Taking the Forum as an example, it seems to me that much of the writing is neither one thing nor another. Neither creative, in the sense of Nietzsche, nor analytic, in the sense of the philosophical essay, where claims are made and then defended. I am including myself. — RussellA

It is a common symptom on an informal site. The biggest issue I see on this forum is how quickly threads can go off topic. There are often some interesting OPs but by the time a page is full it has often morphed into something else entirely.

My hope was to elicit both kinds of writing, at least, if with more effort than we usually put into OP's and responses. — Moliere

I would argue against the more 'creative' styles as such is only worth reading if you have faith in the author. I have no reason to have any faith in any authors on this site. I would be very interested to see BOTH forms used in parallel as I do fully understand the use of analogies to help a well-reasoned point hit home more readily.

My own view is that generally I see more attempts to be original that tend to do the exact opposite. It seems that there are some serious ideas being put forwards, but a lot of them are based on more nebulous ideas and in what I will call pop-philosophy there has certainly been a growing tendency to present 'new views' that are in fact narrow views or poor reiterations of older philosophical works.

The kind of thing I am talking about is someone looking at all of history being shaped by Capitalism or Tea or Psychedelics or Racism etc.,. It is these kind of myopic perspectives, generalised so broadly, that I find disconcerting/disappointing.

I really enjoyed that one. What did you think?

@Baden Did you say you have read 'Psycho Politics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power (Byung Chul-Han)? If not this appears to be basically the same theme.

@RussellA Do you prefer more analytic writing yourself or do you find something like what Nietzsche does equally worthy of attention (regardless of content, talking purely stylistically here!)?

Please, what other things could be deduced from the two fundamentally true statements? — Pieter R van Wyk

You did it yourself here:

According to Stephen Hawking the physicists are getting close to solve the mysteries of the universe. In fact he categorically stated that philosophy is dead and that the torch of knowledge is now carried by physicists (The Grand Design 2010 with Leonard Mlodinow. Since I am not a scientist, I do not have an answer to this question. — Pieter R van Wyk

So, you can just as easily state that philosophy is moving us in the right direction.

Note: I do not at all believe any of that was meant in the manner you frame Hawking's as saying it. More likely he was more inclined towards Feynmann's view of physics (not assuming it can or will give a completely detailed description of the universe).

Honestly, I think you are better off addressing other people who are engaging with you rather than me.

Have fun :)

Answering Moral Skepticism - Shelly Kegan

Finally!

Purpose. Do we make it, are we drawn along by it, or are we the substance of purpose itself?

Whatever purpose means to us it seems to be inextricably the primary feature of human life lived rather than existed.

1. For more than 2,600 years philosophy has studied and contributed to our knowledge and understanding.
2. We still suffer from strife, civil disobedience, revolution and war. — Pieter R van Wyk

So?

From this two statements one could deduce that philosophy has not been able to solve these problems - if these problems has been solved by philosophy we should not be still suffering from them. — Pieter R van Wyk

You can deduce many things from such. I repeat. So?

This then begs the question whether it is in the purview of philosophy to solve these problems. A valid question for sure. — Pieter R van Wyk

One which has been discussed for centuries. SO?

In my humble opinion, if we gain sufficient knowledge and understanding we should be able to, at least, manage these problems better than we are at the moment. — Pieter R van Wyk

Opinion. So?

Therefore, still my opinion, these problems should be under the purview of philosophy. — Pieter R van Wyk

Good for you! You have an opinion.

In short, you are of the opinion that philosophy is meant to solve all humanities problems AND you think if we gain sufficient knowledge and understanding that we should be able to manage humanities problems better.

You then take these opinions as given, and follow up with a question based PURELY on these opinions. 'Why has philosophy not solved humanities problems?'

Imagine someone saying to you the following:

I believe science will solve all the mysteries of the universe. Science has not yet solved all the mysteries of the universe and has, if anything, multiplied them exponentially. So now I ask you a question: Why has science not solved the mysteries of the universe?

