Then idealism is no different than realism. — Harry Hindu

If we say that what we call the physical world stems from minds, that objects do not exist independently from minds, that's not realism no. And "The physical world stems from minds" does not imply at all that "there is nothing beyond your perception" so that's not solipsism either.

Illusions are simply misinterpretations of what is real. It only seems like water when you don't move towards it. When you move towards it, it doesn't behave like a pool of water. This is how you know it's not a pool of water. — Harry Hindu

It behaves like a pool of water that progressively disappears, so you don't have to conclude that it's not water.

When it is understood that it is light we see, not objects, then mirages and "bent" sticks in water is what you would EXPECT to see. — Harry Hindu

I guess Terrapin would disagree with that, he says he encounters mostly phenomena of direct things, for instance the phenomenon of "just a tree", not the phenomenon of "light traveling from a tree towards our eyes", so how does a realist conclude that everything he sees is light reaching his eyes?

Terrapin said "The only way to move away from realism with respect to experience is to introduce theoretical explanations for what's really going on", I'm arguing that to stick with realism we have to "introduce theoretical explanations for what's really going on" all the same, unless we say that everything we experience is real.

edit: double post

Same with me :up:

I feel that I addressed all your points while you didn't address some of mine, but maybe that's how you feel too from your side (that I didn't address some of your points), after all even if I try to put myself in the shoes of others I can't know for sure what it's like.

I believe I had read in another thread that you work in a scientific field (or was it engineering? but engineering looks up to science anyway), so it's understandable that you hold science in high esteem since your education and career revolve around it, and that you have a high incentive to defend it from potential threats to its status. Myself I had an extensive scientific education and then I had started working as an engineer, so I have firsthand experience of what it's like to hold science in high esteem.

(note that when I mention 'science' or 'scientific' I'm simply referring to what is usually called 'science' or 'scientific', I'm not implying it can be precisely defined or characterized beyond that otherwise I would be contradicting my whole point)

So I'm thinking that when we have a high incentive to not see a problem, it's easy to not see it and it's hard to see it.

The reason I noticed the problem (before I knew it had a name in philosophy) is that early on I became critical of the way science is taught in school and presented in the media, I could see statements were presented as truth while they were not certain at all. But what this implied is that alternative theories were presented as false while it was not certain at all that they were false, and so plenty of potentially fruitful alternatives weren't explored, and the curious and intellectually honest people who wanted to explore them were insulted, labeled all sorts of derogatory names, only because they dared to go against the mainstream theories and thought. And then I thought, how does that fit at all the ideal of science that is presented as an open-minded inquiry of nature free of political influence when people are prevented from exploring alternative paths to the mainstream one, when they are bullied into agreeing with the mainstream?

All those theories and activities labeled as 'pseudoscience' are alternative paths, they are not wrong, they are different ways of looking at the phenomena, it could be potentially fruitful to explore any of them further, but the scientific establishment tries to prevent that, because it wants to keep its position of importance, it wants to push the idea that it is working on the important and useful things while everyone else is working on irrelevant and useless things, it wants to push the idea that its members are loyal and noble servants to the truth while the people who go alternative routes are dirty crackpots who want to spread fairy tales and dangerous ideas.

And that's not acceptable. Plenty of people do not like many conclusions of 'science', and they are pressured to agree with them even if it goes against their own theories or beliefs, even if it pushes them into existential despair (for instance the idea of the heat death of the universe is a really depressing one and it is presented as inevitable although that's not certain at all), and that's not acceptable. Scientists have no legitimacy to pressure people to believe what they want them to believe, and no legitimacy to dismiss and ridicule alternative paths to ensure that they don't get funded and don't get explored. If alternative paths were funded as well as dark matter research they would probably have had plenty of interesting and fruitful results, while dark matter research has had pretty much none. Allow me to be blunt, I see it as a fucking disgrace.

Realists don't believe that we can't have false beliefs, that we can't experience hallucinations, etc. — Terrapin Station

And how does the realist get to conclude that what he experienced was a hallucination or that he had a false belief? For instance if the realist sees water in the distance and moves towards it and the water progressively disappears as he gets closer, how does he conclude that this water was an illusion and not that it was real water that progressively disappeared?

You were saying that moving away from realism requires theoretical explanations, but so does sticking to realism as soon as you invoke false beliefs or hallucinations.

I don't see calling some things science and some non-science as a problem. — T Clark

The problem is not calling some things science and some non-science, it is calling them science or non-science arbitrarily, and then using that label to promote the things labeled 'science' and to ridicule or dismiss the ones labeled 'non-science'. If they are not called science or non-science according to consistent criteria, then they are labeled arbitrarily. You keep implying that such criteria exist, what are they? I described how a lot of 'non-science' follows 'the scientific method', so whether something is called science or non-science isn't determined by whether it follows 'the scientific method'.

The underlying problem of course is that some activities and theories are dismissed arbitrarily, while some others are promoted arbitrarily. People are told that if they believe in something that has been labeled as 'unscientific' then they believe in fairy tales, in falsehoods, that they are delusional, that they are crackpots, simply because some self-important community has decided to label it that way. If you don't see the problem with that then I guess I can't make you see it.

The ideas that the Earth is the center of the universe and the universe was created 10,000 years ago can not "be made to fit the current observations." — T Clark

Yes they can. Tell me what observations you think contradict these ideas, and I will explain how these ideas can be made to fit these observations.

As for brains in vats and computer simulations, those are philosophers fantasies developed to undermine the certainty of all knowledge. — T Clark

They can be considered as theories that can be tested experimentally. There are some papers that showed for instance how particular types of computer simulations would have effects observable in principle.

As for dark matter, as I said, there is well-founded observational evidence that there is more matter in the universe than has been observed. That's all the term "dark matter" means. It is a descriptive term. Something of the sort is needed to match current observations. If it doesn't exist, we'll have to abandon or heavily modify other currently well-founded theories, e.g. general relativity or the expansion of the universe. To the best of our current knowledge, it exists. What dark matter is is a big question. Neutrinos have been suggested. Also some exotic not previously observed type of matter. — T Clark

I wholeheartedly disagree that there is well-founded observational evidence for dark matter (in the sense matter that doesn't emit any light). There is evidence general relativity's predictions do not match many observations of stars in other galaxies. General relativity hasn't been tested on large scales. Astrophysicists and cosmologists want to believe that general relativity is accurate on large scales too, that's a belief. The strength of the evidence for dark matter is proportional to the strength of their belief that general relativity accurately describes gravity on large scales. There is no evidence for that belief. In other words, there is no evidence for dark matter.

I believe this is not true. As I indicated previously, I've done some reading in this area, but not a lot. Do you know of specific research that has found well-founded evidence for ESP or telekinesis? If so, let's discuss it. — T Clark

You said "it's not the fruitfulness of the inquiry that makes it science, it's the methods followed", I said that all those fields follow the methods that dark matter research follows, now it seems you're going back to saying that it is fruitfulness that makes something science. Whether ESP or telekinesis research is fruitful or not, it suffices for me to say that they follow the method of making hypotheses and testing them through experiments, like dark matter research.

If only we could address even one thing. It's not just plastic pollution or air pollution, it's our ever-growing consumption and destruction of natural habitats, going for clean energy won't change that, we see ourselves as the masters of the world, the Earth is our toy, we have become disconnected from nature, we spend so much energy and resources to protect ourselves from one another and to be more powerful than the other, we spend so much energy and resources going to jobs whose purpose is to make people addicted to what we sell so that they will spend a lot of energy and resources to get it no matter the costs to everything else, we make people enslaved to money and debt which destroy human relationships, we educate our children to perpetuate this system, the whole thing is rotten to the core, yea we would have to address all of that and I really don't see how. Maybe it's all a consequence of materialism becoming widespread, we focus on the appearences, everything becomes a tool to use and we become disconnected from other life, and then we destroy it and we don't even notice.

