How do we know the subjective world isn't just objective? No one is saying anything like "thoughts are secretions of the brain," and no one is saying anything like "thoughts are energy output of the brain." — Terrapin Station
It seems very close to your often-repeated assertion of the identity of experiences and brain-states. — Wayfarer
Identity is different than saying that something is a secretion or output of something else. — Terrapin Station
I think it is important at this point to say something about identity.
Definition : A and B are said to be
identical if : whenever it is the case that A, it is the case that B, and whenever it is the case that B, it is the case that A.
This is the notion of identity at work when we say, "Bachelors are unmarried men". [Note : As has been pointed out, identity cannot be as trivial as "x = x", which is true of
everything.]
I was briefly pursuing the following idea on another thread before the ugly real world interceded and pulled me away : It is not brain states (i.e., particular arrangements of neurons) and consciousness that are identical. Rather it is
brain activity and consciousness that are identical. Or more properly, it is a particular subset of brain activity and consciousness which are identical (since there is some brain activity not associated with thought).
"Bosh!", you say. But are either consciousness or the corresponding set-of-brain-activity ever encountered without the other? If not, then by the definition of identity given above, they are identical. It would seem that the only objection to this argument would be to disagree with the given definition of identity, or to show the existence of brain activity without consciousness, or to show the existence of consciousness without brain activity.