This is basically what you have done. You are under the assumption that the purpose of something is what your opinion of it is, rather than what it does.

If you read my book — Pieter R van Wyk

Why would I. You have shown nothing of substance.

You are using philosophical tools to say that philosophy does not do what it does.

Deductive Reasoning is part of logical philosophical discourse.

The same deduction that I made regarding the failure of philosophy to solve or at least abate these problems could be made about politics. — Pieter R van Wyk

This is just blatantly ignorant. We no longer burn people at the stake and even have free education and health care in many countries.

Anyway, good luck. Hope you stick around and pick up a thing or two. This forum is pretty good for low level entry into this kind of subject matter.

Have fun :)

My theory (that I explain in my book) is not based on philosophy but based on a fundamental definition of a system, deduced from first principles. — Pieter R van Wyk

Contradicts:

I do not have a definitive solution to these problems either - what I do have is an additional (to philosophy) way that these problems could be tackled. — Pieter R van Wyk

Your hint at an alternative sounds suspiciously 'philosophical'.

I invite anyone to obtain my book - and then I challenge you to find the fatal flaw in my reasoning. — Pieter R van Wyk

I, most definitely, do not blame philosophy or philosophers for the woes of the world - merely pointing out the 'fact' that these problems have not been solved. Not by philosophy nor by politics, science, religion or any other human endeavour. And this is where my book comes in: I ask, is it not time that we rethink the very foundation of our perceptions, our understanding, and the basis of our knowledge - or do we 'pray' that somewhere along the line philosophers ( or: politicians, scientists, religious leaders ...) might find the solution(s) to our problems - before AI becomes the "next class of systems" and the human dream of 'Liberte, Egalite, et Fraternity' becomes only the history of humanity. — Pieter R van Wyk

You think they can be 'solved' or even need 'solving'? I am confused. You sound confused.

You assume there is some ethical absolute? On what foundation are you posing this question.

If there were a perfect political ideology it would require perfect adhesion to it by every single individual. Frankly, I would be more worried if everyone followed one singular path! The very basis of existence appears based on the necessity of open-ended approaches rather than absolute ones - those end in annihilation.

In short, what are you talking about?

On the difficulty of the text: I didn't deliberately try to complexify it, but I tried to prioritize theoretical preciseness which involved employing a lot of technical vocabulary that, understandably, the vast majority of readers were unlikely to be familiar with. In retrospect, a glossary would probably have been helpful, but I wrote most of this in the last week before the deadline and was still proofreading the above when I sent it (there even remain a few typos). — Baden

It shows. Any chance of a rewrite that is accessible? I can see there is something in this that is of interest to me and so I reckon we could have a pretty good discussion about this. The issue is as it stands it is asking more of me than I am willing to give.

I suffer with obtuse writing too sometimes. I feel like a lot of this would make more sense by just getting to the point early on and cutting out a lot of the technical jargon.

What we have outlined above is a warning that situates human subjects in a diachronic hierarchy between biological and social reality and a synchronic relationship with other subjects that both potentializes and creates their status as free agents. — Moliere

That can be said with much simpler wording right? If translated it actually says not much at all. I was hopeful that the following sentences would parse this in simpler terms but it just layered on the words and lost any thread of meaning it may of had.

I least it gives me hope for my own clarity in writing :)

Seriously, I am interested in what your point is here. I am not going to play a guessing game. It feels like you have a lot you want to say and tried it cram it all into a couple of thousand words when more likely a couple of hundred pages would've served better.

Is this being deliberately engineered? Yes, it would seem so. — Amity

I would have to disagree here. The concept of the 'invisible hand' is something Nozick uses to highlight how ineffective it can be to point at deliberate authorship. Psychologically, people will also claim authorship if the outcome is good and deny it when it is bad. I think much caution is needed here.