Are people frightened because they have analyzed the evidence and the assumptions behind the predictive models used and concluded that there is very little doubt that man is responsible and the consequences will be disastrous, or because they are told to be frightened because they are told to believe in the scientific consensus and because they are told that the scientific consensus is right?

As I said there is a lot more room for errors in their models than they would admit, there are plausible alternative explanations which are not properly considered, there is a lot of groupthink going on. Maybe it is right that man is mostly responsible, but what's more certain is that man is responsible for the destruction of the ecosystem regardless of global warming, and we continue destroying it while everyone is getting alarmed over global warming. And that destruction is mostly not due to global warming.

I'm not missing that point because in that post I put on the realist shoes, so to speak. Remove the "out there" if you want, the point still stands, in realism encountering the phenomena of a ghost or of a god or of water means that they refer to real things.

If there is no object independent of perception, then it would simply be wrong to say that we perceive anything. — Harry Hindu

Saying there is no object that is perceived as it is independently of the perceiver is not saying that there is nothing beyond perception, of course if you assume there is nothing beyond perception you end up with solipsism, idealism doesn't make that assumption.

The point is that phenomena that are present aren't actually always of one as a conscious being experiencing things. The only way to move away from realism with respect to experience is to introduce theoretical explanations for what's really going on. — Terrapin Station

But if you say that phenomena (experiences) refer to real things, as in the phenomenon of a tree refers to a real tree out there, and the phenomenon of consciously experiencing a tree refers to a real conscious being experiencing a tree, then the phenomenon of a ghost refers to a real ghost out there, and the phenomenon of water refers to real water out there.

You may never have encountered the phenomenon of a ghost but others claim to have, so are ghosts really out there but only some people can see them?

You may have encountered the phenomenon of water in the distance while encountering the phenomenon of a hot day, and then as you got closer the phenomenon of water started disappearing until it disappeared completely. Does that mean that there was really water out there but as you got closer it progressively disappeared?

Ok I understand you agree that knowing something is at least partly believing it. But when we say "X is true" we're not even saying "I know X is true", so it could be interpreted as saying "X is proven to be true" and that can be prone to confusion. And when Dawkins says "evolution is true" I doubt he says "I believe evolution is true", and if he says "I know evolution is true" I doubt he means "I believe evolution is true".

The issue isn't that. The issue is that the common Internet religion discussion sense of belief (at least as promoted by some atheists) is that belief necessarily is faith-oriented.

The common epistemological sense of belief is NOT that belief is necessarily faith-oriented. Belief is often empirical evidence, logic, etc. oriented.

The dichotomy here doesn't allow that something can be BOTH empirical evidence-based and faith-based.

The common Interneet religion debate sense of belief has it that faith only pertains when there is NO empirical evidence or logic to back something up. — Terrapin Station

But I'm not sure that's a useful distinction. For instance, someone can claim their faith in God is based on experiences they have had or on some argument for the existence of God, which can be construed as based on empirical evidence or logic.

I'm not claiming that belief is not based on empirical evidence or logic, but that empirical evidence and logic are not enough to prove that a theory is true, so even if it is rooted in empirical evidence or logic I don't see it as stating something more certain than faith.

Not in epistemology when we're talking about knowledge in terms of justified true belief for example. — Terrapin Station

How do you define belief then, if not by "acceptance that something is true"?

If you believe that the Sun is going to rise tomorrow, you might say it's based solely on empirical evidence and logic, but it's also based on faith, because of the problem of induction.

And belief is also separated from empirical evidence and logic to some extent, saying "theory X is true" basically ignores the problem of induction. An observation can be seen as evidence for many different theories, it's a matter of belief (or faith) to pick one theory as the true one.

I'm guessing you're reading "belief" in a sense that it often appears in Internet religion debates, where you'll run into atheists who want to say that they don't believe anything, because they're taking belief to only refer to faith (where that's being separated from empirical evidence, logic, etc.), and they want to claim to not buy anything on faith.

That's not how belief is used in epistemology when we talk about knowledge being justified true belief. — Terrapin Station

I don't see a fundamental difference between belief and faith, dictionaries define belief as "acceptance that something is true", and faith as "something that is believed with strong conviction", so there is only a difference of degree between the two.

Faith could be said to be a belief that is hard to change. However I'm not sure anything could make Dawkins change his belief, it's easy to interpret all evidence in a way that it fits one's own beliefs.

BUT... when it comes to man-made global warming or the theory of evolution, saying “I believe they are true” gives license to the ignorant and the disinformation machines to say “We believe they are not true” when there is overwhelming evidence for them to be true. So, yeah. There’s that. — Noah Te Stroete

And then you make a breakthrough when you realize that many of the people who criticize man-made global warming or the theory of evolution are not ignorant and that the evidence is not overwhelming, it's rather the people pushing them who are overwhelming :wink:

I'm more concerned about the destruction of fauna and flora. it is said that humanity has wiped out 60% of vertebrate animals since 1970, insect populations are in great decline, we're polluting the environment, that's much more certain than man-made global warming for which there are alternative explanations in which the human impact is small. However it's pretty clear we're destroying the ecosystem.

This is deeply ironic. Of course he has to rigorously define the problem. You and Lauden complain about this so-called "demarcation problem" but you aren't willing to do the work to deal with it. People's unwillingness or inability is the demarcation problem. — T Clark

It's Laudan not Lauden (you made the mistake twice so I'm mentioning it).

I don't think you understand the problem if you think that one has to rigorously define 'science' in order to rigorously define the problem.

There are activites and theories that are called 'science'. There are activities and theories that are called 'non-science'. Why the former are called 'science' and why the latter are called 'non-science' is the problem. If there are no consistent criteria that are applied to classify something as 'science' and something else as 'non-science', then that means activities and theories are classified as 'science' or 'non-science' arbitrarily. The problem with that is then that it is not justified to dismiss something by labeling it 'non-science' if that label was assigned arbitrarily, and that knowledge labeled 'scientific' is not inherently more valid than knowledge labeled 'unscientific' so scientists and people should stop pretending that it is.

I don't know why you pretend there is no problem if you're not even willing to read the paper or other sources on the demarcation problem.

They are called pseudoscience because their practitioners pretend that it's science but don't apply the legitimate tools of science. Maybe "pretend" is the wrong word. I don't think most of them are liars, I think they're incompetent and ignorant. — T Clark

In order to say that they don't apply the legitimate tools of science, you would have to describe what are these legitimate tools of science, and show that what we call science applies these tools, and that what we call non-science doesn't apply these tools. If we can't do that, if there are things we call science even though they don't apply these tools, or if there are things we call non-science even though they apply these tools, then these tools aren't criteria that distinguish science from non-science, and then it is false to say that something is called pseudoscience because it doesn't apply these tools. Do you not see the problem?

No, it is not true that "plenty of different theories fit the same evidence." — T Clark

Considering that "the Earth is at the center of the Universe", "there is no dark matter", "there is no dark energy", "we are brains in vats", "we live in a computer simulation", "the Universe was created 10000 years ago" all can be made to fit the current observations, I would say it is pretty justified to say that "plenty of different theories fit the same evidence".

It's called the underdetermination of scientific theories, it is widely acknowledged, but in an ideal world I wouldn't even have to say that it is widely acknowledged in order for my interlocutor to consider it seriously.

It used to be perverse to hold that continents move or that rogue waves exist or that we would ever reach the Moon or that the Earth revolves around the Sun or that clocks run at different rates in different places or that fundamental particles have definite trajectories, now it's perverse to hold the contrary. People like to think they hold truth or a close approximation to the truth, until they don't.

