It seems to me there must be a kernel of meaning, or perhaps some arbitrary carry-over from the aliens’ actual means of written expression, to the codex, for there to be some sort of incontrovertible message to be derived in the codex. — ToothyMaw

I think we are in the same page. It is not possible to derive a message from noise. But that is just my intuition.

I think most people would never get too far convincing others about the “meaning” of its “language.” — Fire Ologist

Everything about the presentation screams "language". And note that the aliens embedded language like statistical patterns into the noise.

Some here may find the history of investigation of the Voynich Manuscript interesting. — wonderer1

I had indeed heard of it, this is probably the closest real life analog to my post. Epistemically that is, we still don't know what it is (which surprises me).

I'm guessing if the text contains what could be construed as universal patterns, then maybe that could be used as a basis for discovering more complex meanings. — Nils Loc

You missed some key parts of the op.

Are we talking about any interpretation at all? Or specifically one that would comport with what we might expect intelligent aliens (who have decided to communicate with us) to have to say to us? — ToothyMaw

Any interpretation at all is too permissive, only our alien expectations is too restrictive. What I am asking is, can a incontrovertible message be derived (and in doing so, likely a language)?

No interpretation. It's not a language. — L'éléphant

Maybe. But that is just semantics. "Is it an interpretation or isn't it" is ultimately definitional. I'm interested if meaning can be constructed in noise.



Did you miss

In truth, what some suspected, only half in jest, turned out to be correct. The text was a practical joke played on humanity by a cruel and whimsical alien species. It is complete nonsense, random gibberish, imbued with enough regularity to look like a plausible language, but no more. — hypericin

@Mijin If spatial-temporal continuity is required to maintain identity, then your case adds nothing, the subject is killed no matter what.
If it is not required, then your case reduces to, "How much damage can someone sustain before becoming a new person?"

Are informational objects causally related in the same sense that physical objects are? If so, how. I not how so? — I like sushi

Yes, you can look to life as the best example. Genetic code influences other generic code, messenger molecules, large and small scale structure, really the entire informational and physical reality of all life.

a complete account needs to include both halves of the relation, so to speak. If information is like numerals, then we need to know the status of numbers -- "informational content", perhaps? Or, if information is like numbers, what do we understand numerals to be? I'm calling them "instantiations", but maybe "informational vehicles" is better. Or just "symbols"? — J

I would say there are three terms, not two. Substrate, encoding, and content. Substrate is purely physical, content is purely informational, and they meet in the encoding. "3" encodes the information, 3. Outside the "3" there is a fourth thing, decoder, which interprets "3" by instantiating 3 as a native encoding (synaptic firing pattern in humans, or the electrical pattern 00000011 in a computer)

Note that it might seem that the interpretation is fully a subjective act by the decoder, and that the information (and encoding) are in no way "in" the object. But this is wrong. While this might seem to be the case for "3", imagine taking a pile of sand and decoding Disney's Beauty and the Beast from it. Totally not possible, the information is just not "in" the sand, the way it is"in" the VHS tape.

I have a leaf. In list A itemize those parts of the leaf that are information. In list B itemize those parts that are substrate. — Hanover

A:
The leaf is red.
The leaf has such and such shape.
The genetic sequence is ATATGCA...

B:
(The actual light reflected)
(The actual molecules arranged in such a shape)
(The DNA)

A way to think about the distinction is that state can be exhaustively captured in words. If you write out a map of the color at every point, the exact shape, the full genetic sequence, that is the state, divorced from the leaf's substrate. Whereas no amount of marks on paper can equal a physical leaf.

Can you imagine an non-physical object? Can you refer to something that has velocity but no material qualities? I think you will find in both cases that the answer is no. — I like sushi

Yes, I imagine informational objects, so do many. Using technology these days does that to you. Velocity is typically a property of material objects, but it has an informational analog in data transmission rates.