I see Schiller's main thrust being about the use of 'the playful impulse' as a means of using reason and morality in combination, rather than as separate. He looks at the playful impulse as being the only means by which both can come together.

Personally, when I hear someone say "aesthetic judgement" I see this as somewhat contradictory even though I understand what they mean by this. I say this because I do not see it as 'judgement' at all. Aesthetic taste can be honed but I fail to see how we pass 'judgement' as we simply express, rather than judge, our taste. It is this fuller sense of subjectivity that I see as a perfect means to reconcile differences and come to understand and forge new paths - morally and rationally.

The difficulty I find in expressing this is due to the medium. Philosophy looks to cut into 'Aesthetics' yet it will always resist such analytic brutality. It is non-quantifiable only felt. This 'useless' nature (as I believe Wilde pointed to) is what makes it of importance.

"The only results I see from philosophy are a world in which we are: unable to have peace, unable to eradicate poverty and hunger, and a world in which a well-balanced coexistence with our environment and among ourselves is but a pipedream!" (from How I Understand Things. The Logic of Existence). Why is this? — Pieter R van Wyk

Is this? We exist. Existence means there is some form of balance.

Daily life is Peaceful enough for the vast majority. Example, I cannot recall having to fight anyone physically for any reason - at least since adolescence!

"The Logic of Existence". A bold claim to make that existence is logical.

Purpose? Utility? You understand what these terms mean? Explain please.

Get the idea now. Perspectives help. Alternative perspective offer different views of 'purpose,' 'war' and many other terms we throw around with gay abandon. The mistake we all make is assuming we know what we mean simply by using the authority of 'words'.

Philosophy started on one simple question: How should I live my life?

Everything else is basically a branch of this one question.

To add, what I found most relevant about Berlin was his pluralism. The piecemeal engineering Popper backed was shown as wanting by Berlin due to how this or that agenda can clash with others.

That said, I have to confess: I don't like Popper as a political philosopher. While his falsification theory of science was groundbreaking, his reading of Plato is a caricature. — Benkei

I think that is more than a little unfair. In the preface he makes clear his critique is aimed at nuances, but I can see how you and others may read this as a 'caricature'. I find this harsh judgement though. His attack is on social engineering, so perhaps it is more or less to do with a particular stance you have on social engineering that lies at the heart of your position?

I do not wish to create a strawman argument here, but I think it may help if you explain from exactly what social position problems arise, what is meant by justice in your eyes, and how the law and enforcement plays its part too. The 'strawman' I am trying to avoid here is the idea of a blank slate/equal society. I do not think you are asking for that but I am just trying to read between the lines. I assume you understand that some people are better than others at different things and that this is part and parcel of human life.

I think Italian theorist Franco Berardi with his idea of poesis and rhythm as paths of resistance forms a useful bridge between Schiller and Byung-Chul Han. — Baden

Can you elaborate please?

I think there is probably too much noise atm. Advances are often made in small conclaves not within the thronging masses.

Creativity is not subjective in my view. Some have it and some do not. We are living in a period where what matters is easily drowned out by what does not.

Flibble Flobble.

This question is one thing Popper covers. Our sense of 'Liberty' is basically part of how we parted from the traumas of nature to a more civil means of life. Liberty is undoubtedly part of this incremental transition from the state of nature to life on human terms rather than the dictates of raw nature.

Meaning the concept of liberty is connected with the transition from Closed to Open society, with the increase of reason being put to use.

I do wonder if we might not now be facing the opposite risk though (although one Schiller might still help with), a sort of "fear of the utopian and principled," a "lack of faith in logos (the life of reason)" paired with an outright fear of thymos (the life of spirit/honor/excellence). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think, as Popper says, this is our eternal struggle in some way. I really do think Schiller was onto something regarding 'play' as being a useful means to bridge the divide between these two areas - or rather realise them as integral to each other rather than opposed.