I don't think it's true that "all scientists and philosophers failed." I don't think it's that hard to reach a consensus on what is included in the scientific method. I think you and I could do it if we approached the question openly. — T Clark

But if you don't think it's true why don't you read the paper and the links I've listed? It will give you a lot of information on what has been attempted and on why these attempts don't work.

Sure if you want we can try ourselves. So if we define science as what follows the "scientific method", and non-science as what doesn't follow the "scientific method", then how do we characterize that method so that it includes everything that we call science and excludes everything that we call non-science? If we talk of observations and experiments, that includes a whole lot of what we call non-science. If we talk of making hypotheses and comparing predictions and observations, that includes a whole lot of what we call non-science as well. If we talk of what can be verified, that excludes what we call science. If we talk of what can be falsified, that excludes what we call science (contrary to popular belief scientific theories can always be saved from falsification). If we talk of accumulating knowledge, that includes a lot of what we call non-science. Where do we go from here?

There haven't been "countless experiments" and this aspect of cosmology has many uncertainties. I'm pretty sure that if dark matter can't be confirmed more robustly, it will fall by the wayside. Even if it doesn't, it's not the fruitfulness of the inquiry that makes it science, it's the methods followed. — T Clark

Not countless but many: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Experiments_for_dark_matter_search

Every time they fail to detect it, they assume it's because it has different properties than they expected, and so they come up with another experiment, it's been going on for over 20 years, they could keep doing that forever. What method do they follow? They make an hypothesis, they come up with an experiment to test it, they compare predictions and observations. The same is done in astrology, ufology, ESP research, telekinesis research, homeopathy, acupuncture, free energy research, Loch Ness research, ...

If you say all of them are science, on what basis do you say that they have been shown to be false but not dark matter? There is a double standard there, if an experiment in one of these fields doesn't match what's predicted then the whole field is dismissed, whereas spending enormous resources for over 20 years on dark matter while systematically failing to detect it doesn't refute dark matter in any way, instead it's a reason to keep making more and more experiments. I'll tell you what the difference is, belief, they believe they will find dark matter, but they don't believe they will find any of the other effects I mentioned, so they research dark matter and not these other phenomena. It's not a difference in methodology, it's not a difference in the fruitfulness (actually there are more fruitful results in many of these fields than in dark matter research), it's belief, they look for what they believe, and they call it science, and they call what they don't believe non-science or pseudoscience.

In the sentence I gave I am referring to my relationship to a statement, but if I do believe such and such a statement it's not like I have a problem simply stating that the statement is true too.

So I believe my keys are on the desk. "My keys are on the desk" is true.

I believe evolution is true. Evolution is true.

What's the difference? — Moliere

If that's your relationship with truth then okay. But plenty of people do not equate "I believe X is true" with "X is true". In "X is true" there is implicit idea that X is infaillible, that it cannot possibly be false, that it is something that applies to everyone even if they don't believe in it, whereas in "I believe X is true" one at least acknowledges a belief and presumably the idea that X is possibly faillible.

I think I'd say I believe "X" because there is evidence that supports it implies that the evidence supports "X" is true. — Moliere

Which is still not what he says, he says "X" is true because evidence supports "X", not that he believes "X" is true.

But then I'd ask again: Is it scientism to believe that a scientific theory is true because the evidence is convincing? — Moliere

No I wouldn't say that. However if you start saying that a scientific theory is true because the evidence is convincing, or you start saying that the evidence only supports that theory, or that if it's not scientific then it can't be true or real, or that a scientific consensus is truth or the closest thing to truth, or that something is true because scientists say it, or that if scientists have refuted or falsified something then it's false, or that knowledge can only be gained through the scientific method, or that there are no beliefs in science, I would say it's scientism.

Does Lauden rigorously define what "science" means in his writing? If not, he is contributing to the demarcation problem. — T Clark

That's not right, he doesn't have to rigorously define what 'science' is if his point is that it can't be done (or at best that despite all efforts throughout history no one has yet determined its characteristic features), when he uses the word 'science' he refers to the activities and theories that are usually classified as 'science'. The point is why such-and-such activity or theory is labeled science rather than non-science?

I think a lot of people would say that this is backwards - that our society is one that does not understand and respect science. Large percentages of people continue to believe in astrology, creationism, UFOs, etc. no matter how scientists wave their arms and gnash their teeth. — T Clark

That's not my experience. People who believe in theories that scientists despise are usually much more respectful, it's the scientists who attack them ferociously, and then they have to defend themselves. Scientists and their followers do a lot to ridicule and dismiss and silence alternative views by calling them pseudoscience and a lot of other derogatory terms.

Saying something is supported by science or by scientists is a big selling point in advertising and politics, they wouldn't keep doing it if it didn't work on many people.

Then if science cannot be precisely defined beyond saying that "what is science is what scientists call science, and scientists are a community of people who call themselves scientists and who decide who is a scientist and who isn't", we have to wonder why what is called 'science' should be understood and respected more than other activities.

We would have to put together and agree on a set of standards of what is required in the scientific method. That would take time and thought, but I don't think it would be too difficult. — T Clark

Why have all scientists and philosophers failed for centuries then? Laudan addresses how all attempts have failed, his paper is a great read if you give it the time, otherwise there are other resources that mention the long-standing difficulty of this problem:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demarcation_problem
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/

The important thing about astrology, ESP, ufology, etc isn't that they are not science, it's that they are not true — T Clark

They are all called pseudoscience by the scientific community, that is non-science. If you fail to see that then you'll fail to see the demarcation problem.

They have not been been shown to be true by scientific or other legitimate methods. — T Clark

And so-called scientific theories are not shown to be true either, they are shown to fit the evidence, but plenty of different theories fit the same evidence.

In addition, they have been shown to not be true by scientific or other legitimate methods. — T Clark

No they surely haven't been shown to be false. If you care to explain what makes you think that they are false, I can explain why they aren't. Note that falsified doesn't mean proven false, a theory can always be saved from falsification. General relativity could have been considered falsified, it was saved by assuming the existence of invisible dark matter and dark energy. Astrology, ESP and ufology can also be saved from falsification, so they surely haven't been shown to be false.

Generally speaking, the phenomena studied have not been shown to exist. — T Clark

It depends who you ask, observations are interpreted, they can be interpreted in various ways. Also scientists are researching invisible things, namely dark matter and dark energy, they haven't been detected despite countless experiments and enormous resources spent (especially regarding dark matter), scientists could keep researching them forever and never show them to exist and still call their activity science. On the other hand not nearly as much resources are spent on astrology, ESP or ufology to research them more extensively.

That doesn't follow at all. I believe "X" because there is evidence that supports it does not imply that evidence proves "X" is true. — Moliere

But that's not what he said. He said "X" is true because there is evidence that supports it:

The believing isn’t what makes evolution true or not, it’s that there is evidence that supports it.

Another quote from him, in case you think he sees himself as believing:

Evolution is a fact. Beyond reasonable doubt, beyond serious doubt, beyond sane, informed, intelligent doubt, beyond doubt evolution is a fact. The evidence for evolution is at least as strong as the evidence for the Holocaust, even allowing for eye witnesses to the Holocaust. It is the plain truth that we are cousins of chimpanzees, somewhat more distant cousins of monkeys, more distant cousins still of aardvarks and manatees, yet more distant cousins of bananas and turnips…continue the list as long as desired. That didn’t have to be true. It is not self-evidently, tautologically, obviously true, and there was a time when most people, even educated people, thought it wasn’t. It didn’t have to be true, but it is. We know this because a rising flood of evidence supports it. Evolution is a fact, and this book will demonstrate it.

