I think there is probably too much noise atm. Advances are often made in small conclaves not within the thronging masses.

Creativity is not subjective in my view. Some have it and some do not. We are living in a period where what matters is easily drowned out by what does not.

Flibble Flobble.

This question is one thing Popper covers. Our sense of 'Liberty' is basically part of how we parted from the traumas of nature to a more civil means of life. Liberty is undoubtedly part of this incremental transition from the state of nature to life on human terms rather than the dictates of raw nature.

Meaning the concept of liberty is connected with the transition from Closed to Open society, with the increase of reason being put to use.

I do wonder if we might not now be facing the opposite risk though (although one Schiller might still help with), a sort of "fear of the utopian and principled," a "lack of faith in logos (the life of reason)" paired with an outright fear of thymos (the life of spirit/honor/excellence). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think, as Popper says, this is our eternal struggle in some way. I really do think Schiller was onto something regarding 'play' as being a useful means to bridge the divide between these two areas - or rather realise them as integral to each other rather than opposed.

[...] should not be ruled by nature exclusively, nor should reason rule [...] conditionally. Both of these systems should remain entirely independent of each other, and yet be perfectly as one.
- Schiller, 2006, p. 94

I do not entirely follow this belief, but in the context of political philosophy it works well enough.

Thymos degenerates into cannibalistic appetite at the limit and everyone loses in the long run. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would be interested to hear more about how you believe this concept fits into the modern world AND Schiller's view of aesthetics?

This places aesthetic reason forever at odds with practical and theoretical reason, whereas I would tend to say they are three facets of the same Logos. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, perhaps this depends on your concept of Logos more than what Schiller is referring to here. His primary point is that the aesthetic is not a form of reasoning. It is through the playful impulse that the 'formal impulse,' reasoned abstraction; and 'material impulse,' through sensual experience, are united and realised as the experience of 'beauty'. What is beautiful to us is not open to immediate debate in his eyes as he sees the 'playful impulse' as transcending the others.

Again, I am not exactly in full agreement here as it is a very difficult subject matter to articulate well due to the fact that the reader needs to set aside rational judgement.

My pitch would be: Beauty relates to the whole. Intelligible beauty is higher than sensible beauty. Beauty is that which "pleases when known." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This does seem to be at odds with Schiller's 'playful impulse'. Have you read that particular work of his? If not I highly recommend it. Undoubtedly you will have reservations about some of it, but overall it is a really nice take on the whole subject matter of aesthetics in a more political frame. He offer no resolution but points at this area as a fundamental one. There I find myself wholly in agreement.

Thank you for your comments. Hopefully this will open up some further discussion. I am not very familiar with

Virgil's Aeneid — Count Timothy von Icarus

so that could is something I would like to hear more about too.

My point was people do not just create monoliths out of nothing. It was a metaphor not a history lesson, so treat it as such.

It cuts down quite dramatically on the bullshit. Quite a relief, actually. — Banno

True. I rarely post anything anymore because I find it too much bother wading through trivial responses. If this sounds arrogant I don't mind. It is just a question of efficiency. I no longer have time to spare.

Thanks for comments. Will get to this asap. VERY busy lately.

The Egyptians didn't build the Pyramids first. They started out small and built upon their know-how and expertise over time.

It is really just that simple.

All hail 1's and 0's! :D

If we apply this insight philosophically, we see that striving for a complete worldview may not only be impossible—it may be misguided. — Banno

I think it is deeply misguided too. As you may have noticed I get a little concerned when philosophy ignores scientific evidence, or is simply ignorant of it. That said, it can serve us to look twice and rethink how we look at certain pieces of evidence rather than just taking them at face value.

With many advances today in various fields it is probably asking much for anyone to fully understand the intricacies of each field of interest. I have always felt that if there is one particular use of philosophy it is its ability to narrow this gap of understanding between widely dispersed areas of study.

This seems more and more important as technology propels us onwards with increasing speed.

Like every word in any language it is context dependent. It just so happens that this particular term can be used in common parse to mean quite different things to different people.

Like I have said, the way I view it is through the lens of 'knowledge' - which I take to mean 'something put under some of consideration' - and that 'belief' is that which straddles our immediate appreciation of the world and our background mapping of the world (world as in "weltanschauung" or "axis mundi").