[...] should not be ruled by nature exclusively, nor should reason rule [...] conditionally. Both of these systems should remain entirely independent of each other, and yet be perfectly as one.
- Schiller, 2006, p. 94

I do not entirely follow this belief, but in the context of political philosophy it works well enough.

Thymos degenerates into cannibalistic appetite at the limit and everyone loses in the long run. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would be interested to hear more about how you believe this concept fits into the modern world AND Schiller's view of aesthetics?

This places aesthetic reason forever at odds with practical and theoretical reason, whereas I would tend to say they are three facets of the same Logos. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, perhaps this depends on your concept of Logos more than what Schiller is referring to here. His primary point is that the aesthetic is not a form of reasoning. It is through the playful impulse that the 'formal impulse,' reasoned abstraction; and 'material impulse,' through sensual experience, are united and realised as the experience of 'beauty'. What is beautiful to us is not open to immediate debate in his eyes as he sees the 'playful impulse' as transcending the others.

Again, I am not exactly in full agreement here as it is a very difficult subject matter to articulate well due to the fact that the reader needs to set aside rational judgement.

My pitch would be: Beauty relates to the whole. Intelligible beauty is higher than sensible beauty. Beauty is that which "pleases when known." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This does seem to be at odds with Schiller's 'playful impulse'. Have you read that particular work of his? If not I highly recommend it. Undoubtedly you will have reservations about some of it, but overall it is a really nice take on the whole subject matter of aesthetics in a more political frame. He offer no resolution but points at this area as a fundamental one. There I find myself wholly in agreement.

Thank you for your comments. Hopefully this will open up some further discussion. I am not very familiar with

Virgil's Aeneid — Count Timothy von Icarus

so that could is something I would like to hear more about too.

My point was people do not just create monoliths out of nothing. It was a metaphor not a history lesson, so treat it as such.

It cuts down quite dramatically on the bullshit. Quite a relief, actually. — Banno

True. I rarely post anything anymore because I find it too much bother wading through trivial responses. If this sounds arrogant I don't mind. It is just a question of efficiency. I no longer have time to spare.

Thanks for comments. Will get to this asap. VERY busy lately.

The Egyptians didn't build the Pyramids first. They started out small and built upon their know-how and expertise over time.

It is really just that simple.

All hail 1's and 0's! :D

If we apply this insight philosophically, we see that striving for a complete worldview may not only be impossible—it may be misguided. — Banno

I think it is deeply misguided too. As you may have noticed I get a little concerned when philosophy ignores scientific evidence, or is simply ignorant of it. That said, it can serve us to look twice and rethink how we look at certain pieces of evidence rather than just taking them at face value.

With many advances today in various fields it is probably asking much for anyone to fully understand the intricacies of each field of interest. I have always felt that if there is one particular use of philosophy it is its ability to narrow this gap of understanding between widely dispersed areas of study.

This seems more and more important as technology propels us onwards with increasing speed.

Like every word in any language it is context dependent. It just so happens that this particular term can be used in common parse to mean quite different things to different people.

Like I have said, the way I view it is through the lens of 'knowledge' - which I take to mean 'something put under some of consideration' - and that 'belief' is that which straddles our immediate appreciation of the world and our background mapping of the world (world as in "weltanschauung" or "axis mundi").

I grant that knowing what a book is - outside of really paying conscious attention to this understanding of 'book' - can be called a belief in what I book is ... personally I do not see the use in calling that a 'belief' though, any more than would find myself saying a rock believes gravity keeps it on the ground or data stored on the hard drive on my PC can ever constitute a 'belief' from the perspective of my hard drive.

We know what we mean by such a "background belief": It's part of our web of mental constructs, a set of propositions we assent to if asked -- there may be many other ways of putting it (including more behavioral construals), but the main point is that it is not something that requires "consciously (as in the agent) believing it." The belief remains, in this way of speaking, whether I am conscious of it or not, as Banno says. — J

Well, a cognitive neuroscientist is happy to talk about conscious and unconscious contents. The word consciousness refers to both. There is leeway. The problem begins when we are equating a consciously held and articulated belief as equivalent to a so-called 'background belief'. The use of the term 'belief' is referring to something quite different in each case.

