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No, I think hatred is not created by speech. It's created by direct experiences with people who have conflicting interests with you, and who are not willing to compromise on those interests. — Hallucinogen

You may be precisely incorrect. My experience with people who hate each other as groups is that they have very little to do with each other, use mediators when forced to do so because of economic constraints, and know very little about why they live where they do and what makes that life possible.

At the same time, hate speech is personal. You probably have experiences that confirm that observation. But we all can misunderstand our experiences.

i cannot tell from your post which misunderstanding you are expressing.

I think you are looking for the line between crappy things you wish you had not done to other people and the perception of a boundary or frontier that places acts beyond one's own system of justification.

That gets pretty tricky as a matter of conception. The desire to be the one who judges is strong. I have that desire. I am pretty sure everyone else does. But other elements are in play.

I put the shoe on the other foot. What are the other ways to look at my actions that I did not produce as an argument in my defense?

Stupid has its own life.
Think of it as something that wants to be free in the face of attempts to control it.
It is highly probable that our attempts to corral it are related to how it came to be and act. But that is not a simple thing to track down.
For the time being, distinguishing between how events are described is germane. Is stupid only a result or a player?

Unomuno is interesting to read because he is not interested in any kind of immortality that does not include living his already started life forever.

His emphasis puts all the life outside of death. In this view, death doesn't belong to you any more than a soul that could live another life after yours does.

Finitude unhappy with its fundamental conditions.

The agreement to a common understanding
Broke out into a fight
That allowed the trucks to get away with the loot
With few clues to point at what actually went
Down.

But does all morality find its ground in morality? Morality as psychology? Or morality as reason? Clearly the expression of much morality is in such terms as to make it seem psychological. "Should" is a convenient and easy enough argument, and easy enough to swallow, if it must be swallowed. It seems to me, though, that it all originates in reason. Not temporally; not first reason then practice. People do not usually work that way. But as a matter of logically priority. Experience, then reflection on that experience to unearth basic principles, reasons. Thus, to Brett, (human) morality comes into being in man, but is grounded in reason. — tim wood

Maybe a way to approach the matter is to look at the limits of psychology in a different context than the contrast of reason against the background of experience.

For example, Kierkegaard outlined the limits of psychology as the insufficiency of explanation in relation to the need to decide. If the parameters of some situation can be completely explained as an event, no decisions are needed. The diremption between the absolute and the relative concerns the use of language, as such, and framing it in those terms does not make the observation a new psychology.

I find Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics interesting in this regard because he points to a gap between expressions of "absolute" experiences and the other kind without explaining it. Or at least it can be said that language does not explain language.

I am not sure a belief is a creed. The first word is the translation of the other so that is a problem.
The identification of faith by items declared to be accepted by the believer always seemed odd to me. If such and such is the case, why would anyone care if I swore to it being so?
The announcement seems too large. Uninteresting even.

The gap does not require explaining why some do one thing and others do another in response to the question of what is arbitrary in moral judgements. The activity is either a process that is a perception of what is happening or it is not.

The phenomena is framed by one means or another. That one or another frame lets us hear and see a certain way either is involved with actual beings or they are dreams, projected against a screen.

Your results may vary.

I take it you mean "evolved" in the sense that thinking over time approaches what is good and evil as they really are. The non-arbitrary element being considered is not going to mean anything to those who dismiss that sort of thing as illusion. The baby must be tossed out with the dirty water.

Wayfarer's observation regarding "humans" and the proposition that they have their own nature is germane. I would only add that models of "being a person" in the way Kant based his psychology are oddly less idealistic in that regard. His model was the encouragement to make many others.

So there is a big disconnect between looking at models to determine whether they provide accurate maps of the territory and the debate whether anybody should be making maps at all.

Mortality sucks.

But nobody owns their non-existence. The difference between life and death is you in each of the moments that will never happen again.

I don't understand the judgement part of the post. The value of life is not waiting for a decision. You either hold out your hand to it or not. And the result of that decision is not anything like control of a situation.

A person who actually seeks to achieve things such as respect and tolerance will not be telling people to not say anything that somebody may consider offensive. He will allow people to say exactly what they are feeling and thinking, however offensive these things may be. — Ilya B Shambat

Some of the limits of offense are generational. What was generally permitted in my grandfather's time are actually crimes now. And well they should be.
I live in a culture where there is freedom to make fun of other people without being labeled a hater but it is based upon something far away from something like "however offensive."