I grant that knowing what a book is - outside of really paying conscious attention to this understanding of 'book' - can be called a belief in what I book is ... personally I do not see the use in calling that a 'belief' though, any more than would find myself saying a rock believes gravity keeps it on the ground or data stored on the hard drive on my PC can ever constitute a 'belief' from the perspective of my hard drive.

We know what we mean by such a "background belief": It's part of our web of mental constructs, a set of propositions we assent to if asked -- there may be many other ways of putting it (including more behavioral construals), but the main point is that it is not something that requires "consciously (as in the agent) believing it." The belief remains, in this way of speaking, whether I am conscious of it or not, as Banno says. — J

Well, a cognitive neuroscientist is happy to talk about conscious and unconscious contents. The word consciousness refers to both. There is leeway. The problem begins when we are equating a consciously held and articulated belief as equivalent to a so-called 'background belief'. The use of the term 'belief' is referring to something quite different in each case.

The brain maps the world. The 'we' we call 'we' does not in any way appear to be the whole of the brains content at all! If we take this into consideration I think we can begin to understand that 'belief' is certainly something only felt consciously and that obviously there is some brain stuff going on in the background.

This is more or less an epistemic argument.

Makes sense that these would be quite emotion-laden, but what about studies of beliefs about Chaucer, or algebra? — J

They are anchored in our understanding of the world. We have emotional attachment to existing. Neither are of any use without value attached to them.

Abstractions like algebra also operate under quite different 'beliefs' (if we are using this word) because they are Rules not Truths. It does not matter if you believe in the Rules of any game, it matter how they are of use to you.

All good points. I think if we are looking at what we mean by 'belief' then we need to distinguish between beliefs held in the face of evidence and beliefs held without any concern for evidence. Then there is the justification for beliefs we provide, or even the kinds of beliefs we do not even consider offering justification for.

If a belief is questioned I cannot see how anyone can react completely devoid of emotion. All intentions are driven by a feeling-about-something. All conscious experience is - in some form or another - a judgement-about-something as a means to navigate the world.

Beliefs can be something taken-to-be-true (we are on Earth or The Earth is Flat), that can be questioned but is not normally questioned by those holding the belief, or something regarded as unknown (Life After Death) which is more or less a clinging to sceptical ideas with a strong inclination towards some conclusion - absent of objective evidence.

None of the above can be absent of emotional content. If you believe it can I would really like to hear why and how this is at all possible given that the classical cognitive model has been pretty much dead and buried for a couple of decades now.

Maybe this is a useful link for the discussion: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/index.html#RatiEmot

One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration. — Banno

How so? How can you believe something if you are not consciously (as in the agent) believing it. That seems to fly in the face of how we use language in a rational manner. I think 'background belief' might be a better term for that, but it could possibly give the wrong impression of what we generally mean when talking about belief.

The neuroscience is not yet up to the task, and may never be. — Banno

Your judgement is better almost every cognitive neuroscientist alive today? This view was not widely held in the 80's and 90's. Since then the evidence coming in has forced the vast majority to reject the classical model of cognition.

There has been a swathe of studies relating to political beliefs over the past few years. I task you with finding a single one that did not find a connection between emotion and belief. I will be bold enough to put forward that you will not find a single one showing zero emotional content.

The paper seems to be trying to push philosophers away from classical models of cognition. My point is that most neuroscientists dropped that idea literally decades ago. I do not know of any that hold to such a dated model of cognition today? Undoubtedly there are probably one or two?

Has that been shown somehow in the research you're describing? — J

I very many cases, yes. There are more subtler forms that could be called 'emotional content' that cannot easily, or cannot be pinpointed. All evidence points towards this being the case, hence it is the general consensus among cognitive neuroscientists.

We may not know our reasons before we act — Antony Nickles

Then we had no reason. If you do not know why you did something what makes you think your justification for something you did means anything?

We can automatically react to something and try to understand why, but that is not the reason 'we' did it because 'we' didn't do it. This is not to say there is not an underlying process, just that it was not a conscious one and therefore not an act.

This is the more sketchy area of autonomous decisions and what that means. It is not really an area I like to delve into too deeply as I do not think we are in a position to place a line between 'action' and 'reaction,' only a vague no-man's land of "I don't know?".