If you characterize Dawkins as a believer then I think it's fair to call him a religious fundamentalist.

This confuses me. I can see it mattering if a statement is true or if it is adequately justified and documented, but I don't see why it would matter if something is science or not? — T Clark

Read the beginning and the end of Laudan's paper, he explains it probably better than I could. But in my own words, it matters because scientists dismiss many activities and theories as 'pseudoscience' or 'unscientific' in a derogatory way, as if there was something about these activities and theories that was defective, or wrong, or useless, or unworthy of consideration, while they promote other activities and theories as 'scientific', as hallmarks of truth, knowledge and reason, as something that people ought to believe. In effect they tell people what to believe and what not to believe. That could be fine if there was indeed a fundamental distinction between science and non-science, something that justified the distinction, but if there isn't then these people have no legitimacy to impose their views onto the rest of the world and to dismiss other activities, theories, traditions and cultures the way they do. There is nothing in the label 'scientific' that gives an activity or a theory more legitimacy than one that is labeled 'unscientific', on the basis of that label alone there is no reason to treat them differently.

In his own words:

We live in a society which sets great store by science. Scientific 'experts' play a privileged role in many of our institutions, ranging from the courts of law to the corridors of power. At a more fundamental level, most of us strive to shape our beliefs about the natural world in the 'scientific' image. If scientists say that continents move or that the universe is billions of years old, we generally believe them, however counter-intuitive and implausible their claims might appear to be. Equally, we tend to acquiesce in what scientists tell us not to believe. If, for instance, scientists say that Velikovsky was a crank, that the biblical creation story is hokum, that UFOs do not exist, or that acupuncture is ineffective, then we generally make the scientist's contempt for these things our own, reserving for them those social sanctions and disapprobations which are the just deserts of quacks, charlatans and con-men. In sum, much of our intellectual life, and increasingly large portions of our social and political life, rest on the assumption that we (or, if not we ourselves, then someone whom we trust in these matters) can tell the difference between science and its counterfeit.

It is small wonder, under the circumstances, that the question of the nature of science has loomed so large in Western philosophy. From Plato to Popper, philosophers have sought to identify those epistemic features which mark off science from other sorts of belief and activity. Nonetheless, it seems pretty clear that philosophy has largely failed to deliver the relevant goods. Whatever the specific strengths and deficiencies of the numerous well-known efforts at demarcation (several of which will be discussed below), it is probably fair to say that there is no demarcation line between science and non-science, or between science and pseudo-science, which would win assent from a majority of philosophers. Nor is there one which should win acceptance from philosophers or anyone else.

What makes a belief well founded (or heuristically fertile)? And what makes a belief scientific? The first set of questions is philosophically interesting and possibly even tractable; the second question is both uninteresting and, judging by its checkered past, intractable. If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like 'pseudo-science' and 'unscientific' from our vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us. As such, they are more suited to the rhetoric of politicians and Scottish sociologists of knowledge than to that of empirical researchers. Insofar as our concern is to protect ourselves and our fellows from the cardinal sin of believing what we wish were so rather than what there is substantial evidence for (and surely that is what most forms of 'quackery' come down to), then our focus should be squarely on the empirical and conceptual credentials for claims about the world. The 'scientific' status of those claims is altogether irrelevant.

Let's talk about science for a minute. What is it? (from various places on the web).

[*] The intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment.
[*] The pursuit and application of knowledge and understanding of the natural and social world following a systematic methodology based on evidence.
[*] Systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation. — T Clark

If these were necessary and sufficient conditions to demarcate science from non-science, then everything that we call science would satisfy these conditions, and everything that we call pseudoscience or non-science would not satisfy these conditions.

But what is it in these conditions that excludes for instance astrology, ufology, or modern geocentrism? They all could be said to be intellectual and practical activities following a systematic methodology to gain knowledge about the natural world through observation and experiment. So if we want to say that astrology, ufology and geocentrism are pseudoscience or unscientific, these criteria won't do.

Let's pull out a couple of words I think are important - "systematic" and "methodology." What is the system, the methodology, by which science operates? Well, we call it the scientific method and it involves, as the definitions indicate, observation and experimentation along with a bunch of other stuff. The scientific method is not science, it's how we pursue knowledge and understanding.

Science is the practice of obtaining knowledge using the scientific method. The scientific method is formal set of procedures to provide justification for knowledge using observation, experimentation, and other techniques. — T Clark

Here you say that there is a specific methodology, "the scientific method", by which science operates, implying that what we call pseudoscience or non-science doesn't follow that method. You have defined it roughly as involving observation, experimentation and other techniques. But astrology, ufology and geocentrism also follow a method that involves observation, experimentation and other techniques. So what is it about their method that makes them non-science rather than science?

If we can't say, then the distinction isn't justified, and that's the problem of demarcation. Or rather the problem dissolves when we realize that the distinction isn't justified.

Does this mean that if you enumerated all of the sufficient conditions you would also end up with a necessary condition? — Noah Te Stroete

For example, if I enumerated all of the specific locations on earth that are sufficiently on earth, you would arrive at the necessary condition of being on earth? All that amounts to is being on earth is being on earth. So, yes, I think I agree with you? I’m confused. — Noah Te Stroete

By "A sufficient condition is a superset of a necessary condition", I mean that a sufficient condition for something respects all the necessary conditions for that thing. So for instance being in Funny River, Alaska, is a sufficient condition for being on Earth, but it fits all the necessary conditions for being on Earth. A necessary condition for being on Earth is for instance being on a planet around the Sun, it's necessary but it's not sufficient. All locations on Earth are sufficient conditions but each of them is not individually necessary.

To be on Earth it is necessary to be in one location that is on Earth, but that's also sufficient, so this is both a necessary and sufficient condition.

As another example, being a dog is a sufficient condition for being an animal, but it is not necessary since there are other animals that aren't dogs. However a dog fits all necessary conditions for being an animal, the sufficient condition "being a dog" is a superset of the necessary conditions for being an animal: ("being an organism", "being multicellular", ...).

Maybe superset is a misnomer, I'm not sure, I mean it in the sense that in order to be a dog it is necessary to be an organism, to be multicellular, ...

What we call science can be rather arbitrary. Are the social sciences really science, for example. Do they have all of the necessary conditions to be science or are they missing some? Psychology is science. — Noah Te Stroete

The problem is neither scientists nor philosophers can explain why some activity or set of statements is classified as science rather than non-science. I mean sure, people whom we call scientists classify some activity or set of statements as science and some other as non-science, but how do they do it? If we say they do it because of such-and-such criterion, they don't apply that criterion consistently, they classify some other thing as non-science even though it fits the same criterion, the problem is we can't find a criterion or a set of criteria that is consistently applied and that allows to distinguish science from non-science.

And of course my view on why we can't find such criteria (after trying since antiquity) is that they don't exist, or rather that the only one that works consistently is that something is classified as science because the people whom we call scientists decide to classify it as science, and some other thing is classified as non-science because they decide to classify it as non-science, and that what they base their decision on is not some constant set of criteria but rather their own desires and beliefs. If some authoritative figure decides to call something science and some other thing non-science, the herd follows, and then it becomes commonly accepted. People then try to come up with reasons after the fact, but these stated reasons can't be the real reasons since they don't work in other situations, applying the same criteria in other situations leads to classify as science things that are called non-science, or as non-science things that are called science. It's a problem that goes way beyond the social sciences and psychology, it's a problem that concerns the whole of science.

Laudan's paper is really illuminating, he gives a great overview of the problem and how science and the attempts to demarcate science have evolved throughout history.