This is true of items liek 'and' in language. The 'and' does not exist materially, yet it serves a function for describing material items. — I like sushi

"And" doesn't describe a material item. It is a kind of semantic glue that doesn't describe anything in itself, it is used with other words to create meaning, which may or may not refer to material items.

Words by the way are paradigmatic examples of informational objects. Is the 'and' on a paper the same as these 'and's on your screen?

You can't have it both ways. You can't say that all art is equally art, and then say that some art is "barely" art, or that some art "only marginally identifies as art," or that some art is, "hardly art at all." Inclusion within the category 'art' is either absolute or its not. If "art-likeness [...] determines whether something is art or not," and whether something is art or not does not come in degrees, then "art-likeness" cannot come in degrees. — Leontiskos

I don't want it both ways. When have I said that "whether something is art or not does not come in degrees"?

No, the problem is the word "barely," which implies that some things qualify as art less than others. You began using that word when you talked about, "barely belonging to the category at all." — Leontiskos

Yes. To qualify as art less, means it only marginally identifies as art. Oatmeal, or a poo painting. This is not a value judgement, this is a statement about what the object is; that is, hardly art at all. You keep insisting that this is a value judgement.

Is data stored in a computer "information," or are you referencing the meaning a conscious being imposes on it? — Hanover

Data on a computer certainly is. I think information and interpretation have to be kept distinct. Note that it doesn't need to be a conscious being doing the interpretation.

For example, does the red leaf contain non-physical information that autumn has arrived, or is the red itself physical information? — Hanover

That autumn has arrived is an interpretation, it is not latent in the leaf itself. That same red leaf might be red due to a mutation, a response to a parasite, etc.

The red itself is information, though we don't usually think of it that way. Ontologically information is state divorced from substrate. But we think of information as state encoded on a substrate optimized for state retrieval and manipulation. So the leaf contains endless state, including its color and all the subtle variations in its shading, but it cannot be retrieved or manipulated easily. While the information in the leaf's genetic code is very much information in this sense.

You've switched from a comparison to an absolute. What I said did not imply that an artist must care for every piece of art. — Leontiskos

Comparison to absolute? What does that mean?

It is not the artist caring, it is the critic. A critic can acknowledge that a piece is "artistic", yet not like it.

Your idea that what counts as art and what counts as good art are two entirely separate issues looks to be mistaken, and one way to see this is by looking at our "notable point of agreement": — Leontiskos

How? I don't see it.

Out "notable agreement" speaks only to identity, not quality. It seems you can't stop conflating the two, if you think otherwise. Is the word "qualifies" throwing you off?

Yeah this is definitely an aspect that still bothers me. And it will endlessly make the "guru says nothing" solution distasteful unless it's figured out. — flannel jesus

It is not a solution whatsoever until @Michael can prove it.

In the "official" formulation I saw on Popular Mechanics, it says something to the effect that the islanders do not do anything unless they are logically certain of the outcome. I think this is key. It is impossible to be logically certain that in everyone's mental modelling of everyone's mental modelling, everyone can see blue. In reality, no matter how logical the islanders are, they would see 99 other blues and just say fuck it and act as Michael suggests.

Are you claiming that if we got rid of all of these physical things that the information of music would be floating out in space somewhere? — Philosophim

Certainly not floating in space, but existing in a similar sense that numbers exist. There is no 1, 2, 3, floating in space, these numbers must be instantiated physically to "exist", in your sense. Yet we routinely think of them independently from any particular instantiation, math wouldn't exist if we didn't do this.

The physical notes I write on a page. The physical intstrument I play it with. The physical ears that hear it. — Philosophim

Here, we only identify the notes as information. The instrument is a tool to convert the information contained on the sheet into audible music, and the ears interpret this.

Please, try to give me an example of a 'non-physical' bit of information that exists. — Philosophim

A song on a vinyl LP that is the same as the song you hear on Spotify. If you grant that it is the same song, this song cannot be physical, as their physical instantiation could not be more different.