I do not want to get bogged down in arguments about free-will and what that means to different people at all.

I am talking about both. The main thrust of my point being that the evidence provided by science is sometimes too easily left on the sidelines.

(I'm assuming there is no scientific description of "emotional content.") — J

There is plenty of research into how emotions present themselves in brains. A specific description is part and parcel of how phenomenology has impacted cognitive science - in fact it is the very reason I started reading philosophy more frequently!

Right now it is possible to read someone's brain and have a general idea of what they are thinking about and feeling. It is still low resolution, but such a process easily see the difference between someone thinking about being chased by a scary dog, and someone thinking about a gift they received from a loved one. They are able to get a gist of what the person is thinking about and how they feel about it too.

So, description? Not exactly. They have a low resolution picture. I believe with multiple readings form the same person across a variety of contents it provides a better resolution picture of what they are thinking and feeling - if my memory serves me?

Although it might sound like sci-fi, it is not that mind-blowing when you consider they can see certain parts of the brain stimulated for motor functions and such.

Hang on - again, is the suggestion that reason and emotion are physical things? — Banno

No. I imagine there is something to looking at physical evidence. I am sure someone with a materialistic stance would hold that view though.

Care to fill this out? It doesn't match my understanding of the state of neuroscience. — Banno

My mistake. Conscious and attentive states. Obviously there are automated states, but as we are talking about affective states (belief and general cognition) then it is true enough.

This is why I was curious as to your interest here as being about what consciousness is.

Let us be clear. There are no Conscious States that appear to be wholly absent of emotional content.

Brain States are attended to by Conscious States > affective states. On their own a Brain State is pretty meaningless. This is the general consensus.

In a rough attempt to explain this more clearly, it aligns with what I was saying earlier regarding our appreciation of being on Earth. We do not walk around with the concept of The Earth disentangled from our being, yet when attended to we cannot do so without emotional context, because everything we attend to requires emotional context. We can possess a Brain State that 'pushes' the concept of Earth into the background to the point that 'belief' no longer has meaning. It is just part of the mapping we've done left unattended. I know my name (Conscious State) but I do not always attend to it (Brain State).

Of course, there are alternative ideas like global network theory, but that is seemingly irrelevant to this line of discussion as it frames such as physical only - that is not to say such data cannot verify certain ideas expressed here. Mental-to-mental causation is probably where GWT has some legs.

My point was although these terms are referring to the same physical item it is referring to it in different states.

All of this does remind me of a discussion I tried to start over a decade ago about 'belief' and its various uses and connotations. It did shock me how many people took 'belief' to mean 'unsubstantiated' irrespective of the context.

In the article the argue a point that is applicable to every facet of human experience. Nothing is purely emotional or purely rational. It is more or less about whether or not we are attending to something. What is attended to falls into the realm of 'belief' what is out-of-sight is assumed as too rigid to require our attention.

An example would be the Earth under our feet. We can attend to the idea of the planet Earth, but for the vast majority of the time we certainly do not. The 'belief' in Earth is only apparent once we attend to it.

What I read in the paper is someone's take on some degree of belief rather than seeing this as ubiquitous in all cognitive activities. Meaning, if they think belief is neither purely cognitive nor connotative, then where is the distinction between anything else going on in the brain? Nothing happening in our brains is one or the other.

The differences being talked about can only be abstractions.

4 CONCLUSION

It has been recognized that certain states are hard to categorize, that even though they are belief-like, they do not behave as the standard philosophical view of belief says they should. I have proposed instead that we view these examples as exposing that this view of belief is overly narrow and that we explore ways of theorizing about belief that does not force us to exclude these states as real beliefs. I have here argued that a way of addressing the problem is to conceive of beliefs as kinds of emotions, where emotions contain both cognitive and non-cognitive elements. Even if one has not been convinced, I hope the discussion has revealed that reflection on these problematic states should push us to explore belief's complexity.

If anyone is not convinced all they need to do is study the cognitive neurosciences. No need to conceive of beliefs as emotions, just understand that all brain states can be expressed as emotional.

If that's what sushi meant, I'd to hear more about the conceptual distinction. To what does it correspond? — J

Are you going to ask for the conceptual distinction between Hesperus and Phosphorus too. I am not being facetious here, maybe there is value in this? I have been interested in phenomenology for a long time now.