Yes yes yes, and that scientism runs deep. Look at this link from Richard Dawkins' website: https://www.richarddawkins.net/2013/09/why-i-dont-believe-in-scienceand-students-shouldnt-either/

Why I Don’t Believe In Science…And Students Shouldn’t Either
I don’t believe in science. So why am I so passionate about something I don’t believe in?

At first glance it would then seem that Dawkins is not an adept of scientism, but let's keep reading:

"I don’t believe in evolution – I accept the evidence for evolution." The believing isn’t what makes evolution true or not, it’s that there is evidence that supports it.

Ok so they don't believe in science, they accept the evidence for science. Now what does 'accept' mean? Let's look at the dictionary https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accept : one of the definitions is "to recognize as true: believe".

So they don't believe in science, they believe in the evidence for science. Dawkins says evolution is true because there is evidence that supports it, so he believes that evidence proves scientific theories are true. Which is scientism in disguise. An observation can be interpreted in many different ways, it can be seen as evidence for many different theories, yet he believes observations prove scientific theories.

That's probably why many people don't see scientism as widespread, because it usually isn't explicit, usually it isn't stated explicitly like "I believe in science" (even though there are plenty of examples of people saying that as you mentioned), rather it is implicit, they don't say they believe in science or in scientific theories, they say they accept the evidence or the facts, but then they don't realize or don't say that they believe that this evidence or those facts prove that some scientific theories are true.

In the religion of scientism people believe in some facts. But what makes something a fact? That's where the belief resides. Scientism has been defined for instance as "the view that the characteristic inductive methods of the natural sciences are the only source of genuine factual knowledge and, in particular, that they alone can yield true knowledge about man and society". They believe that their facts are the true facts, the ones people ought to believe. They believe that the things they call evidence prove that such or such scientific theory is true. And so fundamentally they believe in scientific theories, contrary to what they claim. And that is really, really widespread.

I think that you yourself believe that observations can prove a theory, or at least that observations can falsify a theory, but that's not the case either, any theory can be saved from falsification as I explained in other threads. There is always belief involved in what we call knowledge or truth, and science doesn't escape that.

But a little responsible for EVERY INSTANCE OF SUFFERING. That adds up to a lot. — khaled

I said "at worst", as in not necessarily responsible.

It's different if, say, a teacher (just using another fatherly figure) is very nice to you and you're grateful to him and you blame other people for your suffering. In that case he literally has no connection to your suffering so is not to blame. However if it turns out the teacher is the one that originally picked your classmates and knowingly picked bullies when he had other options, it would be a different story wouldn't it? — khaled

What a bad analogy again. Choosing whether or not to have a child is not analog to a teacher choosing whether he's gonna pick bullies as your classmates or not. You keep bringing up stories as if they were valid analogies, they aren't.

Please don't put words in my mouth. I have never blamed my parents for anything. Nor other people for that matter and I don't see how it is relevant who I personally blame for what as to the validity of that blame — khaled

So if some individual doesn't see his parents as responsible for his suffering, who the heck do you think you are to tell that individual he's wrong and his parents are really responsible for his suffering? What makes your subjective point of view more important than his subjective point of view?

Oh you don't see that? What about all those starving children in africa who you know apparently OWE money to? How long of a sentence should you get for NOT providing as much joy as you could to other people. Stop typing and have more kids lest you deny them joy which is apparently morally punishable.

See how ridiculous it sound to say you owe others joy or pleasure? If you truly did you wouldn't be wasting time typing here as it is denying someone somewhere some pleasure potentially. The only thing you owe others is not harming them. Neither of us OWES the other a massage. — khaled

Nice way to totally misinterpret and misrepresent what I said. You complain I put words in your mouth while you're doing worse. I said, in my view I owe joy to my future children, not just "no suffering", because in my view a life without joy isn't a life worth living. I doubt your children would be happy if you consider that all you owe them is "no suffering", but then I guess it's a good thing you don't want to have children.

Look at the asymmetry thing. It clearly says that having children has both good and bad aspects to it. However, me participating in, or not participating in society has a negligably small impact on the suffering or pleasure of any one person so it doesn't matter which I do morally speaking. — khaled

Your existence doesn't have a negligeably small impact no, especially if you go around preaching antinatalism and convince future parents that they are bad people for wanting to have children and make them suffer greatly as a result. You're oblivious to the consequences and ramifications of your actions.

Since when does having children give you immortality? Are you implying that if I have a child I will somehow "live on" consciously INSIDE their cells or something? — khaled

I'm not implying that, that's again you misinterpreting and putting words in my mouth, all the while ignoring what I was replying to.

You say it's ok to make other people suffer if you need to do it to survive. First that's your opinion, not a fact, some people see sacrifice as a good thing so others don't have to suffer because of them.

Second, again, if you want to risk causing suffering as little as possible, go live in the woods far from anyone and only eat plants, that's enough to survive, yet you don't do that, because you're inconsistent.

Third, other people besides you have their own subjective idea of what they "need to do to survive". Plenty of people indeed hold the view that having children is a way to transcend death, if you look around you will find them. Not everyone is like you you know? A few examples from the first page of Google:

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-big-questions/201202/children-and-the-quest-immortality
https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/8080676-our-immortality-comes-through-our-children-and-their-children-through
https://pelos2016.wordpress.com/2016/04/30/the-immortality-trap/

..... No. And heck, if there WAS such a disease I'd say it is debatable to allow having a child in this case. — khaled

I guess you don't know that infertility is correlated with depression and suicide. You don't care about infertility because you don't want children, most people care.

When you want something so much that it gives meaning to your life, and you can't have it, you suffer greatly. In your case, if you couldn't preach antinatalism anywhere I think you too would suffer greatly.

I am very happy with my life. And heck jobs can be fun. That was the point of the metaphor. They CAN be fun but they're not guaranteed to be which is why you can't force people to work them — khaled

And the metaphor is shit because for most people life has nothing to do with a job.

It's not "only to satiate my own desires". It's to stop more people from suffering. — khaled

Which is your desire.

Find me a valid reason or a valid benefactor to the act of having children other than the parents of said children — khaled

You know plenty of children are happy to be alive right?

I would say you are a partial cause for having them in the first place. "I tried my best but the world sucks bucko" doesn't relieve you of responsibility. — khaled

At worst a little responsible for their suffering , and greatly responsible for their joy (in the case where I do my best to bring happiness to the child and it works).

If the child tells me he is happy to be alive, and is thankful to me, and tells me that he suffers because of some other people and not because of me, how can I be construed as being responsible for his suffering? The individual is the one who decides who to blame. It seems to me that you're blaming your parents for your suffering, but plenty of people do not blame their parents, they blame other people.

Solution A to suffering: Don't have the child
Result: No suffering (good) and no pleasure (not bad because you don't owe future children pleasure)
Chance of success: 100%

Solution B to suffering: Prevent every instance of suffering by creating a utopia
Result: No suffering (good) and a lot of pleasure (good)
Chance of success: idk but I don't think it's that high
What happens if it fails: Suffering (bad)

So i'd rather go with solution A — khaled

I disagree with the contrast between suffering and pleasure, I would rather talk of joy or happiness in opposition to suffering. Because some people (potentially many, including me) don't see pleasure as worth living for, but they see joy or happiness as worth living for, to me pleasure is not the same as joy.

And then I don't agree with the asymmetry that "no suffering" is "good" whereas "no joy" is "not bad", in my view "joy" is "good" and "no joy" is "bad". I don't see why we would owe "no suffering" to future children but not "joy".