As a matter of education, teaching children to not classify other children is an argument against "however offensive." It is a culture war. Choose sides.

Tangled up in the blue humiliation game is the factor that is applied to oneself by oneself.
Somewhere in the formation of identity in the Erik Erikson sense of the development of personality, individuals start kicking their own asses.
The activity is closely related to social norms and structures of value. But it has a life of its own. It is difficult to describe by itself. It is mostly known as attempts to circumscribe or negate an agent.
To explain it puts it a distance. To not explain it lets it rule without protest.
There it is.

The nature of logos, and the way it is presented as having a life of its own, may not include the psychological as something that it explains but it becomes a behavior through reflection. That is the whole Kant thing that lead to the Husserl thing.
Perception as perceived.

I am not sure what philosophy is or would be apart from the problem of learning who we are and what helps us live.
There is a lot of interest in psychology because it is based upon an idea of health and well being that is expressed in terms of how a person lives and experiences this life. But that point of view, as exemplary as it may be, needs to be understood. Or not if it cannot be.
Looks like we need to keep thinking about fundamental things.

I recommend reading the book.
While doing a good job of distinguishing the "ancients" from the "Christian" points of view regarding the art of living, he also does the rare turn of seeing them together in their different ways calling for both a private and social means of care.
He also draws a line between the ownership of a self to an idea of leverage in a community. What is clear cut to an "aristocratic" person becomes more complicated for a "democratic" one. What makes Foucault unique is that he doesn't place those types on different planets.

I think intuition also gets a bad reputation for being the opposite of intellect. Intuition is useful because you're reacting to cues that your conscious mind isn't picking up on. — NKBJ

In this capacity, some are more accurate than others. It is disturbing when one encounters a person who sees even when one has a good mask to hide behind.

Behaving in a systematic, rule-guided way does not appear to be a characteristic he admired. Being admirable, was. — Banno

I am not sure about the first part. He celebrated discipline and "orders of rank." His fight against Christianity took the form of denying the "personal" as a refuge from the world of transactions. He insisted that such a withdrawal was also a transaction. The remarks about the nature of a "bad conscience" focus on how it is used to influence outcomes while acting like it is not acting like that.

I propose looking at what he considered to be evidence in a different light from the conclusions he drew from it.

On the Nietzsche side of your question, following rules "only understood by oneself" relates to the differing opinions about his notion of the personal as a result of "perspective."

Some have objected to his use of the term perspective because his critique of the objective should not permit him to relate different points of view in a shared space. Others emphasize that the drives competing for dominance exist and Nietzsche was trying to be an accurate reporter of what those things are.

Being a philologist, Nietzsche's use of terms was not personal but fraught with double and triple meanings. He constantly demanded that his readers know as much as he did. His audacity to say what was most important to the philosophers he praised and criticized is a testimony to a non private language.

There are remarks made by Nietzsche that point out that rules are often used to justify decisions after they are made. That is a lot like observations made by La Rochefoucauld regarding a person always needing to appear righteous to oneself and others.

Maybe Nietzsche is not just one thing.

For myself, the idea of being responsible for what is happening now is the most interesting thing.
Whether that happens through the register of religion or something else is not as interesting as the idea by itself, that individuals influence what is happening now.
So, how does one get to that place?

I am not ridiculing your argument.
I read the update.
I don't agree with one of your assumptions because your description does not square with my experience of those texts.
I put the "you" in quotes because it is not about you.
If my observation is not interesting, just forget it and carry on.

Going by Kierkegaard or Pascal, you might reject evidence in favor of the act of belief as a probability of the reward or belief alone as meaningful in itself. — Christoffer

Pascal said a number of times that the "scandal" of the Christian narrative overturning a particular rational deliberation was a reflection of the human condition that "fit" the phenomena better than other models.

Kierkegaard went further in that direction by developing the idea of a limit to psychology in regards to illuminating the crisis of being a single individual.

Both writers argued from the basis of evidence. They were putting "rationality" on trial using reason. That is not the same as saying "belief is meaningful in itself." If that was the case, why bother with all of that?

In any case, from their point of view, "you" are the one who is epistemologically irresponsible.

Not likely. It's a good neighborhood and I like my living arrangement. Also, we're both tired of moving around and want to rest easy here. — Wallows

That makes sense.
Is there something in the arrangement that you don't like?

It is valid as an expression of a condition. I don't know if it excludes other expressions. The necessity invoked serves a purpose but maybe not purposes that start from opposite presuppositions. I am reluctant to join in the last word on last words.