This from the link:

What does it mean to believe? The traditional philosophical view of belief is that it's a rational cognitive affair, evidence based and directed toward truth. According to this account, things like delusion and religious belief are "edge cases", exceptions that prove the rule. But this week we're considering not only that belief may be closely tied to emotion, but that it may actually be a form of emotion itself.

Is gibberish. No neuroscientist would pay any real attention to what is being said here because it is so wide of the mark.

The hidden premise is that rational thought and emotional thought are separate entities. This is, as I said initially, equivalent to people believing the left hemisphere is rational and the right is emotional.

So you are asking about what consciousness is then? I have no answer for that.

Everything that is consciousness is directedness. Ergo, there is always emotional content. What we feel is driven and what is driven is felt.

what part of belief is cognitive, what is connotative, and how do they relate? — Banno

You believe this is a valid question. I do not believe it is a valid question. I may be taking the 'part' as a literally distinction. Do you you believe the left hemisphere of your brain is logical and your right hemisphere is emotional? Some people still believe this. It is massive misrepresentation of brain function.

If I attempt to read into what you are asking as meaning "what is it that moves us more towards logical analysis than to listen to our intuition" I would probably say the novelty of the experience and the time we have to think about it play a major role in this. Low resolution heuristics that work on multiple fronts are a good stop gap. With more time to mull over and get to the bottom of something undoubtedly we apply more rigour if the set of circumstances allow.

Maybe you are referring to unconscious brain activity? Even there I would be sceptical, but a little more open maybe (not a lot).

If I am way off the mark of what you are asking questions about let me know. Good chance I am :)

I guess it does help for open discussions. Would've helped though. What may end up happening now is a back and forth simply to understand why this person arrived at this point and how such and such a point is related to the topic.

Reading lists are helpful BUT when claims are made in-texts citations should be used.

Rather I’m interested in the idea of a blended state, where a belief is seen as consisting of both cognition and feelings. — Banno

This is a fact rather than an idea. Reason and emotion are not discrete entities. This is a hurdle it will probably take several more decades for people to get over in all academic fields and likely a century more before in bleeds into common public knowledge.

In philosophical parlance it might be better to frame this all as 'intentionality'? Or maybe not.

All reflect Nozick’s suspicion of planned outcomes and preference for spontaneous association. — Moliere

Is this a vague finger pointing at 'hidden-hand'?

Reading list:
Isaiah Berlin – Two Concepts of Liberty
Hegel – Elements of the Philosophy of Right
Hannah Arendt – The Human Condition and In Between Past and Future
Charles Taylor – Sources of the Self
Judith Butler – Precarious Life; The Psychic Life of Power
Michel Foucault – Discipline and Punish; The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1
Karl Marx – Capital Vol. 1
Robert Nozick – Anarchy, State and Utopia — Moliere

Would have been nice to see in-text citations to back up the claims made. I find the interpretation of Nozick to be taken at a stretch to say the least.

I felt reading this that there was an attempt to frame Nozick as stating his thoughts on these matters are to be applied to the real world. He quite explicitly give hypothetical scenarios to explore the workings of how justice is distributed through cooperative agreement and disagreement. It is necessarily simplistic as most hypotheticals are because they are exploratory tools not rules to live by.

It should also be noted that Nozick ends this book by on a very liberal individualistic note in saying no one should be forced to act against their own will, and that people can cooperate on likeminded schemes (nothing radical about this?).

The thrust of the argument seems to be more or less how the author of this piece equates what Nozick wrote to what certain individuals do in the real world today. This is missing the point of Nozick. Maybe this is the only claim here? That Nozick's exploration in 'Anarchy, State and Utopia' has been taken on in too literal a sense by some.

I personal found this a little perverse in the sense that it is a work of rhetoric that seems to steer away from the substance of Nozick's and looks to sully them with people as antagonistic to their own position.

Example of a problem I had when reading this:

Nozick assumes property, contracts and social status can be justified without examining how they arose. But our capacities and entitlements depend on historical contexts that shape access and recognition. — Moliere

No he does not. He outlines a hypothetical scenario in order to explore how concepts of ownership can arise. An equal critique could be leveled at Rawl's when he talks about the 'veil of ignorance'. We all know this is not actually plausible, but we understand the general idea behind it. It is a means of exploring morality on a societal level not a rule to dictate how we live.