Even if I lived like a hermit that won't spare a single animal's life, or at least the chances of it doing so are extremely low. It would only add to food loss and reduce the amount of services I could have provided other people. On the other hand, me not having a child CAN (didn't say it would) spare someone an entire lifetime of suffering. And I am not one for taking risks for others without their consent, so I won't have children. — khaled

You apply a double standard there. On the one hand you focus on the positive experiences you can provide other people, on the other hand you focus on the negative experiences you can provide to a child.

You take risks for others without their consent every second of your life. If you rationalize taking risks for others without their consent by saying that you can give them positive experiences (by providing services to them), you can rationalize having children in the same exact way.

If you justify taking risks for others without their consent by saying that you need to do so to survive, many people could apply the same principle to say that they need to have children to survive through the genes that their children will carry. Some people so badly need to have a child that they can't survive if they don't have one.

I don't see how you can get out of that double standard.

It doesn't matter how much I like a job, I can't force you to work it. — khaled

Life is not a job, that's only how you personally feel about it.

Again, I just don't see that an action that risks harming people to the point of them committing suicide without consent from them and only to satiate one's own desires is moral. — khaled

And yet spreading antinatalism and being successful in making parents believe that they are bad people for having children could precisely harm them to the point of them committing suicide, only to satiate your own desires.

If gravity is not absolute, then it must be a function of an absolute law. — BrianW

The fundamental truth must be that, "REALITY/EXISTENCE IS." (Others would substitute reality/existence with other identities or designations, but that truth holds regardless.) This is because, contrary to that truth, no amount of knowledge, wisdom, philosophy, science, language, etc, etc, could have a foundation with which to begin or operate. Therefore, the laws which establish reality/existence (which I refer to as laws of nature or natural laws) are absolute because they establish that fundamental state. — BrianW

I don't necessarily agree with that though.

Let's say that in this 'reality', there are no laws that are set in stone, but rather some beings have created these laws through their will, and they can change them through their will. Then gravity would be a function of the will of these beings. If that will is unconstrained, then in what sense could gravity be said to be a function of an absolute law? Gravity would be a function of a will that doesn't follow any law. Maybe at some point in the future that 'will' will decide to modify or remove gravity in a lawless way.

But that wouldn't imply that for instance philosophy or language are impossible, these could have as a foundation temporary laws that are not functions of absolute laws.

Basically my point is that if the laws are created and can be modified in lawless ways then they aren't absolute laws.

We know what they are because they are identical in the smallest (most limited) as they are in the greatest sense (the absolute). They operate in us just as they do the whole universe. Though, we cannot match the activity or operation of those laws in terms of quantity, we can certainly improve the quality expressed through us. — BrianW

If we know what they are then what are they? Do you have a list, or they can't be expressed in words?


Note that I am not trying to contradict you at all costs, I think you say interesting things, but you said in your first post that you were welcoming critiques and counter arguments, so I think what I say could be constructive to you, and there are some things you say I do disagree with, things you see as obvious or as certainties while they aren't necessarily so in my view.

For instance the assumption that there are absolute laws that govern existence is not necessarily true in my view, I think existence could be fundamentally lawless and that there are only apparent laws that have a limited validity. And then the distinction between 'laws' and 'rules' would not be warranted, there would simply be 'rules' that are more or less accurate.

According to science, the scientific method, there is insufficient evidence to support the proposition that there is a god. That is to say, conclusions that there is a god are not scientific. — DingoJones

Who gets to decide what counts as "sufficient evidence"? Scientists talk about other universes and about dark energy, yet I'm sure you don't treat those like you treat god, why the double standard? Or if you say that conclusions there are other universes or that there is dark energy are not scientific, then you agree that scientists make unscientific conclusions.

Its not that complex. Just because someone believes in science and believes in god doesn't mean the two are compatible. Its called cognitive dissonance I believe.
If science is your standard, you cannot believe in god. If you have some other standard, “faith” probably, then have it but it isnt science. Thats it. Simple. — DingoJones

Some scientists treat other universes and dark energy as hypotheses, some other scientists believe in them, why don't you tell those who believe in them that they have cognitive dissonance?

Believing in god and applying scientific standards isn't incompatible, what's incompatible is believing in god and believing in science and believing that science proves there is no god.

And to those discussing the open mindedness, perhaps some knows who said this (rough paraphrase) “do not have a mind so open that your brain falls out”. — DingoJones

That's the saying I had in mind, and it's quite a shit metaphor: the mind is not the skull.

Also, the traits you specify scientists possess apply to the wider population. Its a human thing, not a scientist thing. — DingoJones

So if scientists contradict themselves to push the theories they like and dismiss the theories they don't like, it's ok because other humans do it too, that has zero repercussion on the scientific enterprise?

...

That's not far from my own point of view. Where I differ is that I would say it's possible to have the experience that other things exist besides our experiences, and then it's a matter of belief whether we see that as an experience without higher significance or as a sign that there are other things besides our experience.

After all, you get the idea that "your experience is all that can be known to exist" from your experience, so why not get the idea that "other things exist besides your experience" from your experience?

The device would still not alter gravity. Machines (rockets) which move against the Earth's gravity have not disabled gravity, merely employed the use of certain operations allowed within the purview of the law of gravity. I am certain that, even in that supposed repulsion, gravity would still be at work and any momentary hitch in such a function would be met by the corresponding response from the present influences of gravity. — BrianW

But is your certainty on this a rule or a law? And if it is a rule, how can you know that gravity is a law, and thus that we will never find a way to disable gravity in the future?

By laws of nature I mean the operations which establish reality/existence. Reality/existence is absolute, therefore its laws must be absolute, too. — BrianW

What do you mean exactly by reality/existence is absolute? There are plenty of things we used to call reality that we now call imagination, and plenty of things that we used to called imagination that we now call reality, and different people have different views on what is real and what isn't.

I wouldn't say it is impossible that we live in a world governed by absolute laws, but do you acknowledge that if we live in such a world we can't know what these laws are? Otherwise if we know what they are, that means we know that they will keep being valid in the future, and how could we know that? So if we can't know what they are, is it useful to make a distinction between laws and rules? And if somehow we can know what they are, that means we have scientific principles (rules) that are in fact laws, and then again is it useful to make a distinction between laws and rules?

True that. I am often amazed at how dogmatic some science disciples can be. To me, the most important aspect of science is always retaining an open mind. — Pantagruel

Yes, that's the idea of science I grew up with, but then more and more I realized how keeping an open mind is precisely not an attitude that characterizes most scientists nowadays, instead they see an open mind as a defect, as a mind that lets in ideas and beliefs and theories and practices that do not fit the superior realm of Science. If only they could at least define that realm precisely and consistently, but they don't, or rather they can't and that's the worst part of it, they say something is Science because it fits some criteria, and then they say some other thing isn't Science even though it fits the exact same criteria, and then they ridicule that other thing and use derogatory terms to qualify it. That's like the antithesis of having an open mind.

Newton's and Einstein's laws of gravity are not complete by themselves. While they do refer to the operation of gravity, they only designate the part which we understand. For example, the new investigations into dark matter and dark energy hint that these may actually be the fundamental aspects which determine the action of gravity in nature. So far, science can only teach us gravity as we have encountered it, but our experiences are too limited. We know there's more to gravity than we have discovered but we can only work with it to certain extent. This is why I refer to the scientific as rules or principles while the natural are laws. — BrianW

But you could assume that Einstein's theory of gravity is complete, it is precisely this assumption that leads astrophysicists/cosmologists to suppose the existence of dark matter and dark energy, the fact that without them Einstein's gravity doesn't match what we observe in galaxies, but with them it does.

So maybe what you mean is that what is going to happen is already written into nature as natural laws, whereas our scientific theories are only approximations of these laws and are potentially faillible?