Foucault wrote on this topic. I don't follow all of it but I don't understand all of it either.

By presenting a case from his text, I meant those written by Nietzsche himself.

But I also asked for citations from his interpreters. I will respond to the two samples given. I need to mull over it a bit first.

There is much disagreement between different interpretations regarding the role of the will to power in Nietzsche's writings. The central place you give it has been done by others. Perhaps you could point to some kind of consensus through citation.

My saying "perspectivism is not a thesis" is a challenge to the idea that a system of the kind you describe was the intention of the writing. It is not a lot of text. Present a case from those texts to show it was his intention.

I can follow that explanation. It leads me to not understand your postscript:

Please find any fallacy with this, I'd like nothing more. I want to be wrong, it means I can continue to learn — nihil

What is it that you want to be talked out of?

That dilemma appears often in Nietzsche's writings. It is a contradiction he did not appear interested in helping the reader to figure out. But he was pretty clear that "perspectivism" was not a thesis as such. The nature of argument is based upon establishing conditions as either one thing or an other and that is the first challenge thrown down in Beyond Good and Evil. He criticizes the metaphysicians thusly:

Things of the highest value must have another, separate origin of their own, – they cannot be derived from this ephemeral, seductive, deceptive, lowly world, from this mad chaos of confusion and desire. Look instead to the lap of being, the everlasting, the hidden God, the ‘thing-in-itself’ – this is where their ground must be, and nowhere else!”
BGE, 2, translated by Judith Norman

This is not a take down of the "law of non-contradiction." The observation is that the either/or used to establish the necessity for a point of view can exclude experience in many ways. The practice of argument can also put a finger on the scale, as it were. Nietzsche delights in presenting philosophers in that light.

Another element to consider is how much of the "objective" truth is supposed to be a result. Consider the distinction made here:

But anyone who looks at people’s basic drives, to see how far they may have played their little game right here as inspiring geniuses (or daemons or sprites –), will find that they all practiced philosophy at some point, – and that every single one of them would be only too pleased to present itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and as rightful master of all the other drives. Because every drive craves mastery, and this leads it to try philosophizing. – Of course: with scholars, the truly scientific people, things might be different – “better” if you will –, with them, there might really be something like a drive for knowledge, some independent little clockwork mechanism that, once well wound, ticks bravely away without essentially involving the rest of the scholar’s drives. For this reason, the scholar’s real “interests” usually lie somewhere else entirely, with the family, or earning money, or in politics; in fact, it is almost a matter of indifference whether his little engine is put to work in this or that field of research, and every philosophy constitute the true living seed from which the whole plant has always grown. Actually, to explain how the strangest metaphysical claims of a philosopher really come about, it is always good (and wise) to begin by asking: what morality is it (is he –) getting at? Consequently, I do not believe that a “drive for knowledge” is the father of philosophy, but rather that another drive, here as elsewhere, used knowledge (and mis-knowledge!) merely as a tool. But anyone who looks at people’s basic drives, to see how far they may have played their little game right here as inspiring geniuses (or daemons or sprites –), will find that they all practiced philosophy at some point, – and that every single one of them would be only too pleased to present itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and as rightful master of all the other drives. Because every drive craves mastery, and this leads it to try philosophizing. – Of course: with scholars, the truly scientific people, things might be different – “better” if you will –, with them, there might really be something like a drive for knowledge, some independent little clockwork mechanism that, once well wound, ticks bravely away without essentially involving the rest of the scholar’s drives. For this reason, the scholar’s real “interests” usually lie somewhere else entirely, with the family, or earning money, or in politics; in fact, it is almost a matter of indifference whether his little engine is put to work in this or that field of research, and whether the “promising” young worker turns himself into a good philologist or fungus expert or chemist: – it doesn’t signify anything about him that he becomes one thing or the other. In contrast, there is absolutely nothing impersonal about the philosopher; and in particular his morals bear decided and decisive witness to who he is – which means, in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand with respect to each other.
BGE, 6, translated by Judith Norman

So, you have a critic of "objectivity" making distinct claims about what exists. The easiest thing to do at this point is got off the highway and go somewhere else.

Are you saying with Jimi Hendrix that, I'm the one that's got to die when it's time for me to die, so let me live my life the way I want to?

Say more about the difference between "MUST" and "COULD."

I don't understand the condition of mortality as a disincentive to learn. It certainly kicks my ass to not just lounge around and wait for good opportunities.