I am confused as to what is meant by 'Radical Individualism' especially in relation to Nozick?

I was expecting to see some mention of 'the hidden-hand'. Did I miss that?

This is very much a focus on university level undergraduate philosophy papers and how they should be written.

What has to be kept in mind is that this is a means of examiners seeing a student has read the material and understood it with an analytical eye and nothing more.

I have not read this fully yet but a quick skim brings up some trouble I have found recently when reading philosophy from a broad spectra of authors.

I have had something of a strange experience reading Byung-Chul Han year past year or so and it resonates with a lot of what is being said here.

Although I found a lot of his views intriguing there were also that seemed to be nothing more than baseless assumptions. The somewhat poetical style I am not too fussed about as long as they are then firmly translated into a formal description. As an example, Kant did use an analogy or two but very sparingly. I have seen quite a number of of philosophical pieces written over the past few decades that tend to lean far too heavily on metaphor and analogy. — I like sushi

In reply to myself ... now I have read further I see this has little to do with what this piece of writing is saying. Nevertheless, I would be interested to hear the author's views on philosophical writing in general.

I would have to disagree with this though for a very particular reason:

Opinion and belief are the catalyst to philosophical enquiry, but without clear justification based on logical reason and solid evidence, philosophy will degenerate into multiple factions forever at odds with each other. — Moliere

I think there is certainly danger in getting sidetracked, but I am of the opinion that many of the greatest achievements of humanity are accidental. By going off-piste we can stumble upon fertile ground in which to plant new ideas. Sometimes nothing grows, and sometimes something does.

All that said, an underlying foundation is obviously a useful means of orientation if nothing else. I did not like reading some of Byung-Chul Han's points because they seems free-floating and in some cases flying in the face of certain pieces of evidence I happen to know of that he may not? Without substantiating his points more thoroughly it did undermine his position elsewhere as it left me doubtful about the depth and breadth of his knowledge in certain areas of science.

Many people can have differing opinions about what kind of cheese the Moon is made of, but such opinions should be put to bed once there is hard evidence showing the Moon is not made of cheese at all. A great many lines of thought in philosophy are hampered by simple ignorance of the empirical evidence available - too often to my liking!

I have not read this fully yet but a quick skim brings up some trouble I have found recently when reading philosophy from a broad spectra of authors.

I have had something of a strange experience reading Byung-Chul Han year past year or so and it resonates with a lot of what is being said here.

Although I found a lot of his views intriguing there were also that seemed to be nothing more than baseless assumptions. The somewhat poetical style I am not too fussed about as long as they are then firmly translated into a formal description. As an example, Kant did use an analogy or two but very sparingly. I have seen quite a number of of philosophical pieces written over the past few decades that tend to lean far too heavily on metaphor and analogy.

This reflects the classic liberal view of negative liberty, as defined by Isaiah Berlin: freedom from external constraint or coercion. The ideal subject is left alone to pursue personal goals. But this idea, though rhetorically powerful, proves conceptually and practically inadequate. — Moliere

Berlin's point was that Negative Liberty is better than Positive Liberty. He was warning against authoritarianism dressed up as the pursuit of liberty.

On another note, I would really have liked to have seen some comparisons with Popper's views. I would be really interest see the author's thoughts on what Popper had to say in regards to 'Open Society And It's Enemies'. There seems to be a direct parallel to what is being discussed in this essay.

I am 100% riffing here. Just want to see what ideas people can come up with.

Modesty rules pre-existed Victorian times obviously, going all the way back to the time when Adam draped his junk with a fig leaf. — Hanover

Abrahamic hang ups then. We all know about the Olympics. I just do not see this as a front runner. Important in modern society? Yes! I am looking under the hood though as I think there could possibly be more to this than meets the eye.

I recall reading about how samurai shat whenever they pleased and then people carefully gathered it up like some profound offering to give to their fields. Without a doubt Christian values have led to more prudish behavior.

How about this. I am wondering that today maybe with think of the act of defecating and bathing as a habit where it was once imbued with far more ritual and meaning than in the past. For women 'toilette' seems to hold a social significance compared to men. If we go back far enough was it held in higher regard and of higher importance for all? We are animals so territory marking may be something worth considering here?