It will be impossible to do away with gravity (the law of nature) — BrianW

But what if in the future we manage to create a device that makes two planets repel one another instead of attract one another, that means we could do away with gravity. How would we know that this is impossible? And then how would we know what is law and what isn't?

The universe is always changing with respect to the configuration of its components, are its laws always changing in the same regard? Or, in what way could the universe and its laws change? — BrianW

It could be that gravity works in some specific way now, and that at some point in the future it will start working differently. But then you could always say that the true law specifies how it works throughout the history of the universe, and that a law that doesn't always work is not a real law. But there is still the problem of determining what is law and what isn't, unless you're ok with saying that there are laws but we don't know what they are? Otherwise if we knew these laws, then some scientific theories (rules) would actually be laws.

There is no 'conflict' if science and religion are seen as operating in different domains of human necessity. Ostensibly, science operates in the domain of 'prediction and control'; Religion operates in the domain of 'emotional and social need'. Conflict arises when 'needs' stray out of their domains — fresco

The problem with that characterization is that people can then claim that "emotional and social needs" can be controlled or fulfilled through "prediction and control", and that's how science gets to the position of authority that it has today, people believe that whatever problem that can be solved can be solved through science and so there is no need for anything else. There are elements of prediction and control and emotional and social need both in what we call science and what we call religion.

I think a more accurate characterization would be to recognize that science is not fundamentally different from religion, the apparent difference lies in that what we call science is more focused on what we perceive with our usual senses, whereas religion or spirituality is usually more focused on feelings.

In any discussion about science I feel it is important to point out the problem of demarcation that seems to be consistently ignored: we can't even define precisely what is science and what isn't science! All such attempts fail in some way. If we say science is defined through falsifiability, there are plenty of so-called scientific theories that aren't falsifiable. If we say science follows a scientific method, there are plenty of practices that follow this scientific method and that are considered non-science. People who call themselves scientists decide what theories or practices they call 'science' to give them more importance, and to dismiss theories and practices they don't like, calling them 'pseudoscience', 'fiction', 'fairy tales', 'unworthy of consideration'.

I would characterize Science as a religion all the same, with its own system of beliefs and practices, that doesn't have inherently a position of authority over other systems of beliefs and practices, besides the authority that its numerous adherents confer to it. At that point Science believers usually react furiously, saying Science tells how the world is, Science has successes, but so do other systems of beliefs and practices, they all tell their own story of how the world is and they all have their own successes, it's simply that what counts as a success within one system doesn't always count as a success within another system, smartphones and spacecrafts and nuclear weapons can be seen as great achievements within one system, while being seen as signs of retrogression within another system, depending on what the system values most.

If reality has different times in relation to the distance from the gravitational source, then time is different. There is no other time than the time that reality is following. From a physicalists perspective you are falsely making time transcendent. — Coben

The concept of time stems from our perception of change, and time is defined relationally. For instance I might say "time runs slow today", because compared to other days I perceive today to be longer than other days. Usually we compare our perception of a process with that of another perceived process, which we call a clock, and which we define to be a reference process.

So in order to say that a clock runs slow, we can't say that in an absolute sense, we have to compare it to another reference process, so another clock. So when we talk of gravitational time dilation, we're fundamentally saying that a clock in a given gravitational environment runs diffently compared to a clock in another gravitational environment.

It is usually assumed that all processes in the vicinity of the clock are affected and not just the process of the clock, but experiments that test gravitational time dilation make a comparison between specific reference processes, they don't test all processes, so strictly speaking tests of gravitational time dilation have only shown that different gravitational environments affect specific processes differently.

In all this there is no "time" that runs slower in some places than in some others, people sometimes say that clocks run slower because time is dilated, that's a fallacy of reification, of treating time as having an existence independent of how we define the concept through our measurements. Which links back to what gater said, that gravity has an effect on devices whose measurements we call time, gravity has an influence on processes, not on some reified "time", in that sense I agree with him.

But then he talks of "actual time" that remains "constant" and is not affected by gravity, but that's a reification or a tautology at best, if we want we can define the reference processes as clocks in a space far from any gravitational source, but then these clocks aren't affected by gravity by definition. If we define "actual time" as the measurement shown by clocks not affected by gravity, then by definition gravity doesn't affect these measurements, so saying gravity doesn't affect "actual time" is a tautology, whereas implying "actual time" is something other than the measurement shown by these clocks is to make again the fallacy of reification, or to treat it as some transcendent entity, so in that sense I agree with you.

We perceive change, and change is relational, no need to talk about "actual time" that exists independently of that, what we call time is how we choose to measure that relational change, it's not some concrete external entity that flows.

Religion accepts that we'd rather make up a story than leave a question unanswered, that we humans love metaphor to explain complex and abstract concepts more easily, that we look for guidance and meaning in our lives
So does that mean that religion is false, an illusion, a man-made fiction? Not quite.
Have not science and philosophy themselves shown the fallacies and inadequacies of rational thinking? There are limits to science, and very often the "scientific fact" is nothing but "the model that currently holds up in most tests".

So what, if an old creation myth is contradicted by evolution or geology?
Our ancestors didn't have those answers, so the religious metaphor was all they could rely on.
Today, you can choose to discard the metaphor of myth. Or you can understand that it is, indeed, allegorical, and it may still teach you something useful, and then you keep it alongside the science.
Another example: Even if you know that the sun does not move around the earth and is nothing but a big ball of gas: you can still speak about the sun "rising", and you can find profound meaning in a hymn that praises the sun god for nurturing life on earth. — WerMaat

Indeed :up:

"Scientific facts" change as well as religious metaphors. The stories that scientists used to tell are very different from the one they tell now, and the ones they tell in the future may again be very different. It seems many believe that science is now close to truth, and all that remains is to work out the details, but that's what people said too before the advent of relativity and quantum mechanics and computers, so I really wouldn't count on the "scientific facts" of today to be the final version of the scientific tale.

There is also the widespread view that science works while religion doesn't, but that's not right, spirituality works for many people in ways that science doesn't work for them. People who want most of all to feel love and connectedness and meaning don't care much about the latest technologies or about sending spacecrafts into outer space, technology can be a useful tool but they don't see it as the most important thing, as something to idolize. The importance of scientific 'successes' is relative, among other things they have given us the tools to destroy one another more efficiently, the quest for incessant progress has led to the progressive destruction of nature and other species and cultures, and it doesn't look like scientific stories will be enough to make us change course.

We might very well continue praising the successes of science all while continuing to destroy the world and ourselves until our last breath, stuck in the belief that science could find the solution to all our problems. Science can tell people that nuclear war would bring global destruction, but it won't stop people from using nuclear weapons. To say that only science works is to focus on the material while being oblivious to everything else, and that's a religion in itself.

Interesting train of thought.

To make sure I understand you correctly, "law" is often defined as a "system of rules which a particular country or community recognizes as regulating the actions of its members and which it may enforce by the imposition of penalties", you would classify that as a code and not as a law right?

Another thing, in your view what's the difference between natural law and scientific law? It seems that you classify "natural laws" as laws, and "scientific laws" as rules. For instance why would gravity be considered a natural law and not a scientific law? Are you saying for instance that Newton's law of gravitation and Einstein's general relavity are scientific laws and not natural laws, whereas the observations we make that things tend to fall to the ground count as a natural law and not a scientific law? I don't see a difference myself, in both cases observations are compiled and generalized into a principle. Also, the terms "scientific law" and "natural law" are often used interchangeably by some people.