The brain maps the world. The 'we' we call 'we' does not in any way appear to be the whole of the brains content at all! If we take this into consideration I think we can begin to understand that 'belief' is certainly something only felt consciously and that obviously there is some brain stuff going on in the background.

This is more or less an epistemic argument.

Makes sense that these would be quite emotion-laden, but what about studies of beliefs about Chaucer, or algebra? — J

They are anchored in our understanding of the world. We have emotional attachment to existing. Neither are of any use without value attached to them.

Abstractions like algebra also operate under quite different 'beliefs' (if we are using this word) because they are Rules not Truths. It does not matter if you believe in the Rules of any game, it matter how they are of use to you.

All good points. I think if we are looking at what we mean by 'belief' then we need to distinguish between beliefs held in the face of evidence and beliefs held without any concern for evidence. Then there is the justification for beliefs we provide, or even the kinds of beliefs we do not even consider offering justification for.

If a belief is questioned I cannot see how anyone can react completely devoid of emotion. All intentions are driven by a feeling-about-something. All conscious experience is - in some form or another - a judgement-about-something as a means to navigate the world.

Beliefs can be something taken-to-be-true (we are on Earth or The Earth is Flat), that can be questioned but is not normally questioned by those holding the belief, or something regarded as unknown (Life After Death) which is more or less a clinging to sceptical ideas with a strong inclination towards some conclusion - absent of objective evidence.

None of the above can be absent of emotional content. If you believe it can I would really like to hear why and how this is at all possible given that the classical cognitive model has been pretty much dead and buried for a couple of decades now.

Maybe this is a useful link for the discussion: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/index.html#RatiEmot

One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration. — Banno

How so? How can you believe something if you are not consciously (as in the agent) believing it. That seems to fly in the face of how we use language in a rational manner. I think 'background belief' might be a better term for that, but it could possibly give the wrong impression of what we generally mean when talking about belief.

The neuroscience is not yet up to the task, and may never be. — Banno

Your judgement is better almost every cognitive neuroscientist alive today? This view was not widely held in the 80's and 90's. Since then the evidence coming in has forced the vast majority to reject the classical model of cognition.

There has been a swathe of studies relating to political beliefs over the past few years. I task you with finding a single one that did not find a connection between emotion and belief. I will be bold enough to put forward that you will not find a single one showing zero emotional content.

The paper seems to be trying to push philosophers away from classical models of cognition. My point is that most neuroscientists dropped that idea literally decades ago. I do not know of any that hold to such a dated model of cognition today? Undoubtedly there are probably one or two?

Has that been shown somehow in the research you're describing? — J

I very many cases, yes. There are more subtler forms that could be called 'emotional content' that cannot easily, or cannot be pinpointed. All evidence points towards this being the case, hence it is the general consensus among cognitive neuroscientists.

We may not know our reasons before we act — Antony Nickles

Then we had no reason. If you do not know why you did something what makes you think your justification for something you did means anything?

We can automatically react to something and try to understand why, but that is not the reason 'we' did it because 'we' didn't do it. This is not to say there is not an underlying process, just that it was not a conscious one and therefore not an act.

This is the more sketchy area of autonomous decisions and what that means. It is not really an area I like to delve into too deeply as I do not think we are in a position to place a line between 'action' and 'reaction,' only a vague no-man's land of "I don't know?".

I do not want to get bogged down in arguments about free-will and what that means to different people at all.

I am talking about both. The main thrust of my point being that the evidence provided by science is sometimes too easily left on the sidelines.

(I'm assuming there is no scientific description of "emotional content.") — J

There is plenty of research into how emotions present themselves in brains. A specific description is part and parcel of how phenomenology has impacted cognitive science - in fact it is the very reason I started reading philosophy more frequently!