If its not physical, what is it? This is always the problem. You have no real definition of non-physical that we can clearly point to that doesn't involve the physical. Can you explain non-physical apart from 'a physical process'? — Philosophim

Information is not physical. If it was, it could not retain its identity as it propagates through completely different physical mediums. Information requires a medium, but it is a mistake to conflate information with its medium.

I believe consciousness is informational in nature, not physical. And so like for all informational things, it is a mistake to call consciousness physical, conflating it with its medium, the brain.

If you doubt that consciousness is informational (though I don't see how you can, as you agree consciousness is ultimately computational), reflect how each and every piece of conscious content, every "quale", is telling you something, some piece of information, either about the world (the five senses), your body, your conscious mind (thoughts), or your unconscious mind (emotions).

Again, do you think that the world where a molecule changes speed has one more physical thing than the world where the molecule does not change speed? If a molecule's speed is physical then it seems that you must hold this. — Leontiskos

Hmm. Either motion isn't physical, or maybe, just maybe, it is your definition of physical that is at fault.

We all think this never works. You know this doesn't work at low n, but think it does at high n. Therefore it is incumbent on you to find the special n where it starts working.


I still think you are missing the recursion. To act in concert, everyone must model everyone's mental state. And that model must include the modeling of everyones mental state. Every time you move from x's mental state to their model of y's mental state, x can no longer be counted as blue; whether or not x is blue, x doesn't know what y sees when y looks at x's eyes.

Humans wouldn't think this way, but these are perfect logicians, not humans.

I looked into it a bit further online just now and it appears that red, the first chromatic color mentioned in early writings across cultures, is strongly associated with blood. — praxis

Even in philosophy, I've wondered why red seems to be the go to example when discussing color.

Red/orange might be the earliest colorful (not black/white) dye used, from iron oxide.

Sorry for the delay, I was camping and wasn't on here much.

Someone who desires art will hold that what is more artistic is better than what is less artistic. — Leontiskos

Not true, even though "artistic" is a poor choice of words on my part.

A critic might say, "though the piece is obviously artistic, I don't care for it". This reads normally enough to me.

But "artistic" is a bad choice because it not only means "art-like, belonging to the category of art", there are strong positive connotations about quality. While the alternative "artsy" means "art-like" with weaker negative connotations. So I will just say "art-like".

"Someone who desires art will hold that what is more art-like is better than what is less art-like." Is clearly false. Better art does not belong to the category of art more than lesser art. Either it belongs, it doesn't, or it's marginal. Artists don't compete to create art that is more art-like, they compete to create better art.

Art-likeness is distinct from quality, and it, not quality, determines whether something is art or not. Do you agree?

That seems to fly in the face of evolutionary biology. We have three receptors in our eyes and one is specialised towards blue light which control our cycadian rhythm. — I like sushi

When would a hunter gatherer actually need to distinguish blue from other colors? Red berries, green foliage, yellow flowers, but blue? It's not actually very relevant.

Our eyes are most sensitive to green, somewhat less to red, and far less to blue.

Probably. But the interesting part to me is exploring different aspects and arguments. it's pretty rich, for a logic puzzle!

We already know that no-one will. Our waiting those first 98/99 days is purely performative, not informative, — Michael

It is not purely performative. If it was I'm sure the perfect logicians could find a way to skip it.

After the guru speaks, everybody knows everybody knows ... there is at least one blue
After the first day, everybody knows everybody knows... There is at least two blues.
And so on

It seems to me that if (1) is true then everyone knows that (1) is true and everyone knows that everyone knows that (1) is true, etc. So you get your recursion. — Michael

1. I know x
2. Everyone knows x
3. I know everyone knows x
4. Everyone knows everyone knows x.
5. I know everyone knows everyone knows x
6. Everyone knows everyone knows everyone knows x
...

You claim that at some number in this series, they stop being distinct facts, so that the next number is the same fact as the previous?