The sinners are punished for their sin, but in a manner that the sin itself is the punishment. In hell, they simply replay the sin in its most naked, repetitive form. — csalisbury

Kierkegaard presents this element as a kind of default that needs to be superseded:

When the originality in earnestness is acquired and preserved, then there is succession and repetition, but as soon as originality is lacking in repetition, there is habit. The earnest person is earnest precisely through the originality with which he returns in repetition.......
But this same thing to which earnestness is to return with the same earnestness can only be earnestness itself; otherwise it becomes pedantry.
The Concept of Anxiety, 414, translated by Reidar Thomte

Like "accepting the acceptance" this condition is requiring the individual to change. While the change depends upon the individual, the individual cannot do it alone. Nor would it be important if they could.

Love requires a hell of a lot of patience. There is a demand in expressions of affection that would have them be immediately returned in kind. It is disappointing when they are not. Everyone is so easily injured. The whole set up seems designed to cause optimal pain and confusion. Hell is other people. Gaining some freedom of movement to give and receive honestly is the whole enchilada.

You could read your observation the opposite way.
Why does it is take so little to refer to something?
Whether a description is true or not is a function of what one is trying to keep in view.
Maybe the capacity for us to talk past each other is greater than any narrative that forces us to accept the same starting places.

Well having read James, I think Wittgenstein was holding out for a limit to what could be explained, not saying one just could decide to not bother after working on it long enough.

Why did Socrates scare people? Could you clarify what Timaeus and Philebus reference? — Carmaris19

Well, I think Fooloso4 has been much more helpful in his remarks than I was in mine. My reference to Timaeus and Philebus was to emphasize the range of responses to the "corporeal" in Plato. The range is evident in the Republic as well in terms of mythological visions being joined with arguments that reveal what the nature of what we encounter may be. Where those elements converge or diverge are themselves matters of contention and inquiry.

My observation about scaring people was given only to encourage you to read the actual arguments themselves to experience Socrates as the one who asks for agreement or disagreement in the relentless way he does. Reading summaries of the dialogues evades that element and turns an encounter into a definition. You enter the discussion for the first time when you go, "wait, why did you agree to that?"

I thank you.They are good. (I am about half way through)

I don't want to make light of the theme that Descartes was careful to not anger the Church but I don't agree that the argument that we have been given is simply a ruse. In some ways, this is the ultimate ground of verification. If what I am experiencing is false by design, then my existence is a cruel joke.

Nobody likes being the butt of a cruel joke.

I believe this is the jist of what he is saying. When I first heard this, I thought it was stupid to consider ideas more real than (basically what I consider) reality--but as we move to more abstract ideas (like the self) I find that we begin to see some very interesting ideas that while I can't say have sold me on the tenets of immaterialism, are still surprisingly brilliant. This is where my pondering begins. — Carmaris19

It is good to read the actual dialogues because the accounts of them capture some of what is going on but the experience of dealing with the relentless comparisons of what is to be agreed upon or not gives one a chance to agree or not at any point. Socrates scared the crap out of many people who confronted him. It is important to know why.

The matter of the "material" is presented both as a topic of cosmology in a mythical register along side of attempts to talk about perception in real time. The Timaeus in contrast to the Philebus, for example. The mixture pissed off Aristotle and he did his own thing.

Starting like Aristotle did is good.

I want to live. It's just incredibly difficult to do so when I don't have a logical justification. — simmerdown

As you have noted, the death you are able to bring about does not belong to you. Perhaps your life doesn't belong to you either. The agency that permits you to bring about an intended result makes sense in the context of realizing what not doing something will likely cause to happen. "Something like: If I don't plant these seeds in the next few weeks, we will starve later on in the year." Or: "To build this house, I will need to gather materials and act in a planned sequence." Life is not the result of that kind of deliberation. Observing there is something like an instinct for survival does not mean life has no purpose of its own. To frame it in that way is a judgement, not an investigation. I do think it is important to affirm life to keep on living but disagree with Camus that it passes through the agency to end it.

The capacity to end it exists. To deliberate upon using this power is to use death to attain a purpose. You won't get to own it later but it can achieve an end. This can range from a cessation of personal suffering to deliberately harming other people. In some societies, it can be a way to maintain status after some failure or loss of favor occurs. It is a kind of predicate.

I don't agree with your judgement either.
Oy vey.

I expressed my opinion.
Just like you did.

What did I come here for? That is a good question.
I will think about it.

I don't see how the opinion you express here requires so much denigration.