It has nothing to do with reading comprehension. You said...
the "there is no free will" crowd always wants to appeal to it being a standard view or implication of the sciences that there is no free will. That's wrong, though. The "there is no free will" crowd should have looked at what was going on in the sciences after the mid-1800s — Terrapin Station
Those are your actual words, right? So Your claim is that it is wrong that the standard view or implication of the sciences is that there is no free will, and that this is wrong on account of some development in science that happened after the mid-1800s. That is literally what you claimed.
I posted a quote from an article describing the standard view of neuroscience as being that quantum indeterminacy has no effect on brain processes, which can be treated a classical objects. You said that had nothing to do with it. My quote certainly represented the view of 'the sciences' with regards to quantum indeterminacy and free-will, so the only other option to explain its supposed irrelevancy would be if you were
not talking about the discoveries of quantum mechanics, but instead some other scientific advance from the mid 1800s which supports free-will.
So I look at the previous part of your post to get some context. Here you say...
Free will obtains via the fact that the world is not strongly deterministic. The standard view in the sciences, by the way, is that the world is not strongly deterministic, where that's been the standard view for over 150 years now, but somehow the message isn't getting through. In online forums like this, everyone still seems to think that it's the early 1800s and they're supporting Laplace for president. (See "Laplace's demon" if you don't know what I'm talking about.) — Terrapin Station
Brilliant, so now I have the context I'm looking for. Determinism, and Laplacian determinism at that. The claim is made in this paragraph that it is now the standard view (that term 'standard view' is exactly the one used in the paragraph I'm trying to comment on) that the world is "not strongly deterministic". There's also reference to this being the case since the mid 1800s, the same "mid 1800s" as is mentioned in the paragraph I'm commenting on.
So now I have my context - the "standard view" referred to in the paragraph I'm concerned about must be the view that the world is not strongly deterministic, and "what was going on in the sciences after the mid-1800s" refers to undermining Laplace (you even helpfully suggest looking up Laplace's demon if we're unsure what you're talking about). So I do that.
Wikipedia has a helpful section under 'Laplace's demon' listing all the arguments against it (which is what we're looking for). Thermodynamic irreversibility, Quantum mechanical irreversibility, Chaos theory, Cantor diagonalization. The first is not the scientific consensus, it's one man's opinion and there are counter-arguments, so that can't be the argument we're looking for. The second is quantum mechanics and I've been told my quote about quantum mechanics not affecting the brain is not relevant, so that can't be it. The third and fourth are explicitly not about how things function, they're about how much we can predict them - free will is not about our ability to predict what actions will result from the state of the universe, it's about whether they are causal or not, so that's not it.
So Wikipedia is obviously insufficient to find which developments (other than quantum mechanics) are contrary to Laplace with regards to free-will.
So we try something more in depth. The SEP doesn't have an article on Laplace's demon, but it does has one on causal determinism which mentions Laplace's demon.
The first part is all about the confusion between determinism as a state of affairs and determinism as in 'predictability'. This is the only context in which Laplace's demon is mentioned. But since the debate about free-will is about a state of affairs, not our ability to predict that state, this must be irrelevant to what you're getting at. Plus, you mentioned that "standard view" of the
sciences - so we can skip the sections on epistemology (that's not a view of the
sciences). Next we come to "The Status of Determinism in Physical Theories". Great - herein we must surely find the "standard view" (that's not about quantum mechanics) to which you are referring, the one which the "there's no free will" crowd have neglected to take account of...
First we have "the trajectory of an object that is accelerated unboundedly" - no relation to brain processes there.
Then we have "multiple-particle collisions" - difficult to see that being related to brain processes either, but maybe.
Then, the issues with "infinite numbers of particles, infinite (or unbounded) mass densities, and other dubious infinitary phenomena" - hopefully we're not getting into that one.
An issue with a model "created by John Norton (2003)" - so not that (we're looking fo the view that's been standard for the last 150 years but isn't quantum mechanics).
Another is "a form of indeterminism first highlighted by Earman and Norton (1987)" - so not that.
Finally, "ordinary black holes" obviously don't have anything to do with brains, nor do white holes, although still "most white hole models have Cauchy surfaces and are thus arguably deterministic".
And there my research ended.
So I'm struggling to see how it is my reading comprehension which has field to yield the "standard view" of science which counters Laplace but which is neither quantum mechanics, nor about predictability and which yet affects the "classical objects" of the brain.
So perhaps you could now enlighten us as to what these views are?