Everyone can see 99 blues in the n=100 case. But this is not the same as the guru speaking, or everyone seeing on a piece of paper "there is one blue". With only visual evidence there can always be cases where 1 believes 2 believes 3 believes... 99 believes there is no blue. Only communication can collapse this chain.

are you saying that (2) is false and should instead say:

2. If everyone knows that (1) is true and if ... — Michael

It's worse than your amended 2. It recurses endlessly.



There is a fundamental problem. Whatever condition you think is sufficient ((1) in your case), , everybody must know it, not just you. But not in the omniscient sense, you, the islander, must know everybody knows it. But if you prove that, that new thing you now know is an additional fact that everyone must know, and you have to know they know it, and everybody must know that, and ..

My last substantive reply he only replied to the first sentence, I suspected he didn't really read it

Did you read my last post? I don't want to repeat of you didn't.

I’m not. I’m explicitly saying that I don’t think it needs to be recursive. — Michael

If you are missing the need, you are missing it.

.You are missing the recursion.

Once your list is fully expanded, #1 knows a fact, call it A:

A: everybody knows that everybody knows guru can see blue.

Ok, #1 knows A. But then #1 realizes, everyone has to know A to proceed, not just me. Otherwise we cannot act in concert.

So, really #1 must establish a meta-fact, B:

B: everyone knows A.

So #1 goes though a longer expansion, and proves B. But then #1 realizes, wait, if I have to know B to proceed, everyone has to know it. So now really he has to establish

C: everyone knows B.

...

And so on.

Even in the case of two people, they are all distinct facts, all the way up. It's just that we lose our ability to mentally grasp them pretty fast.

But isn't it curious that in R I said "better (or more artistic)," and in your own posts you recognize that some art is more artistic? Usually if something is more artistic then we would say that it is better qualified to be art, so I don't see how you can so neatly separate identification vs. evaluation. Usually the definition of art is going to determine what is more or less artistic — Leontiskos

By saying "better (or more artistic)" you are conflating evaluation and identification. We identify art by whether it is artistic or not. If A is more qualified as art than B, A is more artistic than B. But this does NOT mean A is better than B. This is demonstrated by the meal example. Every 5 star Michelin meal is more artistic than salted oatmeal. But there are many 5 star Michelin meals I would rather eat oatmeal than them.

Why is the Michelin meal more artistic than the basic meal? — Leontiskos

Much more effort, intention, time, resources, and training was devoted to the Michelin meal, all to create an object very carefully honed to modify the mental state of the consumer of the meal in a very specific way

Why is the Rembrandt better than the frowny face? — Leontiskos

I do not have a grip on the better question, and doubt there can be an account independent of preference. To be sure, the Rembrandt is also vastly more artistic than A Foul Frown, which seriously confuses the question here. .

(A notable point of agreement here may be this: That which barely qualifies as art at all is much more likely to be mistaken for non-art than something which readily qualifies as art, and the person who makes a mistake with regard to the former is much less mistaken than the person who makes a mistake with regard to the latter.) — Leontiskos

Yes, we agree here.

Number blues A B C...

At n=3, A doesn't know B knows C sees a blue.
At n=4, A doesn't know B knows C knows D sees a blue.
And so on.
Of course, every permutation of these are true as well.

here's the more tricky part - what new information did the Guru give them that they didn't already have? — flannel jesus

This is the beating heart of the puzzle, if you can't answer this you don't understand the puzzle. It is not to synchronize, not to make the counterfactual work.

It is to make sure, not that everybody knows everybody sees a blue, but that everybody knows everybody knows everybody knows..., n-1 times, that everybody sees a blue.

N=0 nobody is a blue.
N=1 not everybody sees a blue.
N=2 everybody sees a blue, everybody does not know everybody sees a blue.
N=3 everybody knows everybody sees a blue, everybody does not know everybody knows everybody sees a blue.
N=4 everybody knows everybody knows everybody sees a blue, everybody does not know everybody knows everybody knows everybody sees a blue.

And so on.