You seem somewhat bothered by something. Not sure what it is.

Anyway, you can have the last word. Bye have fun

Everything else it is societal factors that need considering. If all women were happy to accomodate males in their exclusive places then all is well. — Malcolm Parry

Yes. Trans women are a special case of males though. The reason trans women are trans women is because they are trans women. They are not women. They are not men. They are viewed as being biological men but they are not men in the social sense.

It is uncivil to treat someone who wishes to be treated one way another way simply because it displeases you. If it is about fairness - say in sports - fair enough. If it is about treating someone with respect and dignity I see no real issue. We are not talking about delusional people, we are talking about people who feel a certain way and only want a modicum of social acceptance ... of course there are always agitators though.

If I was transgendered I am not sure how I would feel about all the attention right now. I guess it is good in one way and bad in another. The issue used as a political weapon does at least mean it has crested the hill of general acceptance.

I was honestly expecting the next big -ism in social debate to be ageism.

I wrote in plain English. It shouldn't be too hard to see how you sidestepped the main thrust of the logic.

For the sake of clarity, if there is no discernable difference, then what is the harm of trans women entering a competition for women if that is where they feel they belong? To repeat. I am talking about situations where there are mixed, female only and male only competitions.

Perhaps the reasoning is not as obvious to others as I first thought. If the choice is effectively arbitrary then it does not matter where people compete. In fact, it makes little sense to have male or female only competitions other than to follow a cultural tradition. Given that trans women classify themselves as a types of women (if not biologically female) and wish to be treated as trans women - not men in dressed - then the only reason I can see to bar them is pure prejudice.

Of course, you could argue that a man could join the women's competition too. Why not? It would make a whole lot more sense if there were no such categorical distinction if the differences in ability between the sexes was non-existent. The one situation where most of the push back comes from is that feminist movements to bring women into sports after centuries of suppression could suffer from a few trans women competing and winning. Such could be viewed as males actively suppressing women in sports. This is understandable to some degree (as financial rewards may be given to trans women instead of women). I do wonder if trans women would be willing to compete for the sake of competing without taking any monetary reward - it would be a nice gesture maybe. What also needs to be understood is that suppression of a smaller minority can be seen as just as needless. Nuances are nuances. My interest in more analytic than anything else. I am neither a woman nor a a trans woman. I have travelled enough around the world to see different attitudes to the phenomenon of transgenderism. One of the most striking things I have experienced was in Manila. There it is VERY unusual if you do not come across several trans women everyday. Why is it so common there? I have no idea. it seems strange that in a Catholic country where there is suppression of homosexuality in the power high up, that at the day-to-day experience it is more common than anywhere else I have ever visited.

Now, in comparison, if we are talking about domestic abuse where some women feel actively threatened by trans women it does make sense to also use some basic level of respect and tolerate the threat they feel if they have literally suffered severe abuse and it makes them mentally unstable and insecure.

I am NOT talking about any of this as a one way street. Plenty of trans women do not think of themselves as female and actual women, they are quite happy to state they merely wish to be treated as women, within certain limitations, and respect as a human being.

Trans women who say they are literally women do not really have my support.
Trans women who say they wish merely to be treated as if they are women have my support.
Understandably there are many grey areas and I would be against either of the above statements depending on the circumstances.

Circumstances and case by case analysis matter.

Honestly, I do not think I have a lot more to say about this. It is one curiosity of many for me not an obsession.

And "ablutions" may not be the right word. — Moliere

It is the right word. It is not the only word though. I am interested in the subconscious aspects here in relation to secular and non-secular rituals.

Yes. Not now though. That was probably a matter of convenience though as it was the only place to get hot water.

I think we are getting off track though. I am exploring the social habits of humans in general, not just in this specific period of time. I am curious as to how our attitudes have changed and why - on a psychological level rather than just one of mere convenience.

The Romans had adequate plumbing and kept bathing a defecation apart. That is one instance. This is not to say convenience does not play any roll. Even if you believe it is the main role I am interested in other factors.

I was initially thinking about such habits as becoming ritualised and how and why they became so. I wonder if there is some underlying trait that views purification as something other than physical (hygiene) and is more about mental purification - by way of isolation.