Regarding "rules" you said: "Often we can work around them, modify them and even discard them in favour of others". Newton's law of gravitation does fit the description, it can be said to have been modified or discarded in favour of other scientific laws, whereas the underlying concept of gravity has perdured, so you might say this is what makes gravity a "law" and Newton's gravitation a "rule". But it is not inconceivable that in the future we might manage to create some anti-gravity device, and then gravity would stop being "unavoidable" and so it would stop being a law the way you defined it. So it seems to me that we can't really know whether we're dealing with a "law" or a "rule", maybe what we interpret as a law will turn out to be a rule, and maybe what we interpret as a rule will turn out to be never modified or discarded, which would make it a law. So maybe the distinction you make between law and rule is not warranted.

I'm surprised. Maybe I wasn't paying close attention to what you have written. I thought we were talking about the hard problem of consciousness - the question of where and how our personal experience is generated through our bodies. Where it comes from. I thought you were arguing that emergence couldn't be the answer because it doesn't really exist so no new principles or behaviors can develop between one layer of organization and and the next. So that leaves the hard question unanswered. — T Clark

Yes you understood that correctly. Strictly speaking I wouldn't say emergence doesn't exist, for instance I do agree that there are laws of biology and chemistry, I do agree that there are properties like density and viscosity that fundamental particles do not have, but I'm saying that in materialism these laws and properties can be reduced to laws and properties of the fundamental particles, and if we say they can't and we can't describe their emergence in any way then the emergent laws and properties are taken to be fundamental in themselves, and we end up describing the universe in terms of hundreds of fundamental laws at various levels, seeing all levels as disconnected.

For instance using the example of the cell again, we end up saying that there are fundamental laws that govern the behavior of a cell that don't reduce to the laws that govern the behavior of the molecules that make up the cell, and we do that at all levels. But then that also means that consciousness is taken as fundamental and not as reducible to brain activity, and that's not materialism, that's something else. So basically, if we say the emergence of consciousness from matter cannot be described in any way then we're refuting materialism, while taking consciousness as fundamental. The hard problem stems from saying that consciousness is not fundamental and arises from matter.

Now it seems to me that you are saying that consciousness is somehow applied to us from the outside, which would be vitalism as I understand it. Or are you saying that the physical world develops out of consciousness, since it is fundamental? How does that work? — T Clark

If consciousness is fundamental then it's not "applied from the outside" any more than if matter is fundamental it's "applied from the outside". Also, saying consciousness is fundamental is not equivalent to vitalism, because life doesn't necessarily have consciousness (or at least that doesn't have to be assumed).

But if we say that consciousness is fundamental and not matter, then the physical world is part of consciousness and that's the philosophy of idealism. Which doesn't reduce to solipsism, the physical world could be seen as a part of our collective consciousness. But there is no hard problem of explaining how that world can develop out of consciousness, because it doesn't exist outside consciousness, it is part of consciousness. It could be interpreted for instance as a shared dream.

Whereas in materialism we can't say that consciousness is part of matter, because it is said that consciousness arises from some matter, and that's what gives rise to the hard problem.

Just to make sure I understand - you think that consciousness rising up out of brain function is fundamentally different in kind than life rising up out of chemistry. And that this is the reason for the "hard problem" of consciousness. Is that right?

In what I've read, a lot of people equate the hard problem and vitalism. I'm assuming you disagree. — T Clark

It depends how we define life. We could have self-sustaining aggregates of molecules that follow the laws of chemistry and that we call life forms, in principle we might even have life forms that look like human beings and that obey the laws of chemistry, but these life forms wouldn't have any consciousness, they wouldn't perceive/feel/think anything. So life rising up out of chemistry, sure why not, but not life with consciousness.

Maybe the people who equate the hard problem with vitalism implicitly refer to life with consciousness.

Can the hard problem be solved by science? If so, where do we look? If not, that's just magic too. I've been following up on our previous discussion with some reading. — T Clark

Again it depends how we define science, here we have another kind of somewhat hard problem, the problem of demarcation between science and non-science, I had made a thread about it, basically my view on the subject is that there is no criterion scientists apply consistently to define what is science and what isn't, rather scientists call 'scientific' the theories that suit their personal desires/beliefs and 'unscientific' the ones that don't. So I don't agree that what isn't labeled 'science' is automatically magic.

The hard problem arises from assuming materialism, my view is it can't be solved within materialism. But the problem disappears if idealism is assumed instead of materialism for instance, in idealism consciousness is fundamental as opposed to matter so there is no hard problem of explaining how consciousness can arise from matter. There are some apparent problems with idealism, but they aren't 'hard' like the hard problem of consciousness in materialism. And we could very well have a science that assumes idealism, science doesn't have to be restricted to materialism.

This isn't to say that the hard problem only disappears in idealism, it also disappears for instance in panpsychism but in it another hard problem appears, the so-called combination problem. In interactionism we have instead the problem of interaction. Some form of idealism seems the less problematic to me, but I haven't thought thoroughly about all philosophical viewpoints yet.

This is one part I’m still trying to find a way to explain: how this concept of energy, as ‘the capacity to do work’, shifts to and from potentially and actually doing work. But I don’t have the physics or math background to conceive or critique any formula for the connection. — Possibility

Don't worry about the physics or maths, they don't explain that either.

Basically the concept of energy stems from assuming that there are laws that dictate change and that these laws are constant through time.

As a basic example, assume there is the law that objects accelerate towards the Earth at the rate of 9.8 m/s² (for instance if you drop something from the top of a cliff, its velocity would increase by 9.8 m/s every second, neglecting air friction).

So if you drop the object at time t=0, its velocity as a function of time is v = 9.8*t (until it crashes on the ground).

If we call H the height of the cliff and h the height at which the object is during the fall (h decreases during the fall), we can infer that :

v²/2 = 9.8*(H-h) (I can detail if you want)

So during the whole fall, the quantity v²/2 + 9.8*h remains constant. So when the quantity 9.8*h decreases, the quantity v²/2 increases by the same amount. At the top of the cliff, v²/2 is 0 while the quantity 9.8*h is maximal, and at the bottom of the cliff v²/2 is maximal (right before the crash) while the quantity 9.8*h is 0.

So if you define v²/2 as kinetic energy and 9.8*h as potential energy, you can say as a figure of speech that during the fall, the potential energy of the object is converted into kinetic energy, but there is no substance we see that gets actually converted, it's just a mathematical wordplay.

Why did the object accelerate during the fall? Well we don't know, that's just what we observe, and we model that through a law, talking about energy doesn't explain anything, saying that there was a potential stored in the object that got released during the fall and made the object accelerate is just one abstract way of looking at it, but if you choose to reify that potential as something concrete that really got converted or actualized during the fall, maths and physics won't tell you anything about that (so don't spend years studying maths and physics in the hope that you will find such an explanation in there).

That's not to say that you can't create a coherent view of the world by assuming that everything is "interaction of potentiality" (I have a vague intuition of what that might be but I think it's worth exploring), but don't believe that you will find in physics how the potential to do work gets actualized into doing work, just because physicists talk misleadingly of potential energy being converted into motion doesn't mean they are doing anything more than describing how things move, otherwise you will spend years chasing a chimera.

Are you talking about the as of yet unknown or perhaps unknowable nature of qualia of perception and emotions? — Noah Te Stroete

I'm talking about the impossibility to explain consciousness in a materialist framework (by consciousness I refer to what a being experiences: perceptions, feelings, thoughts ...), or in other words the impossibility to explain what gives rise to our consciousness based on the contents of our perceptions alone (so if we claim to have a model that describes the fundamental laws that govern our universe, but it is impossible to derive from that model that anything experiences anything even in principle, then it's not a model of our universe, because at least something experiences something). Well we can always give an explanation by invoking magic (for instance say that consciousness arises from the brain because magic, or that it arises from some complex process we can't describe), but usually we expect more from an explanation, otherwise we can explain anything in any way we want.