In order to get started, so that the failure of anybody to leave is meaningful, all this must be known. And, for @Michael solution to work, all this must be known too. Only a truth telling guru communicating to everyone that indeed there is a blue can cut through this recursive epistemic conundrum.

Would it then follow that if we have a prepared food that is not art, and then someone adds salt to make it taste better, it has become art? I am not convinced that such a thing is correctly identified as art. — Leontiskos

I think it would be art. The addition of salt, and the quantity added, is an aesthetic choice designed to modify mental state, in this case taste perception. Our "artist" may have chosen pepper instead, or, to really go all out, both.

But note, I agree with P and Q, and so I acknowledge that some art is more artistic than others. This meal would be a minimal example of art, barely belonging to the category at all, probably not enough to identify as art in an everyday context. Compare with a 5 star Michelin meal, much more artistic (but not better) , and which most everyone would call art.

If that is the only characteristic in your definition of art, then it seems like better/worse could only be attributed to the degree of modification intended or else achieved. — Leontiskos

No, and here you are again conflating identification vs evaluation of art. My definition is only for identification, evaluation is an orthogonal problem.

Consider again the Michelin meal. There are many basic meals (meals only marginally artistic) I would much rather eat than many Michelin meals. Many basic meals are just better, to me. Yet, I easily acknowledge that all the Michelin meals are more artistic than all the basic meals.

There are no doubt many gourmands who would always prefer the Michelin meals. Me and the gourmands are at an impasse, we have no independent way of deciding which is better, and nor should we expect one. Yet, we can both happily accept that the Michelin meals are more artistic.

Do you hold that benzodiazepines are art? — Leontiskos

No. By "experience" I mean, experience by the five senses. The effect of a benzo is not in the taste, but requires absorption into the blood stream. Drugs are human creations designed to alter physical state (and this alteration in turn, may or may not alter mental state). I exclude this, the alteration must arise from the experience of the purported art, in the above sense of "experience".

Similar for food. Food allays hunger by altering physical state. But, most food is also designed to alter mental state by the experience of it's taste, appearance, and smell, and so most (prepared) food is also art.

It may be helpful to introduce R beside P and Q, which includes a more specific genus: — Leontiskos

Why is this helpful to the question of "what is art"? To be sure, I think a frowny face scrawled on printer paper with feces is worse than a Rembrandt, by any reasonable definition of "worse" here, so I also believe R.

So what do you think? Do you prefer P or ~P? — Leontiskos

You seem to have ascribed a fair amount of doctrine to me that I have not explicitly set forth.

I prefer P, Q.

Do you have an alternative understanding of art to offer? — Leontiskos

I do, and I've already offered it to you directly. Here is my current formulation:

Art is a human creation (in the loosest, most permissive sense) whose experience is designed to modify the mental state of the experiencer.

You will no doubt feel that mine is vastly too permissive, just as yours is vastly too restrictive to me. Yet we both believe P, Q.

The problem with yours is that you, like so many, conflate the question of "what is good art" with "what is art". Much of what you wrote just reads as a list of your opinions on good art. But that may well be what @Moliere is actually asking, and so I might be the one who is ot.

Actually Michael still keeps green:

1. As of right now, everyone has come to know that everyone knows that green sees blue through some means or another — Michael

So for this to be false, we must find some blue that can find some blue that they aren't sure knows green sees a blue.

How will you do this when n=100?

Hey no editing.

For (1) to be false, blue A must see blue B , and know that B sees blue C, but not know that B knows that C sees a blue.

This doesn't seem possible when n=100.

And yet, it is wildly unintuitive that (1) is false when n=100, or 1000, or 10000, or...

Yeah, I follow, there is definitely a case to be made. This puzzle has been confusing the fuck out of me. The core problem is, I think you understand, at what point is (1)?

n=3: no, every blue thinks it could be 2
n=4: no, every blue thinks it could be 3
n=5: no, every blue thinks it could be 4
...

My disagreement is that you need the guru to say something just to make the counterfactual work.