enlightening in this respect. My nieces appear to agree with one another for the sake of establishing fairness and equality. Wars can happen in any situation in which they perceive that fairness and equality is no longer possible.

As you've demonstrated, to determine is a verb relating two objects; namely a process called a determinator and an object determined through the actions of the determinator.

What if these two objects are considered as constituting a single object? Doesn't the relation of determination disappear?

Suppose that a process we have no understanding of, i.e. an oracle, produced a sequence of a hundred numbers that we do not recognise as following a mathematical law. In which case we might identify the sequence with the oracle's actions. For to say "the oracle determined the sequence" wouldn't say anything over and above the fact that it outputted the sequence. We could have equally said that the oracle performed a miracle. In other words, it would make no sense to say at this point in time that the sequence of numbers that the oracle produced was either random or non-random.

Suppose that we later recognised the sequence as being the Fibonacci sequence. Then the sentence "The Oracle determined the first 100 numbers " has a sense it previously did not have. For in this case we are indicating that we are interpreting the oracle's outputs using at least one additional external process, such as a calculator, that is independent of the oracle's actions and that we might externally appeal to if predicting the oracle's future actions. In which case we might then say that our calculator determines the oracle's actions, or equivalently, that the numbers the oracle produced are non-random.

But what if we considered the calculator and oracle as constituting a single object? Does it now make sense to say that the joint outputs of the calculator and oracle is either random or non-random? The answer is yes, assuming we live in a culture of mathematics that interprets this joint system using external criteria for 'checking' the answer.

But what if we considered all of that together with the oracle? Now the answer is no. For the concepts of determination and randomness are purely representational concepts that are relational and have no universal applicability.