Right now it is possible to read someone's brain and have a general idea of what they are thinking about and feeling. It is still low resolution, but such a process easily see the difference between someone thinking about being chased by a scary dog, and someone thinking about a gift they received from a loved one. They are able to get a gist of what the person is thinking about and how they feel about it too.

So, description? Not exactly. They have a low resolution picture. I believe with multiple readings form the same person across a variety of contents it provides a better resolution picture of what they are thinking and feeling - if my memory serves me?

Although it might sound like sci-fi, it is not that mind-blowing when you consider they can see certain parts of the brain stimulated for motor functions and such.

Hang on - again, is the suggestion that reason and emotion are physical things? — Banno

No. I imagine there is something to looking at physical evidence. I am sure someone with a materialistic stance would hold that view though.

Care to fill this out? It doesn't match my understanding of the state of neuroscience. — Banno

My mistake. Conscious and attentive states. Obviously there are automated states, but as we are talking about affective states (belief and general cognition) then it is true enough.

This is why I was curious as to your interest here as being about what consciousness is.

Let us be clear. There are no Conscious States that appear to be wholly absent of emotional content.

Brain States are attended to by Conscious States > affective states. On their own a Brain State is pretty meaningless. This is the general consensus.

In a rough attempt to explain this more clearly, it aligns with what I was saying earlier regarding our appreciation of being on Earth. We do not walk around with the concept of The Earth disentangled from our being, yet when attended to we cannot do so without emotional context, because everything we attend to requires emotional context. We can possess a Brain State that 'pushes' the concept of Earth into the background to the point that 'belief' no longer has meaning. It is just part of the mapping we've done left unattended. I know my name (Conscious State) but I do not always attend to it (Brain State).

Of course, there are alternative ideas like global network theory, but that is seemingly irrelevant to this line of discussion as it frames such as physical only - that is not to say such data cannot verify certain ideas expressed here. Mental-to-mental causation is probably where GWT has some legs.

My point was although these terms are referring to the same physical item it is referring to it in different states.

All of this does remind me of a discussion I tried to start over a decade ago about 'belief' and its various uses and connotations. It did shock me how many people took 'belief' to mean 'unsubstantiated' irrespective of the context.

In the article the argue a point that is applicable to every facet of human experience. Nothing is purely emotional or purely rational. It is more or less about whether or not we are attending to something. What is attended to falls into the realm of 'belief' what is out-of-sight is assumed as too rigid to require our attention.

An example would be the Earth under our feet. We can attend to the idea of the planet Earth, but for the vast majority of the time we certainly do not. The 'belief' in Earth is only apparent once we attend to it.

What I read in the paper is someone's take on some degree of belief rather than seeing this as ubiquitous in all cognitive activities. Meaning, if they think belief is neither purely cognitive nor connotative, then where is the distinction between anything else going on in the brain? Nothing happening in our brains is one or the other.

The differences being talked about can only be abstractions.

4 CONCLUSION

It has been recognized that certain states are hard to categorize, that even though they are belief-like, they do not behave as the standard philosophical view of belief says they should. I have proposed instead that we view these examples as exposing that this view of belief is overly narrow and that we explore ways of theorizing about belief that does not force us to exclude these states as real beliefs. I have here argued that a way of addressing the problem is to conceive of beliefs as kinds of emotions, where emotions contain both cognitive and non-cognitive elements. Even if one has not been convinced, I hope the discussion has revealed that reflection on these problematic states should push us to explore belief's complexity.

If anyone is not convinced all they need to do is study the cognitive neurosciences. No need to conceive of beliefs as emotions, just understand that all brain states can be expressed as emotional.

If that's what sushi meant, I'd to hear more about the conceptual distinction. To what does it correspond? — J

Are you going to ask for the conceptual distinction between Hesperus and Phosphorus too. I am not being facetious here, maybe there is value in this? I have been interested in phenomenology for a long time now.